November 9, 1923: Nuremberg

From the series 'SA Battle Experiences Which We Will Never Forget' published in Der SA-Mann: "We stayed overnight in the Colosseum (that means Nuremberg). Then in the morning we found out what had happened in Munich. 'Now a revolution will also be made in Nuremberg', we said. All of a sudden the police came from the Maxtor police station and told us that we should go home, that the Putsch in Munich had failed. We did not believe that and we did not go home. Then came the State Police with fixed bayonets and drove us out of the hall. One of us then shouted: 'Let's go to the Cafe Habsburg!' By the time we arrived, however, the police again had everything surrounded. Some shouted then, 'The Jewish place will be stormed.... Out with the Jews!'. Then the police started to beat us up. Then we divided into small groups and roamed through the town, and wherever we caught a Red or a Jew we knew, blows ensued. Then in the evening we marched, although the police had forbidden it, to a meeting in Furth. In the Hornschuch promenade the police again attempted to stop us. It was all the same to us. In the next moment we attacked the police in our anger so that they were forced to flee. We marched on to Geissmann Hall. There again they tried to stop us. But the Landsturm, which was also there, attacked the policemen like persons possessed and drove them from the streets. After the meeting we dissolved and went to the edge of town. From there we marched in close column back to Nuremberg. In Willstrasse, at the Plarrer, the police came again. We simply shoved them aside. They did not trust themselves to attack, for that would have meant a blood bath. We decided beforehand not to take anything from anyone. In Furth, too, they had already noticed that we were up to no good. A large mass of people accompanied us on the march. We marched with unrolled flags and sang so that the streets resounded: Comrade reach me your hand; we want to stand together; even though they have false impressions, the spirit must not die; swastika on the steel helmet, black-white-red armband; we are known as Storm Troop (SA) Hitler!"

29 August 1932

From a letter from Schacht to Hitler: "But what you could perhaps do with in these days is a kind word. Your movement is carried internally by so strong a truth and necessity that victory in one form or another cannot elude you for long...Wherever my work may take me in the near future, even if you should see me one day behind stone walls, you can always count on me as your reliable assistant."

21 November 1932

Goebbels Diary: "In a conversation with Dr. Schacht I assured myself that he absolutely shares our point of view. He is one of the few who stand immovable behind the Fuehrer."

3 March 1933:

From a speech by Goering at a Nazi demonstration in Frankfurt: "Certainly I shall use the power of the State and the police to the utmost, my dear Communists, so you won't draw any false conclusions; but the struggle to the death, in which my fist will grasp your necks, I shall lead with those down there who are the Brown Shirts."

March 10 1933:

From an affidavit by American Herman I. Roseman: "Yesterday, March 10th, 1933, in the afternoon about 4:30, I came out of KDW with my fiancee, Fraulein Else Schwarzlose, residing in Wilmersdorf (giving the address). A man in SA uniform stepped on my toe purposely, obviously offended me and said "Pardon." I said "Bitte," and walked ahead. He then followed me and kicked me saying, "Na und?" A policeman saw this and walked ahead, paying no attention to attacks made on me. Then I took my passport out of my pocket, showed it to the second policeman, and said that I was an American citizen, but he walked ahead, obviously not able to afford me protection, or at least being unwilling. The SA man continued to attack me, struck me in the face, wounded me over the eye, and continued to do me bodily harm. During this attack, all the time my walking along, we reached another policeman, and I applied to him, showing my passport and said, "I am an American and am entitled to protection." He shrugged his shoulders and said, "What can I do?" By this time the SA man had obviously inflicted enough attack upon me and walked away. Upon my appeal, the policeman brought my fiancee and me to the station house at 13 Bayreutherstrasse. My fiancee and I reported to the officer in charge. He heard the story and said that he was sorry, but that there was nothing to do. My face was bleeding. The policeman said that he had orders not to interfere in any affair in which an SA man took part. I then asked him what I could do to protect myself. He said that there was nothing to do but to wait until the situation was better. He added that the police were absolutely powerless, and were under the direction of the SA, and that there were SA Sturmabteilungen in the police itself. Thereupon I departed."

March 10 1933:

From another American, Mrs. Jean Klauber: "On the night of Friday, March 10, 1933, she and her husband had retired for the night when they were awakened by a prolonged ringing of their apartment bell. They heard pounding upon the street door and a demand for immediate entry and a concurrent threat to break the door down. The street door was opened by the janitor's wife; and a party of four or five men entered and went at once to the apartment of the deponent, where they again rang and pounded on the door. Mr. Klauber asked who was there and was answered, 'The police.' He opened the door and a party of four or five men in brown uniforms, one wearing a dark overcoat and carrying a rifle, pushed in, jostling Mr. and Mrs. Klauber aside. One asked Mrs. Klauber where the telephone was and she indicated the room where it was to be found and started to go there. Thereupon, she was knocked down by one of them. They went on to the bedroom where Mr. and Mrs. Klauber followed them, and there they demanded their passports. Mr. Klauber went to the wardrobe to get his and was stopped, being asked by the intruders whether he was carrying any weapons. Being clothed only in pajamas, his denial was accompanied by a gesture indicating his garb. He then turned to the wardrobe, opened it, and reached for one of his four suits hanging therein where he thought the passport was, and was immediately attacked from behind by all but one of the intruders, who beat him severely with police clubs, the one with the overcoat and rifle standing by. Remarks were shouted such as, 'look! Four suits, while for 14 years we have been starving!' Mrs. Klauber tried to inquire the reason for their actions, and was answered, 'Jews. We hate you. For 14 years we have been waiting for this, and tonight we will hang many of you.' 'When the intruders stopped beating Mr. Klauber he was unconscious, and they again demanded the passports of Mrs. Klauber. Mrs. Klauber found her American passport and her German passport (required by local authorities as the wife of a German citizen and issued by the police at Munich after her arrival here); and the intruders took both in spite of Mrs. Klauber's protests that she was American. She then searched for her husband's passport, laid hold of his pocketbook, and in her excitement offered it to them. Though full of money they refused it, and again demanded the passport. Mrs. Klauber then found it and handed it over. Then the intruders returned to the unconscious Mr. Klauber, saying, 'He hasn't had enough yet,' and beat him further. Then they left, saying, 'We are not yet finished,' and just as they departed, one of them said to Mrs. Klauber, 'Why did you marry a Jew? I hate them,' and struck her on the jaw with his police club."

23 March 1933:

From a pastoral letter from the Bishop of Cologne: "The Archbishop of Cologne, Cardinal Schulte, announces to the Archdiocese of Cologne a declaration of the Bishops' Conference at Fulda, which states: The bishops of the diocese of Germany, in their dutiful solicitude to keep the Catholic faith pure and to protect the inviolable aims and rights of the Catholic Church, have adopted, for weighty reasons during the last years, an attitude of opposition toward the National Socialist movement, through prohibitions and warnings, which were to remain in effect as long and as far as those reasons remained valid. It should now be recognized that there are public and solemn declarations issued by the highest representative of the Reich Government-who at the same time is the authoritarian leader of that movement-which acknowledge the inviolability of the teachings of the Catholic faith and the unswerving mission and rights of the Church and which expressly guarantee the full validity of the legal pacts concluded between the several German Lander and the Church. Without lifting the condemnation, implied in our previous measures, of certain religious and ethical errors, the Episcopate now believes it can be confident that those general prohibitions and warnings prescribed need no longer be regarded as necessary."

30 March 1933:

From 'Defeat the enemy of the world!' by Julius Streicher: "Jewry wanted this battle. It shall have it until it realizes that the Germany of the brown battalions is not a country of cowardice and surrender. Jewry will have to fight until we have won victory. National Socialists! Defeat the enemy of the world. Even if the world is full of devils, we shall succeed in the end."

2 May 1933:

From releases issued by the National Socialist Party Press Agency: "National Socialism, which today has assumed leadership of German labor, can no longer bear the responsibility for leaving the men and women of the German working class, the members of the largest trade Organization in the world, the German trade union movement, in the hands of people who do not know a fatherland called Germany. Because of that, the National Socialist Factory Cell Organization has taken over the leadership of the trade unions. The NSBO has eliminated the former leadership of the free trade unions of the General German Trade Unions League, and of the General Independent Employees' Federation. On 2 May 1933 the NSBO took over the leadership of all trade unions; all trade-union buildings were occupied and most stringent control of financial and personnel matters of the organizations has been setup."

24 May 1933:

From an internal SS report: "On May 24, 1933, the 30-year-old, single, attorney-at-law, Dr. Alfred Strauss from Munich, who was in the concentration camp Dachau as a prisoner under protective custody, was killed by two pistol shots from SS Man Johann Kantschuster who escorted him on a walk, prescribed for him by the camp doctor, outside the fenced part of the camp. Kantschuster gives the following report: He himself had to urinate; Strauss proceeded on his way. Suddenly Strauss broke away towards the bushes located at a distance of about 6 meters from the line. When Kantschuster noticed it, he fired two shots at the fugitive from a distance of about 8 meters; whereupon Strauss collapsed dead. On the same day, May 24, 1933, a judicial inspection of the locality took place. The corpse of Strauss was lying at the edge of the wood. Leather slippers were on his feet. He wore a irlock on one foot, while the other foot was bare, obviously because of an injury to this foot. Subsequently an autopsy was performed. Two bullets had entered the back of the head. Besides, the body showed several black and blue spots and also open wounds. I have charged Kantschuster today with murder and have made application for the opening and execution of a judicial preliminary investigation as well as for the issuance of a warrant of arrest against him."

1 October 1933:

From a document generated by the camp commander of Dachau: "By virtue of the law on revolutionaries, the following offenders considered as agitators, will be hanged: Anyone who, for the purpose of agitating, does the following in the camp, at work in the quarters, in the kitchens and workshops, toilets and places of rest: holds political or inciting speeches and meetings, forms cliques, loiters around with others; who, for the purpose of supplying the propaganda of the opposition with atrocity stories, collects true or false information about the concentration camp and its institution, receives such information, buries it, talks about it to others, smuggles it out of the camp into the hands of foreign visitors or others by means of clandestine or other methods, passes it on in writing or orally to released prisoners or prisoners who are placed above them, conceals it in clothing or other articles, throws stones and other objects over the camp wall containing such information, or produces secret documents; who, for the purpose of agitating, climbs on barracks roofs and trees, seeks contact with the outside by giving light or other signals, or induces others to escape or commit a crime, gives them advice to that effect or supports such undertakings in any way whatsoever."

2 November 1933:

From a speech by Von Papen from the same platform as Hitler and Gauleiter Terboven, in the course of the campaign for the Reichstag election and the referendum concerning Germany's leaving the League of Nations: "Ever since Providence called upon me to become the pioneer of national resurrection and the rebirth of our homeland, I have tried to support with all my strength the work of the National Socialist movement and its Fuehrer; and just as I at the time of taking over the Chancellorship (that was in 1932) advocated paving the way to power for the young fighting liberation movement, just as I on January 30 was destined by a gracious fate to put the hands of our Chancellor and Fuehrer; into the hand of our beloved Field Marshal, so do I today again feel the obligation to say to the German people and all those who have kept confidence in me: The good Lord has blessed Germany by giving her in times of deep distress a leader who will lead her through all distresses and weaknesses, through all crises and moments of danger, with the sure instinct of the statesman into a happy future...Let us, in this hour, say to the Fuehrer of the new Germany that we believe in him and his work."

6 January 1934:

From an article which appeared in Der SA-Mann: "The new Germany would not have been without the SA man; and the new Germany would not go on existing if the SA man would now, with the feeling of having fulfilled his duty, quietly, unselfishly, and modestly step aside, or if the new State would send him home much like the Moor who has done his duty. On the contrary, the SA man, following the will of the Fuehrer, stands as a guarantor of the National Socialist revolution before the gates of power and will remain standing there at all times. For gigantic missions still await fulfillment which would not be thinkable without the presence and the active cooperation of the SA. What has been accomplished up till now, the taking over of the power in the State and the ejection of those elements which are responsible for the pernicious developments of the postwar years as bearers of Marxism, liberalism, and Capitalism, are only the preliminaries, the springboard, for the real aims of National Socialism. Being conscious of the fact that the real National Socialist construction work would be building in an empty space without the seizure of power by Adolf Hitler, the Movement and the SA man as the fighting bearer of its will, primarily have directed all of their efforts thereupon, to achieve the platform of continued striving and to obtain the foundation or the realization of our desires. Out of this comes the further mission of the SA for the completion of the German revolution: First, to be the guarantor of the power of the National Socialist State against all attacks from without as well as from within; second, to be the high institute of education of the people for the living National Socialism."

20 March 1934:

From a radio address by Hans Frank: "The first task was that of uniting all Germans into one State. It was an outstanding historical and legislative accomplishment on the part of our Fuehrer that by boldly grasping historical development he eliminated the sovereignty of the various German states. At last we have now, after 1,000 years, again a unified German State in every respect. It is no longer possible for the world, based on the spirit of resistance inherent in small states, which are set up on an egoistical scale and solely with a view to their individual interest, to make calculations to the detriment of the German people. That is a thing of the past for all times to come... The second fundamental law of the Hitler Reich is racial legislation. The National Socialists were the first in the entire history of human law to elevate the concept of race to the status of a legal term. The German Nation, unified racially and nationally, will in the future be legally protected against any further disintegration of the German race stock... The sixth fundamental law was the legal elimination of those political organizations which within the State, during the period of the regeneration of the people and the reconstruction of the Reich, were once able to place their selfish aims ahead of the common good of the nation. This elimination has taken place entirely legally. It is not the coming to the fore of despotic tendencies, but it was the necessary legal consequence of a clear political result of the 14 years' struggle of the NSDAP. In accordance with these unified legal aims in all spheres, particular efforts have for months now been made regarding the work of the great reform of the entire field of German law. As the leader of the German jurists, I am convinced that, together with all strata of the German people, we shall be able to construct the legal state of Adolf Hitler in every respect and to such an extent that no one in the world will at any time be able to dare to attack this constitutional state as regards its laws."

19 September 1934:

From Ambassador Dodd's diary; notes on a conversation with Schacht: "He then acknowledged that the Hitler Party is absolutely committed to war; and the people, too, are ready and willing. Only a few government officials are aware of the dangers and are opposed. He concluded, 'But we shall postpone it 10 years. Then it may be we can avoid war. I reminded him of his Bad Eilsen speech some 2 weeks ago and said, 'I agree with you about commercial and financial matters in the main. But why do you not, when you speak before the public, tell the German people they must abandon a war attitude?' He replied, 'I dare not say that. I can speak only on my special subjects. How, then, can German people ever learn the real dangers of war, if nobody ever presents that side of the question? He once more emphasized his opposition to war and added that he had used his influence with Hitler - 'a very great man', he interjected - to prevent war. I said, 'The German papers printed what I said at Bremen about commercial relations between our countries, but not a word about the terrible effects and barbarism of war.' He acknowledged that and talked very disapprovingly of the Propaganda Ministry which suppresses everything it dislikes. He added, as I was leaving 'You know a party comes into office by propaganda and then cannot disavow it or stop it."

13 February 1935:

Hitler pays a visit to Nuremberg to congratulate Streicher on the occasion of his 50th birthday, from an account in the Volkischer Beobachter: "Adolf Hitler spoke to his old comrade in arms and the latter's followers in words which went straight to their hearts. By way of introduction he remarked that it was a special pleasure for him to spend, on this day of honor to Julius Streicher, a short while in Nuremberg, the town of battle-steeled National Socialist solidarity, within the circle of the veteran standard-bearers of the National Socialist idea. Just as they all, during the years of misery, had unshakably believed in the victory of the Movement, so his friend and comrade in arms, Streicher, had stood faithfully at his side at all times. It had been this unshakable belief that had moved mountains. For Streicher it would surely be an inspiring thought that this 50th anniversary meant to him not only the turn of a half century, but also of a thousand years of German history. He had in Streicher a comrade of whom he could say that here in Nuremberg was a man who would never waver for a single second and who would unflinchingly stand behind him in every situation.

22 June 1935:

From a speech by Streicher to the Hitler Youth on the so-called 'Holy Mountain' near Nuremberg: "Boys and girls, look back a little more than 10 years ago. A great war the World War - had raged over the peoples of the earth and had left in the end a heap of ruins. Only one people remained victorious in that dreadful war, a people of whom Christ said that its father is the Devil. That people had ruined the German Nation in body and soul. At that time Adolf Hitler, an unknown man, arose from among the people and became a voice which proclaimed a holy war and struggle. He cried to the people to take courage again and to rise and join in liberating the German people from the Devil, so that mankind might again be free from that race which has roamed the globe for centuries and millennia, marked with the brand of Cain. Boys and girls, even if it is said that the Jews were once the chosen people do not believe it, but believe us when we say that the Jews are not a chosen people. Because it cannot be that a chosen people should act among the peoples as the Jews do today."

26 July 1934:

From the Volkischer Beobachter: "The Reich Press office of the NSDAP announces the following order of the Fuehrer: 'In consideration of the great meritorious service of the SS, especially in connection with the events of 30 June 1934, I elevate it to the standing of an independent organization within the NSDAP. The Reichsfuehrer SS, like the Chief of Staff, is, therefore, directly subordinate to the highest SA leader."

26 June 1935:

From the minutes of the working committee of the Reich Defense Council: Lieutenant Colonel Jodl: "The demilitarized zone requires special treatment. In his speech of the 21st of May and other utterances, the Fuehrer has stated that the stipulations of the Versailles Treaty and the Locarno Pact regarding the demilitarized zone are being observed. To the aide-memoire of the French charged' affaires on recruiting offices in the demilitarized zone, the Reich Government has replied that neither civilian recruiting authorities nor other offices in the demilitarized zone have been entrusted with mobilization tasks, such as the raising, equipping, and arming of any kind of formations for the event of war or in preparation therefor. Since political complications abroad must be avoided at present under all circumstances, only those preparatory measures that are urgently necessary may be carried out. The existence of such preparations or the intention of making such preparations must be kept in strictest secrecy in the zone itself as well as in the rest of the Reich."

1 October 1935:

Goebbels in a speech which appeared in Das Archiv: "The inner-political opponents did not disappear due to mysterious unknown reasons, but because the Movement possessed a strong arm within its organization; and the strongest arm of the movement is the SA. The Jewish question will not be solved separately but by laws which we enact, for we are an anti-Jewish government."

18 May 1936:

From the report of a conversation with the United States Ambassador, Mr. Bullitt: "Von Neurath said that it was the policy of the German Government to do nothing active in foreign affairs until the Rhineland had been digested. He explained that he meant that, until the German fortifications had been constructed on the French and Belgian frontiers, the German Government would do everything possible to prevent rather than encourage an outbreak by the Nazis in Austria and would pursue a quiet line with regard to Czechoslovakia. 'As soon as our fortifications are constructed and the countries of Central Europe realize that France cannot enter German territory at will, all those countries will begin to feel very differently about their foreign policies and a new constellation will develop,' he said."

2 December 1936:

From a conference, attended by Goering and General's Milch, Kesselring, Rudel, Stumpff, Christiansen: "World press excited about the landing of 5,000 German volunteers in Spain. Official complaint by Great Britain; she gets in touch with France. Italy suggests that Germany and Italy send, each, one division ground troops to Spain. It is, however, necessary that Italy, as interested Mediterranean power, issue a political declaration first. A decision can be expected only within a few days. The general situation is very serious. Russia wants the war. England rearms speedily. Command therefore: Beginning today highest degree of readiness regardless of financial difficulties. Goering takes over full responsibility. Peace until 1941 is desirable. However, we cannot know whether there will be implications before. We are already in a state of war. It is only that no shot is being fired so far."

9 December 1936:

From a speech by Schacht at Frankfurt: "Germany has too little living space for her population. She has made every effort, and certainly greater efforts than any other nation, to extract from her own existing small space whatever is necessary for the securing of her livelihood. However, in spite of all these efforts, the space does not suffice."

20 January 1937:

From a report by Ambassador Davies to the US Secretary of State: "He (Schacht) stated the following: That the present condition of the German people was intolerable, desperate, and unendurable; that he had been authorized by his Government to submit proposals to France and England which would: (1) Guarantee European peace, (2) secure present European international boundaries, (3) reduce armaments, (4) establish a new form of a workable league of nations, and (5) abolish sanctions with new machinery for joint administration; all based upon a colonial cession that would provide for Germany an outlet for population, a source for food stuffs, fats, and raw materials."

30 January 1937:

(It was possible to refuse Nazi Party membership. Only one man did this, however, Von Eltz-Rubenach, who was the Minister of Posts and Minister of Transport at the time.) A letter from Von Eltz-Rubenach to Hitler: "Berlin, 30 January 1937, Wilhelm Street, 79. My Fuehrer: I thank you for the confidence you have placed in me during the 4 years of your leadership and for the honor you do me in offering to admit me into the Party. My conscience forbids me, however, to accept this offer. I believe in the principles of positive Christianity and must remain faithful to my God and to myself. Party membership, however, would mean that I should have to countenance, without protest, the increasing violent attacks by Party officers on the Christian confessions and on those who wish to remain faithful to their religious convictions. This decision has been infinitely difficult for me, for never in my life have I performed my duty with greater joy and satisfaction than under your wise state leadership. I ask to be permitted to resign. With German greetings, yours very obediently, Baron von Eltz." Note: Von Eltz-Rubenach was allowed to retire.

1 February 1937:

From the Volkischer Beobachter, South German edition: "In view of the anticipated reopening of the rolls for Party membership, the Fuehrer, as the first step in this regard, personally carried out the enlistment into the Party of the members of the Cabinet who so far had not belonged to it; and he handed them simultaneously the Gold Party Badge, the supreme badge of honor of the Party. In addition, the Fuehrer awarded the Gold Party Badge to Colonel General Baron von Fritsch; Generaladmiral, Dr. Raeder; the Prussian Minister of Finance, Professor Popitz; and the Secretary of State and Chief of the Presidential Chancellery, Dr. Meissner. The Fuehrer also honored with the Gold Party Badge the Party members State Secretary Dr. Lammers, State Secretary Funk, State Secretary Korner, and State Secretary General of the Air Force Milch."

(Note: In Hitler's original Cabinet of 30 January 1933, there were only three Cabinet members who were members of the Party: Goering, Frick, and Hitler. On 30 January 1937 Hitler executed acceptance into the Party of those Cabinet members who were not already members of the Nazi Party.)

16 February 1937:

From remarks made by Goering during a visit to Warsaw: "On the German side, there is no desire whatever to deprive Poland of any part of her territory. Germany is completely reconciled to her present territorial status. Germany would not attack Poland and has no intention of seizing the Polish Corridor. We do not want the Corridor. I say sincerely and categorically that we do not need the Corridor. Just as Germany trusts and believes that Poland has no intention of seizing Eastern Prussia and the remaining part of Silesia, so can Poland believe that Germany has no intention of depriving her of any rights and possessions..."

14 March 1937:

From the Papal Encyclical, 'Mit brennender Sorge' by Pope Pius XI: "It discloses intrigues which from the beginning had no other aim than a war of extermination. In the furrows in which we had labored to sow the seeds of true peace, others, like the enemy in Holy Scripture (Matt. xiii, 25), sowed the tares of suspicion, discord, hatred, calumny, of secret and open fundamental hostility to Christ and His Church, fed from a thousand different sources and making use of every available means. On them and on them alone and on their silent and vocal protectors rests the responsibility for the fact that now, on the horizon of Germany, there is to be seen, not the rainbow of peace, but the threatening storm clouds of destructive religious strife. Anyone who has even a grain of a sense of truth left in his mind and even a shadow of a feeling of justice left in his heart will have to admit that, in the difficult and eventful years which followed the concordat, every word and every action of Ours was ruled by loyalty to the terms of the agreement; but also he will have to recognize with surprise and deep disgust that the unwritten law of the other party has been arbitrary misinterpretation of agreements, circumvention of agreements, weakening of the force of agreements and, finally, more or less open violation of agreements."

8 August 1937:

From an order by the Secret State Police at Berlin: "The Reich Minister of Justice had informed me that he does not share the opinion voiced by subordinate departments on various occasions according to which the arrest of the Bibelforscher (Jehovah's Witnesses) after they have served a sentence is supposed to jeopardize the authority of the law courts. He is fully aware of the necessity for measures by the State Police after the sentence has been served. He asks, however, not to bring the Bibelforscher into Protective custody under circumstances detrimental to the respect of the law courts....If information regarding the impending release of a Bibelforscher from arrest is received from the authorities carrying out the sentence, my decision regarding the ordering of measures by the State Police will be asked for without delay in accordance with my circular decree dated 22. 4. 3Y, so that transfer to a concentration camp can take place immediately after the sentence has been served. Should a transfer into concentration camp immediately after the serving of the sentence not be possible, Bibelforseher will be detained in police prisons."

29 August 1937:

From a speech by Von Neurath: "The unity of the racial and national will created through Nazism with unprecedented elan has made possible a foreign policy by which the fetters of the Versailles Treaty were forced, the freedom to arm regained, and the sovereignty of the whole nation reestablished. We have really again become master in our own house and we have created the means of power to remain henceforth that way for all times.... The world should have seen from ... Hitler's deeds and words that his aims are not aggressive."

11 September 1937:

From a speech by Reichsleiter Ley to the fifth annual session of the German Labor Front: "Once I said to the Fuehrer: 'My Fuehrer, actually I am standing with one foot in jail, for today I am still the trustee of the comrades Leipart and Imbusch; and should they someday ask me to return their money, then it will be found that I have put it into buildings or otherwise spent it. But they shall never again find their property in the condition in which they handed it over to me. Therefore I should have to be convicted.' The Fuehrer laughed then and remarked that apparently I felt extremely well in this condition. It was very difficult for us all. Today we laugh about it."

30 October 1937:

From a speech by Von Neurath before the Academy of German Law: "In recognition of these elementary facts the Reich Cabinet has always interceded in favor of treating every concrete international problem within the scope of methods especially suited to it, not to complicate it unnecessarily by involvement with other problems; and, as long as problems between only two powers are concerned, to choose the direct way for an immediate understanding between these two powers. We are in a position to state that this method has fully proved itself good not only in the German interest, but also in the general interest."

21 December 1937:

From Ambassador Dodd's diary; notes on a conversation with Schacht: "Schacht meant what the army chiefs of 1914 meant when they invaded Belgium, expecting to conquer France in 6 weeks; that is, domination and annexation of neighboring little countries, especially north and east. Much as he dislikes Hitler's dictatorship, he, like most of the remittent Germans, wishes annexation without war if possible; with war if the United States will keep hands off."

11 February 1938:

From Jodl's Diary: "In the evening and on 12 February General K (Keitel) with General Von Reichenau and Sperrle at Obersalzberg. Schuschnigg, together with G. Schmidt are being put under the heaviest political and military pressure. At 2300 hours Schuschnigg signs protocol.

13 February 1938:

From Jodl's Diary: In the afternoon General K asks Admiral C (Canaris) and myself to come to his apartment. He tells us that the Fuehrer's order is to the effect that military pressure, by shamming military action, should be kept up until the 15th. Proposals for these deceptive maneuvers are drafted and submitted to the Fuehrer by telephone for approval.

14 February 1938

From Jodl's Diary: At 2:40 o'clock the agreement of the Fuehrer arrives. Canaris went to Munich to the Counter-Intelligence Office VII and initiates the different measures. The effect is quick and strong. In Austria the impression is created that Germany is undertaking serious military preparations."

10 March 1938:

From the diary of Alfred Jodl: "By surprise and without consulting his ministers Schuschnigg ordered a plebiscite for Sunday, 13 March, which should bring a strong majority for the Legitimists in the absence of plan or preparation. Fuehrer is determined not to tolerate it. The same night, March 9 to 10, he calls for Goering. General Von Reichenau is called back from Cairo Olympic Committee, General Von Schober is ordered to come, as well as Minister Glaise Horstenau, who is with Gauleiter Burckel in the Palatinate."

26 March 1938:

From a speech by Goering in Vienna: "I must address myself with a serious word to the city of Vienna. The city of Vienna can no longer rightfully be called a German city. So many Jews live in this city. Where there are 300,000 Jews, you cannot speak of a German city. Vienna must once more become a German city, because it must perform important tasks for Germany in Germany's Ostmark. These tasks lie in the sphere of culture as well as in the sphere of economics. In neither of them can we, in the long run, put up with the Jew. This, however, should not be attempted by inappropriate interference and stupid measures but must be done systematically and carefully. As Delegate for the Four Year Plan, I commission the Reichsstatthalter in Austria jointly with the Plenipotentiary of the Reich to consider and take any steps necessary for the redirection of Jewish commerce,i.e., for the Aryanization of business and economic life, and to execute this process in accordance with our laws, legally but inexorably."

17 June 1938:

From an order by Bormann prepared by Reichsleiter Hierl: "The Reich Labor Service is a training school in which the German youth should be educated to national unity in the spirit of National Socialism. What religious beliefs a person has is not a decisive factor, but what is decisive that he first of all feels himself a German. All confessional discussions are forbidden in the Reich Labor Service because it disturbs the comrade-like harmony of all the Labor Servicemen and the Labor Service women. This is also the reason why an participation of the Reich Labor Service in revivals and other meetings and festivals of religious character are impossible."

17 August 1938:

Hitler Order: "By means of the nomination of the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police in the Ministry of the Interior on June 17, 1936, I have created the basis for the unification and reorganization of the German Police. With this step the Schutzstaffeln of the NSDAP, which were under the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police even up to now, have entered into close connection with the duties of the German Police."

10 November 1938:

From an order by SS Gruppenfuehrer Heydrich, sent to all headquarters of the State Police and all districts and subdistricts of the SD: "As soon as the course of events of this night allows the use of the officials employed for this purpose, as many Jews, especially rich ones, as can be accommodated in the existing prisons are to be arrested in all districts. For the time being only healthy men, not too old, are to be arrested. Upon their arrest, the appropriate concentration camps should be contacted immediately, in order to confine them in these camps as fast as possible. Special care should be taken that the Jews arrested in accordance with these instructions are not ill-treated."

29 November 1938:

From a confidential report of the SA-Brigadefuehrer to his group commander: "The following order reached me at 3 o'clock on 10 November 1938. 'On the order of the Gruppenfuehrer, all Jewish synagogues within the 50th Brigade are to be blown up or set on fire immediately. Neighboring houses occupied by Aryans are not to be damaged. The action is to be carried out in civilian clothes. Rioting and plundering are to be prevented. Report of execution of orders to reach the brigade Fuehrer or office by 8:30.' I immediately alerted the Standartenfuehrer and gave them the most exact instructions; the execution of the order began at once."

10 August 1938:

From Jodl's diary: "The Army chiefs and the chiefs of the Air Forces groups, Lieutenant Colonel Jeschonnek, and I are ordered to the Berghof. After dinner the Fuehrer makes a speech lasting for almost 3 hours, in which he develops his political thoughts. The subsequent attempts to draw the Fuehrer's attention to the defects of our preparations, which are undertaken by a few generals of the Army, are rather unfortunate. This applies especially to the remarks of General Von Wietersheim, in which, to top it off, he claims to quote from General Adams that the Western fortifications can be held for only 3 weeks. The Fuehrer becomes very indignant and flares up, bursting into the remarks that in such a case the whole Army would not be good for anything. 'I assure you, General, the position will be held not only for 3 weeks, but for 3 years.' The cause of this despondent opinion, which unfortunately enough is held widely within the Army General Staff, is based on various reasons. First of all, it (the General Staff) is prejudiced by old memories and feels responsible also for political decisions instead of obeying and executing its military mission. That is certainly done with traditional devotion, but the vigor of the soul is lacking, because in the end they do not believe in the genius of the Fuehrer. One does perhaps compare him with Charles XII. And since water flows downhill, this defeatism may not only possibly cause immense political damage, for the opposition between the generals' opinion and that of the Fuehrer is common talk, but may also constitute a danger for the morale of the troops. But I have no doubt that this, as well as the morale of the people, will encourage the Fuehrer enormously when the right moment comes."

29 September 1938:

From Jodl's diary: "The Munich Pact is signed, Czechoslovakia as a power is out. Four zones as set forth will be occupied between the 2d and 7th of October. The remaining part of mainly German character will be occupied by the 10th of October. The genius of the Fuehrer and his determination not to shun even a world war have again won the victory without the use of force. The hope remains that the incredulous, the weak, and the doubtful people have been converted and will remain that way."

12 November 1938:

From a report of a meeting held under Goering's chairmanship: Goering: "'s meeting is of a decisive nature. I have received a letter written by the chief of staff of the Fuehrer's Deputy, Bormann, on the Fuehrer's orders directing that the Jewish question be now, once and for all, coordinated and solved one way or another..." Funk: "...I have prepared a law for this case which provides that as from 1 January 1939 Jews shall be prohibited from operating retail stores and mail-order establishments as well as independent workshops. They shall be further prohibited from hiring employees for that purpose or offering any goods on the market. Wherever a Jewish shop is operated, it is to be closed by the police. From 1 January 1939 a Jew can no longer operate a business in the sense of the law for the regulation of national labor of 20 January 1934…Fischbock, speaking for Seyss-Inquart: "Your Excellency: In this matter we have already a very complete plan for Austria. There are 12,000 Jewish artisans and 5,000 Jewish retail shops in Vienna. Before the seizure of power we had already a definite plan for tradesmen, regarding this total of 17,000 stores. Of the shops of the 12,000 artisans about 10,000 were to be closed definitely and 2,000 were to be kept open; 4,000 of the 5,000 retail stores should be closed and 1,000 should be kept open, that is, Aryanized. According to this plan, between 3,000 and 3,500 of the total of 17,000 stores would be kept open, all others closed. This was decided following investigations in every single branch and according to local needs, in agreement with all competent authorities, and is ready for publication as soon as we receive the law which we requested in September. This law shall empower us to withdraw licenses from artisans quite independent of the Jewish question. I shall have this decree issued today...Out of 17,000 stores 12,000 or 14,000 would be closed and the remainder Aryanized or handed over to the Bureau of Trustees which is operated by the State." Goering: "I have to say that this proposal is grand. This way the whole affair would be wound up in Vienna, one of the Jewish capitals, so to speak, by Christmas or by the end of the year." Funk: "We can do the same thing over here."

17 November 1938:

From a speech by Walter Funk: "State and economy constitute a single unit. They must be directed according to the same principles. The best proof of this is given by the most recent development of the Jewish problem in Germany. One cannot exclude the Jews from political life and yet let them live and work in the economic sphere."

29 November 1938:

From a speech by Schacht, in Berlin: "If there is anything remarkable about the New Plan, it is again only the fact that German organization under National Socialist leadership succeeded in conjuring up in a very short time the whole apparatus of supervision of imports, direction of exports, and promotion of exports. The success of the New Plan can be proved by means of a few figures. Calculated according to quantity, the import of finished products was cut down by 63 percent between 1934 and 1937. On the other hand, the import of ores was increased by 132 percent, of petroleum by 116, of grain by 102, and of rubber by 71 percent."

7 January 1939:

From a memorandum from the Reichsbank Directorate to Hitler, signed by Schacht: "From the beginning the Reichsbank has been aware of the fact that a successful foreign policy can be attained only by the reconstruction of the German Armed Forces. It - the Reichsbank - therefore assumed to a very great extent the responsibility of financing the rearmament spite of the inherent dangers to the currency. The justification thereof was the necessity, which pushed all other considerations into the background, to carry through the armament at once, out of nothing and furthermore under camouflage, which made a respect-commanding foreign policy possible."

19 January 1939:

From Hitler's letter to Schacht: "At the occasion of your recall from office as President of the Reichsbank Directorate I take the opportunity of expressing to you my most sincere and warmest gratitude for the services which you have rendered repeatedly to Germany and to me personally in this capacity during long and difficult years. Your name, above all, will always be connected with the first epoch of the national rearmament. I am happy to be able to avail myself of your services for the solution of new tasks in your position as Reich Minister."

21 January 1939:

From the minutes of Hitler's reception of the Czech Minister for Foreign Affairs, Chvalkovsky: "Chvalkovsky began by thanking the Fuehrer for having done his country the honor of receiving the Minister for Foreign Affairs twice within 3 months. He had come here to inform the Fuehrer that he had strictly fulfilled the promise made to him on 14 October although this had cost him a very great deal of trouble...The Fuehrer thanked him for his statements. The foreign policy of a people is determined by its home policy. It is quite impossible to carry out a foreign policy of type 'A' and at the same time a home policy of type 'B.' It could succeed only for a short time. From the very beginning the development of events in Czechoslovakia was bound to lead to a catastrophe. This catastrophe had been averted thanks to the moderate conduct of Germany. Had Germany not followed the National Socialist principles which do not permit of territorial annexations the fate of Czechoslovakia would have followed another course. Whatever remains today of Czechoslovakia has been rescued not by Benes, but by the National Socialist tendencies...For instance, the strength of the Dutch and Danish armies rests not in themselves alone but in realizing the fact that the whole world was convinced of the absolute neutrality of these states. When war broke out, it was well known that the problem of neutrality was one of extreme importance to these countries. The case of Belgium was somewhat different, as that country had an agreement with the French General Staff. In this particular case Germany was compelled to forestall possible eventualities. These small countries were defended not by their armies but by the trust shown in their neutrality...Chvalkovsky, backed by Mastny, again spoke about the situation in Czechoslovakia and about the healthy farmers there. Before the crisis, the people did not know what to expect of Germany. But when they saw that they would not be exterminated and that the Germans wished only to lead their people back home, they heaved a sigh of relief...World propaganda, against which the Fuehrer had been struggling for so long a time, was now focused on tiny Czechoslovakia. Chvalkovsky begged the Fuehrer to address, from time to time, a few kind words to the Czech people. That might work miracles. The Fuehrer is unaware of the great value attached to his words by the Czech people. If he would only openly declare that he intended to collaborate with the Czech people-and with the people, themselves, not with the Minister for Foreign Affairs-all foreign propaganda would be utterly defeated. The Fuehrer concluded the conversation by expressing his belief in a promising future."

25 January 1939:

From a speech by Ribbentrop in Warsaw: "It is a fundamental part of German foreign policy in accordance with the firm will of the Fuehrer of the German people that the friendly relations between Germany and Poland, based on the existing treaty, be strengthened progressively and deepened...Thus Poland and Germany can look forward to the future with complete confidence upon the solid basis of their mutual relations."

25 January 1939:

From 'The Jewish Question as a Factor in German Foreign Policy in the Year 1938': by Reich Foreign Minister Ribbentrop: "It is certainly no coincidence that the fateful year 1938 has brought nearer the solution of the Jewish question simultaneously with the realization of the 'idea of Greater Germany,' since the Jewish policy was both the basis and consequence of the events of the year 1938...The final goal of German Jewish policy is the emigration of all the Jews living in Reich territory...These examples from reports from authorities abroad can, if desired, be amplified. They confirm the correctness of the expectation that criticism of the measures for excluding Jews from German Lebensraum, which were misunderstood in many countries for lack of evidence, would be only temporary and would swing in the other direction the moment the population saw with its own eyes and thus learned what the Jewish danger was to them. The poorer and therefore the more burdensome the immigrant Jew is to the country absorbing him, the stronger this country will react and the more desirable is this effect in the interest of German propaganda. The object of this German action is to be a future international solution of the Jewish question, dictated not by false compassion for the 'United Religious Jewish Minority' but by the full consciousness of aIl peoples of the danger which it represents to the racial composition of the nations."

12 March 1939:

From Raeders speech on the occasion of the German Heroes' Day: "Throughout Germany celebrations took place on the occasion of Hero Commemoration Day...These celebrations were combined for the first time with the celebration of the freedom to rearm...National Socialism which originates from the spirit of the German fighting soldier, has been chosen by the German people as its ideology. The German people follow the symbols of its regeneration with as much great love as fanatical passion. The German people has had practical experience of National Socialism and it has not been imposed, as so many helpless critics abroad believe. The Fuehrer has shown his people that in the National Socialist solidarity of the people lies the great and invincible source of strength, whose dynamic power ensures not only peace at home but also enables us to release all the Nation's creative powers...This is the reason for the clear and unsparing summons to fight Bolshevism and international Jewry, the nation-destroying activities of which our own people have sufficiently suffered. Therefore, the alliance with all like-minded nations who, like Germany, are not willing to allow their strength, dedicated to construction and peaceful work at home, to be disrupted by alien ideologies and by parasites of a foreign race...If later on we instruct in the technical handling of weapons, this task demands that the young soldier should also be taught National Socialist ideology and the problems of life. This part of the task, which becomes for us both a duty of honor and a demand which cannot be refused, can and will be carried out if we stand shoulder to shoulder and in sincere comradeship to the Party and its organizations...The Armed Forces and the Party thus became more and more united in attitude and spirit...Germany is the protector of all Germans within and beyond our frontiers. The shots fired at Almeria (this refers, of course, to the bombardment of the Spanish town of Almeria, carried out by a German naval squadron on the 31 May 1937 during the course of the Spanish Civil War) are proof of that...They all planted into a younger generation the great tradition of death for a holy cause, knowing that with their blood they will lead the way towards the freedom of their dreams."

14 June 1939:

From a directive by Commander-in-Chief of the Army Von Brauchitsch: "The object of the operation is to destroy the Polish Armed Forces. High policy demands that the war should be begun by heavy surprise blows in order to achieve quick results. The intention of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army is to prevent a regular mobilization and concentration of the Polish Army by a surprise invasion of Polish territory and to destroy...the mass of the Polish Army which is to be expected to be west of the Vistula-Narev Line...The army group commands and the army commands will make their preparations on the basis of surprise of the enemy. There will be alterations necessary if surprise should have to be abandoned. These will have to be developed simply and quickly on the same basis; they are to be prepared mentally to such an extent that in case of an order from the Commander-in-Chief of the Army they can be carried out quickly."

19 August 1939:

From a from letter from Seyss-Inquart to Himmler: "...As far as my membership in the Party is concerned, I state that I was never asked to join the Party but had asked Dr. Kier in December 1931 to clarify my relationship with the Party, since I regarded the Party as the basis for the solution of the Austrian problem ... I paid my membership fees and, as I believe, directly to the Gau Vienna. These contributions also took place after the period of suppression. Later on I had direct contact with the Ortsgruppe in Dombach. My wife paid these fees, but the Blockleiter was never in doubt, considering that this amount, 40 shillings per month, was a share for my wife and myself, and I was in every respect treated as a Party member...In every way, therefore, I felt as a Party member, considered myself a Party member, thus, as stated, as far back as December 1931"

22 September 1939:

From a memorandum by the German naval war staff: "Flag Officer U-boats intends to give permission to U-boats to sink without warning any vessels sailing without lights...In practice there is no opportunity for attacking at night, as the U-boat cannot identify a target which is a shadow in a way that entirely obviates mistakes being made. If the political situation is such that even possible mistakes must be ruled out, U-boats must be forbidden to make any attacks at night in waters where French and English naval forces or merchant ships may be situated. On the other hand, in sea areas where only English units are to be expected, the measures desired by Flag Officer U-boats can be carried out; permission to take this step is not to be given in writing, but need merely be based on the unspoken approval of the Naval Operations Staff. U-boat commanders should be informed by word of mouth, and the sinking of a merchant ship must be justified in the War Diary as due to possible confusion with a warship or an auxiliary cruiser. In the meanwhile, U-boats in the English Channel have received instructions to attack all vessels sailing without lights."

9 October 1939:

From a memorandum and directive by Hitler distributed only to the four service chiefs, Keitel, Brauchitsch, Goering, and Raeder: "The aim of the Anglo-French conduct of war is to dissolve or disintegrate the 80-million-state (Germany), again so that in this manner the European equilibrium, in other words, the balance of power which serves their ends, may be restored. This battle, therefore, will have to be fought out by the German people one way or another. Nevertheless, the very great successes of the first month of the war could serve, in the event of an immediate signing of peace, to strengthen the Reich psychologically and materially to such an extent that from the German viewpoint there would be no objection to ending the war immediately, insofar as the present achievement with arms is not jeopardized by the peace treaty. It is not the object of this memorandum to study the possibilities in this direction, or even to take them into consideration. In this paper I shall confine myself exclusively to the other case: the necessity to continue the fight, the object of which, as already stressed, consists, insofar as the enemy is concerned, in the dissolution or destruction of the German Reich. In opposition to this the German war aim is the final military dispatch of the West, that is, destruction of the power and ability of the Western Powers ever again to be able to oppose the state consolidation and further development of the German people in Europe. As far as the outside world is concerned, however, this internal aim will have to undergo various propaganda adjustments, necessary from a psychological point of view. This does not alter the war aim. It is and remains the destruction of our Western enemies....The successes of the Polish campaign have made possible first of all a war on a single front, awaited for past decades without any hope of realization; that is to say, Germany is able to enter the fight in the West with all her might, leaving only a few covering troops in the East. The remaining European states are neutral either because they fear for their own fates or lack interest in the conflict as such or are interested in a certain outcome of the war, which prevents them from taking part at all, or at any rate too soon...Belgium and Holland: Both countries are interested in preserving their neutrality but incapable of withstanding prolonged pressure from England and France. The preservation of their colonies, the maintenance of their trade, and thus the securing of their interior economy, even of their very life, depend wholly upon the will of England and France. Therefore in their decisions, in their attitude, and in their actions both countries are dependent upon the West in the highest degree. If England and France promise themselves a successful result at the price of Belgian neutrality, they are at any time in a position to apply the necessary pressure. That is to say, without covering themselves with the odium of a breach of neutrality, they can compel Belgium and Holland to give up their neutrality. Therefore, in the matter of the preservation of Belgo-Dutch neutrality, time is not a factor which might promise a favorable development for Germany...The Nordic States: Provided no completely unforeseen factors appear, their neutrality in the future is also to be assumed. The continuation of German trade with these countries appears possible even in a war of long duration."

14 October 1939:

From a speech by Walter Funk: "Although all economic and financial departments were harnessed to the task of the Four Year Plan under the leadership of General Field Marshal Goering, Germany's economic preparation for war was also secretly advanced in another sector for well over a year, namely, through the formation of a national guiding apparatus for special war economy tasks which would have to be accomplished the moment that war became a fact. For this work all economic departments were combined into one administrative authority, the Plenipotentiary General for Economics, to which position the Fuehrer appointed me one and a half years ago."

15 October 1939:

From a memorandum compiled by Raeder and the German naval war staff: "Possibilities of Future Naval Warfare: I. Military requirements for the decisive struggle against Great Britain: Our naval strategy will have to employ all the military means at our disposal as expeditiously as possible. Military success can be most confidently expected if we attack British sea communications wherever they are accessible to us, with the greatest ruthlessness; the final aim of such attacks is to cut off all imports into and exports from Britain. We should try to consider the interests of neutrals in so far as this is possible without detriment to military requirements. It is desirable to base all military measures taken on existing international law; however, measures which are considered necessary from a military point of view, provided a decisive success can be expected from them, will have to be carried out, even if they are not covered by existing international law. In principle, therefore, any means of warfare which is effective in breaking enemy resistance should be based on some legal conception even if that entails the creation of a new code of naval warfare. The supreme war council...will have to decide what measures of military and legal nature are to be taken. Once it has been decided to conduct economic warfare in its most ruthless form, in fulfillment of military requirements, this decision is to be adhered to under all circumstances. Under no circumstances may such a decision for the most ruthless form of economic warfare, once it has been made, be dropped or released under political pressure from neutral powers; that is what happened in the World War to our own detriment. Every protest by neutral powers must be turned down. Even threats of further countries, particularly of the United States, coming into the war, which can be expected with certainty should the war last a long time, must not lead to a relaxation in the form of economic warfare once embarked upon. The more ruthlessly economic warfare is waged, the earlier will it show results and the sooner will the war come to an end. The economic effect of such military measures on our own war economy must be fully recognized and compensated through immediate reorientation of German war economy and the redrafting of the respective agreements with neutral states; for this, strong political and economic pressure must be employed if necessary."

19 October 1939:

From a speech by Goering: "In the first mentioned territories the reconstruction and expansion of the economy, the safeguarding of all their production facilities and supplies must be aimed at, as well as a complete incorporation into the Greater German economic system at the earliest possible time. On the other hand there must be removed from the territories of the Government General all raw materials, scrap materials, machines, etcetera, which are of use for the German war economy. Enterprises which are not absolutely necessary for the meager maintenance of the bare existence of the population must be transferred to Germany, unless such transfer would require an unreasonably long period of time and would make it more practical to exploit those enterprises by giving them German orders to be executed at their present location."

20 October 1939:

From notes of a conference between Hitler and the Chief of the OKW, Keitel 'Regarding Future Relations of Poland to Germany': "...1) The Armed Forces will welcome it if they can dispose of administrative questions in Poland. On principle, there cannot be two administrations.... 3) It is not the task of the administration to make Poland into a model province or a model state of the German order or to put her economically or financially on a sound basis. The Polish intelligentsia must be prevented from forming a ruling class. The standard of living in the country is to remain low; we want only to draw labor forces from there. Poles are also to be used for the administration of the country. However, the forming of national political groups may not be allowed. 4) The administration has to work on its own responsibility and must not be dependent on Berlin. We do not want to do there what we do in the Reich. The responsibility does not rest with the Berlin Ministries since there is no German administration unit concerned. The accomplishment of this task will involve a hard racial struggle which will not allow any legal restrictions. The methods will be incompatible with the principles otherwise adhered to by us. The Governor General is to give the Polish nation only bare living conditions and is to maintain the basis for military security.... 6) Any tendencies towards the consolidation of conditions in Poland are to be suppressed. The 'Polish muddle' must be allowed to develop. The Government of the territory must make it possible for us to purify the Reich territory from Jews and Poles too. Collaboration with new Reich 'provinces (Posen and West Prussia) only for resettlements (compare Himmler mission). Purpose: Shrewdness and severity must be the maxims in this racial struggle in order to spare us from going to battle on account of this country again."

23 October 1939:

From the Volkischer Beobachter; 'Churchill Sank the Athenia': "The above picture shows the proud Athenia, the ocean giant, which was sunk by Churchill's crime. One can clearly see the big radio equipment on board the ship. But nowhere was an SOS heard from the ship. Why was the Athenia silent? Because her captain was not allowed to tell the world anything. He very prudently refrained from telling the world that Winston Churchill attempted to sink the ship through the explosion of a time bomb. He knew it well, but he had to keep silent. Nearly 1,500 people would have lost their lives if Churchill's original plan had resulted as the criminal wanted. Yes, he longingly hoped that the 100 Americans on board the ship would find death in the waves so that the anger of the American people, who were deceived by him, should be directed against Germany, as the presumed author of the deed. It was fortunate that the majority escaped the fate intended for them by Churchill. Our picture on the right shows two wounded passengers. They were rescued by the freighter City of Flint, and as can be seen here, turned over to the American coast guard boat Gibb for further medical treatment. They are an unspoken accusation against the criminal Churchill. Both they and the shades of those who lost their lives call him before the tribunal of the world and ask the British people, 'How long will the office, one of the richest in tradition known to Great Britain's history, be held by a murderer?"

17-22 November 1939:

From an internal document: "...At 3:00 p.m. Reich Minister, Dr. Seyss-Inquart, addressed the department heads of the district chief and stated among other things that the chief guiding rule for carrying out German administration in the Government General must be solely the interests of the German Reich. A stem and inflexible administration must make the area of use to German economy; and, so that excessive clemency may be guarded against, the results of the intrusion of the Polish race into German territory must be brought to accordance with which the administration in the 'Government' must be conducted...The resources and inhabitants of this country would have to be made of service to the Reich, and only within these limits could they prosper. Independent political thought should no longer be allowed to develop. The Vistula area might perhaps be still more important to German destiny than the Rhine. The Minister then gave as a guiding theme to the district leaders: 'We will further everything which is of service to the Reich and will put an end to everything which may harm the Reich.' Dr. Seyss-Inquart then added that the Governor General wished that those men who were fulfilling a task for the Reich here should receive a post with material benefits in keeping with their responsibility and achievements...Cycow is a German village....Reich Minister Dr. Seyss-Inquart made a speech in which he pointed out that the fidelity of these Germans to their nationality now found its justification and reward through the strength of Adolf Hitler...This district with its very marshy character could, according to District Chief Schmidt's deliberations, serve as a reservation for the Jews, a measure which might possibly lead to heavy mortality among the Jews."

27 December 1939:

From a speech by Hans Frank: "Today we are proud of having formulated our legal principles from the very beginning in such a way that they need not be changed in the case of war. For the maxim - that which serves the Nation is right, and that which harms it is wrong, which stood at the beginning of our legal work and which established this idea of the community, of the people as the only standard of the law - this maxim shines out also in the social order of these times."

30 December 1939:

From the minutes of a meeting between Hitler and Raeder: "The Chief of the Naval Operations Staff requests that full power be given to the Naval Operations Staff in making any intensification suited to the situation and to the means of war. The Fuehrer agrees in principle to the sinking without warning of Greek ships in the American prohibited area and of neutral ships in those sections of the American prohibited area in which the fiction of mine danger can be upheld, e.g., the Bristol Channel." Generated by the OKW, signed by Jodl: "On the 30th of December 1939, according to a report of the Supreme Commander of the Navy, the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces decided that: I) Greek merchant ships in the area declared by England and the USA to be a barred zone are to be treated as enemy vessels. (Attack must be carried out without being seen. The denial of the sinking of these steamships, in case the expected protests are made, must be possible.) 2) In the Bristol Channel all shipping may be attacked without warning-where the impression of a mining incident can be created. Both measures are authorized to come into effect immediately."

17 January 1940:

From a letter written by Bormann, to Reichsleiter Rosenberg: "Nearly all the districts (Gaue) report to me regularly that the churches of both confessions are as active as ever in ministering spiritually to members of the Armed Forces. This finds expression especially in the fact that soldiers are being sent religious publications by the pastors of their home parishes. These publications are, in part, very well written. I have repeated reports that these publications are being read by the troops and thereby exercise a certain influence on their morale. I have at that time sought, by contacting at once the General Field Marshal, the High Command of the Armed Forces, and Party Member Reichsleiter Amann, to restrict considerably the production and shipment of publications of this type. The result of these efforts remained unsatisfactory. As Reichsleiter Amann has repeatedly informed me, the restriction of these pamphlets by means of the paper rationing cannot be achieved because the paper used for the pamphlets is being purchased on the open market. If the influencing of the soldiers by the Church is to be effectively combated, this will be accomplished only by producing many good publications in the shortest possible time under the supervision of the Party. Also, at the last meeting of the Deputy Gauleiter comments were made on this matter to the effect that such publications are not available in sufficient quantities. I maintain that it is necessary that in the very near future we transmit to the Party Service Offices, down to the Ortsgruppenleiter, a list of additional publications of this sort which should be sent to our soldiers by the Ortsgruppen."

19 January 1940:

From a letter from Bormann to the Reich Minister for Finance: "...As it has been reported to me, the war contribution of the churches for the 3-month period beginning 1 November 1939 has been tentatively set at RM 1,800,000 per month, of which RM I million are to be paid by the Protestant Church, and RM 800,000 by the Catholic Church. The fixing of such a low amount has surprised me. I see from numerous reports that political communities are obliged to raise such a large war contribution that the performance of their tasks-some of them very important; for example, in the field of public welfare-is endangered. In view of this, a higher quota also from the churches appears to me to be absolutely justified"

25 January 1940:

Excerpts of a letter from Hermann Goering to Hans Frank: "1. In view of the present requirements of the Reich for the defense industry, it is at present fundamentally impossible to carry on a long-term economic policy in the Government General. It is necessary so to steer the economy of the Government General that it will, in the shortest possible time, accomplish results representing the maximum that can be secured out of the economic strength of the Government General for the immediate strengthening of our capacity for defense. 2. In particular the following performances are expected of the total economy of the Government General...." ..."Supply and transportation of at least 1 million male and female agricultural and industrial workers to the Reich- among them at least 750,000 agricultural workers of which at least 50 percent must be women-in order to guarantee agricultural production in the Reich and as a replacement for industrial workers lacking in the Reich."

22 February 1940:

From a letter from Reichsleiter Bormann to Reichsleiter Rosenberg: "Christianity and National Socialism are phenomena which originated from entirely different basic causes. Both differ fundamentally so strongly that it will not be possible to construct a Christian teaching which would be completely compatible with the point of view of the National Socialist ideology; just as the communities of Christian faith would never be able to stand by the ideology of National Socialism in its entirety...The Fuehrer's deputy finds it necessary that all these questions should be thoroughly discussed in the near future in the presence of the Reich leaders who are especially affected by them."

8 March 1940:

From notes of a meeting of department heads of the Government General: "One thing is certain. The authority of the Governor General as the representative of the will of the Fuehrer and the will of the Reich in this territory is certainly strong, and I have always emphasized that I would not tolerate misuse of this authority. I have made this known anew at every office in Berlin, especially after Herr Field Marshal Goering on 12-2-1940, from Karin Hall, had forbidden all administrative of offices of the Reich, including the Police and even the Wehrmacht, to interfere in administrative matters of the Government General. There is no authority here in the Government General which is higher as to rank, stronger in influence, and of greater authority than that of the Governor General. Even the Wehrmacht has no governmental or official functions here of any kind; it has only security functions and general military duties - it has no political power whatsoever. The same applies to the Police and the SS. There is here no state within a state, but we are representatives of the Fuehrer and of the Reich."

16 March 1940: From the 'diary' of Hans Frank: "The Governor General remarks that he had long negotiations in Berlin the representatives of the Reich Ministry for Finance and the Reich Ministry for Food. Urgent demands have been made there that Polish farm workers should be sent to the Reich in greater numbers. He has made the statement in Berlin that he, if it is demanded from him, could of course exercise force in some such manner: he could have the police surround a village and get the men and women in question out by force, and then send them to Germany. But one can also work differently, besides these police measures, by retaining the unemployment compensation of these workers in question."

12 April 1940:

From Hans Frank's 'diary’: "Under pressure from the Reich, it had now been decreed that, since sufficient labor did not present itself voluntarily for service in the German Reich, compulsion could be used. This compulsion meant the possibility of arresting male and female Poles. A certain amount of unrest had been caused by this, which, according to some reports, had spread very widely and which could lead to difficulties in all spheres. Field Marshal Goering had once pointed out, in his big speech, the necessity for sending a million workers to the Reich. One hundred and sixty thousand had been delivered to date.... To arrest young Poles as they left church or the cinema would lead to ever-increasing nervousness among the Poles. Fundamentally Frank had no objections to removing people capable of work who were lounging about in the streets. But the best way would be to organize a round-up, and one was absolutely justified in stopping a Pole in the street and asking him what work he did, where he was employed, et cetera."

10 May 1940: From Hans Frank's 'diary’: "Then the Governor General deals with the problem of the compulsory labor service of the Poles. Upon the pressure from the Reich it has now been decreed that compulsion may be exercised in view of the fact that sufficient manpower was not voluntarily available for service inside the German Reich. This compulsion means the possibility of arrest of male and female Poles. Because of these measures a certain disquietude had developed which, according to individual reports, was spreading very much and might produce difficulties everywhere. General Field Marshal Goering some time ago pointed out, in his long speech, the necessity to deport into the Reich a million workers. The supply so far was 160,000. However, great difficulties had to be overcome here. Therefore it would be advisable to cooperate with the district and town chiefs in the execution of the compulsion, so that one could be sure from the start that this action would be reasonably expedient. The arrest of young Poles when leaving church service or the cinema would bring about an ever increasing nervousness of the Poles. Generally speaking, he had no objections at all to the rubbish, capable of work yet often loitering about, being snatched from the streets. The best method for this, however, would be the organization of a raid; and it would be absolutely justifiable to stop a Pole in the street and to question him as to what he was doing, where he was working..."

14 May 1940:

From notes of an interview of Hess by Ambassador Mr. Kirkpatrick: "He then passed to political questions. He said that, on reflection, he had omitted to explain that there were two further conditions attached to his peace proposals. First, Germany could not leave Iraq in the lurch. The Iraqis had fought for Germany and Germany would, therefore, have to require us to evacuate Iraq. I observed that this was going considerably beyond the original proposal that German interests should be confined to Europe, but he retorted that, taken as a whole, his proposals were more than fair. The second condition was that the peace agreement should contain a provision for the reciprocal indemnification of British and German nationals, whose property had been expropriated as the result of war. Herr Hess concluded by saying that he wished to impress on us that Germany must win the war by blockade. We had no conception of the number of submarines now building in Germany. Hitler always did things on a grand scale and devastating submarine war, supported by new types of aircraft, would very shortly succeed in establishing a completely effective blockade of England. It was fruitless for anyone here to imagine that England could capitulate and that the war could be waged from the Empire. It was Hitler's intention, in such an eventuality, to continue the blockade of England, even though the island had capitulated, so that we would have to face the deliberate starvation of the population of these islands."

15 May 1940:

From notes of an interview of Hess by Ambassador Mr. Kirkpatrick: "I then threw a fly over him about Ireland. He said that in all his talks with Hitler, the subject of Ireland had never been mentioned except incidentally. Ireland had done nothing for Germany in this war and it was therefore to be supposed that Hitler would not concern himself in Anglo-Irish relations. We had some little conversation about the difficulty of reconciling the wishes of the South and North and from this we pass to American interest in Ireland, and so to America. On the subject of America, Hess took the following line. 1. The Germans reckoned with American intervention and were not afraid of it. They knew all about American aircraft production and the quality of the aircraft. Germany could outbuild England and America combined. 2. Germany had no designs on America. The so-called German peril was a ludicrous figment of imagination. Hitler's interests were European. 3. If we made peace now, America would be furious. America really wanted to inhabit the British Empire. Hess concluded by saying that Hitler really wanted a permanent understanding with us on a basis which preserved the Empire intact. His own flight was intended to give us a chance of opening conversations without loss of prestige. If we reject this chance, it would be clear proof that we desired no understanding with Germany and Hitler would be entitled-in fact it would be his duty-to destroy us utterly and to keep us after the war in a state of permanent subjection."

11 June 1940:

From a letter from Raeder to the German Navy: "The most outstanding of the numerous subjects of discussion in the Officers Corps are, for the time being, the torpedo positions and the problem whether the naval building program, up to autumn 1939, envisaged the possibility of the outbreak of war as early as 1939, or whether the emphasis ought not to have been laid, from the first, on the construction of U-boats...If the opinion is voiced in the Officers Corps that the entire naval building program has been wrongly directed and if, from the first, the emphasis should have been on the U-boat weapon and after its consolidation on the large ships, I must emphasize the following matters: The building up of the fleet was directed according to the political demands, which were decided by the Fuehrer. The Fuehrer hoped, until the last moment, to be able to put off the threatening conflict with England until 1944- 45. At that time the Navy would have had available a fleet with a powerful U-boat superiority and a much more favorable ratio as regards strength in all other types of ships, particularly those designed for warfare on the High Seas. The development of events forced the Navy, contrary to the expectation even of the Fuehrer, into a war which it had to accept while still in the initial stage of its rearmament. The result is that those who represent the opinion that the emphasis should have been laid from the start on the building of the U-boat arm appear to be right. I leave undiscussed how far this development, quite apart from difficulties of personnel, training, and dockyards, could have been appreciably improved in any way in view of the political limits of the Anglo-German Naval Treaty. I leave also undiscussed, how the early and necessary creation of an effective air force slowed down the desirable development of the other branches of the forces. I indicate, however, with pride, the admirable and, in spite of the political restraints in the years of the Weimar Republic, far-reaching preparation for U- boat construction, which made the immensely rapid construction of the U-boat arm, both as regards equipment and personnel, possible immediately after the assumption of power..."

20 June 1940:

From a speech by Rosenberg: "The job of feeding the German people stands, this year, without a doubt, at the top of the list of Germany's claims on the East; and here the southern territories and the northern Caucasus will have to serve as a balance for the feeding of the German people. We see absolutely no reason for any obligation on our part to feed also the Russian people with the products of that surplus territory. We know that this is a harsh necessity, bare of any feelings."

16 August 1940:

"Concerning the Reintroduction of the Mother Tongue. Following the measures undertaken with a view of reintroducing the mother tongue of the Alsatian people, I decree as follows: 1. Official Language. All public services in Alsace, including administration of communes, of corporations within the meaning of civil law, public establishments, churches, and foundations, as well as tribunals, will use exclusively the German language orally and in writing. The Alsatian population will use exclusively its German mother tongue in both oral and written applications to the above establishments. 2. Christian and Family Names. Christian names will be exclusively used in their German form orally and in writing, even when they have been inscribed in the French language on the birth register. As soon as this present decree comes into force, only German Christian names may be inscribed upon the birth register. Alsatians who bear French Christian names, which do not exist in German form, are asked to apply for a change of their Christian names in order to show their attachment to, Germanism. The same holds good for French family names...4. It is forbidden to draw up, in the French language, contracts and accounts under private seal of whatever nature they may be. Anything printed on business paper and on forms must be drawn up in the German language. Books and accounts of all business firms, establishments, and companies must be kept in the German language. 5. Inscriptions in Cemeteries. In the future, inscriptions on crosses and on tombstones can be written only in the German language. This provision applies as well to a new inscription as to the renewal of old inscriptions."

September 24 1940:

From the diary of Koichi Kido, Hirohito's Lord Privy Seal and longtime advisor, recorded the following concerning a meeting in the palace with the Emperor: "...(Hirohito discussed) the Tripartite Alliance and the form the rites should take to commemorate it. The Emperor asked the Imperial Household Minister to consult past records to find out what kind of sacred rituals took place at the time of the signing of the (1904) Anglo-Japanese Friendship Treaty. The Imperial Household Minister had discovered there had been no Shinto religious rites. The Emperor has decided that, dealing with this highly important occurrence...we should have a special ceremony at the shrine inside the palace, and ask for the blessing of the Gods on his Tripartite Pact."

26 September 1940:
From official notes of the German naval war staff: "Naval Supreme Commander (Doenitz) with the Fuehrer. Naval Supreme Commander presents his opinion about the situation: The Suez Canal must be captured with German assistance. From Suez, advance through Palestine and Syria; then Turkey in our power. The Russian problem will then assume a different appearance. Russia is fundamentally frightened of Germany. It is questionable whether action against Russia. from the north will then be still necessary."

2 October 1940:

From notes made by Bormann: "Secret; Berlin, 2 October 1940; note. On 2 October 1940, after dinner at the Fuehrer's apartment, a conversation arose on the nature of the Government General, the treatment of the Poles and the incorporation, already approved by the Fuehrer, of the Districts of Piotrokow and Tomassov into the Warthegau. The conversation began when the Reich Minister, Dr. Frank, informed the Fuehrer that the activities in the Government General could be termed very successful. The Jews in Warsaw and other cities had been locked up in the ghetto; Krakow would very shortly be cleared of them...

The Fuehrer further emphasized that the Poles, in direct contrast to our German workmen, are specially born for labor; we must give every possibility of advancement to our German workers; as to the Poles there can be no question of improvement for them. On the contrary, it is necessary to keep the standard of life low in Poland and it must not be permitted to rise. The Government General must, under no condition whatsoever, be an isolated and uniform economic region; it must not produce independently, even in part, any manufactured goods necessary for its subsistence; the Government General should be used by us merely as a source of unskilled labor (in industries such as brick manufacturing, road construction, et cetera). One cannot change the nature of a Slav, as the Fuehrer has already emphasized. While as a rule our German workers are by nature assiduous and diligent, the Poles are lazy and it is necessary to use compulsion to make them work. However, there is no reason to expect that the Government General will become an independent economic region, as there are no mineral resources, and even should such be available the Poles are not capable of utilizing them. The Fuehrer has explained that the Reich needs large estates to provide food for our large cities; these large estates, as well as other agricultural enterprises, are in need of labor, and cheap labor in particular, for the cultivation of the soil and for harvesting. As soon as the harvest time is over, the laborers can go back to Poland because should they be employed in agriculture the whole year round they themselves would use up an important part of the crops. The best solution would thus be to import from Poland temporary laborers for the duration of the sowing and for the harvesting. Our industrial districts are overpopulated, while at the same time there is a lack of manpower in agriculture. That is where we can make use of the Polish laborers. For this reason, it would be quite right to have a surplus of manpower in the Government General, so that every year the laborers needed by the Reich could be procured from there. It is indispensable to bear in mind that the Polish gentry must cease to exist; however cruel this may sound, wherever they are, they must be exterminated. There must, of course, be no sexual intercourse with Poles. It would consequently be a correct procedure if Polish harvesters, both men and women, came together to the Reich. Whatever the mutual relationships were in their camps would not be a matter of our concern-no zealous Protestant should poke his nose into these affairs.

The Fuehrer stressed once more that there should be one master only for the Poles-the German; two masters, side by side, cannot and must not exist; therefore, all representatives of the Polish intelligentsia are to be exterminated. This sounds cruel, but such is the law of life. The Government General represents a Polish reserve of manpower-a vast Polish labor camp. The Poles will also benefit from this, as we look after their health and see to it that they do not starve, et cetera, but they must never be raised to a higher level, for they will then become anarchists and Communists. It will therefore be proper for the Poles to remain Roman Catholics; Polish priests will receive food from us and will, for that very reason, direct their little sheep along the path we favor. The priests will be paid by us and will, in return, preach what we wish them to preach. If any priest acts differently, we shall make short work of him. The task of the priest is to keep the Poles quiet, stupid, and dull-witted. This is entirely in our interests. Should the Poles rise to a higher level of development, they will cease to be that manpower of which we are in need. In other respects it will suffice for a Pole to possess a small holding in the Government General-a large farm is not at all necessary; he will have to earn the money he requires in Germany. It is precisely this cheap labor we need; every German and every German worker will benefit by this cheap labor. A strict German administration must exist in the Government General to keep order in the labor reservations. These reservations mean for us the maintenance of agriculture, particularly of our large estates, and they are, besides, a source of supply of labor...

To sum up, the Fuehrer wants to state once more: 1. The lowest German workman and the lowest German peasant must always stand economically 10 percent above any Pole...3. I do not wish that a German workman should, as a rule work more than 8 hours when we return to normal conditions; if a Pole, however, works 14 hours, he is still, in spite of that, to earn less than a German workman. 4. The ideal picture is this: A Pole must possess a small holding in the Government General which will, to a certain extent, provide him and his family with food. The money required by him for clothes, supplementary foods, et cetera, et cetera, he must earn by working in Germany. The Government General must become a center for supplying seasonal unskilled labor, particularly agricultural laborers. The existence of these workmen will be fully guaranteed, because they will always be used as cheap labor."

10 October 1940:

Published in the Verordnungsblatt for the occupied territory of France on 17 October 1940: "Ordinance concerning protection against acts of sabotage, 10 October 1940. By virtue of the powers which have been conferred upon me by the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, I decree the following: I. Whoever intentionally does not fulfill or fulfills inadequately the tasks of surveillance which are imposed upon him by the Chief of the Military Administration in France, or by an authority designated by the latter, shall be condemned to death...In less serious cases concerning infractions of Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the present ordinance, and in case of negligence, punishment by solitary confinement with hard labor or imprisonment may be imposed."

7 November 1940:

From a document on the stationery of the Reich Governor of Vienna, the Reichsstatthalterin Vienna: "Subject: Compulsory labor of able-bodied Jews. 1. Notice: On 5 November 1940 telephone conversation with Colonel (Standartenfuehrer) Huber of the Gestapo. The Gestapo has received secret directions from the Reich Security Main Office (RSHA) as to how able-bodied Jews should be drafted for compulsory labor service. Investigations are being made at present by the Gestapo to find out how many able-bodied Jews are still available, in order to make plans for the contemplated mass projects. It is assumed that there are not many more Jews available. If some should still be available, however, the Gestapo has no scruples to use the Jews even for clearing away the destroyed synagogues. SS Standartenfuehrer Huber will make a report personally to the Regierungsprasident in this matter. I have reported to the Regierungsprasident accordingly. The matter should be kept further in mind. -Dr. Fischer"

21 November 1940:

From notes of a conference at which State Secretary Dr. Landfried represented the Reich Ministry of Economics: Reich Commissioner: "Today's conference is the continuation of a conference which was held in Berlin. On this occasion I should like, first of all, to stress and establish definitely that the collaboration between the Wehrmacht and the Reich Commissioner is exemplary. I must protest against the idea that the Wehrmacht carried out its financial task here in a muddled and irresponsible manner. We must also take into account the particular circumstances which then prevailed in Norway and which still partially prevail.

Certain tasks were fixed by the Fuehrer which were to be carried out within a given time. At the conference in Berlin the following points were settled, which we can take as a basis of today's conference. There is no doubt that the country of Norway was utilized for the execution of the tasks of the Wehrmacht during the last 7 months in such a way that a further drain on the country without some compensation is no longer possible in view of the future tasks of the Wehrmacht. I considered it from the beginning my obvious duty in my capacity as Reich Commissioner to devote my activities to mobilizing all the economic and material forces of the country for the purposes of the Wehrmacht and not to call on the resources of the Reich as long as I am in a position to organize such resources in the country." Dr. Landfried: "I am very glad to be able to state that we have succeeded here in Norway... in mobilizing the economic forces of Norway for German needs to an extent which it has not been possible to attain in all the other occupied countries. I must thank you especially in the name of the Minister of Economics for having succeeded in inducing the Norwegians to achieve the greatest possible results."

14 November 1940
From official notes of the German naval war staff: "Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer. Fuehrer is 'still inclined' to instigate the conflict with Russia. Naval Supreme Commander recommends putting it off until the time after the victory over England, since there is heavy strain on German forces and the end of warfare is not in sight.

3 December 1940:

From a letter to Schirach from Lammers: "To the Reich Governor in Vienna, Gauleiter Von Schirach: As Reichsleiter Bormann informs me, the Fuehrer has decided, after receipt of one of the reports made by you, that the 60,000 Jews still residing in the Reichsgau Vienna will be deported most rapidly to the Government General, because of the housing shortage prevalent in Vienna. I have informed the Governor General in Krakow, as well as the Reichsfuehrer SS, about this decision of the Fuehrer and I request you also to take cognizance of it.-Lammers"

27 December 1940
From official notes of the German naval war staff: "Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer. Naval Supreme Commander emphasizes again that strict concentration of our entire war effort against England as our main enemy is the most urgent need of the hour. On the one hand, England has gained strength by the unfortunate Italian conduct of the war in the eastern Mediterranean and by the increasing American support. On the other hand, however; she can be hit mortally by a strangulation of her ocean traffic which is already taking effect. What is being done for submarine and naval air force construction is much too little. Our entire war potential must work for the conduct of the war against England; thus for the Navy and Air Force, every dispersion of strength prolongs the war and endangers the final success. Naval Supreme Commander voices serious objections against Russia campaign before the defeat of England."

16 January 1941:

From a letter from Bormann to Dr. Posse of the State Picture Gallery in Dresden: "Dear Dr. Posse: Enclosed herewith I am sending you the pictures of the altar from the convent in Hohenfurth near Krumau. The convent and its entire property will be confiscated in the immediate future because of the subversive attitude of its inmates toward the State. It would be up to you to decide whether the pictures are to remain in the convent at Hohenfurth or are to be transferred to the museum at Linz after its completion. I shall await your opinion in the matter. Bormann."

18 February 1941
From official notes of the German naval war staff: "Chief of Naval Operations (SKL) insists on the occupation of Malta even before Barbarossa."

19 February 1941:

From a German administrative document found in the archives of the Gau Administration of Strasbourg: "The Gauleiter desires that the Alsatian population be recommended by the organization of the Block- and Zellenleiter to rip up the French flags still in possession of the people and to use them in a suitable way for household needs. By the 1st of next May no French Rag should be in private hands. This goal should be attained in a way by which the Blockleiter are to visit each household and recommend the families to use the flags for household needs. It should also be pointed out that after the 1st of next May corresponding conclusions shall be drawn concerning the attitude of owners if, after this date, French flags are still found in private possession."

23 February 1941
From official notes of the German naval war staff: "Instruction from Supreme Command, Armed Forces (OKW) that seizure of Malta 'is contemplated for the fall of 1941 after the execution of Barbarossa"

19 March 1941
From official notes of the German naval war staff: "In case of Barbarossa, Supreme Naval Commander describes the occupation of Murmansk as an urgent request of the Navy; Chief of Supreme Command Armed Forces considers compliance very difficult.

5 March 1941:

Basic Order Number 24: "The Fuehrer has issued the following order regarding collaboration with Japan: "It must be the aim of the collaboration based on the Three Power Pact to induce Japan, as soon as possible, to take active measures in the Far East. Strong British forces will thereby be tied down, and the center of gravity of the interests of the United States of America will be diverted to the Pacific. The sooner she intervenes, the greater will be the prospects of success for Japan in view of the still undeveloped preparedness for war on the part of her adversaries. The Barbarossa operation will create particularly favorable political and military prerequisites for this. To prepare the way for the collaboration it is essential to strengthen the Japanese military potential with all means available. For this purpose the High Commands of the branches of the Armed Forces will comply in a comprehensive and generous manner with Japanese desires for information regarding German war and combat experience, and for assistance in military economics and in technical matters. Reciprocity is desirable, but this factor should not stand in the way of negotiations. Priority should naturally be given to those Japanese requests which would have the most immediate application in waging war. In special cases the Fuehrer reserves the decisions for himself. The harmonizing of the operational plans of the No parties is the responsibility of the Naval High Command. This will be subject to the following guiding principles: a. The common aim of the conduct of war is to be stressed as forcing England to the ground quickly and thereby keeping the United States out of the war. Beyond this Germany has no political, military, or economic interests in the Far East which would give occasion for any reservations with regard to Japanese intentions. b. The great successes achieved by Germany in mercantile warfare make it appear particularly suitable to employ strong Japanese forces for the same purpose. In this connection every opportunity to support German mercantile warfare must be exploited. c. The raw material situation of the pact powers demands that Japan should acquire possession of those territories which it needs for the continuation of the war, especially if the United States intervenes. Rubber shipments must be carried out even after the entry of Japan into the war, since they are of vital importance to Germany. d. The seizure of Singapore as the key British position in the Far East would mean a decisive success for the entire conduct of war of the three powers. In addition, attacks on other systems of bases of British naval power-extending to those of American naval power only if the entry of the United States into the war cannot be prevented-will result in weakening the enemy's system of power in that region and also, just like the attack on sea communications, in tying down substantial forces of all kinds (Australia). A date for the beginning of operational discussions cannot yet be fixed. In the military commissions to be formed in accordance with the Three Power Pact, only such questions are to be dealt with as equally concern the three participating powers. These will include primarily the problems of economic warfare. The working out of the details is the responsibility of the main commission with the co-operation of the Armed Forces High Command. The Japanese must not be given any intimation of the Barbarossa operations."

6 March 1941:

Directives on the Treatment of Foreign Farm Workers of Polish Nationality. Issued by the Minister for Finance and Economy of Baden, Germany: "The agencies of the Baden State Peasant Association of the Reich Food Administration, have received the result of the negotiations with the Higher SS and Police Fuehrer in Stuttgart on 14 February 1941 with great satisfaction. Appropriate memoranda have already been turned over to the District Peasants Associations. Below I promulgate the individual regulations as they have been laid down during the conference and the manner in which they are now to be applied: 1. On principle, farm workers of Polish nationality are no longer granted the right to complain, and thus no complaints may be accepted by any official agency. 2. The farm workers of Polish nationality may no longer leave the localities in which they are employed, and have a curfew from 1 October to 31 March from 2000 hours to 0600 hours and from 1 April to 30 September from 2100 hours to 0500 hours. 3. The use of bicycles is strictly prohibited. Exceptions are possible for riding to the place of work in the field if a relative of the employer or the employer himself is present. 4. The visit to churches, regardless of faith, is strictly prohibited, even when there is no service in progress. Individual spiritual care by clergymen outside of the church is permitted. 5. Visits to theaters, motion pictures, or other cultural entertainment are strictly prohibited for farm workers of Polish nationality. 6. The visit to restaurants is strictly prohibited to farm workers of Polish nationality, except for one restaurant in the village, which will be selected by the Regional Commissioner's Office "-Landratsamt-" and then only 1 day per week. The day which is allowed for visiting the restaurant will also be determined by the Landratsamt. This regulation does not change the curfew regulation mentioned above under '2.' 7. Sexual intercourse with women and girls is strictly prohibited; and wherever it is discovered, it must be reported. 8. Gatherings of farm workers of Polish nationality after work is prohibited, whether it is on other farms, in the stables, or in the living quarters of the Poles. 9. The use of railroads, buses, or other public conveyances by farm workers of Polish nationality is prohibited. 10. Permits to leave the village may be granted only in very exceptional cases by the local police authority (mayor's office). However, in no case may it be granted if a Pole wishes to visit a public agency on his own authority, whether it is a labor office or the District Peasants Association, or if he wants to change his place of employment. 11. Unauthorized change of employment is strictly prohibited. The farm workers of Polish nationality have to work daily as long as it is to the interests of the enterprise and is demanded by the employer. There are no limits to the working hours. 12. Every employer has the right to give corporal punishment to farm workers of Polish nationality if persuasion and reprimand fail. The employer may not be held accountable in any such case by an official agency. 13. Farm workers of Polish nationality should, if possible, be removed from the household; and they can be quartered in stables, etc. No consideration whatever should restrict such action. 14. Report to the authorities of all crimes committed by farm workers of Polish nationality which sabotage industry or slow down work-for instance, unwillingness to work, impertinent behavior-is compulsory even in minor cases. An employer who loses a Pole sentenced to along prison sentence because of such a compulsory report will upon request, have preference for the assignment of another Pole from the competent labor office. 15. In all other cases, only the State Police is still competent. For the employer himself, severe punishment is provided if it is established that the necessary distance has not been kept from farm workers of Polish nationality. The same applies to women and girls. Noncompliance with the Reich tariffs for farm workers of Polish nationality will be punished by the competent labor office by the taking away of the workers."

13 March 1941:

From a speech in Amsterdam by Seyss-Inquart: "...The Jews, for us, are not Dutch. They are those enemies with whom we can come to neither an armistice nor to peace. This applies here, if you wish, for the duration of the occupation. Do not expect an order from me which stipulates this, except regulations concerning police matters. We will beat the Jews wherever we meet them, and those who join them must bear the consequences. The Fuehrer declared that the Jews have played their final act in Europe, and therefore they have played their final act."

18 March 1941:

From a radio speech by Fritzsche: "But the crown of all wrongly applied Rooseveltian logic is the sentence: 'There never was a race and there never will be a race which can serve the rest of mankind as a master.' Here, too, we can only applaud Mr. Roosevelt. It is precisely because there exists no race which can be the master of the rest of mankind, that we Germans have taken the liberty to break the domination of Jewry and of its capital in Germany, of Jewry which believed it had inherited the crown of secret world domination."

18 March 1941:

Notes from a meeting between Raeder and Hitler: "Japan must take steps to seize Singapore as soon as possible, since the opportunity will never again be as favorable (whole English fleet contained; unpreparedness of USA for war against Japan; inferiority of US fleet vis-a-vis the Japanese). Japan is indeed making preparations for this action, but according to all declarations made by Japanese officers she will carry it out only if Germany proceeds to land in England. Germany must therefore concentrate all her efforts on spurring Japan to act immediately. If Japan has Singapore all other East Asiatic questions regarding the USA and England are thereby solved (Guam, Philippines, Borneo, Dutch East Indies). Japan wishes, if possible, to avoid war against the USA. She can do so if she determinedly takes Singapore as soon as possible.

20 March 1941:

Munich, Brown House, Personal-Secret: "To: All Gau leaders. Subject: Sequestration of Church properties (Monastery property, et cetera). "Recently, valuable church properties have had to be sequestered on a large scale, especially in Austria; according to reports of the Gauleiter to the Fuehrer these sequestration’s were often because of violations of ordinances relating to war economy (for example, hoarding of foodstuffs of various kinds, textiles, leather goods, et cetera). In other cases they were for violations of the law relating to subversive acts against the State and in some cases because of illegal possession of arms. Obviously no compensation is to be paid to the churches for sequestration’s made for the above-mentioned reasons. With regard to further sequestration’s, several Austrian Gau leaders, on the occasion of the Fuehrer's last visit to Vienna, attempted to clarify the question of who should acquire such sequestered properties. Please take note of the Fuehrer's decision, as contained in the letter written by Reich Minister Dr. Lammers to the Reich Minister of the Interior, dated 14 March 1941. I enclose copy of extracts of the same. -M. Bormann."

29 March 1941: Ribbentrop meets with the Japanese Foreign Minister, Matsuoka, in Berlin. The following are excerpts from the report of their conversations found in the German Foreign Office archives. It is interesting that Ribbentrop, possibly the worst Foreign Minister any Nation has been cursed with in modern times, repeatedly offers the services of 'the greatest expert on military questions' to the Japanese. One can only imagine what Hitler's advice would have consisted of. Would he have approved, in principle, the sneak attack of Pearl Harbor? "The RAM (Ribbentrop) resumed, where they had left off the preceding conversation with Matsuoka about the latter’s impending talks with the Russians in Moscow. He expressed the opinion that it would probably be best, in view of the whole situation, not to carry the discussions with the Russians too far. He did not know how the situation would develop. One thing was certain, however, namely that Germany would strike immediately, should Russia ever attack Japan. He was ready to give Matsuoka this positive assurance so that Japan could push forward to the South on Singapore without fear of possible complications with Russia. The largest part of the German Army was on the Eastern frontiers of the Reich anyway and fully prepared to open the attack at any time. He (the RAM), however, believed that Russia would try to avoid developments leading to war. Should Germany, however, enter into a conflict with Russia, the USSR would be finished off within a few months. In this case Japan would have, of course, even less reason to be afraid than ever, if she wants to advance on Singapore. Consequently, she need not refrain from such an undertaking because of possible fears of Russia. He could not know, of course, just how things with Russia would develop. It was uncertain whether or not Stalin would intensify his present unfriendly policy against Germany. He (the RAM) wanted to point out to Matsuoka in any case that a conflict with Russia was at least within the realm of possibility. In any case, Matsuoka could not report to the Japanese Emperor, upon his return, that a conflict between Russia and Germany was impossible. On the contrary, the situation was such that such a conflict, even if it were not probable, would have to be considered possible...Next, the RAM turned again to the Singapore question. In view of the fears expressed by the Japanese of possible attacks by submarines based on the Philippines, and of the intervention of the British Mediterranean and home fleets, he had again discussed the situation with Grossadmiral Raeder. The latter had stated that the British Navy during this year would have its hands so full in the English home waters and in the Mediterranean that it would not be able to send even a single ship to the Far East. Grossadmiral Raeder had described the United States submarines as so poor that Japan need not bother about them at all. Matsuoka replied immediately that the Japanese Navy had a very low estimate of the threat from the British Navy. It also held the view that, in case of a clash with the American Navy, it would be able to smash the latter without trouble. However, it was afraid that the Americans would not take up the battle with their fleet; thus the conflict with the United States might perhaps be dragged out to 5 years. This possibility caused considerable worry in Japan. The RAM replied that America could not do anything against Japan in the case of the capture of Singapore. Perhaps for this reason alone, Roosevelt would think twice before deciding on active measures against Japan. For while on the one hand he could not achieve anything against Japan, on the other hand there was the probability of losing the Philippines to Japan; for the American President, of course, this would mean a considerable loss of prestige, and because of the inadequate rearmament, he would have nothing to offset such a loss. In this connection Matsuoka pointed out that he was doing everything to reassure the English about Singapore. He acted as if Japan had no intention at all regarding this key position of England. Therefore it might be possible that his attitude toward the British would appear to be friendly in words and in acts. However, Germany should not be deceived by that. He assumed this attitude not only in order to reassure the British, but also in order to fool the pro-British and pro-American elements in Japan just so long, until one day he would suddenly open the attack on Singapore. In this connection Matsuoka stated that his tactics were based on the certain assumption that the sudden attack against Singapore would unite the entire Japanese nation with one blow. ('Nothing succeeds like success,' the RAM remarked.) He followed here the example expressed in the words of a famous Japanese statesman addressed to the Japanese Navy at the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war: 'You open fire, then the nation will be united.' The Japanese need to be shaken up to awaken. After all, as an Oriental, he believed in the fate which would come, whether you wanted it or not...Matsuoka then introduced the subject of German assistance in the blow against Singapore, a subject which had been broached to him frequently, and mentioned the proposal of a German written promise of assistance. The RAM replied that he had already discussed these questions with Ambassador Oshima. He had asked him to procure maps of Singapore in order that the Fuehrer-who probably must be considered the greatest expert on military questions at the present time-could advise Japan on the best method of attack against Singapore. German experts on aerial warfare, too, would be at her disposal; they could draw up a report, based on their European experiences, for the Japanese on the use of dive-bombers from airfields in the vicinity against the British Fleet in Singapore. Thus, the British Fleet would be forced to disappear from Singapore immediately. Matsuoka remarked that Japan was less concerned with the British Fleet than with the capture of the fortifications. The RAM replied that here, too, the Fuehrer had developed new methods for the German attacks on strongly fortified positions, such as the Maginot Line and Fort Eben-Emael, which he could make available to the Japanese. Matsuoka replied in this connection that some of the younger expert Japanese Naval officers, who were close friends of his, were of the opinion that the Japanese Naval forces would need 3 months until they could capture Singapore. As a cautious Foreign Minister, he had doubled this estimate. He believed he could stave off any danger which threatened from America for 6 months. If, however, the capture of Singapore required still more time and if the operations would perhaps even drag out for a year, the situation with America would become extremely critical; and he did not know as yet how to meet it. If at all avoidable, he would not touch the Netherlands East Indies, since he was afraid that in case of a Japanese attack on this area, the oil fields would be set afire. They could be brought into operation again only after 1 or 2 years. 'The RAM added that Japan would gain decisive influence over the Netherlands East Indies simultaneously with the capture of Singapore."

4 April 1941:

From two letters addressed to the German Armistice Commission at Wiesbaden by the ex-Ambassador Scapini: "4 April 1941. "M. Georges Scapini, Ambassador of France. To his Excellency Monsieur Abetz, German Ambassador in Paris. Subject: Men captured after the coming into force of the Armistice Convention and treated as prisoners of war...I. The Geneva Convention applies only during a state of war as far as captures are concerned. Armistice, however, suspends war operations; therefore, any man captured after the Armistice Convention came into force and treated as a prisoner of war, is wrongfully retained in captivity...The Armistice Convention, in its second paragraph, states only that the French Armed Forces stationed in regions to be occupied by Germany are to be brought back quickly into unoccupied territory and demobilized, but does not say that they are to be taken into captivity, which would be contrary to the Geneva Convention...1. Civilians. If it is admitted that civilians captured before the armistice cannot be treated as prisoners of war, as discussed in my previous letter, surely there is all the more reason not to consider as such those captured after the armistice. I note in this respect that captures, some of which were collective, were carried out several months after the end of hostilities....To the categories of civilians defined in my first letter, I wish to add one more-that of demobilized civilians who were going back to their homes in the occupied zone after the armistice and who, more often than not, were captured on their way home and sent into captivity as a result of the initiative of local military authorities. ...T. Soldiers. As such I would define, by convention, men who, though freed after the armistice, could not for some reason due to the difficult circumstances of that period-be provided with the regular demobilization papers. Many of them were captured and taken into captivity under the same condition as those mentioned above...A. Civilians not subject to military service. It is obvious that these men could not be considered soldiers according to French law. They can be classified, according to age, into three groups: (a) Men under 21 not yet called to the colors. Example: Flanquart, Alexandre, 18 years old, captured by the German troops at Courrieres, Pas-de-Calais, at the time of the arrival of the latter in that region. His address in captivity was Number 65/388, Stalag II-B. (b) Men between 21 and 48 who were not mobilized, who were demobilized, or who were considered unfit for service...(c) Men specially assigned to the army. I will classify them into two groups: 1. Men mobilized into special corps, which are military formations established at the time of the mobilization by different ministerial departments...2. Men specially assigned, who at mobilization were kept in the positions which they held in time of peace in military services or establishments. Example: Workmen in artillery depots. Civilians specially assigned. Contrary to those mentioned above, the civilians who were specially assigned did not belong to military formations and were not subject to military authority. Nevertheless they were arrested..."

12 April 1941:

From a memorandum submitted by the Reich Plenipotentiary: "The German Reich Plenipotentiary has received instructions to demand from the Royal Government of Denmark: First: A formal declaration as to whether His Majesty, the King of Denmark, to whom M. De Kauffmann, Minister of Denmark now refers, or any other member of the Royal Danish Government had, prior to its publication, any knowledge of the treaty concluded between M. De Kauffmann and the American Government. Second: The immediate putting into effect of the recall of M. De Kauffmann, Minister of Denmark, by His Majesty, the King of Denmark. Third: The delivery without delay to the American Charge d'Affaires in Copenhagen of a note disavowing M. De Kauffmann, communicating the fact that he is being recalled, and stating that the treaty thus concluded is not binding upon the Danish Government, and formulating the most energetic protest against the American, procedure. Fourth: A communication to be published in the press, according to which the Danish Royal Government clearly states that M. De Kauffmann acted against the will of His Majesty, the King, and of the Danish Royal Government and without their authorization; that he has been recalled, and that the Danish Government considers the treaty thus concluded as not binding upon it and has formulated the most energetic protests against the American procedure. Fifth: The promulgation of a law according to which the loss of nationality and the confiscation of property may be pronounced against any Danish subject who has been guilty of grave offenses abroad against the interests of Denmark, or against the provisions laid down by the Danish Government. Sixth: M. De Kauffmann is to be brought to trial for the crime of high treason, by virtue of Article 98 of the penal code, and of Article 3, Section 3, of the law of 18 January 1941, and to lose his nationality in conformity with a law to be promulgated, as mentioned under Paragraph 5."

17 April 1941:

From a letter written by the Reich Minister of Justice to the Chief of the Reich Chancellery: "It has been my opinion from the outset that special conditions prevailing in the annexed eastern territories require special measures of penal law and penal procedure against Poles and Jews...The aim to create a special law for Poles and Jews in the eastern territories was pursued further according to plan by the ordinance dated 6 June 1940. By this ordinance German penal law, which had been used in the eastern territories already from the outset Divas formally made applicable...The procedure for enforcing a prosecution has been abrogated for it seems intolerable that Poles or Jews should be able to force the German public prosecutor to launch an accusation. Poles and Jews have also been deprived of the right to prosecute in their own names or join the public prosecutor in an action. In addition to this special law in the sphere of procedure, some special conditions have been included in Article 2 of the introductory ordinance. These provisions were established in agreement with the Reich Minister of the Interior by reason of requirements which had arisen. From the beginning it was intended to augment the special conditions in case of need. This need, which had become apparent in the meantime, should be met by an executive and supplementary order to be added to the original ordinance and which was referred to in the letter from the Deputy of the Fuehrer...After I was informed of the express wish of the Fuehrer that, as a matter of principle, Poles and presumably the Jews, too, are to be treated differently from the Germans within this sphere of penal law, after preliminary discussions, etc., I draw up the enclosed draft concerning criminal law and procedure against Poles and Jews...The draft represents altogether special law, both in the sphere of penal law and penal procedure. The suggestions of the Deputy of the Fuehrer have been taken into consideration to a far reaching extent. Number 1, Paragraph 3, contains a general crime formula on the basis of which any Pole or Jew in the eastern territory can in future be prosecuted and any kind of punishment can be inflicted on him for any attitude or action which is considered punishable and is directed against Germans...In accordance with the opinion of the Deputy of the Fuehrer, I started from the point of view that the Pole is less susceptible to the infliction of ordinary imprisonment...Under these new kinds of punishment prisoners are to be lodged outside prisons in camps and are to be forced to do heavy and heaviest labor...The introduction of corporal punishment, and that is either as penal punishment or as disciplinary measure, which the Deputy of the Fuehrer has brought up for discussion, has not been included in the draft. I cannot agree to this type of punishment because its infliction does not, in my opinion, correspond to the cultural level of the German people."

20 April 1941: From official notes of the German naval war staff: "Naval Supreme Commander with Fuehrer. Navy Supreme Commander asks about result of Matsuoka's visit and evaluation of Japanese-Russian pact....Fuehrer has informed Matsuoka 'that Russia will not be touched if she behaves in a friendly manner according to the treaty. Otherwise, he reserves action for himself.' Japan-Russia pact has been concluded in agreement with Germany and is to prevent Japan from advancing against Vladivostok and to cause her to attack Singapore."

25 April 1941:

From a letter from Bormann to Rosenberg: "We are inducing schools more and more to reduce and abolish morning religious services. Similarly the confessional and general prayers in several parts of the Reich have already been replaced by National Socialist mottoes. I would be grateful to know your opinion on a future National Socialist morning service instead of the present confessional morning services which are usually conducted once per week."

26 April 1941:

From a German administrative document found in the archives of the Gau Administration of Strasbourg: "If, after 1 June 1941, Alsatians are found still to have French flags in their possession, they are to be sent to a concentration camp for one year."

13 May 1941:

From an account of conversations between Ribbentrop and Mussolini and Ciano: "To begin with, the Reich Foreign Minister conveyed the Fuehrer's greetings to the Duce. He would shortly propose to the Duce a date for the planned meeting, which he would like to take place as soon as possible. As the place for the meeting he would probably prefer the Brenner. At the present moment he was, as the Duce could well understand, still busy with the Hess Affair and with a few military matters. The Duce replied that he would agree with all the Fuehrer's proposals...The Reich Foreign Minister then said that the Fuehrer had sent him to the Duce in order to inform him about the Hess affair and the conversations with Admiral Darlan. With regard to Hess's affair he remarked that the Fuehrer and his staff had been completely taken aback by Hess's action and that it had been the deed of a lunatic. Hess had been suffering for a long time from bilious attacks and had fallen into the hands of magnetists and nature-cure doctors who caused his state of health to become worse. All these matters were being investigated at the moment, as well as the responsibility of the aides-de-camp who had known about Hess's forbidden flights. Hess had for weeks carried out secret practice flights in an ME-110. Naturally he had acted only from idealistic motives. Disloyalty towards the Fuehrer was utterly out of the question. His conduct had to be explained by a kind of abstractness and a state of mind caused by his illness...Being sympathetically inclined towards England, he had conceived the crazy idea of using Great Britain's fascist circles to persuade the British to give in. He had explained all this in a long and confused letter to the Fuehrer. When this letter reached the Fuehrer, Hess was already in England. It was hoped in Germany that he would perhaps meet with an accident on the way, but he was now really in England and had tried to contact the former Marquis of Clydesdale, the present Duke of Hamilton. Hess quite wrongly considered him as a great friend of Germany and had flown to the neighborhood of his castle in Scotland."

13 May 1941:

Hitler Order: "Order concerning the exercise of martial jurisdiction and procedure in the area 'Barbarossa' and special military measures. ...The application of martial law aims, in the first place, at maintaining discipline. The fact that the operational areas in the East are so far-flung, the battle strategy which this necessitates, and the peculiar qualities of the enemy, confront the courts-martial with problems which, being short-staffed, they cannot solve while hostilities are in progress and until some degree of pacification has been achieved in the conquered areas, unless jurisdiction is confined, in the first instance, to its main task. This is possible only if the troops themselves take ruthless action against any threat from the enemy population. For these reasons I herewith issue the following order effective for the area 'Barbarossa' (area of operations, Army rear area, and area of political administration): I. Treatment of offenses committed by enemy civilians. 1. Until further notice the military courts and the courts martial will not be competent for crimes committed by enemy civilians. 2. Guerillas should be disposed of ruthlessly by the military, whether they are fighting or in flight. 3. Likewise all other attacks by enemy civilians on the Armed Forces, its members, and employees, are to be suppressed at once by the military, using the most extreme methods, until the assailants are destroyed. 4. Where such measures have been neglected or were not at first possible, persons suspected of criminal action will be brought at once before an officer. This officer will decide whether they are to be shot. On the orders of an officer with the powers of at least a battalion commander, collective drastic measures will be taken without delay against localities from which cunning or malicious attacks are made on the Armed Forces, if circumstances do not permit of a quick identification of individual offenders. 5. It is expressly forbidden to keep suspects in custody in order to hand them over to the courts after the reinstatement of civil courts. 6. The commanders of the army groups may, by agreement with the competent naval and air force commanders, reintroduce military jurisdiction for civilians in areas which are sufficiently pacified. For the area of the political administration this order will be given by the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. II. Treatment of offenses committed against inhabitants by members of the Armed Forces and its employees. 1. With regard to offenses committed against enemy civilians by members of the Wehrmacht and its employees prosecution is not obligatory, even where the deed is at the same time a military crime or offense. 2. When judging such offenses, it must be borne in mind, whatever the circumstances, that the collapse of Germany in 1918, the subsequent sufferings of the German people, and the fight against National Socialism which cost the blood of innumerable supporters of the movement, were caused primarily by Bolshevistic influence and that no German has forgotten this fact. 3. Therefore, the judicial authority will decide in such cases whether a disciplinary penalty is indicated, or whether legal proceedings are necessary. In the case of offenses against inhabitants it will order a court-martial only if maintenance of discipline or security of the forces call for such a measure. This applies, for instance, to serious offenses originating in lack of self-control in sexual matters or in a criminal disposition and to those which indicate that the troops are threatening to get out of hand. Offenses which have resulted in senseless destruction of billets or stores or other captured material, to the disadvantage of our forces, should as a rule be judged no less severely. The order to institute proceedings requires in every single case the signature of the judicial authority. 4. Extreme caution is indicated in assessing the credibility of statements made by enemy civilians. III. Responsibility of military commanders of the troops. Within their sphere of competence military commanders are personally responsible for seeing that: 1. Every commissioned officer of the units under their command is instructed promptly and in the most emphatic manner on principles set out under I, above. 2. Their legal advisers are notified promptly of these instructions and of verbal information in which the political intentions of the High Command were explained to the commanders-in-Chief. 3. Only those court sentences are confirmed which are in accordance with the political intentions of the High Command. IV. Security. Once the camouflage is lifted, this decree will be treated as 'most secret."

15 May 1941:

From a letter addressed to the Reichsfuehrer SS, and signed S. Rascher: "For the time being I have been assigned to the Luftgau Commando VII, Munich, for a medical course. During this course where researches on high-altitude flights play a prominent part (determined by the somewhat higher ceiling of the English fighter planes), considerable regret was expressed at the fact that no tests with human material had yet been possible for us, as such experiments are very dangerous and nobody volunteers for them. I put, therefore, the serious question: Can you make available two or three professional criminals for these experiments? The experiments are made at Bodenstandige Prufstelle fur Hohenforschung der Luftwaffe, Munich. The experiments, by which the subjects may, of course, die, would take place with my cooperation. They are essential for researches on high-altitude flight and cannot be carried out, as has been tried, with monkeys, who offer entirely different test-conditions. I have had a very confidential talk with the deputy of the Surgeon of the Air Force, who makes these experiments. He is also of the opinion that the problem in question could only be solved by experiments on human persons. (Feeble-minded could also be used as test material.)"

22 May 1941:

From a letter dated addressed to Dr. Rascher, and bearing the stamp of the Personal Staff of the Reichsfuehrer SS, and the initials, 'K Br' which initials are those of SS Sturmbannfuehrer Karl Brandt: "Dear Dr. Rascher: Shortly before flying to Oslo, the Reichsfuehrer SS gave me your letter of 15 May 1941 for partial reply. I can inform you that prisoners will, of course, be gladly made available for the high-flight researches. I have informed the Chief of the Security Police of this agreement of the Reichsfuehrer SS, and requested that the competent official be instructed to get in touch with you."

23 May 1941:

From a study prepared by the Economic Staff East, Group La, the Agricultural Group, under the direction of Goering; 'Economic Policy Directives for Economic Organization East, Agricultural Group’: "The surplus territories are situated in the black soil district (that is in the south and southeast) and in the Caucasus. The deficit areas are principally located in the forest zone of the North (podsol-soil district). Therefore, an isolation of the black soil areas will in any case place greater or lesser surpluses in these regions at our disposal. The consequences will be cessation of supplies to the entire forest zone, including the essential industrial centers of Moscow and Leningrad...1. All industry in the deficit area, particularly the manufacturing industries in the Moscow and Leningrad regions as well as the Ural industrial regions will be abandoned. It may be assumed that these regions today absorb an annual 5 to 10 million tons from the food production zone. 2. The Trans-Caucasian oil district will have to be excepted, although it is a deficit area. This source of oil, cotton, manganese, copper, silk, and tea must continue to be supplied with food in any case, for special political and economic reasons. 3. No further exception, with a view to preserving one or the other industrial region or industrial enterprise, must be permitted. 4. Industry can only be preserved insofar as it is located in the surplus region. This applies, apart from the above mentioned oil field regions in the Caucasus, particularly to the heavy industries in the Donets district (Ukraine). Only the future will show to what extent it will prove possible to maintain in full these industries, and in particular the Ukrainian manufacturing industries, after the withdrawal of the food surplus required by Germany. The following consequences result from this situation, which has received the approval of the highest authorities, since it is in accord with the political tendencies (preservation of the Little Russians, preservation of the Caucasus, of the Baltic provinces, of White Russia, to the prejudice of the Great Russians). I. For the forest zone: a) Production in the forest zone (the food-deficit area) will become 'naturalized,' similar to the events during the World War and the Communist tendencies of the war, and so forth -namely, agriculture in that territory will begin to become a mere 'home production.' The result will be that the planting of products destined for the market, such as flax and hemp in particular, will be discontinued; and the area used therefor will be taken over for products for the producer (grain, potatoes). Moreover, discontinuance of fodder deliveries to that area will lead to the collapse of the dairy production and of pig-producing in that territory. b) Germany is not interested in the maintenance of the productive power of these territories, except for supplying the troops stationed there. The population, as in the old days, will utilize their land for growing their own food. It is useless to expect grain or other surpluses to be produced. Only after many years can these extensive regions be intensified to an extent that they might produce genuine surpluses. The population of these areas, in particular the urban population, will have to face most serious distress from famine. It will be necessary to divert the population into the Siberian spaces. Since rail transport is out of the question, this too, will be an extremely difficult problem. c) In this situation, Germany will only draw substantial advantages by quick, non-recurrent seizure-that is, it will be vitally necessary to make the entire flax harvest available for German needs, not only the fibers but also the oleaginous seeds. It will also be necessary to utilize for German purposes the livestock which has no fodder base of its own-that is, it will be necessary to seize livestock holdings immediately and to make them available to the troops, not only for the moment but in the long run, and also for exportation to Germany. Since fodder supplies will be cut off, pig and cattle holdings in these areas will of necessity drastically decline in the near future. If they are not seized by the Germans at an early date, they will be slaughtered by the population for their own use, without Germany getting anything out of it...It has been demanded by the Fuehrer that the reduction of the meat ration should be ended by fall. This can only be achieved by the most drastic seizure of Russian livestock holdings, particularly in areas which are in a favorable transport situation in relation to Germany...In the future, southern Russia must turn its face towards Europe. Its food surpluses, however, can only be paid for if it purchases its industrial consumer goods from Germany or Europe. Russian competition from the forest zone must, therefore, be abolished. It follows from all that has been said that the German administration in these territories may well attempt to mitigate the consequences of the famine which undoubtedly will take place and to accelerate the return to primitive agricultural conditions. An attempt might be made to intensify cultivation in these areas by expanding the acreage under potatoes or other important food crops giving a high yield. However, these measures will not avert famine. Many tens of millions of people in this area will become redundant and will either die or have to emigrate to Siberia. Any attempt to save the population there from death by starvation, by importing surpluses from the black-soil zone, would be at the expense of supplies to Europe. It would reduce Germany's staying power in the war and would undermine Germany's and Europe's power to resist the blockade. This must be clearly and absolutely understood...I. Supplies for the Army: Germany's food situation in the third year of war demands, imperatively, that the Wehrmacht, in all its provisioning, must not live off Greater German territory or that of incorporated or friendly areas from which this territory receives imports. This minimum aim, the provisioning of the Wehrmacht from enemy territory in the third year and if necessary in later years, must be attained at any price. This means that one-third of the Wehrmacht must be fully provisioned by French deliveries to the army of occupation. The remaining two-thirds (and even slightly more in view of the present size of the Wehrmacht) must without exception be provisioned from the Eastern areas....Thus it is not important, under any circumstances, to preserve what has existed; but what matters is a deliberate turning away from the existing situation and introducing Russian food resources into the European framework. This will inevitably result in an extinction of industry as well as a large part of the people in what so far have been the food-deficit areas. It is impossible to state this alternative in sufficiently hard and severe terms...Our problem is not to replace intensive food production in Europe through the incorporation of new space in the East, but to replace imports from overseas by imports from the East. The task is two-fold: 1. We must use the Eastern areas for overcoming the food shortages during and after the war. This means that we must not be afraid of drawing upon the capital substance of the East. Such an intervention is much more acceptable from the European standpoint than drawing upon the capital substance of Europe's agriculture. 2. For the future New Order, the food-producing areas in the East must be turned into a permanent and substantial complementary source of food for Europe, through intensified cultivation and resulting higher yields. The first-named task must be accomplished at any price, even through the most ruthless cutting down of Russian domestic consumption, which will require discrimination between the consuming and producing zones."

25 May 1941:

From a letter from General Doyen, Delegate of the French authorities at the German Armistice Commission: "Wiesbaden, 25 May 1941. General de Corps d'Armee Doyen, President of the French Delegation at the German Armistice Commission, to General of Artillery Vogl, President of the German Armistice Commission. On several occasions, and notably in my letters Numbers 14,263/AE and 14,887/AE of 26 February and 8 March, I protested to you against the use made of French labor within the Todt Organization in the execution of military work on the coast of Brittany. I have today the duty of calling your attention to other cases in which the occupation authorities have had recourse to recruiting French civilians to carry out services of a strictly military character, cases which are even more grave than those which I have already called to your attention. If, indeed, as concerns the workers engaged by the Todt Organization, it may be argued that certain ones among them accepted voluntarily an employment for which they are being remunerated (although in practice most often they were not given the possibility of refusing this employment), this argument can by no means be invoked when the prefects themselves are obliged at the expense of the departments and the communities, to set up guard services at important points, such as bridges, tunnels, works of art, telephone lines, munitions depots, and areas surrounding aviation fields. The accompanying note furnishes some examples of the guard services which have thus been imposed upon Frenchmen, services which before this were assumed by the German Army and which normally fall to the latter, since it is a question of participating in watches or of preserving the German Army from risks arising from the state of war existing between Germany and Great Britain...I am instructed to lodge a formal protest with you against such practices and to beg you to intervene so that an immediate end may be put to this. On 16 November, in letter Number 7,843/A.E, I already protested against the ordinance that was decreed on 10 October 1940, by the Chief of the Military Administration in France, which provided the death penalty for any person failing to carry out or carrying out inadequately the tasks of surveillance imposed by the occupation authorities. I protested then that this demand, as well as the penalty, was contrary to the spirit of the Armistice Convention, the object of which was to relieve the French population from any participation in the hostilities..."

30 May 1941:
From official notes of the German naval war staff: "Duce demands urgently decisive offensive Egypt-Suez for fall 1941; 12 divisions needed for that. 'This stroke would be more deadly to the British Empire than the capture of London'; Chief, Naval Operations, agrees completely."

15 June 1941: From official notes of the German naval war staff: "On the proposal of Chief Naval Operations...use of arms against Russian submarines south of the northern boundary of the land warning area is permitted immediately; ruthless destruction is to be aimed at." From a letter by Keitel: "Offensive action against enemy submarines in the Baltic Sea. To: High Command of the Navy - OKM (SKL). Offensive action against submarines south of the line Memel-southern tip of land is authorized if the boats cannot be definitely identified as Swedish during the approach by German naval forces. The reason to be given up to B-day is that our naval forces believed to be dealing with penetrating British submarines."

10 July 1941:

From a radio speech by Fritzsche: ". . . finally to make the holy resolve to lend one's assistance in the final destruction of those who are capable of such dastardly acts...The Bolshevist agitators made no effort to deny that in towns, thousands, and in the villages, hundreds of corpses of men, women, and children have been found, who had been either killed or tortured to death. In spite of this Bolshevik agitators assert that this was not done by Soviet commissars but by German soldiers. But we know our German soldiers. No German women, fathers, or mothers require proofs that their husbands or their sons cannot have committed such atrocious acts."

16 July 1941:

From a top-secret memorandum (Prepared by Martin Bormann) of a conference at the Fuehrer's headquarters concerning the war in the East attended by Hitler, Lammers, Goering, Keitel, Rosenberg, and Bormann: "...A. Now it was essential that we did not publicize our aims before the world, also there was no need for that; but the main thing was that we ourselves knew what we wanted. By no means should we render our task more difficult by making superfluous declarations. Such declarations were superfluous because we could do everything wherever we had the power, and what was beyond our power we would not be able to do anyway. What we told the world about the motives for our measures ought to be conditioned, therefore, by tactical reasons. We ought to act here in exactly the same way as we did in the cases of Norway, Denmark, Holland, and Belgium. In these cases, too, we did not publish our aims; and it was only sensible to continue in the same way. Therefore, we shall emphasize again that we were forced to occupy, administer, and secure a certain area; it was in the interest of the inhabitants that we provided order, food, traffic, and so forth, hence our measures. Nobody shall be able to recognize that it initiates a final settlement. This need not prevent our taking all necessary measures-shooting, Resettling, etc. - and we shall take them. But we do not want to make any people our enemies prematurely and unnecessarily. Therefore we shall act as though we wanted to exercise a mandate only. At the same time we must know clearly that we shall never leave those countries. Our conduct therefore ought to be: 1) To do nothing which might obstruct the final settlement, but to prepare for it only in secret; 2) To emphasize that we are liberators. In particular: The Crimea has to be evacuated by all foreigners and to be settled by Germans only. In the same way the former Austrian part of Galicia will become Reich Territory. Our present relations with Romania are good, but nobody knows what they will be at any future time. This we have to consider, and we have to draw our frontiers accordingly. One ought not to be dependent on the good will of other people. We have to plan our relations with Romania in accordance with this principle. On principle, we have now to face the task of cutting up the giant cake according to our needs, in order to be able: First, to dominate it; second, to administer it; and third, to exploit it. The Russians have now ordered partisan warfare behind our front. This partisan war again has some advantage for us; it enables us to eradicate everyone who opposes us. Principles: Never again must it be possible to create a military power west of the Urals, even if we have to wage war for a hundred years in order to attain this goal. Every successor of the Fuehrer should know security for the Reich exists only if there are no foreign military forces west of the Urals. It is Germany who undertakes the protection of this area against all possible dangers. Our iron principle is and has to remain: We must never permit anybody but the Germans to carry arms...The Fuehrer emphasizes that the entire Baltic country will have to be incorporated into Germany. At the same time, the Crimea, including a considerable hinterland (situated north of the Crimea), should become Reich territory; the hinterland should be as large as possible. Rosenberg objects to this because of the Ukrainians living there. Note by Bormann: (Incidentally: It occurred to me several times that Rosenberg has a soft spot for the Ukrainians; thus he desires to aggrandize the former Ukraine to a considerable extent.) The Fuehrer emphasizes furthermore that the Volga colony, too, will have to become Reich territory, also the district around Baku; the latter will have to become a German concession (military colony)."

27 July 1941:

From an order signed by Keitel: "In accordance with the regulations concerning classified material the following offices will destroy all copies of the Fuehrer's decree of 13 May 1941... ...a) All of files up to the rank of 'general commands' inclusive b) group commands of the armored troops c) army commands and offices of equal rank, if there is an inevitable danger that they might fall into the hands of unauthorized persons. The validity of the decree is not affected by the destruction of the copies. In accordance with Paragraph III, it remains the personal responsibility of the commanding officers to see to it that the offices and legal advisers are instructed in time and that only the sentences are confirmed which correspond to the political intentions of the Supreme Command. This order will be destroyed together with the copies of the Fuehrer's decree."

31 July 1941:

From a letter from Goering to Heydrich: "Complementing the task that was assigned to you on 24 January 1939, which dealt with arriving at thorough furtherance of emigration and evacuation solution of the Jewish problem, as advantageous as possible, I hereby charge you to make all necessary organizational and practical preparations for bringing about a complete solution of the Jewish question in the German sphere of influence in Europe. Wherever other governmental agencies are involved, these are to cooperate with you. I charge you furthermore to send me, before long, an over-all plan concerning the organizational, factual, and material measures necessary for the accomplishment of the desired final solution of the Jewish question."

4 August 1941 Stalin to FDR:

"The USSR attaches great importance to the matter of neutralizing Finland and her association from Germany. The severance of relations between Britain and Finland and the blockade of Finland, announced by Britain, have already borne fruit and engendered conflicts among the ruling circles of Finland. If the US Government were to threaten Finland with a rupture of relations, the Finnish Government would be more resolute in the matter of breaking with Germany. In that case the Soviet Government could make certain territorial concessions to Finland with a view to assuaging her and conclude a new peace treaty with her."

13 August 1941:

From a letter from the Bishop of Limburg to the Reich Minister of Justice: "...About 8 kilometers from Limburg, in the little town of Hadamar, on a hill overlooking the town, there is an institution which had formerly served various purposes and of late had been used as a nursing home; this institution was renovated and furnished as a place in which, by consensus of opinion, the above-mentioned euthanasia has been systematically practiced for months, approximately since February 1941. The fact has become known beyond the administrative district of Wiesbaden, because death certificates from a Registry Hadamar Moenchberg are sent to the home communities...Several times a week buses arrive in Hadamar with a considerable number of such victims. School children of the vicinity know this vehicle and say, 'There comes the murder box again.' After the arrival of the vehicle, the citizens of Hadamar watch the smoke rise out of the chimney and are tortured with the ever-present thought of the miserable victims, especially when repulsive odors annoy them, depending on the direction of the wind. The effect of the principles at work here are: Children call each other names and say, 'You're crazy; you'll be sent to the baking oven in Hadamar.' Those who do not want to marry or find no opportunity say, 'Marry, never! Bring children into the world so they can be put into the bottling machine!' You hear old folks say, 'Don't send me to a state hospital! After the feeble-minded have been finished off, the next useless eaters whose turn will come are the old people.' ...The population cannot grasp that systematic actions are carried out which, in accordance with Paragraph 211 of the German criminal code, are punishable with death! Officials of the Secret State Police, it is said, are trying to suppress discussion of the Hadamar occurrences by means of severe threats. In the interest of public peace this may be well intended, But the knowledge and the conviction and the indignation of the population cannot be changed by it; the conviction will be increased with the bitter realization that discussion is prohibited with threats but that the actions themselves are not prosecuted under penal law."

15 August 1941 FDR and Churchill to Stalin:

"We have taken the opportunity afforded by the consideration of the report of Mr. Harry Hopkins on his return from Moscow to consult together as to how best our two countries can help your country in the splendid defense that you are putting up against the Nazi attack…The needs and demands of your and our armed services can only be determined in the light of the full knowledge of the many facts which we must take into consideration in the decisions that we take. In order that all of us may be in a position to arrive at speedy decisions as to the apportionment of our joint resources, we suggest that we prepare a meeting which should be held at Moscow, to which we would send high representatives who could discuss these matters directly with you. If this conference appeals to you, we want you to know that pending the decisions of that conference we shall continue to send supplies and materials as rapidly as possible. We realize fully how vitally important to the defeat of Hitlerism is the brave and steadfast resistance of the Soviet Union and we feel therefore that we must not in any circumstances fail to act quickly and immediately in this matter of planning the program for the future allocation of our joint resources."

16 September 1941:

From an order issued by Keitel at Hitler's direction: "Subject: Communist insurrection in occupied territories. 1. Since the beginning of the campaign against Soviet Russia, Communist insurrection movements have broken out everywhere in the area occupied by Germany. The type of action taken is growing from propaganda measures and attacks on individual members of the Armed Forces into open rebellion and widespread guerilla warfare. It can be seen that this is a mass movement centrally directed by Moscow, which is also responsible for the apparently trivial isolated incidents in areas which up to now have been otherwise quiet. In view of the many political and economic crises in the occupied areas, it must, moreover, be anticipated that nationalist and other circles will make full use of this opportunity of making difficulties for the German occupying forces by associating themselves with the Communist insurrection. This creates an increasing danger to the German war effort, which shows itself chiefly in general insecurity for the occupying troops, and has already led to the withdrawal of forces to the main centers of disturbance. 2. The measures taken up to now to deal with this general Communist insurrection movement have proved inadequate. The Fuehrer has now given orders that we take action everywhere with the most drastic means, in order to crush the movement in the shortest possible time. Only this course, which has always been followed successfully throughout the history of the extension of influence of great peoples, can restore order. 3. Action taken in this matter should be in accordance with the following general directions: a. It should be inferred in every case of resistance to the German occupying forces, no matter what the individual circumstances, that it is of Communist origin. b. In order to nip these machinations in the bud the most drastic measures should be taken immediately and on the first indication, so that the authority of the occupying forces may be maintained and further spreading prevented. In this connection it should be remembered that a human life in the countries concerned frequently counts for nothing, and a deterrent effect can be attained only by unusual severity. The death penalty for 50-100 Communists should generally be regarded in these cases as suitable atonement for one German soldier's death. The way in which sentence is carried out should still further increase the deterrent effect. The reverse course of action, that of imposing relatively lenient penalties and of being content, for purposes of deterrence, with the threat of more severe measures does not accord with these principles and shall not be followed...The commanding officers in the occupied territories shall see to it that these principles are made known without delay to all military establishments concerned in dealing with Communist measures of insurrection."

16 September 1941:

Goering, at a meeting of German military officials concerned with the better exploitation of the occupied territories for the German food economy: "In the occupied territories on principle only those people are to be supplied with an adequate amount of food who work for us. Even if one wanted to feed all the other inhabitants, one could not do it in the newly occupied Eastern areas. It is, therefore, wrong to funnel off food supplies for this purpose if it is done at the expense of the Army and necessitates increased supplies from home."

19 September 1941:

"Appeal to the population of occupied territories. On 21 August a German soldier was fired on and killed by cowardly murderers. In consequence I ordered on 23 August that hostages be taken, and threatened to have a certain number of them' shot in case such an assault should be repeated. New crimes have obliged me to put this threat into execution. In spite of this, new assaults have taken place. I recognize that the great majority of the population is conscious of its duty, which is to help the authorities in their unremitting effort to maintain calm and order in the country in the interest of this population. But among you there are agents paid by powers hostile to Germany, Communist criminal elements who have only one aim, which is to sow discord between the occupying power and the French population. These elements are completely indifferent to the consequences, affecting the entire population, which result from their activity. I will no longer allow the lives of German soldiers to be threatened by these murderers. I shall stop at no measure, however rigorous, in order to fulfill my duty. But it is likewise my duty to make the whole population responsible for the fact that, up to the present, it has not yet been possible to lay hands on the cowardly murderers and to impose upon them the penalty which they deserve. That is why I have found it necessary, first of all for Paris, to take measures which, unfortunately, will hinder the everyday life of the entire population. Frenchmen, it depends on you whether I am obliged to render these measures more severe or whether they can be suspended again. I appeal to you all, to your administration and to your police, to cooperate by your extreme vigilance and your active personal intervention in the arrest of the guilty. It is necessary, by anticipating and denouncing these criminal activities, to avoid the creation of a critical situation which would plunge the country into misfortune. He who fires in ambush on German soldiers, who are doing only their duty here and who are safeguarding the maintenance of a normal life, is not a patriot but a cowardly assassin and the enemy of all decent people. Frenchmen! I count on you to understand these measures which I am taking in your own interests also."-Signed "Von Stulpnagel."

30 September 1941:

From general orders of Keitel, better known in France under the name of "hostages code," which repeats and specifies in detail the previous order, namely that of 23 August 1941: "1. On 22 August 1941, I issued the following announcement: "'On the morning of 21 August 1941, a member of the German Armed Forces was killed in Paris as a result of a murderous attack. I therefore order that: I. All Frenchmen held in custody of whatever kind, by the German authorities or on behalf of German authorities in France, are to be considered as hostages as from 23 August. If any further incident occurs, a number of these hostages are to, be shot, to be determined according to the gravity of the attempt.' 2. On 19 September 1941 by an announcement to the Plenipotentiary of the French Government attached to the Military Commander in France, I ordered that, as from 19 September 1941, all French males who are under arrest of any kind by the French authorities or who are taken into custody because of Communist or anarchistic agitation are to be kept under arrest by the French authorities also on behalf of the Military Commander in France. 3. On the basis of my notification of the 22d of August 1941 and of my order of the 19th of September 1941 the following groups of persons are therefore hostages: (a) All Frenchmen who are kept in detention of any kind whatsoever by the German authorities, such as police custody, imprisonment on remand, or penal detention. (b) All Frenchmen who are kept in detention of any kind whatsoever by the French authority on behalf of the German, authorities. This group includes: (aa) All Frenchmen who are kept in detention of any kind whatsoever by the French authorities because of Communist or anarchist activities. (bb) All Frenchmen on whom the French penal authorities impose prison terms at the request of the German military courts and which the latter consider justified. (cc) All Frenchmen who are arrested and kept in custody by the French authorities upon demand of the German authorities or who are being handed over by the Germans to French authorities with the order to keep them under arrest. (c) Stateless inhabitants who have already been living for some time in France are to be considered as Frenchmen within the meaning of my notification of the 22d of August 1941'. "III. Release from detention. Persons who were not yet in custody on 22 August 1941 or on 19 September 1941 but who were arrested later or are still being arrested are hostages as from the date of detention if the other conditions apply to them. The release of arrested persons authorized on account of expiration of sentences, lifting of the order for arrest, or for other reasons will not be affected by my announcement of 22 August 1941. Those released are no longer hostages. In as far as persons are in custody of any kind with the French authorities for Communist or anarchist activity, their release is possible only with my approval as I have informed the French Government.... VI. Lists of hostages. If an incident occurs which according to my announcement of 22 August 1941 necessitates the shooting of hostages, the execution must immediately follow the order. The district commanders, therefore, must select for their own districts from the total number of prisoners (hostages es) those who, from a practical point of view, may be considered for execution and enter them on a list of hostages. These lists of hostages serve as a basis for the proposals to be submitted to me in the case of an execution. I. According to the observations made so far, the perpetrators of outrages originate from Communist or anarchist terror gangs. The district commanders are, therefore, to select from those in detention (hostages), those persons who, because of their Communist or anarchist views in the past or their positions in such organizations or their former attitude in other ways, are most suitable for execution. In making the selection it should be borne in mind that the better known the hostages to be shot, the greater will be the deterrent effect on the perpetrators, themselves, and on those persons who, in France or abroad, bear the moral responsibility--as instigators or by their propaganda-for acts of terror and sabotage. Experience shows that the instigators and the political circles interested in these plots are not concerned about the life of obscure followers, but are more likely to be concerned about the lives of their own former officials. Consequently, we must place at the head of these lists: (a) Former deputies and officials of Communist or anarchist organizations. (b) Persons (intellectuals) who have supported the spreading of Communist ideas by word of mouth or writing. (c) Persons who have proved by their attitude that they are particularly dangerous. (d) Persons who have collaborated in the distribution of leaflets... 2. Following the same directives, a list of hostages is to be prepared from the prisoners with De Gaullist sympathies. 3. Racial Germans of French nationality who are imprisoned for Communist or anarchist activity may be included in the list. Special attention must be drawn to their German origin on the attached form. Persons who have been condemned to death but who have been pardoned may also be included in the lists.... ...5. The lists have to record for each district about 150 persons and for the Greater Paris Command about 300 to 400 people. The district chiefs should always record on their lists those persons who had their last residence or permanent domicile in their districts, because the persons to be executed should, as far as possible, be taken from the district where the act was committed.... "The lists are to be kept up to date. Particular attention is to be paid to new arrests and releases.' ...VII. Proposals for executions: In case of an incident which necessitates the shooting of hostages, within the meaning of my announcement of 22 August 1941, the district chief in whose territory the incident happened is to select from the list of hostages persons whose execution he wishes to propose to me. In making the selection he must, from the personal as well as local point of view, draw from persons belonging to a circle which presumably includes the guilty...For execution, only those persons who were already under arrest at the time of the crime may be proposed. The proposal must contain the names and number of the persons proposed for execution, that is, in the order in which the choice is recommended...When the bodies are buried, the burial of a large number in a common grave in the same cemetery is to be avoided, in order not to create places of pilgrimage which, now or later, might form centers for anti-German propaganda. Therefore, if necessary, burials must be carried out in various places."

3 October 1941 Stalin to FDR:

"…I have no doubt that you will do all that is necessary to ensure implementation of the Moscow Conference decisions as speedily and fully as possible, all the more because the Hitlerites will certainly try to use the winter months for exerting maximum pressure upon the USSR at the front. Like you, I am confident of final victory over Hitler for the countries now joining their efforts to accelerate the elimination of bloody Hitlerism, a goal for which the Soviet Union is now making such big and heavy sacrifices."

7 October 1941:

From a top secret order of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces signed by Jodl: "...The Fuehrer has again decided that a capitulation of Leningrad or, later, of Moscow is not to be accepted even if it is offered by the enemy...Therefore, no German soldier is to enter these cities. By our fire we must force all who try to leave the city through our lines to turn back. The exodus of the population through the smaller, unguarded gaps toward the interior of Russia is only to be welcomed. Before the cities are taken, they are to be weakened by artillery fire and air attacks, and their population should be caused to flee. We cannot take the responsibility of endangering our soldiers' lives in order to save Russian cities from fire, nor that of feeding the population of these cities at the expense of the German homeland...All commanding officers shall be informed of this will of the Fuehrer..."

9 October 1941:

From a radio speech by Fritzsche: "Today we can only say: Blitzkrieg or not, this German thunderstorm has cleansed the atmosphere of Europe. Certainly it is quite true that the dangers threatening us were eliminated one after the other with lightning speed but in these lightning blows which shattered England's allies on the continent, we saw not a proof of the weakness, but a proof of the strength and superiority of the Fuehrer's gift as a statesman and military leader; a proof of the German peoples' might; we saw the proof that no opponent can rival the courage, discipline, and readiness for sacrifice displayed by the German soldier, and we are particularly grateful for these lightning, incomparable victories, because-as the Fuehrer emphasized last Friday-they give us the possibility of embarking on the organization of Europe and on the lifting of the treasures of this old continent, already now in the middle of war, without its being necessary for millions and millions of German soldiers to be on guard, fighting day and night along this or that threatened frontier; and the possibilities of this continent are so rich that they suffice to supply all needs in peace or war."

10 October 1941:

From a directive, by Field Marshal Von Reichenau, Commander in-Chief (Oberbefehlshaber) of the German 6th Army then operating on the Eastern Front: "Subject: Conduct of troops in Eastern Territories. Regarding the conduct of troops towards the Bolshevistic system, vague ideas are still prevalent in many cases. The most essential aim of war against the Jewish-Bolshevistic system is a complete destruction of their means of power and the elimination of Asiatic influence from the European culture. In this connection the troops are facing tasks which exceed the one-sided routine of soldiering. The soldier in the Eastern Territories is not merely a fighter according to the rules of the art of war, but also a bearer of ruthless national ideology and the avenger of bestialities which have been inflicted upon German and racially related nations. Therefore, the soldier must have full understanding for the necessity of a severe but just revenge on subhuman Jewry. The Army has to aim at another purpose, that is the annihilation of revolts in the hinterland, which as experience proves, have always been caused by Jews. The combating of the enemy behind the front line is still not being taken seriously enough. Treacherous, cruel partisans and unnatural women are still being made prisoners of war; and guerilla fighters dressed partly in uniforms or plain clothes and vagabonds are still being treated as proper soldiers and sent to prisoner-of-war camps. In fact, captured Russian officers talk even mockingly about Soviet agents moving openly about the roads and very often eating at German field kitchens. Such an attitude of the troops can only be explained by complete thoughtlessness, so it is now high time for the commanders to clarify the meaning of the present struggle. The feeding of the natives and of prisoners of war who are not working for the Armed Forces from army kitchens is an equally misunderstood humanitarian act, as is the giving of cigarettes and bread. Things which the people at home can spare under great sacrifices and things which are being brought by the command to the front under great difficulties should not be given to the enemy by the soldier, not even if they originate from booty. It is an important part of our supply. When retreating the Soviets have often set buildings on fire. The troops should be interested in extinguishing fires only as far as it is necessary to secure sufficient numbers of billets. Otherwise, the disappearance of symbols of the former Bolshevistic rule, even in the form of buildings, is part of the struggle of destruction. Neither historic nor artistic considerations are of any importance in the Eastern Territories. The command issues the necessary directives for the securing of raw materials and plants essential for war economy. The complete disarming of the civil population in the rear of the fighting troops is imperative, considering the long and vulnerable lines of communication. Where possible, captured weapons and ammunition should be stored and guarded. Should this be impossible because of the situation, the weapons and ammunition will be rendered useless. If isolated partisans are found using firearms in the rear of the Army, drastic measures are to be taken. These measures will be extended to that part of the male population who were in a position to hinder or report the attacks. The indifference of numerous allegedly anti-Soviet elements, which originates from a 'wait-and-see' attitude, must give way to a clear decision for active collaboration. If not, no one can complain about being judged and treated as a member of the Soviet system. The fear of the German counter measures must be stronger than the threats of the wandering Bolshevistic remnants. Being far from all political considerations of the future, the soldier has to fulfill two tasks: 1. Complete annihilation of the false Bolshevistic doctrine of the Soviet State and its armed forces. 2. The pitiless extermination of alien treachery and cruelty and thus the protection of the lives of German military personnel in Russia. This is the only way to fulfill our historic task to liberate the German people once and forever from the Asiatic-Jewish danger. Signed: Von Reichenau, Oberbefehlshaber."

15 October 1941:

From a report of Einsatzgruppe A, covering the period up to 15 October 1941: "...EinsatzGroup A, after preparing their vehicles for action, proceeded to their area of concentration as ordered on 23 June 1941, the second day of the campaign in the East. Army Group North, consisting of the 16th and 18th Armies and Panzer Group 4, had started the advance the day before. Our task was to establish hurriedly personal contact with the commanders of the armies and with the commander of the army rear area. It must be stressed from the beginning that cooperation with the Armed Forces was generally good; in some cases, for instance with Panzer Group 4 under Colonel General Hoppner, it was very close and almost cordial. Misunderstandings which cropped up with some authorities in the first days were cleared up mainly through personal discussions...Similarly, native anti-Semitic forces were induced to start pogroms against Jews during the first hours after the entry, though this inducement proved to be very difficult. Following our orders the Security Police was determined to solve the Jewish question with all possible means and most decisively. But it was desirable that the Security Police should not put in an immediate appearance, at least in the beginning, since the extraordinarily harsh measures were apt to stir even German circles. It had to be shown to the world that the native population itself took the first action by way of natural reaction against the suppression by Jews during several decades and against the terror exercised by the Communists during the preceding period...After the failure of purely military activities, such as the placing of sentries and combing through the newly occupied territories with whole divisions, even the Armed Forces had to look out for new methods. The Einsatz group undertook the search for new methods as an essential task. Soon, therefore, the Armed Forces adopted the experiences of the Security Police and their methods of combating the partisans. For details I refer to the numerous reports concerning the struggle against the partisans...Instigation of self-cleansing actions: Considering that the population of the Baltic countries had suffered very heavily under the government of bolshevism and Jewry while they were incorporated in the USSR, it was to be expected that after the liberation from that foreign government, they (that is, the population themselves) would render harmless most of the enemies left behind after the retreat of the Red Army. It had to be the duty of the Security Police to set in motion these self-cleansing movements and to direct them into the correct channels in order to accomplish the purpose of the cleansing operations as quickly as possible. It was no less important, in view of the future, to establish the unshakeable and provable fact that the liberated population themselves took the most severe measures against the bolshevist and Jewish enemy quite on their own, so that the direction by German authorities couldn't be found out. In Lithuania this was achieved for the first time by partisan activities in Kovno. To our surprise it was not easy, at first, to set in motion an extensive pogrom against the Jews. Klimatis, the leader of the partisan unit mentioned above, who was used for this purpose primarily, succeeded in starting a pogrom on the basis of advice given to him by a small advanced detachment acting in Kovno and in such a way that no German order or German instigation was noticed from the outside. During the first pogrom in the night from 25 to 26 June, the Lithuanian partisans did away with more than 1,500 Jews, setting fire to several synagogues or destroying them, by other means and burning down a Jewish dwelling district consisting of about 60 houses. During the following nights 2,300 Jews were eliminated in a similar way. In other parts of Lithuania similar actions followed the example of Kovno, though smaller and extending to the Communists who had been left behind. These self-cleansing actions went smoothly because the Army authorities, who had been informed, showed understanding for this procedure. From the beginning it was obvious that only the first days after the occupation would offer the opportunity for carrying out pogroms. After the disarmament of the partisans the self-cleansing actions ceased necessarily...Occasionally the conditions prevailing in the lunatic asylums necessitated operations of the Security Police. Many institutions had been robbed by the retreating Russians of their whole food supply. Often the guard and nursing personnel had fled. The inmates of several institutions broke out and became a danger to the general security; therefore, in Aglona (Lithuania) 544 lunatics, in Mariampol (Lithuania) 109 lunatics, and in Mogutowo, near Luga, 95 lunatics were liquidated...In some cases authorities of the Armed Forces asked us to clean out, in a similar way, other institutions which were wanted as billets. However, as interests of the Security Police did not require any intervention, it was left to the authorities of the Armed Forces to take the necessary action with their own forces...When it was decided to extend the German operations to Leningrad and also to extend the activities of Einsatz Group A to this town, I gave orders on 18 July 1941, to parts of Einsatzkommandos 2 and 3 and to the staff of the group to advance to Novosselje, in order to prepare these activities and to be able to advance as early as possible into the area around Leningrad and into the city itself. The advance of the forces of Einsatz Group A, which were intended to be used for Leningrad, was effected in agreement with and on the express wish of Panzer Group 4...Einsatzkommandos of Einsatz Group A of the Security Police participated from the beginning in the fight against the nuisance created by partisans. Close collaboration with the Armed Forces and the exchange of experiences which were collected in the fight against partisans, brought about a thorough knowledge of the origin, organization, strength, equipment and system used by the Red partisans as time went on."

21 October 1941:

A copy of the notice in the newspaper Le Phare: "Notice. Cowardly criminals in the pay of England and of Moscow killed, with shots in the back, the Feldkommandant of Nantes on the morning of 20 October 1941. Up to now the assassins have not been arrested. As expiation for this crime I have ordered that 50 hostages be shot to begin with. Because of the gravity of the crime, 50 more hostages will be shot in case the guilty should not be arrested between now and 23 October 1941 by midnight." Note: After the attack on two German officers at Nantes on 20 October 1941 and in Bordeaux a few days later, the German Army decided to make an example.

22 October 1941:

From notes made at the time by The Abbe Moyon: "It was on a beautiful autumn day. The temperature was particularly mild. There had been lovely sunshine since morning. Everyone in town was going about his usual business. There was great animation in the town for it was Wednesday, which was market day. The population knew from the newspapers and from the information it had received from Nantes that a superior officer had been killed in a street in Nantes but refused to believe that such savage and extensive reprisals would be applied. At Choisel Camp the German authorities had, for some days, put into special quarters a certain number of men who were to serve as hostages in case of special difficulties. It was from among these men that those who were to be shot on this evening of 22 October 1941 were chosen. The Cure of Bere was finishing his lunch when M. Moreau Chief of Choisel Camp presented himself. In a few words the latter explained to him the object of his visit. Having been delegated by M. Lecornu, the subprefect of Chateaubriant. he had come to inform him that 27 men selected among the political prisoners of Choisel were going to be executed that afternoon; and he asked Monsieur Le Cure to go immediately to attend them. The priest said he was ready to accomplish this mission, and he went to the prisoners without delay. When the priest appeared to carry out his mission, the subprefect was already among the condemned. He came to announce the horrible fate which was awaiting them, asking them to write letters of farewell to their families without delay. It was under these circumstances that the priest presented himself at the entrance to the quarters... Suddenly there was the sound of automobile engines. The door, which I had shut at the beginning so that we might be more private, was abruptly opened and French constables carrying handcuffs appeared. A German officer arrived. He was actually a chaplain. He said to me, 'Monsieur le Cure, your mission has been accomplished and you must withdraw immediately."' Access to the quarry where the execution took place was absolutely forbidden to all Frenchmen. I only know that the condemned were executed in three groups of nine men, that all the men who were shot refused to have their eyes bound, that young Mocquet fainted and fell, and that the last cry which sprang from the lips of these heroes was an ardent 'Vive la France."

23 October 1941:

"To the Prefect of the Gironde, Bordeaux: As expiation for the cowardly murder of the Councillor of War, Reimers, the Military Commander in France has ordered 50 hostages to be executed. The execution will take place tomorrow. In case the murderers should not be arrested in the very near future, additional measures will be taken, as in the case of Nantes. I have the honor of making this decision known to you. Chief of the Military Regional Administration,"-signed" Von Faber Du Faur."

28 October 1941:

From a directive of the 8th Military District: "Re: Soviet Russian prisoners of war. The following arrangements were decided during a conference of the OKW: 1. Blankets. The Soviet Russians will receive paper blankets, which they will have to manufacture themselves, in the form of quilts, from paper tissue, filled with crumpled paper and similar material. The material will be procured by the OKW...Burial of Soviet Russians: Soviet prisoners of war are to be buried naked, without a coffin, wrapped in packing paper. Coffins will be used only for transports. In the labor commands the burial will be attended to by the competent authorities. Burial expenses will be met by the competent M-Stalag for prisoners of war. The stripping of the bodies will be done by the camp guards. Signed: by order, Grossekettler."

30 October 1941:

From a report from the Commissioner General of Sluzk to the Commissioner General of Minsk: "On 27 October, in the morning at about 8 o'clock, a first lieutenant of the Police Battalion Number 11, from Kovno, Lithuania, appeared and introduced himself as the adjutant of the battalion commander of the Security Police. The first lieutenant explained that the police battalion had received the assignment to effect the liquidation of all Jews here in the town of Sluzk within 2 days. The battalion commander with his battalion in strength of four companies, two of which were made up of Lithuanian partisans, was on the march here and the action would have to begin instantly. I replied to the first lieutenant that I had to discuss the action in any case first with the commander. About half an hour later the police battalion arrived in Sluzk. Immediately after the arrival a conference with the battalion commander took place according to my request. I first explained to the commander that it would not very well be possible to effect the action without previous preparation, because everybody had been sent to work and that it would lead to terrible confusion. At least it would have been his duty to inform me a day ahead of time. Then I requested him to postpone the action 1 day. However, he refused this with the remark that he had to carry out this action everywhere in all towns and that only 2 days were allotted for Sluzk. Within those 2 days the town of Sluzk had by all means to be cleared of Jews. For the rest, as regards the execution of the action, I must point out, to my deepest regret, that the latter almost bordered on sadism. The town itself during the action offered a picture of horror. With indescribable brutality on the part both of the German police officers and particularly of the Lithuanian partisans, the Jewish people, and also with them White Ruthenians, were taken out of their dwellings and herded together. Everywhere in the town shots were to be heard, and in different streets the corpses of Jews who had been shot accumulated. The White Ruthenians were in the greatest anguish to free themselves from the encirclement. In addition to the fact that the Jewish people, among whom were also artisans, were barbarously maltreated in sight of the White Ruthenian people, the White Ruthenians themselves were also beaten with clubs and riflebutts. It was no longer a question of an action against the Jews. It looked much more like a revolution...In conclusion, I find myself obliged to point out that the police battalion looted in an unheard-of manner during the action and that not only in Jewish houses but equally in those of the White Ruthenians. Anything of use, such as boots, leather, cloth, gold and other valuables, was taken away. According to statements of the troops, watches were torn off the arms of Jews openly on the street and rings pulled off their fingers in the most brutal manner. A disbursing officer reported that a Jewish girl was asked by the police to obtain immediately 5,000 rubles to have her father released. This girl is said actually to have run about everywhere to obtain the money...I am submitting this report in duplicate so that one copy may be forwarded to the Reich Minister. Peace and order cannot be maintained in White Ruthenia with methods of that sort. To have buried alive seriously wounded people, who then worked their way out of their graves again, is such extreme beastliness that this incident as such must be reported to the Fuehrer and the Reich Marshal. The civil administration of White Ruthenia makes every effort to win the population over to Germany, in accordance with the instructions of the Fuehrer. These efforts cannot be brought into harmony with the methods described here."

31 October 1941:

From a secret memorandum issued from Hitler's headquarters: "The lack of workers is becoming an increasingly dangerous hindrance for the future German war and armament industry. The expected relief through releases from the Armed Forces is uncertain as to the extent and date; its probable extent will by no means correspond to expectations and requirements in view of the great demand. The Fuehrer has now ordered that even the manpower of the Russian prisoners of war should be utilized to a large extent by large-scale assignments for the requirements of the war industry. The prerequisite for production is adequate nourishment. Also very small wages to provide a few every-day necessities must be offered with additional premiums for special effort, as the case may be...II.Construction and armament industry. (a) Work units for construction of all kinds, particularly for the fortification of coastal defenses (concrete workers, unloading units for essential war plants). (b) Suitable armament factories which are to be selected in such a way that their personnel will consist in the majority of prisoners of war under guidance and supervision (upon withdrawal and other employment of the German workers). III. Other war industries. (a)Mining as under II (b) Railroad construction units for building tracks, etc. (c) Agriculture and forestry in closed units. The utilization of Russian prisoners of war is to be regulated on the basis of the above examples: The Reich Minister for Armament and Munitions and the Inspector General for the German Road System in agreement with the ReichMinister for Labor and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (Economic Armament Office). Deputies of the Reich Minister for Armament and Munitions are to be admitted to the prisoner-of-warcamps to assist in the selection of skilled workers."

4 November 1941:

Stalin to FDR: "…Your decision, Mr. President, to grant the Soviet Union an interest-free loan to the value of $1,000,000,000 to meet deliveries of munitions and raw materials to the Soviet Union is accepted by the Soviet Government with heartfelt gratitude as vital aid to the Soviet Union in its tremendous and onerous struggle against our common enemy - bloody Hitlerism. On instructions from the Government of the USSR I express complete agreement with the terms for granting the loan, repayment of which shall begin five years after the end of the war and continue over 10 years after expiration of the five-year period. The Soviet Government is ready to do everything to supply the United States of America with such commodities and raw materials as are available and as the United States may need. As regards your wish, Mr. President, that direct personal contact be established between you and me without delay if circumstances so require, I gladly join you in that wish and am ready, for my part, to do all in my power to bring it about."

5 November 1941:

From a letter from Bormann addressed to all Reichsleiter, Gauleiter, and Kreisleiter: "To save costs, service departments of the Army will generally be contacted regarding transport of corpses (furnishing of vehicles) whenever possible. No coffins will be indented for the transfer and burial. The body will be completely enveloped with strong paper (if possible, oil, tar, asphalt paper) or other suitable material. Transfer and burial is to be carried out unobtrusively. If a number of corpses have to be disposed of, the burial will be carried out in a communal grave. In this case, the bodies will be buried side by side (not on top of each other) and in accordance with the local custom regarding depth of graves. Where a graveyard is the place of burial a distant part will be chosen. No-we repeat-No burial ceremony or decoration of graves will be allowed."

6 November 1941:

FDR to Stalin: "I am happy to inform you that medical supplies…will be provided as rapidly as these supplies can be purchased and shipped, less such portion thereof as the British may supply….The American Red Cross is prepared to provide approximately one-third of the total list at an approximate cost of $5,000,000 as a gift of the American people…The Red Cross is also transmitting a message…pointing out the importance of reasonable observation by the American Red Cross representative of the distribution made of its supplies subject, of course, to all appropriate military considerations. I would deeply appreciate it if your Government can assure me that the desired arrangements are acceptable…"

7 November 1941:

Goering, at a conference at the Air Ministry: "The Fuehrer's point of view as to employment of prisoners of war in war industries has changed basically. So far a total of 5 million prisoners of war-employed so far 2 million. In the interior and the Protectorate it would be ideal if entire factories could be manned by Russian prisoners of war except the employees necessary for directing. For employment in the interior and the Protectorate the following are to have priority: (a) At the top, the coal mining industry. Order by the Fuehrer to investigate all mines as to suitability for employment of Russians, in some instances manning the entire plant with Russian laborers. (b) Transportation (construction of locomotives and cars, repair shops,et cetera). Railroad-repair and factory workers are to be sought out from the prisoners of war. Rail is the most important means of transportation in the East. (c) Armament industries. Preferably factories of armor and guns. Possibly also construction of parts for aircraft engines. Suitable complete sections of factories to be manned exclusively by Russians if possible. For the remainder, employment in groups. Use in factories of tool machinery, production of farm tractors, generators, etc. In emergency, erect in some places barracks for casual workers who are used in unloading units and for similar purposes. (Reich Minister of the Interior through communal authorities.) OKW/AWA is competent for procuring Russian prisoners of war. Employment through Planning Board for employment of all prisoners of war. If necessary, offices of Reich commissariats. No employment where danger to men or supply exists, that is, factories exposed to explosives, waterworks, powerworks, etc. No contact with German population, especially no 'solidarity.' German worker as a rule is foreman of Russians. Food is a matter of the Four Year Plan. Procurement of special food (cats,horses, etc. Clothes, billeting, messing somewhat better than at home where part of the people live in caves. Supply of shoes for Russians; as a rule wooden shoes, if necessary install Russian shoe repair shops. Examination of physical fitness in order to avoid importation of diseases. Clearing of mines as a rule by Russians; if possible by selected Russian engineer troops."

9 November 1941:

From a memorandum entitled 'Transportation of Russian Prisoners of War, destined for Execution, into the Concentration Camps’: "The commandants of the concentration camps are complaining that 5 to 10 percent of the Soviet Russians destined for execution are arriving in the camps dead or half dead. Therefore the impression has arisen that the Stalags are getting rid of such prisoners in this way. It was particularly noted that when marching, for example, from the railroad station to the camp a rather large number of PW's collapsed on the way from exhaustion, either dead or half dead, and had to be picked up by a truck following the convoy. It cannot be prevented that the German people take notice of these occurrences. Even if the transportation to the camps is generally taken care of by the Wehrmacht, the population will attribute this situation to the SS. In order to prevent, if possible, similar occurrences in the future, I therefore order that, effective from today on, Soviet Russians declared definitely suspect and obviously marked by death (for example with hunger-typhus) and therefore not able to withstand the exertions of even a short march on foot shall in the future, as a matter of basic principle, be excluded from the transport into the concentration camps for execution."

3 December 1941:

From the diary of Mussolini's son-in-law, Count Galeazzo Ciano, Foreign Minister of Italy: "Sensational move by Japan. The Ambassador asks for an audience with the Duce and reads him a long statement on the progress of the negotiations with America, concluding with the assertion that they have reached a dead end. Then invoking the appropriate clause in the Tripartite Pact, he asks that Italy declare war on America immediately after the outbreak of hostilities and proposes the signing of an agreement not to conclude a separate peace. The interpreter translating this request was trembling like a leaf. The Duce gave fullest assurances, reserving the right to confer with Berlin before giving a reply. The Duce was pleased with the communication and said, 'We are now on the brink of the intercontinental war which I predicted as early as September 1939.' What does this new event mean? In any case it means that Roosevelt has succeeded in his maneuver. Since he could not enter the war immediately and directly, he entered it indirectly by letting himself be attacked by Japan. Furthermore, this event also means that every prospect of peace is becoming further and further removed and that it is now easy-much too easy-to predict a long war. Who will be able to hold out longest? It is on this basis that the problem must be considered. Berlin's answer will be somewhat delayed because Hitler has gone to the southern Front to see General Kleist, whose armies continue to give way under the pressure of an unexpected Soviet Offensive."

4 December 1941:

From the diary of Count Galeazzo Ciano, Foreign Minister of Italy: "Berlin's reaction to the Japanese move is extremely cautious. Perhaps they will accept because they cannot get out of it, but the idea of provoking America's intervention pleases the Germans less and less. Mussolini, on the other hand, is pleased about it."

5 December 1941:

From the diary of Count Galeazzo Ciano, Foreign Minister of Italy,: "A night interrupted by Ribbentrop's restlessness. After delaying 2 days, now he cannot wait a minute to answer the Japanese; and at three in the morning he sent Mackensen to my house to submit a plan for a triple agreement relative to Japanese intervention and the pledge not to make a separate peace. He wanted me to awaken the Duce, but I did not do so, and the latter was very glad I had not."

8 December 1941:

From the diary of Count Galeazzo Ciano, Foreign Minister of Italy: "A night telephone call from Ribbentrop. He is overjoyed about the Japanese attack on America. He is so happy about it that I am happy with him, though I am not too sure about the final advantages of what has happened. One thing is now certain, that America will enter the conflict and that the conflict will be so long that she will be able to realize all her potential forces. This morning I told this to the Ding who had been pleased about the event. He ended by admitting that, in the long run, I may be right. Mussolini was happy, too. For a long time he has favored a definite clarification of relations between America and the Axis."

10 December 1941

From an order to the 512th German Infantry Regiment: "...A zone which, in view of the circumstances, is to be evacuated, upon withdrawal of the troops should present a desert zone. In order to carry out a complete destruction, all the houses shall be burned. To this end they should first be filled with straw, particularly stone houses. Structures of stone are to be blown up, particularly cellars. Measures for the creation of desert zones…are to be prepared beforehand and carried out ruthlessly and in their entirety...In razing our towns and villages, the German command demands of its troops that a desert zone be created in all Soviet localities from which the invaders are successfully expelled by the Red Army."

13 December 1941:

From a letter from the Military Commander addressed to the General Delegate of the French Government: "The General Secretariat of Youth has informed us by letter of 11 November 1941 of its intention to establish so-called social youth centers whose aim shall be to give to youth a civic education and to safeguard it from the moral degeneracy which threatens it. The creation of these social youth centers, as well the establishment of youth camps, must be sanctioned by the Commander-in-Chief of the Military Forces in France. Before being able to make a final decision as to the creation of these social centers, it appears indispensable that greater details should be furnished, particularly about the persons responsible for these centers in the various communes, the points of view which win prevail when selecting the leaders of these centers, the principal categories of youth to be recruited and detailed plans for the intended instruction and education of these young people."

14 December 1941:

The notes of a conference between Hitler and Japanese Ambassador Oshima, held in the presence of Reich Foreign Minister Ribbentrop. "First the Fuehrer presents Ambassador Oshima with the Grand Cross of the Order of Merit of the German Eagle in gold. With cordial words he acknowledges his services in the achievement of German-Japanese cooperation, which has now obtained its culmination in a close brotherhood of arms. General Oshima expresses his thanks for the great honor and emphasizes how glad he is that this brotherhood of arms has now come about between Germany and Japan. The Fuehrer continues: 'You gave the right declaration of war.' This method is the only proper one. Japan pursued it formerly and it corresponds with his own system, that is, to negotiate as long as possible. But if one sees the other is interested only in putting one of, in shamming and humiliating one, and is not willing to come to an agreement, then one should strike as hard as possible, indeed, and not waste time declaring war. It was heartwarming to him to hear of the first operations of the Japanese. He himself negotiated with infinite patience at times, for example, with Poland and also with Russia. When he then realized that the other did not want to come to an agreement, he struck suddenly and without formality. He would continue to go on this way in the future."

16 December 1941:

From closing address to a cabinet session by Governor General Frank of occupied Poland: "As far as the Jews are concerned, I want to tell you quite frankly that they must be done away with in one way or another. The Fuehrer said once: 'Should united Jewry again succeed in provoking a world war, the blood of not only the nations which have been forced into the war by them will be shed, but the Jew will have found his end in Europe.' I know that many of the measures carried out against the Jews in the Reich at present are being criticized. It is being tried intentionally, as is obvious from the reports on the morale, to talk about cruelty, harshness, etc. Before I continue, I would beg you to agree with me on the following formula: We will principally have pity on the German people only and nobody else in the whole world. The others, too, had no pity on us. As an old National Socialist I must also say: This war would be only a partial success if the whole lot of Jewry would survive it, while we would have shed our best blood in order to save Europe. My attitude towards the Jews will therefore, be based only on the expectation that they must disappear. They must be done away with. I have entered negotiations to have them deported to the East. A large conference concerning that question, to which I am going to delegate the State Secretary Dr. Buehler, will take place in Berlin in January. That discussion is to take place in the Reich Security Main Office with SS Lieutenant General Heydrich. A great Jewish migration will begin, in any case. But what should be done with the Jews? Do you think they will be settled down in the 'Ostland' in villages? This is what we were told in Berlin: Why all this bother? We can do nothing with them either in the 'Ostland' or in the 'Reichskommissariat.' So liquidate them yourselves. Gentlemen, I must ask you to arm yourselves against all feeling of pity. We must annihilate the Jews, wherever we find them and wherever it is possible, in order to maintain there the structure of the Reich as a whole. This will, naturally, be achieved by other methods than those pointed out by Bureau Chief Dr. Hummel. Nor can the judges of the Special Courts be made responsible for it because of the limitations of the frame work of the legal procedure. Such outdated views cannot be applied to such gigantic and unique events. We must find at any rate a way which leads to the goal, and my thoughts are working in that direction. The Jews represent for us also extraordinarily malignant gluttons. We have now approximately, 2,500,000 of them in the Government General, perhaps with the Jewish mixtures and everything that goes with it, 3,500,000 Jews. We cannot shoot or poison those 3,500,000 Jews; but we shall nevertheless be able to take measures which will lead, somehow, to their annihilation, and this in connection with the gigantic measures to be determined in discussions with the Reich. The Government General must become free of Jews, the same as the Reich. Where and how this is to be achieved is a matter for the offices which we must appoint and create here. Their activities will be brought to your attention in due course."

16 December 1941 FDR to Stalin:

"It is extremely important, in my view, to take immediate steps for the purpose of paving the way not only for joint operations in the coming weeks, but also for the final defeat of Hitlerism. I should like very much to see you and talk it over personally with you, but…at the moment this is impossible…I want to tell you once more about the genuine enthusiasm throughout the United States for the success of your armies in the defense of your great nation. I flatter myself with the hope that the preliminary conferences I have scheduled for next week will lead to a more permanent organization for the planning of our efforts…"

17 December 1941:

Stalin to Churchill: "I received your message of December 16. It did not indicate the aims of the conferences…I saw fit when I met Mr. Eden, who had just arrived in Moscow, to ask him what those aims were and whether the two conferences could be put off for a while. It appeared, however, that Mr. Eden was not posted either. I should like, therefor, to have the appropriate elucidation’s from you in order to ensure the results expected from Soviet participation. Thank you for the sentiments expressed over the Soviet armies’ successes. I wish you success in the struggle against aggression in the Pacific…"

18 December 1941:

From a radio speech by Fritzsche: "The fate of Jewry in Europe has turned out to be as unpleasant as the Fuehrer predicted it would be in the event of a European war. After the extension of the war instigated by Jews, this fate may also spread to the New World, for it can hardly be assumed that the nations of this New World will pardon the Jews for the misery of which the nations of the Old World did not absolve them."

18 December 1941:

From the document 'Memorandum to the Fuehrer - Concerning Jewish Possessions in France' written by Reich Foreign Minister Rosenberg: "In compliance with the order of the Fuehrer for protection of Jewish cultural possessions, a great number of Jewish dwellings remained unguarded. Consequently, many furnishings have disappeared because a guard could, naturally, not be posted. In the whole East the administration has found terrible conditions of living quarters, and the chances of procurement are so limited that it is not possible to procure any more. Therefore, I beg the Fuehrer to permit the seizure of a Jewish home furnishings of Jews in Paris who have fled or will leave shortly and those of Jews living in all parts of the occupied West to relieve the shortage of furnishings in the administration in the East. A great number of leading Jews were, after a short examination in Paris, again released. The attempts on the lives of members of the Forces have not stopped; on the contrary they continue. This reveals an unmistakable plan to disrupt the German-French cooperation, to force Germany to retaliate and, with this, evoke a new defense on the part of the French against Germany. I suggest to the Fuehrer that, instead of executing 100 Frenchmen, we shoot in their place 100 Jewish bankers, lawyers, etc. It is the Jews in London and New York who incite the French Communists to commit acts of violence, and it seems only fair that the members of this race should pay for this. It is not the little Jews but the leading Jews in France who should be held responsible. That would tend to awaken the anti-Jewish sentiment."

24 December 1941:

From an order of the commander of the 98th German Infantry Division: "...Available stocks of hay, straw, foodstuffs, et cetera, are to be burned. All the stoves in dwelling houses are to be wrecked by placing hand grenades in them, thus making further use of them impossible. This order under no circumstances is to fall into the hands of the enemy..."

3 January 1942:

From a conversation between Hitler and Japanese Ambassador Oshima, in the presence of Ribbentrop: "The Fuehrer, using a map, explains to the Japanese Ambassador the present position of marine warfare in the Atlantic, emphasizing that what he considers his most important task is to get the U-boat warfare going in full swing. The U-boats are being reorganized. Firstly, he had recalled all U-boats operating in the Atlantic. As mentioned before, they would now be posted outside United States ports. Later, they would be off Freetown and the larger boats even as far down as Capetown...After having given further explanations on the map, the Fuehrer pointed out that, however many ships the United States built, one of their main problems would be the lack of personnel. For that reason even merchant ships would be sunk without warning with the intention of killing as many of the crew as possible. Once it gets around that most of the seamen are lost in the sinkings, the Americans would soon have difficulties in enlisting new people. The training of seagoing personnel takes a very long time. We are fighting for our existence and our attitude cannot be ruled by any humane feelings. For this reason he must give the order that in case foreign seamen could not be taken prisoner, which is in most cases not possible on the sea, U-boats were to surface after torpedoing and shoot up the life boats. Ambassador Oshima heartily agreed with the Fuehrer's comments, and said that the Japanese, too, are forced to follow these methods."

3 January 1942:

From a Hitler Order: "...Cling to every populated center; do not retreat a single step; defend yourself to the last soldier, to the last grenade. That is the requirement of the present moment. Every point occupied by us must be turned into a base, which must not be surrendered under any circumstances, even if outflanked by the enemy. If, however, the given point must be abandoned on superior orders, it is imperative that everything be razed to the ground, the stoves blown up..."

18 January 1942:

From a verbal note of the Secretariat of State of His Holiness the Pope to the German Embassy: "Measures and acts which gravely violate the rights of the Church, being contrary not only to the existing concordats but to the principles of international law ratified by the Second Hague Conference. Yet, despite this keen desire, but often-and this is much more grave-to the very fundamental principles of Divine Law both natural and positive. Let it suffice to recall in this connection, among other things, the changing of the Catholic state elementary schools into undenominational schools; the permanent or temporary closing of many minor seminaries, of not a few major seminaries, and of some theological faculties; the suppression of almost all the private schools and of numerous Catholic boarding schools and colleges; the repudiation, decided upon unilaterally, of financial obligations which the State, municipalities, and so forth, had towards the Church; the increasing difficulties put in the way of the activity of the religious orders and congregations in the spiritual, cultural, and social field, and above all the suppression of abbeys, monasteries, convents, and religious houses in such great numbers that one is led to infer a deliberate intention of rendering impossible the very existence of the orders and congregations in Germany."

29 January 1942:

From a circular of the Arbeitseinsatz; of the Delegate for the Four Year Plan: "Berlin (SW 11), 29 January 1942, Saarlandstrasse 96. Subject: Increased mobilization of labor for the German Reich from the occupied territories and preparations for mobilization by force. The labor shortage, aggravated on the one hand by drafts for the Wehrmacht and on the other hand by the increased amount of work for armaments in the Reich, renders it necessary for labor for service in the Reich to be recruited from the occupied territories to a much greater extent than heretofore, in order to relieve the shortage. Therefore, any and all methods must be adopted which make it possible to transport, without exception and at once, for employment in the Reich, manpower in the occupied territories which is unemployed or which can be released... for use in Germany after most careful screening..." "...In the first place, this mobilization shall be carried out on a voluntary basis as hitherto. For this reason recruitment for employment in the German Reich must be intensified considerably. If, however, satisfactory results are to be obtained, the German authorities who are operating in the occupied territories must be able to exert any pressure necessary to support the voluntary recruitment of labor for employment in Germany. Accordingly, as far as may be necessary, the regulations in force in the occupied territories with regard to changing the place of employment or... those refusing work, must be tightened. Supplementary regulations concerning distribution of labor must, above all, insure that older persons who are exempt will be used to replace younger persons so that the latter may be made available for the Reich. A far-reaching reduction in the amount of relief granted by public welfare must also be effected in order to induce laborers to accept employment in the Reich. Unemployment relief must be set so low that the amount, in comparison with the average wages in the Reich and the possibilities there for sending remittances home, may serve as an inducement to the workers to accept employment in Germany. When refusal to accept work in the Reich is not justified, relief must be reduced to an amount barely sufficient for subsistence or even cancelled. In this case partial withdrawal of ration cards and an assignment to particularly heavy compulsory work may be considered."

29 January 1942:

From a circular issued by Dr. Mansfeld on the responsibility of Goering: "In order to avoid effects detrimental to the armament industry, all considerations must yield to the necessity of filling in every case the gaps in the labor supply caused by extensive drafting into the Wehrmacht. To this end the forced mobilization of workers from the occupied territories must not be overlooked if voluntary recruitment should not succeed. The mere possibility of compulsory mobilization will, in many cases, facilitate recruiting. Therefore I ask you to take immediate steps in your district to promote the employment of workers in the German Reich on a voluntary basis. I herewith request you to prepare for publication, regulations to render possible forced mobilization of labor in your territory for Germany, so that they may be decreed at once in case recruiting on a voluntary basis remains without the success necessary to relieve labor in the Reich."

31 January 1942:

Published in the Verordnungsblatt of France: "Ordinance of 31 January 1942 concerning the requisition of service and goods. By virtue of the plenary powers which have been conferred on me by the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, I decree the following: 1. Whoever fails to comply with these requisitions of service or goods which are imposed upon him by the Military Commander in France, or an authority designated by him, or who performs them in such a manner as to imperil or make fail the purpose of the services or requisitions, shall be punished by penal servitude, imprisonment, or fine. A fine may be imposed in addition to penal servitude or imprisonment. 2. In serious cases the penalty of death may be inflicted."

11 February 1942:FDR to Stalin: "For January and February our shipments have included and will include 449 light tanks, 408 medium tanks, 244 fighter planes, 24 B-25’s, and 233 A-20’s. I realize the importance of getting supplies to you at the earliest possible date and every effort is being made to get shipments off. The reports here indicate you are getting on well in pushing back the Nazis. Although we are having our immediate troubles in the Far East, I believe that we will have that area reinforced in the near future to such an extent that we can stop the Japs, but we are prepared for some further setbacks."

13 February 1942:

FDR to Stalin: "…My attention has just been called to the fact that the Soviet Government has placed requisitions with us for supplies and munitions of a value which will exceed the billion dollars which were placed at its disposal last autumn under the Lend-Lease Act following an exchange of letters between us. Therefor, I propose that under this same Act a second billion dollars be placed at the disposal of your Government upon the same conditions as those upon which the first billion were allocated. Should you have any counter suggestions to offer with regard to the terms under which the second billion dollars should be made available you may be sure that careful and sympathetic consideration will be given them…"

17 February 1942:

From an order issued by Alfred Rosenberg: "…1. The death penalty, or, in lesser cases, penal servitude will be inflicted upon: Those who undertake to use violence against the German Reich or against the high authority established in the occupied territories; those who undertake to commit violence against a Reich citizen or a person of German nationality for his or her belonging to this German nationality; those who undertake to use violence against a member of the Wehrmacht or its followers, the German police including its auxiliary forces, the Reich Labor Service, a German authority or institution, or the organizations of the NSDAP; those who appeal or incite to disobedience of orders or directives issued by the German authorities; those who with premeditation damage the furniture of German authorities and institutions or things used by the latter for their work or in the public interest; those who undertake to assist anti-German movements or to maintain the organizational connection of groups prohibited by the German authorities; those who participate in or incite hostile activity and thus reveal anti-German mentality or who by their behavior lower or injure the authority or the welfare of the German State and people; those who premeditatively commit arson and thereby damage German interests in general or the property of a Reich citizen or persons of German nationality. 2. Furthermore, the death penalty and, in lesser cases, penal servitude is to be inflicted upon: Those who agree to commit any punishable action as foreseen by Paragraph 1; those who enter into serious negotiations on that subject; those who offer their services to commit such an action or accept such an offer; or those who possess credible information on such an action or its intention at a moment when the danger can still be averted, and willfully refrain from warning the German authorities or the menaced person in due time. 3. An offense not coming under Paragraphs 1 and 2 is to be punished by death, even if this penalty is not provided for by the general German criminal laws and by decrees of German authorities, if the offense is of a particularly base type or for other reasons is particularly serious. In such cases the death xenalty is also permissible for juvenile hard criminals. 4. (1) If there is insufficient justification for turning the case over to competent courts-martial, the special courts are competent. (2) The special instructions issued for the Armed Forces are not hereby affected"

18 February 1942:

Stalin to FDR: "…I stress that it is now, when the peoples of the Soviet Union and their Army are bending their energies to throw the Hitler troops back by a tenacious offensive, the US deliveries, including tanks and aircraft, are essential for our common cause and our further success…Your decision, Mr. President, to grant the Government of the USSR another $1,000,000,000 under the Lend-Lease Act on the same terms as the first $1,000,000,000, is accepted by the Soviet Government with sincere gratitude. With reference to the matter raised by you I would like to say that, in order not to delay decision, the Soviet Government will not at the moment raise the matter of revising the terms for the second $1,000,000,000 to be granted to the Soviet Union nor call for taking due account of the extreme strain placed on the USSR by the war against our common foe…the appropriate Soviet agencies are encountering great difficulties as far as shipping the munitions and materials purchased in the USA is concerned. In these circumstances we think that the most useful system is the one effectively used in shipping munitions from Britain…the British military authorities supplying the munitions and materials select the ships, supervise their loading in harbor and conveying to the ports of destination. The Soviet Government would be most grateful if the same system of delivering munitions and conveying the ships to Soviet harbors were adopted by the US Government."

20 February 1942:

Order issued by Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler to SD and SecurityPolice officers concerning Eastern Workers: "…III. Combating violations against discipline. (1) In keeping with the equal status of laborers from the original Soviet Russian territory with prisoners of war, a strict discipline must be maintained in quarters and in workshops. Violations against discipline, including refusal to work and loafing at work, will be dealt with exclusively by the secret state police. The less serious cases will be settled by the leader of the guard according to instructions from the state police headquarters with measures as provided for in the appendix. To break acute resistance, the guards shall be permitted to use also physical compulsion against the laborers. But this may be done only for a cogent reason. The laborers should always be informed that they will be treated decently when conducting themselves with discipline and accomplishing good work. In serious cases, that is, in such cases where the measures at the disposal of the leader of the guard do not suffice, the state police is to step in. In such instances, as a rule, severe measures will be taken, that is, transfer to a concentration camp or special treatment. The transfer to a concentration camp is made in the usual manner. In especially serious cases special treatment is to be recommended at the Reich Security Main Office; personal data and the exact facts must be given. Special treatment is hanging. It should not take place in the immediate vicinity of the camp. A certain number of laborersf rom the original Soviet Russian territory should attend the special treatment; at that time they are to be advised of the circumstances which lead to this special treatment. Should special treatment be required within the camp for exceptional reasons of camp discipline, this must be applied for...VI. Sexual intercourse. Sexual intercourse is forbidden to laborers of the original Soviet Russian territory. Owing to their closely confined quarters they have no opportunity for it... For every case of sexual intercourse with German men or women application for special treatment is to be made for male labor from the original Soviet Russian territory, transfer to a concentration camp for female labor...VIII. Search. Fugitive workers from the original Soviet Russian territory are to be announced on principle in the German search book. Furthermore, search measures are to be decreed locally. When caught the fugitive must in principle be proposed for special treatment."

23 February 1942:

FDR to Stalin: "…I would like you to know that in due course we will be glad to revise with you our agreement on the funds advanced by us under the Lend-Lease Act. At the moment the prime task is delivery of supplies to you. I have given directions to study your proposal for centralizing here munitions deliveries to Russia. We are greatly encouraged by the latest news of the successes of your Army. I send you warm congratulations on the 24th anniversary of the Red Army."

24 February 1942:

From a speech to the Nazi Gauleiter delivered by Speer: "I therefore proposed to the Fuehrer at the end of December that all my labor force, including specialists, be released for mass employment in the East. Subsequently the remaining prisoners of war, about 10,000, were put at the disposal of the armament industry by me."

1 March 1942:

From a signed Hitler Order: "The directives concerning co-operation with the Wehrmacht were given to the Chief of the OKW with the approval of Reichsleiter Rosenberg..."Jews, Freemasons, and related ideological enemies of National Socialism are responsible for the war which is now being waged against the Reich. The co-ordinated ideological fight against those powers is a military necessity. I have therefore charged Reichsleiter Rosenberg to carry out this task in co-operation with the chief of the OKW. His Einsatzstab in the Occupied Territories is authorized to search libraries, record offices, lodges, and other ideological and cultural institutions of all kinds for suitable material, and to confiscate the said material for the ideological task of the NSDAP and the later scientific research work of the Hohe Schule. The same regulation applies to cultural assets which are in possession of or the property of Jews, or ownerless, or not clearly of unobjectionable origin. The necessary measures within the Eastern territories under the German Administration are determined by Reichsleiter Rosenberg in his capacity as Reichsminister for the Occupied Eastern Territories. -Adolf Hitler."

14 March 1942:

From a memorandum on Krupp stationery to a Herr Hupe, a director of the Krupp locomotive factory in Essen, Germany: "During the last few days we established that the food for the Russians employed here is so miserable that the people are getting weaker from day to day. Investigations showed that single Russians are not able to place a piece of metal for turning into position, for instance, because of lack of physical strength. The same conditions exist in all other places of work where Russians are employed."

16 March 1942:

FDR to Stalin: "…I want to take this opportunity to assure you again that we are going to bend every possible effort to move these supplies to your battle lines. The determination of your armies and people to defeat Hitlerism is an inspiration to the free people of all the world."

18 March 1942:

From a conference of district political leaders at Krakow: Frank: "...Incidentally, the struggle for the achievement of our aims will be pursued cold-bloodedly. You see how the state agencies work. You see that we do not hesitate at anything, and stand dozens of people up against the wall. This is necessary because a simple reflection tells me that it cannot be our task at this period, when the best German blood is being sacrificed, to show regard for the blood of another race; for out of this, one of the greatest dangers may arise. One already hears today in Germany that prisoners of war, for instance, in Bavaria or Thuringia, are administering large estates entirely independently, while all the men in a village fit for service are at the front. If this state of affairs continues, then a gradual retrogression of Germanism will result. One should not underestimate this danger. Therefore, everything revealing itself as a Polish power of leadership must be destroyed again and again with ruthless energy. This does not have to be shouted abroad; it will happen silently."

6 April 1942:

From an order by Sauckel: "Order Number 1Concerning Appointment of Gauleiter as Commissioners for the Allocation of Labor in the Gaue. I hereby appoint the Gauleiter of the NSDAP my commissioners for allocation of labor in the Gaue administered by them. A. Their tasks are: 1) The achievement of smooth co-operation between all offices set up by the State, the Party, the Wehrmacht, and the economic authorities to deal with questions of manpower; and by means of this, the regulation of different interpretations and claims in such a way as to utilize manpower to the best possible effect...4) Investigation of the results obtained by utilizing the labor of all foreign male and female workers. Special regulations will be issued with regard to these. 5) Investigation of the correct feeding, housing, and treatment of all foreign workers and prisoners of war engaged in work..."

12 April 1942: FDR to Stalin

"It is unfortunate that geographical distance makes it practically impossible for you and me to meet at this time. Such a meeting of minds in personal conversation would be useful to the conduct of the war against Hitlerism…I have in mind a very important military proposal involving the utilization of our armed forces in a manner to relieve your critical Western Front. This objective carries great weight with me. Therefore, I wish you would consider sending Mr. Molotov and a General upon whom you rely to Washington in the immediate future…The American people are thrilled by the magnificent fighting of your armed forces and we want to help you in the destruction of Hitler’s armies and material more than we are doing now…"

20 April 1942: Stalin to FDR

"…The Soviet Government agrees that it is essential to arrange a meeting between V.M. Molotov and you for an exchange of views on the organization of a second front in Europe in the near future…It goes without saying that Molotov will also go to London to exchange views with the British Government. I have no doubt that I shall be able to have a personal meeting with you, to which I attach great importance, especially in view of the big problems of organizing the defeat of Hitlerism that confront our two countries. Please accept my sincere regards and wishes for success in the struggle against the enemies of the United States of America."

27 April 1942:

From a note by V. M. Molotov, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR: "...By direct order of its High Command the German fascist Army has subjected Soviet towns and villages to unparalleled devastation upon seizure and in the course of the army's occupation...The special detachments set up by the German Command for the purpose of setting fire to Soviet populated centers and for the mass extermination of the civilian population during the retreat of the Hitlerite Army, are perpetrating their sanguinary deeds with the cold-bloodedness of professional criminals. Thus, for instance before their retreat from the village of Bolshekrepinskaya, Rostov region, the Germans sent down the streets of the village special flame-throwing machines which burned 1,167 buildings, one after the other. The large, flourishing village was turned into flaming bonfires which consumed the dwellings, the hospital, the school, and various other public buildings. At the same time machine gunners, without any warning, shot at inhabitants who approached their burning houses; some of the residents were bound, sprayed with gasoline and thrown into the burning buildings...In their insane fury against the Soviet people, which was caused by defeats suffered at the front, the commanding general of the 2d German Panzer Army, General Schmidt, and the commander of the Orel administrative region and military commander of that city, Major General Hamann, had created special demolition commandos for the destruction of towns, villages, and collective farms of the Orel region. These commandos, plunderers, and arsonists destroyed everything in the path of their retreat. They destroyed cultural monuments and works of art of the Russian people, burned down cities, towns, and villages..."

30 April 1942:

From a letter to Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler from SS Obergruppenfuehrer Pohl: "Today I report about the present situation of the concentration camps and about measures I have taken to carry out your order of the 3rd of March 1942...1. The war has brought about a marked change in the structure of the concentration camps and has changed their duties fundamentally with regard to the employment of the prisoners. The custody of prisoners for the sole reasons of security, education, or as a preventive measure is no longer the main consideration. The importance now lies in the economic side. The mobilization of all prisoner labor for purposes of the war (increase of armament) now, and for purposes of construction in the forthcoming peace, is coming more and more to the foreground. 2. From this knowledge necessary measures result which require a gradual transformation of the concentration camps from their former one-sided political character into an organization adapted to economic tasks. 3. For this reason I called together all the leaders of the former inspectorate of concentration camps, all camp commanders, and all managers and supervisors of work, on the 23rd and 24th of April 1942 and explained personally to them this new development. I have compiled, in the order attached, the essential points which have to be brought into effect with the utmost urgency if the commencement of work for the purposes of the armament industry is not to be delayed. 4. The camp commander alone is responsible for the utilization of the manpower available. This utilization must be, in the true meaning of the word, complete, in order to obtain the greatest measure of performance. Work is allotted only centrally and by the Chief of the Department D. The camp commanders themselves may not accept on their own initiative work offered by third parties and may not negotiate about it. 5. There is no limit to working hours. Their duration depends on the kind of working establishments in the camps and the kind of work to be done. They are fixed by the camp commanders alone. 6. Any circumstances which may result in a shortening of working hours (for example, meals, roll-calls, etc., have therefore to be restricted to an irreducible minimum. Time wasting walks and noon intervals, only for the purpose of taking meals, are forbidden."

4 May 1942:

FDR to Stalin

"We are having grave difficulties with the northern convoy route and have informed Litvinov of the complications. You may be sure, however, that no effort will be omitted to get as many ships off as possible…I am looking forward to seeing Molotov and the moment I hear of the route we shall make preparations to provide immediate transportation. I do hope Molotov can stay with me in the White House while he is in Washington but we can make a private home nearby available if that is desired."

15 May 1942:

Stalin to FDR: "…In connection with the present difficulties in sailing and escorting ships to the USSR. I have already approached Prime Minister Churchill for his help in overcoming them as quickly as possible. As the delivery of cargoes from the USA and Britain in May is a pressing matter, I address the same request to you, Mr. President. V.M. Molotov will leave for the USA and Britain a few days later than planned - on account of weather vagaries…As to Molotov’s place of residence in Washington, both he and I thank you for your offer."

20 May 1942:

From a letter, addressed to SS Obergrupenfuehrer Wolff, and signed E. Milch: "Dear Wolff (In German: Liebes Wolffchen): In reference to your telegram of 12 May, our sanitary inspector reports to me that the altitude experiments carried out by the SS and Air Force at Dachau have been finished. Any continuation of these experiments seems not to be necessary. However, the carrying out of experiments of some other kind, in regard to perils on the high seas, would be important. These have been prepared in immediate agreement with the proper offices; Major Weltz (Medical Corps) will be charged with the execution and Captain Rascher (Medical Corps) will be made available until further orders in addition to his duties within the Medical Corps of the Air Corps. A change of these measures does not appear necessary, and an enlargement of the task is not considered pressing at this time. The low-pressure chamber would not be needed for these low-temperature experiments. It is urgently needed at another place and therefore can no longer remain in Dachau. I convey the special thanks from the Supreme Commander of the Air Corps to the SS for their extensive cooperation. I remain with best wishes for you in good comradeship and with Heil Hitler! Always yours, E. Milch."

13 June 1942:

From letter from Goering to Colonel Veltjens: "Owing to the simultaneous purchases of goods by the different branches of the Wehrmacht and other organizations on the so-called black market, a situation has developed in some occupied territories which hampers the methodical exploitation of these countries for the needs of German war economy, is also harmful to German prestige, and endangers the discipline necessary in the military and civilian administration. This deplorable state of things can no longer be tolerated. I therefore charge you to regularize these commercial transactions in agreement with the services that are involved and, particularly, with the chiefs of the administration of the occupied territories. In principle, commercial transactions in the occupied territories that are made outside the framework of the normal provisioning, or constituting a violation of price regulations, must be limited to special cases and can be carried out only with your previously given assent. I approve your proposal that only to trading companies controlled by the Reich should be assigned the handling of these goods, in the first place the 'Roges.' I beg you to submit, at the earliest possible date, a detailed plan of operation for starting your activity in Holland, Belgium, France, and Serbia. (In Serbia it is Consul General Neuhausen who is to be in charge.) This plan must include the seizure of port installations and machinery and tools of enterprises to be closed down in the occupied territories. As to the results of your work, I beg you to submit a report to me every month through my representative; the first to be sent on 1 July 1942. If necessary, the Central Planning Board will decide as to the distribution of merchandise thus purchased."

16 June 1942:

Jodl's diary: "The Operational Staff of the Navy (SKL) applied on the 29th May for permission to attack the Brazilian sea and air forces. The SKL considers that a sudden blow against the Brazilian war ships and merchant ships is expedient at this juncture because defense measures are still incomplete, because there is the possibility of achieving surprise, and because Brazil is actually fighting Germany at sea."

17 June 1942:

FDR to Stalin

"The situation, which is developing in the Northern Area of the Pacific Ocean and in the Alaskan Area, presents tangible evidence that the Japanese Government may be taking steps to carry out operations against the Soviet Maritime Provinces. Should such an attack materialize the United States is ready to assist the Soviet Union with American air power provided the Soviet Union makes available to it suitable landing fields in the Siberian Area. The efforts of the Soviet Union and of the United States would of course have to be carefully coordinated in order promptly to carry out such an operation. Ambassador Litvinov has informed me that you have signified your approval of the movement of American Planes via Alaska and Northern Siberia to the Western Front and I am pleased to receive this news. I am of the opinion that in our common interests it is essential that detailed information be immediately initiated between our joint Army, Navy and Air representatives in order to meet this new danger in the Pacific. I feel that the question is so urgent as to warrant granting to the representatives of the Soviet Union and the United States full power to initiate action and to make definite plans. For this reason I propose that you and I appoint such representatives and that we direct them immediately to confer in Moscow and Washington."

1 July 1942:

Stalin to FDR

"…I should like to tell you that I fully concur with you as to the advisability of using the Alaska-Siberia route for US aircraft deliveries to the Western Front. The Soviet Government has, therefore, issued instructions for completing at the earliest possible date the preparations now under way in Siberia to receive aircraft, that is, for adapting the existing airfields and providing them with additional facilities. As to whose pilots should fly the aircraft from Alaska, I think the task can be entrusted, as the State Department once suggested, to Soviet pilots who could travel to Nome or some other suitable place at the appointed time. An appropriate group of those pilots could be instructed to carry out the survey flight proposed by you. To fully ensure reception of the aircraft we should like to know the number of planes which the USA is allocating for dispatch to the Western Front by that route…"

6 July 1942:

FDR to Stalin: "The Egyptian crisis which is threatening the supply route to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has caused Prime Minister Churchill to direct me to an urgent inquiry whether forty A-20 bombers which are now in Iraq en route to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics can be transferred to the Egyptian front. Because of limited information here, it is impossible for me to express judgement on this matter. For this reason I thought it better to request you to make a decision, taking into consideration the interests of the war effort of the United Nations as a whole."

7 July 1942:

Stalin to FDR: "In view of the situation in which the Allied forces find themselves in Egypt I have no objection to forty of the A-20 bombers now in Iraq en route to the USSR being transferred to the Egyptian front."

9 July 1942:

From a decree issued by Fritz Sauckel; Die Beschaftigung von auslandischen Arbeitshraftenin Deutschland: "According to reports of transportation commanders "-Transportleiter-" presented to me, the special trains provided by the German railway have frequently been in a really broken down condition. Numerous windowpanes have been missing in the coaches. Old French coaches without lavatories have been partly employed so that the workers had to fit up an emptied compartment as a lavatory. In other cases, the coaches were not heated in winter so that the lavatories quickly became unusable because the water system was frozen and the flushing apparatus was therefore without water."

9 July 1942:

FDR to Stalin: "I am deeply appreciative of your telegram authorizing the transfer of forty bombers to Egypt. I have arranged for one hundred and fifteen medium tanks with ammunition and spare parts to be shipped to you in addition to all tanks being shipped in accordance with the terms of the July protocol."

18 July 1942:

Stalin to FDR: "…As regards the survey flight, we could in the next few days send a plane from Krasnoyarsk to Nome - I mean an American twin-engine aircraft - which could take on the US officers on its way back from Nome. I take this opportunity to thank you for the news about the dispatch of an additional hundred and fifteen tanks to the USSR. I consider it my duty to warn you that, according to our experts at the front, US tanks catch fire very easily when hit from behind or from the side by anti-tank rifle bullets. The reason is that the high-grade gasoline used forms inside the tank a thick layer of highly inflammable fumes. German tanks also use gasoline, but of a low grade which yields smaller quantities of fumes, hence, they are more fireproof. Our experts think that the diesel makes the best tank motor."

23 July 1942:

FDR to Stalin: "…Members of the survey flight will be in Alaska and ready to depart by August first. In this connection a four-engine bomber will be at Nome in the event that it is required. I greatly appreciate your report on the difficulties experienced at the front with American tanks. It will be most helpful to our tank experts in eradicating the trouble with this model to have this information. The fire hazard in future models will be reduced, however, as they will operate on a lower octane fuel."

4 August 1942: From Franks 'diary': "State Secretary Kruger then continues, saying that the Reichsfuehrer's next immediate plan until the end of the following year would be to settle the following German racial groups in the two districts (Zamoscand Lublin) - 1,000 peasant homes (1 homestead per family of about 6) for Bosnian Germans; - 1,200 other kinds of homes; - 1,000 homesteads for Bessarabian Germans; - 200 for Serbian Germans; - 2,000 for Leningrad Germans; - 4,000 for Baltic Germans; - 500 for Wolhynia Germans; and - 200 homes for Flemish, Danish, and Dutch Germans; in all 10,000 homes for 50,000 to 60,000 persons...(Govenor General Frank declares that) "...the resettlement plan is to be discussed cooperatively by the competent authorities and he declares his willingness to approve the final plan by the end of September after satisfactory arrangements had been made concerning all the questions appertaining thereto - in particular the guaranteeing of peace and order - so that by the middle of November, as the most favorable time, the resettlement can begin."

5 August 1942:

FDR to Stalin: "Knowledge has come to me which I feel is authentic that the Government of Japan has decided not to undertake military operations against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at this time. This, I believe, means postponement of any attack on Siberia until spring of next year…"

10 May 1942:

"High Command of the Army, General Staff of the Army, Quartermaster General, Office of Military Administration, (EC) Number II 3210/42 – secret…The Plenipotentiary for Allocation of Labor appointed by the Fuehrer, Gauleiter Sauckel. . . in consideration of the increased armament requirements of the Reich and in order to secure the manpower requirements of the German war and armament economy, has ordered that the enlisting and transferring into the Reich of Russian manpower be speeded up and considerably increased. For the execution of this recruiting action. . . influence of the military and local administrative authorities (field Kommandantura, local Kommandantura, I A -- organization of the Economic Staff East, district administrations, town mayors, et cetera) . . . is necessary. This is a task of decisive importance for the outcome of the war. The labor situation of the Reich makes it necessary that the ordered measures are carried out on a priority basis and in a large scale manner. This must be the chief task of all organizations...Priority of Manpower Needs in the Armed Forces and Economy in the East...The immediate manpower needs of the Army must be satisfied in the highest priority inasmuch as the need is actually inescapable . . . and unalterable. The scale of the needs of the Army is to be determined by the armies, the commanders of the front areas, and the Wehrmacht commanders. However, in consideration of the urgent labor needs of the Reich... the severest standard is to be applied, and especially the scale of the troops' own manpower needs is to be most carefully examined."

6 August 1942:

From a conference chaired by Goering: Goering: "I have to say one thing to this. I do not wish to praise the Gauleiter Sauckel; he does not need it. But what he has done in such a short time to collect workers so quickly from the whole of Europe and supply them to our undertakings is a unique achievement. I must tell that to all these gentlemen; if each of them used in their sphere of activity a tenth of the energy used by Gauleiter Sauckel, the tasks laid upon them would indeed easily be carried out. This is my sincere conviction and in no way fine words."

9 August 1942:

FDR to Stalin: "Your frank opinion on the following plan, which I think may be useful, would be very much appreciated: For the primary purpose of explaining to the Governments of Iran, Iraq, Turkey, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt the danger they run in a German victory and that their greatest hope for the future lies in the defeat of Nazi domination of the places of the Near East and the Middle East, I am sending Mr. Wendell Willkie to visit the Governments of these countries. For a wholly different purpose Mr. Willkie would very much like to visit the Soviet Union. In addition to seeing for himself the undying unity of thought in repelling the invader and the great sacrifices which you are all making, he wants to know more about the wonderful progress made by the Russian people. As you know Mr. Willkie was my opponent in the 1940 elections and he is today the head of the minority party. H is heart and soul with my administration in our foreign policy of opposition to Nazism and real friendship with your Government, and he is greatly helping in war work. For the sake of the present and the future I personally think that a visit to the Soviet Union by Mr. Willkie would be a good thing…"

11 August 1942:

From an order directed to commandants of concentration camps from SS Brigadefuehrer and General of the Waffen-SS Glucks: "The Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police has ordered that punishment by beating will be executed in concentration camps for women by prisoners under the ordered supervision. In order to coordinate this order the Main Office Chief SS of the Economic Administration Main Of lice, SS Obergruppenfuehrer and General of the Waffen-SS Pohl, has ordered, effective immediately, that punishment by beating will also be executed by prisoners in concentration camps for men. It is forbidden to have foreign prisoners execute the punishment on German prisoners."

12 August 1942: Stalin to FDR

"Your message of August 9 to hand. The Soviet Government takes a favorable view of Mr. Wendell Willkie’s visit to the USSR and I can assure you that he will be most cordially entertained."

18 August 1942:

From a discussion between the Sauckel and Frank at Krakow: Frank: "...I am pleased to report to you officially, Party Comrade Sauckel, that we have up to now supplied 800,000 workers for the Reich...Recently you have requested us to supply a further 140,000. I have pleasure in informing you officially that in accordance with our agreement of yesterday, 60 percent of the newly requested workers will be supplied to the Reich by the end of October and the balance of 40 percent by the end of the year. Beyond the present figure of 140,000 you can, however, next year reckon upon a higher number of workers from the Government General, for we shall employ the Police to conscript them."

19 August 1942:

From an official memorandum of the Ministry for Occupied Eastern Territories: Bormann: "The Slavs are to work for us. In so far as we don't need them, they may die. They should not receive the benefits of the German public health system. We do not care about their fertility. They may practice abortion and use contraceptives; the more the better. We don't want them educated; it is enough if they can count up to 100. Such stooges will be the more useful to us. Religion we leave to them as a diversion. As to food, they will not get any more than is absolutely necessary. We are the masters; we come first."

19 August 1942:

FDR to Stalin: "I regret that I was unable to have been with you and Mr. Churchill in the conferences which have recently taken place in Moscow. The urgent needs of the military situation, especially insofar as the Soviet-German front is concerned, are well known to me. I am of the opinion that it will be difficult for the Japanese to dislodge us from the vantage point which we have gained in the area of the South-west Pacific. Although the naval losses of our forces were considerable in that area, the advantages which we have gained will justify them and I can assure you we are going to press them in a vigorous manner. I well realize on the other hand that the real enemy of both our countries is Germany and that at the earliest possible moment it will be necessary for both our countries to bring our power and forces to bear against Hitler. Just as soon as it is humanly possible to assemble transportation you may be sure this will be done. In the interim there will leave the United States for the Soviet Union during the month of August over 1,000 tanks, and at the same time other strategic materials are going forward, including aircraft. The fact that the Soviet Union is bearing the brunt of the fighting and losses during the year 1942 is well understood by the United States and I may state that we greatly admire the magnificent resistance which your country has exhibited. We are coming as quickly and as strongly to your assistance as we possibly can and I hope that you will believe me when I tell you this."

22 August 1942:

Decree Number 10 of the Plenipotentiary General for Allocation of Labor: "In order to mobilize the labor force of the occupied territories under the new organization for the Allocation of Labor within the European area, this force must be subjected to a rigid and uniform control. The maximum production, as well as the useful and rational distribution of this force, must be assured in order to satisfy the labor requirements of the Reich and the occupied territories. By virtue of the full powers which are conferred upon me, I order: I) By virtue of the decree of the Fuehrer, under date of 21 March 1942, concerning the Plenipotentiary General for Allocation of Labor and by virtue of the ordinance of the Delegate for the Four Year Plan, under date of 27 March 1942, concerning the application of this decree, I likewise am competent to employ, as may be necessary, the labor of occupied territories, as well as to take all the measures necessary to augment its efficiency. Those German offices competent for the tasks of the Arbeitseinsatz and for the policy of wages, or my commissioners, will carry out this Allocation of Labor and take all measures necessary to increase efficiency, according to my instructions. 2) This decree extends to all the territories occupied during the war by the Wehrmacht, as far as they are under German administration. 3) The labor available in the occupied territories must be utilized in the first place to satisfy the primary war needs of Germany herself. This labor must be utilized in the occupied territories in the following order: a) For the needs of the army, the occupation services, and the civilian services; b) for the needs of German armament; c) for the tasks of food supply and agriculture; d) for industrial needs other than those of armament, in which Germany is interested; e) for the industrial needs concerning the population of the territory in question."

22 August 1942:

Stalin to FDR: "…I, too, regret that you were unable to take part in the talks which Churchill and I recently had. With reference to what you say about the dispatch of tanks and other strategic materials from the United States in August I should like to emphasize our special interest in receiving US aircraft and other weapons, as well as trucks in the greatest numbers possible. It is my hope that every step will be taken to ensure early delivery of the cargoes to the Soviet Union, particularly over the northern sea route."

24 August 1942:

From a cabinet meeting of the Government General: Hans Frank: "Before the German people suffer starvation, the occupied territories and their people shall be exposed to starvation. In this moment, therefore, we here in the Government General must have the iron determination to help the great German people, that is our fatherland. The Government General, therefore, must do the following: The Government General has undertaken to send 500,000 tons of bread grain to the fatherland in addition to the foodstuffs already being delivered for the relief of Germany or consumed here by troops of the Armed Forces, Police, or SS. If you compare this with our contributions of last year you can see that this means a six-fold increase over that of last year's contribution by the Government General. The new demand will be fulfilled exclusively at the expense of the foreign population. It must be done cold-bloodedly and without pity… With all the difficulties which arise from the illness of workers, or the breaking down of your co-operatives, you must always bear in mind that it is much better if a Pole collapses than if the Germans are defeated. The fact that we shall be condemning 1,200,000 Jews to death by starvation should be mentioned incidentally. Of course, if the Jews do not die from starvation, it is to be hoped that anti-Jewish measures will be expedited in the future."

26 August 1942:

From a letter addressed by the German, Dr. Michel, Chief of the Administrative Staff, to the Delegate General for Franco-German economic relations: "Paris, 26 August 1942. Military Commander in France, economic section; to M. Barnaud, Delegate General for Franco-German Economic Relations; Paris. President Laval promised Gauleiter Sauckel, Plenipotentiary General for Allocation of Labor, to make every effort to send to Germany, to help German armament economy, 350,000 workers, of which 150,000 should be metal workers. The French Government intended at first to solve this problem by recruitment, especially of the affectes speciaux. This method has been abandoned and that of voluntary enrollment has been attempted with a view to the liberation of prisoners. The past months have shown that the end in view cannot be achieved by means of voluntary recruitment. In France, German armament orders have increased in volume and urgency. Moreover, special tasks have been set, the accomplishment of which depends upon the supply of a very considerable number of workers. In order to assure the realization of the tasks for which France is responsible in the sphere of the Arbeitseinsatz, the French Government must now be asked to put into execution the following measures: 1) The publication of a decree, concerning change of place of work. By virtue of this decree, leaving the place of employment and engaging labor depends on the approval of certain specified authorities. 2) The institution of compulsory registration of all persons out of work, as well as of those who do not work full time or are not permanently employed. This compulsory registration is to ensure the fullest recruitment possible of all the reserves still available. 3) The publication of a decree for the mobilization of workers for tasks important to the policy of state. This decree is to ensure: (a) The necessary labor for Germany; (b) the workers necessary in France for the carrying out of orders which have been transferred there and the workers needed for special tasks. 4) Publication of a decree ensuring an adequate supply of apprentices. This decree is to impose upon French enterprise the duty of turning out, by means of apprenticeship and systematic training, young workers possessing adequate qualifications. For the Military Commander, the Chief of the Administrative Staff."-Signed----"Dr. Michel."

31 August 1942:

From a letter from General Field Marshal Milch addressed to the Reichsfuehrer SS: "Dear Mr. Himmler: I thank you very much for your letter of the 25th of August. I have read with great interest the reports of Dr. Rascher and Dr. Romberg. I am informed about the current experiments. I shall ask the two gentlemen to give a lecture, combined with the showing of motion pictures, to my men in the near future. Hoping that it will be possible for me to see you at the occasion of my next visit to headquarters, I remain with best regards and Heil Hitler! Yours, E. Milch."

4 September 1942:

From a conference report: "The Fuehrer has ordered the immediate importation of 400,000 to 500,000 female domestic eastern workers from the Ukraine between the ages of 15 and 35 and has charged the Plenipotentiary for Allocation of Labor with the execution of this action which is to end in about 3 months. In connection with this-this is also approved by Reichsleiter Bormann-the illegal bringing of female housekeepers into the Reich by members of the Armed Forces, or various other agencies is to be allowed subsequently and, furthermore, irrespective of the official recruiting, is not to be prevented...Generally one gathered from this conference that the questions concerning the recruitment and mobilization, as well as the treatment of female domestic workers from the east, are being handled by the Plenipotentiary for Allocation of Labor, the Reichsfuehrer SS, and the Chief of the German Police and the Party Chancellery, and that the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories is in these questions considered as having no, or only limited, competence."

8 September 1942:

From a Hitler order initialed by Keitel: "The extensive coastal fortifications which I have ordered to be erected in the area of Army Group West make it necessary that in the occupied territory all available workers be assigned and give the fullest extent of their productive capacities to this task. The previous allotment of workers originating from these countries is insufficient. In order to increase it I order the introduction of compulsory labor and the prohibition of changing the place of employment without permission of the authorities in the occupied territories. Furthermore, the distribution of food and clothing ration cards to those subject to labor draft should in the future depend on the possession of a certificate of employment. Refusal to accept an assigned Job, as well as leaving the place of work without the consent of the authorities in charge, will result in the withdrawal of the food and clothing ration cards. The GBA "-DeputyGeneral for Arbeitseinsatz-" in agreement with the military commander, as well as the Reich Commissioner, will issue the appropriate decrees."

8 September 1942:

From a decree by Sauckel: "The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht; General Headquarters of the Fuehrer. The extensive coastal fortifications which I have ordered to be erected in the area of Army Group West necessitate in the occupied territory the utilization of all available workers to the fullest extent and to their utmost capacity. The assignment of indigenous workers, made up to now, is insufficient. In order to increase it, I order the introduction of compulsory labor and the prohibition of changing the place of employment without permission of the authorities in the occupied territories. Furthermore, in future, the distribution of food and clothing ration cards to those subject to compulsory labor shall depend on the possession of a certificate of employment. Refusal to accept an assigned job, as well as leaving the place of work without the consent of the authorities in charge, will result in the withdrawal of the food and clothing ration cards. "The GBA (the office of Sauckel) in agreement with the military commanders or the Reich Commissioners, will issue the appropriate directives."

8 September 1942:

From a Hitler order: "The heavy defensive battles in the area of Army Groups Center and North induce me to fix my views on some fundamental tasks of the defense...The enemy carries on construction to a far greater extent than do our own troops. I know that it will be argued that the enemy has at his disposal more labor for construction of such positions. But it is therefore an absolute necessity at exactly this point to make use, with ruthless energy, especially of prisoners of war and the population for these tasks. Only in this respect is the Russian superior to us in his brutal way. By this means, however, the German soldier, too, can be spared to a large extent from labor on defensive works behind the front lines, in order that he may be kept free and fresh for his real duties. Frequently the necessary ruthlessness which the present fateful battle demands is not yet being employed here, for in it not a victory but the existence and survival of our people is contested. Besides, it is in all circumstances still always more humane to drive the Russian population to work, with every means, as it has always been accustomed to be driven, than to sacrifice our most precious possession, our own blood."

12 September 1942:

From a letter to commanders of concentration camps from SS Obersturmbannfuehrer Liebehenschel: "According to a communication of the Chief of the Security Police and the SD, and conforming to a report of the Chief of the Security Police and the SD in Prague, urns of deceased Czechs and Jews were sent for burial to the home cemeteries within the Protectorate. In view of different events (demonstrations, erecting of posters inimical to the Reich on urns of deceased inmates in the halls of cemeteries of the home communities, pilgrimages to the graves of deceased inmates, etc., within the Protectorates, the delivery of urns with the ash remnants of deceased nationals of the Protectorate and of Jews is henceforth prohibited. The urns shall be preserved within the concentration camps. In case of doubt about the preservation of the urns oral instructions shall be available at this agency."

14 September 1942:

From a speech by Hitler Youth leader von Schirach before the European Youth Congress in Vienna: "Every Jew who exerts influence in Europe is a danger to European culture. If anyone reproaches me with having driven from this city, which was once the European metropolis of Jewry, tens of thousands upon tens of Thousands of Jews into the ghetto of the East, I feel myself compelled to reply, 'I see in this an action contributing to European culture."

15 September 1942:

From the Vienna edition of the Volkischer Beobachter by Baldur von Schirach: "Every Jew who exerts influence in Europe is a danger to European culture. If anyone reproaches me with having driven from this city, which was once the European metropolis of Jewry, tens of thousands upon tens of thousands of Jews into the ghetto of the East, I feel myself compelled to reply, 'I see in this an action contributing to European culture."

17 September 1942:

From a telegram and reply from the commander of the U-boat Schacht to Doenitz's headquarters (Schacht had been taking part in the rescue of survivors from the Laconia): "163 Italians handed over to Annamite. Navigating officer of Laconia and another English officer on board...Action as in wireless telegram message of 17th of September was wrong. Boat was detailed to rescue Italian allies and not for the rescue of English and Poles."

17 September 1942:

From the navel war diary signed by Doenitz: "The attention of all commanding officers is again drawn again to the fact that all efforts to rescue members of the crews of ships which have been sunk contradict the most primitive demands for the conduct of warfare for annihilating enemy ships and their crews. Orders concerning the bringing in of the captains and chief engineers still stand." From a top-secret order sent to all commanding officers of U-boats: "1. No attempt of any kind must be made at rescuing members of ships sunk; and this includes picking up persons in the water and putting them in lifeboats, righting capsized lifeboats and handing over food and water. Rescue runs counter to the rudimentary demands of warfare for the destruction of enemy ships and crews. 2. Orders for bringing in captains and chief engineers still apply. 3. Rescue the shipwrecked only if their statements will be of importance to your boat. 4. Be harsh, having in mind that the enemy takes no regard of women and children in his bombing attacks on German cities."

18 September 1942:

From a memorandum of an agreement between Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler, and the Minister of Justice (sic), Thierack: "...2. Transfer of asocial elements from prison to the Reichsfuehrer SS for extermination through work. To be transferred without exception are persons under protective arrest, Jews, Gypsies, Russians and Ukrainians, Poles with more than 3-year sentences, Czechs, and Germans with more than 8-year sentences, according to the decision of the Reich Minister for Justice. First of all the worst asocial elements amongst those just mentioned are to be handed over. I shall inform the Fuehrer of this through Reichsleiter Bormann...14. It is agreed that, in consideration of the intended aims of the Government for the clearing up of the Eastern problems, in the future, Jews, Poles, Gypsies, Russians, and 'Ukrainians are no longer to be tried by the ordinary courts, so far as punishable offenses are concerned; but are to be dealt with by the Reichsfuehrer SS. This does not apply to civil lawsuits, nor to Poles whose names are reported or entered in the German racial lists."

21, 22 September 1942:

From notes of a Speer conference with Hitler: "I pointed out to the Fuehrer that, apart from an insignificant amount of work, no possibility exists of organizing armament production in the concentration camps, because: (1) the machine tools required are missing; (2) there are no suitable premises. Both these assets would be available in the armament industry, if use could be made of them by a second shift. "The Fuehrer agrees to my proposal that the numerous factories set upoutside towns for reasons of air raid protection should release their workers to supplement the second shift in town factories and should in return be supplied with labor from the concentration camps-also two shifts. I pointed out to the Fuehrer the difficulties which I expect to encounter if Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler should be able, as he requests, to exercise authoritative influence over these factories. The Fuehrer, too, does not consider such an influence necessary. The Fuehrer, however, agrees that Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler should derive advantage from making his prisoners available; he should get equipment for his division. I suggest giving him a share in kind (war equipment) in ratio to the man-hours contributed by his prisoners. A 3 to 5 percent share is being discussed, the equipment also being calculated according to man-hours. The Fuehrer would agree to such a solution. The Fuehrer is prepared to order the additional allocation of this equipment and weapons to the SS, upon submission of a list."

30 September 1942:

Report found in the Rosenberg files: "How necessary this interference was is shown by the fact that this train with returning laborers had stopped at the same place where a train with newly recruited Eastern Workers had stopped. Because of the corpses in the trainload of returning laborers, a catastrophe might have been precipitated had it not been for the mediation of Mrs. Miller. In this train women gave birth to babies who were thrown out of the windows during the journey, people having tuberculosis and venereal diseases rode in the same car, dying people lay in freight cars without straw, and one of the dead was thrown on the railway embankment. The same must have occurred in other returning transports."

4 October 1942:

From a speech by Goering: "I have examined with very special care the situation in the occupied countries. I have seen how the people lived in Holland, in Belgium, in France, in Norway, in Poland, and wherever else we set foot. I have noticed that although very often their propaganda speaks officially of the difficulty of their food situation, in point of fact this is far from being the case. Of course everywhere, even in France, the system of ration cards has been introduced; but what is obtained on these ration cards is but a supplement, and people live normally on illegal commerce. The recognition of this has caused me to make a firm decision, creating a principle which must be rigidly adhered to. The German people must be considered before all others in the battle against hunger and in the problem of food supply. It is my desire that the population of the territories which have been conquered by us and taken under our protection shall not suffer from hunger. If, however, through enemy measures difficulties of food supply should arise, then all must know that if there is to be hunger anywhere it shall in no case be in Germany..."

5 October 1942:

Letter from Fritz Sauckel to Rosenberg: "The Fuehrer has worked out new and most urgent plans for armament which require the quick mobilization of two million more foreign workers. The Fuehrer therefore has granted me, for the execution of his decree of 21 March 1942, new powers for my new duties, and has especially authored me to take whatever measures I think are necessary in the Reich, the Protectorate, the Government General, as well as in the occupied territories, in order to assure, at all costs an orderly mobilization of labor for the German armament industry. The additional required labor forces will have to be drafted, for the most part, from the recently occupied Eastern Territories, especially from the Reichskommissariat Ukraine. Therefore, the Reichskommissariat Ukraine must furnish 225,000 workers by 31 December 1842 and 225,000 more by 1 May 1942. I ask you to inform Reich Commissioner, Gauleiter, Party Member Koch at once about the new situation and requirements and especially to see that he supports personally in every possible way the execution of this new order. I intend to visit Party Member Koch shortly and I would be grateful if he could inform me as to where and when I could meet him for a personal discussion. Just now though, I ask that the recruiting be taken up at once with all energy and the use of every factor, especially the experts of the labor offices. All directives which temporarily limited the procurement of Eastern Workers are annulled. The Reich procurement for the next months must be given priority over all other measures. I do not ignore the difficulties which exist for the execution of this new order, but I am convinced that with the ruthless use of all resources and with the full co-operation of an concerned the execution of the new demands can be accomplished by the date fixed. I have already communicated the new demands directly to the ReichCommissioner for the Ukraine by teletype. In reference to our phone-call of today, I will send you the text of the Fuehrer's decree at the beginning of next week."

7 October 1942:

Stalin to FDR

"…The difficulties of delivery are reported to be due primarily to shortage of shipping. To remedy the shipping situation the Soviet Government would be prepared to agree to a certain curtailment of US arms deliveries to the Soviet Union. We should be prepared temporarily fully to renounce deliveries of tanks, guns, ammunition, pistols, etc. At the same time, however, we are badly in need of increased deliveries of modern fighter aircraft - such as Aircobras - and certain other supplies. It should be borne in mind that the Kittyhawk is no match for the modern German fighter. It would be very good if the USA could ensure the monthly delivery of at least the following items: 500 fighters, 8,000 to 10,000 trucks, 5,000 tons of aluminum, and 4,000 to 5,000 tons of explosives. Besides, we need, within 12 months, two million tons of grain (wheat) and as much as we can have of fats, concentrated foods and canned meat. We could bring in a considerable part of the food supplies in Soviet ships via Vladivostok if the USA consented to turnover to the USR 20 to 30 ships at the least to replenish our fleet. I have talked this over with Mr. Willkie, feeling certain that he will convey it to you. As regards the situation at the front, you are undoubtedly aware that in recent months our position in the South, particularly I the Stalingrad area, has deteriorated due to shortage of aircraft, mostly fighters. The Germans have bigger stocks of aircraft than we anticipated. In the South they have at least twofold superiority in the air, which makes it impossible for us to protect our troops. War experience has shown that the bravest troops are helpless unless protected against air attack."

8 October 1942:

From the Volkischer Beobachter: "In future an terrorist and sabotage units of the British and their accomplices, who do not behave as soldiers but as bandits, will be treated as such by the German troops and shot on the spot without mercy, wherever it may be."

8 October 1942:

From a memorandum of the Secretariat of State to the German Embassy: "For quite a long time the religious situation in the region called 'Warthegau' gives cause for very grave and ever-increasing anxiety. There, in fact, the Episcopate has been little by little almost completely eliminated; the secular and regular clergy have been reduced to proportions that are absolutely inadequate, because they have been in large part deported and exiled; the education of clerics has been forbidden; the Catholic education of youth is meeting with the greatest opposition; the nuns have been dispersed; insurmountable obstacles have been put in the way of affording people the help of religion; very many churches have been closed; Catholic intellectual and charitable institutions have been destroyed; ecclesiastical property has been seized."

9 October 1942: FDR to Stalin

"…We are moving as rapidly as possible to place an air force under your strategic command in the Caucasus. I am now trying to find additional planes for you immediately and will advise you soon. I am also trying to arrange to have some of our merchant ships transferred to your flag to increase your flow of materials in the Pacific. I have just ordered an automobile tire plant to be made available to you. We are sending a large number of engines and other equipment as well as personnel. I am confident that our contemplated operation will be successful. The gallant defense of Stalingrad has thrilled everyone in America and we are confident of its success."

12 October 1942: FDR to Stalin

"I am examining every possibility of increasing the number of fighter planes to be sent to the Soviet Union. The fact of the matter is that all Aircobra production is now going to fighting fronts immediately. While these urgent combat requirements make it impossible to increase the number of Aircobras for you at the moment, nevertheless I am hoping to increase our production of this type at the expense of other types in order to give you more planes. Also if our forthcoming operations which you know about turn out successfully as they promise, we would then be in a position to release fighters. Our heavy bombardment group has been ordered mobilized immediately for the purpose of operating on your southern flank. This movement will not be contingent on any other operation or commitment and these planes and sufficient transports will go to the Caucasus at an early date. I shall telegraph you in a day or so in reference to explosives, aluminum and trucks. Twenty merchant ships for use in the Pacific are being made available to you. In October we will ship to you 276 combat planes and everything possible is being done to expedite these deliveries."

14 October 1942:

From the minutes of a meeting of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht: "During the era of total warfare sabotage has become one of the most important elements in the conduct of war. It is sufficient to state our attitude to this question. The enemy will find evidence of it in the reports of our own propaganda units...We have already announced by radio our intention of liquidating, in future, all groups of terrorists and saboteurs acting like bandits. Therefore the VVFSt has only to issue regulations to the troops how to deal with terrorist and sabotage groups...In combat or in flight they are to be killed without mercy...Members of terrorist and sabotage groups of the British Army wearing uniform, who in the opinion of our troops are guilty of acting dishonorably or in any manner contrary to the law of nations, are to be kept in separate custody after capture.... ...Instructions concerning the treatment to be inflicted upon them will be given by the WFSt in agreement with the Army legal service and the Counter-Intelligence Department, Foreign Section (Amt Ausland Abwehr)......Violation of the laws of war by terrorist or sabotage troops is in the future always to be assumed when individual assailants as saboteurs or agents, regardless of whether they were soldiers or whatever their uniform might be, place themselves outside the laws of war by committing surprise attacks or brutalities which in the judgment of our troops are inconsistent with the fundamental rules of war...In such cases the assailants will be killed without mercy to the last man, in combat or in flight....Confinement in prisoner-of-war camps, even temporarily, is forbidden."

16 October 1942: FDR to Stalin

"I am glad to inform you, in response to your request, that the items involved can be made available for shipment as follows" Wheat; two million short tons during the remainder of the protocol year at approximately equal monthly rates. Trucks; 8,000 to 10,000 per month. Explosives; 4,000 short tons in November and 5,000 tons per month thereafter. Meat; 15,000 tons per month. Canned Meat; 10,000 tons per month. Lard; 12,000 tons per month. Soap Stock; 5,000 tons per month. Vegetable Oil; 10,000 tons per month. I will advise you at an early date of the aluminum shipments which I am exploring. I have given orders that no effort be spared to keep our routes fully supplied with ships and cargo in conformity with your desires as to priorities on our commitments to you."

18 October 1942: From a Hitler Order (The Commando Order): "1. For some time our enemies have been using in their warfare methods which are outside the international Geneva Conventions. Especially brutal and treacherous is the behavior of the so-called commandos, who, as is established, are partially recruited even from freed criminals in enemy countries. From captured orders it is divulged that they are directed not only to shackle prisoners, but also to kill defenseless prisoners on the spot at the moment in which they believe that the latter, as prisoners, represent a burden in the further pursuit of their purpose or could otherwise be a hindrance. Finally, orders have been found in which the killing of prisoners has been demanded in principle. 2. For this reason it was already announced, in an addendum to the Armed Forces communiqué of 7 October 1942, that in the future, Germany, in the face of the sabotage troops of the British and their accomplices, will resort to the same procedure, that is, that they will be ruthlessly mowed down by the German troops in combat, wherever they may appear. 3. I therefore order: From now on all enemies on so-called commando missions in Europe or Africa, challenged by German troops, even if they are to all appearances soldiers in uniform or demolition troops, whether armed or unarmed, in battle or in flight, are to be slaughtered to the last man. It does not make any difference whether they are landed from ships and airplanes for their actions, or whether they are dropped by parachute. Even if these individuals, when found, should apparently be prepared to give themselves up, no pardon is to be granted them on principle. In each individual case full information is to be sent to the OKW for publication in the communiqué of the Armed Forces. 4. If individual members of such commandos, such as agents, saboteurs, et cetera, fall into the hands of the Armed Forces by some other means, through the police in occupied territories, for instance, they are to be handed over immediately to the SD. Any imprisonment under military guard, in PW stockades, for instance, et cetera, is strictly prohibited, even if this is only intended for a short time. 5. This order does not apply to the treatment of any soldiers who, in the course of normal hostilities, large-scale offensive actions, landing operations, and airborne operations, are captured in open battle or give themselves up. Nor does this order apply to enemy soldiers falling into our hands after battles at sea, or to enemy soldiers trying to save their lives by parachute after air battles. 6. I will hold responsible under military law, for failing to carry out this order, all commanders and officers who either have neglected their duty of instructing the troops about this order, or acted against this order when it was to be executed…a supplementary order of the Fuehrer is enclosed. This order is intended for commanders only and must not, under any circumstances, fall into enemy hands. The further distribution is to be limited accordingly by the receiving bureaus. The bureaus named in the distribution list are held responsible for the return and destruction of all distributed copies of this order and copies made thereof. "I have been compelled to issue strict orders for the destruction of enemy sabotage troops and to declare noncompliance with these orders severely punishable. I deem it necessary to announce to the competent commanding officers and commanders the reasons for this decree. As in no previous war, a method of destruction of communications behind the front, intimidation of the populace working for Germany, as well as the destruction of war-important industrial plants in territories occupied by us has been developed in this war...The consequences of these activities are of extraordinary weight. I do not know whether each commander and officer is cognizant of the fact that the destruction of one single electric power plant, for instance, can deprive the Luftwaffe of many thousand tons of aluminum, thereby eliminating the construction of countless aircraft that will be missed in the fight at the front and so contribute to serious damage of the homeland as well as to bloody losses of the fighting soldiers. Yet this form of war is completely without danger for the adversary. Since he lands his sabotage troops in uniform but at the same time supplies them with civilian clothes, they can, according to need, appear as soldiers or civilians. While they themselves have orders ruthlessly to remove any German soldiers or even natives who get in their way, they run no danger of suffering really serious losses in their operations, since at the worst, if they are caught, they can immediately surrender and thus believe that they will theoretically fall under the provisions of the Geneva Convention. There is no doubt, however, that this is a misuse in the worst form of the Geneva agreements, especially since part of these elements are even criminals liberated from prisons, who can rehabilitate themselves through these activities. England and America will therefore always be able to find volunteers for this kind of warfare, as long as they can truthfully assure them that there is no danger of loss of life for them. At worst, all they have to do is successfully to commit their attacks on people, traffic installations, or other installations and, upon being encountered by the enemy, to capitulate. If the German conduct of war is not to suffer grievous damage through these incidents, it must be made clear to the adversary that all sabotage troops will be exterminated, without exception, to the last man. This means that their chance of escaping with their lives is nil. Under no circumstances can it be permitted, therefore, that a dynamite, sabotage, or terrorist unit simply allows itself to be captured, expecting to be treated according to the rules of the Geneva Convention. It must, under all circumstances, be ruthlessly exterminated. The report on this subject appearing in the Armed Forces communiqué will briefly and laconically state that a sabotage, terror, or destruction unit has been encountered and exterminated to the last man. I therefore expect the commanding officers of armies subordinate to them, as well as individual commanders, not only to realize the necessity of taking such measures, but to carry out this order with energy. Officers and noncommissioned officers who fail through some weakness are to be reported without fail or, if the circumstances require aft, e. g. if danger is imminent, to be at once made strictly accountable. The homeland, as well as the fighting soldier at the front, has the right to expect that behind their backs the essentials of nourishment as well as the supply with war-important weapons and ammunition remains secure. These are the reasons for the issuance of my decree. If it should become necessary, for reasons of interrogation, initially to spare one man or two, then they are to be shot immediately after interrogation."

19 October 1942:

From a report by Professor Paul Thomsen: "I consider it is my duty, although I am only here in the East on a specific scientific mission, to add a general political outline to my actual reports. I must admit, openly and in all honesty, that I return home with the most grievous impressions. In this fateful hour of our nation every mistake we make may result in the most disastrous consequences. A Polish or a Czech problem can be crushed because the biological forces of our people are sufficient for that purpose. Remnants of people like Estonians, Lithuanians, and Letts have to adapt themselves to us or they will perish. Things are quite different in the immense Russian area, of vital necessity to us as a basis for raw materials...I do not dare to voice an opinion on the economic measures, such as, for instance, the abolition of the free market in Kiev, which has been taken as a heavy blow by the population, since I am in no position to observe the entire situation. The 'sergeant major attitude,' the beatings and shouting in the streets, the senseless destruction of scientific institutions which is still going on as strong as ever in Dniepropetrovsk, should cease immediately and be punished severely.-Kiev, 19 October 1942; Professor Dr. Paul W. Thomsen."

14 November 1942: Stalin to FDR: "…No serious changes have occurred on the Soviet-German front in the past week. We plan to launch our winter campaign in the near future and are preparing for it. I shall keep you informed about it. All of us here rejoice at the brilliant success of US and British arms in North Africa. Congratulations on the Victory. With all my heart I wish further success."

16 November 1942: From a letter from Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler addressed to General Pohl: "Dear Pohl: The following struck me during my visit to Dachau on the 13th of November 1942 regarding the experiments conducted there for the saving of people whose lives are endangered through intense chilling in ice, snow, or water, and who are to be saved by the employment of every method or means: I had ordered that suitable women are to be set aside from the concentration camp for these experiments for the warming of those who were exposed. Four girls were set aside who were in the concentration camp for loose morals and because as prostitutes they were a potential source of infection."

19 November 1942:

FDR to Stalin: "…the menace of Japan can be most effectively met by destroying the Nazis first…you and I and Churchill are in complete agreement on this. Our recent battles in the South-west Pacific make the position there mere secure even though we have not yet eliminated attempts by the Japanese to extend their southward drive. The American and British staffs are now studying further moves in the event that we secure the whole south shore of the Mediterranean from Gibraltar to Syria. Before any further step is taken, both Churchill and I want to consult with you and your staff, because whatever we do next in the Mediterranean will have a definite bearing on your magnificent campaign and your proposed moves this coming winter. I do not have to tell you to keep up the good work. You are doing that, and I honestly feel that things everywhere look brighter."

20 November 1942:

Stalin to FDR: "We have begun the offensive operations in the Stalingrad area - in its southern and north-western sectors. The objective of the first stage is to seize the Stalingrad-Likhaya railway and disrupt the communications of the Stalingrad group of the German troops. In the north-western sector the German front has been pierced along a 22-kilometre line and along a 12-kilometre line in the southern sector. The operation is proceeding satisfactorily."

20 November 1942:

From captured Nazi teletype communications: 1. Following supplementary report is made about landing of a British freight glider at Egersund in the night of November 20. a) No firing on the part of the German defense. b) The towing plane (Wellington) crashed after touching the ground...On 20 November 1942 at 5:50 an enemy plane was found 15 kilometers northeast of Egersund. It is a British aircraft (towed glider) made of wood without engine. Of the 17 member crew three are dead, six are severely, the others are slightly, wounded. All wore English khaki uniforms without sleeve insignia. Furthermore, following items were found: 8 knapsacks, tents, skis, and radio sender, exact number still unknown. The glider carried rifles, light machine guns and machine pistols, number unknown. At present the prisoners are with the battalion in Egersund...Beside the 17-member crew extensive sabotage material and work equipment were found. Therefore the sabotage purpose was absolutely proved. The 280th Infantry Division ordered the execution of the action according to the Fuehrer Order. The execution was carried out toward the evening of 20 November. Some of the prisoners wore blue ski-suits under their khaki uniforms which had no insignia on the sleeves. During a short interrogation the survivors have revealed nothing but their names, ranks and serial numbers...In connection with the shooting of the 17 members of the crew, the Armed Forces Commander of Norway has issued an order to the district commanders, according to which the interrogations by G-2 and by BDS (Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei, that is, the police) are important before the execution of the Fuehrer Order; in case of Paragraph Number 4 of the Fuehrer Order, the prisoners are to be handed over to the BDS."

26 November 1942:

FDR to Stalin: "I want you to know that we have hit the Japs very hard in the Solomons. There is a probability that we have broken the backbone of the strength of their fleet, although they still have too many aircraft carriers to suit me, but we may well get some more of them soon. We are in the South-west Pacific with very heavy forces by air, land and sea and do not intend to play a waiting game. We are going to press our advantages. I am sure we are sinking more Jap ships and destroying more airplanes than they can build. I am hopeful that we are going to drive the Germans out of Africa soon and then we will give the Italians a taste of some real bombing, and I am sure they will never stand up to the pressure. The news from the Stalingrad area is most encouraging and I send you my warmest congratulations."

27 November 1942:

Stalin to FDR: "…I fully appreciate your desire to explain the military set-up to people in Australia and New Zealand, and your preoccupation with operations in the South-west Pacific. As to the Mediterranean operations, which are making such favorable progress and are important in terms of changing the whole military situation in Europe, I share your view that the time is ripe for appropriate consultations between the general Staffs of the USA, Great Britain and the USSR. Heartfelt regards and good wishes for further success in your offensive."

28 November 1942:

Stalin to FDR: "…I am glad to hear of your successes in the Solomons area and of the strong build-up of your forces in the South-west Pacific. Feeling certain of the speedy expulsion of Germans from North Africa, I trust that this will help in launching Allied offensive operations in Europe. The intensive air raids planned for Italy will no doubt be very useful. We have achieved some success in the Stalingrad operation, largely facilitated by snowfall and fog which prevented the Germans from making full use of aircraft. We have decided to launch operations on the Central Front, too, to keep the enemy from moving his forces south. I send my warmest regards and best wishes to the US Armed Forces."

2 December 1942:

FDR to Stalin: "The more I consider our mutual military situation and the necessity for reaching early strategic decisions, the more persuaded I am that you, Churchill and I should have an early meeting. It seems to me that a conference of our military leaders alone will not be sufficient, first, because they could come to no ultimate decisions without our approval and, secondly, because I think we should come to some tentative understanding about the procedures which should be adopted in event of a German collapse…If the right decision is reached, we may, and I believe will, knock Germany out of the war much sooner than we anticipated…"

6 December 1942:

Stalin to FDR: "…I welcome the idea of a meeting between the three heads of Governments to establish a common strategy. To my great regret, however, I shall be unable to leave the Soviet Union. This is so critical a moment that I cannot absent myself even for a single day. Just now major military operations - part of our winter campaign - are under way, nor will they be relaxed in January. It is more than likely that it will be the other way round. Fighting is developing both at Stalingrad and on the Central Front. At Stalingrad we have encircled a large group of German troops and hope to complete their destruction."

7 December 1942:

From the Frank ‘Diary' : "Should the new food supply plan be put into effect, it means that for the city of Warsaw and its surroundings alone 500,000 people will no longer receive food relief."

13 December 1942:

From captured Nazi files: "According to the last sentence of the Fuehrer Order of 18th October, individual saboteurs can be spared for the time being in order to keep them for interrogation. The importance of this measure was proved in the cases of the Glomfjord, 2-man torpedo Drontheim, and glider plane Stavanger, where interrogations resulted in valuable knowledge of enemy intentions. Since in the case of Egersund the saboteur was liquidated immediately and no clues were obtained; therefore, Armed Forces Commander refers to the above mentioned last sentence of the Fuehrer Order calling for liquidation only after a short interrogation."

14 December 1942:

From a statement by Frank made to the political leaders of the NSDAP at Krakow: "I will endeavor to get out of the reservoir of this territory everything that is yet to be had out of it. When you consider that it was possible for me to deliver to the Reich 600,000 tons of bread grain and in addition 180,000 tons to the Armed Forces stationed here; further, an abundance amounting to many thousands of tons of other commodities, such as seed, fats, vegetables, besides the delivery to the Reich of 300 million eggs, etcetera, you can estimate how important the work in this territory is for the Reich. In order to make clear to you the significance of the consignment from the Government General of 600,000 tons of bread grain, you are referred to the fact that the Government General, by this achievement alone, covers the raising of the bread ration in the Greater German Reich by two-thirds for the present rationing period. This enormous achievement can rightfully be claimed by us…You know that we have delivered more than 940,000 Polish workers to the Reich. The Government General thereby stands absolutely and relatively at the head of all European countries. This achievement is enormous and has also been recognized as such by Gauleiter Sauckel."

14 December 1942:

Stalin to FDR

"I, too, express deep regret at not being able to leave the Soviet Union in the immediate future, or even in early March. Front affairs simply will not let me do so. Indeed, they necessitate my continuous presence. I do not know yet what were the specific matters that you, Mr. President, and Mr. Churchill wanted discussed at our joint conference. Could we not discuss them by correspondence until we have an opportunity to meet? I think we shall not differ. I feel confident that no time is being wasted, that the promise to open a second front in Europe, which you, Mr. President, and Mr. Churchill gave for 1942 or the spring of 1943 at the latest will be kept and that a second front in Europe will really be opened jointly by Great Britain and the USA next spring. With reference to the rumors about the Soviet attitude to the use of Darlan and people like him…I consider it an important achievement that you have succeeded in winning Darlan and others to the Allied side against Hitler…"

16 December 1942:

FDR to Stalin

"I am not clear as to just what happened in regard to our offer of American air assistance in the Caucasus. I am fully willing to send units with American pilots and crews. I think they should operate by units under their American commanders, but each group would, of course, be under overall Russian command as to tactical objectives. Please let us know your desires as soon as possible, as I truly want to help all I can. Pursuit plane program would not be affected. What I refer to is essentially the bombing plane type which can be flown to the Caucasus."

16 December 1942:

Gestapo Muller to SS Himmler: "In connection with the increase in the transfer of labor to the concentration camps ordered to be completed by 30 January 1943, the following procedure may be applied in the Jewish section: 1. Total number: 45,000 Jews. 2. Start of transportation 11 January 1943. And of transportation: 31 January 1943. (The Reich railroads are unable to provide special trains for the evacuation during the period from 15 December 1942 to 10 January 1943 because of the increased traffic of Armed Forcesleave trains.) 3. Composition: The 45,000 Jews are to consist of 30,000 Jews from the district of Bialystok; 10,000 Jews from the Ghetto of Theresienstadt, 5,000 of whom are Jews fit for work who heretofore had been used for smaller jobs required for the ghetto and 5,000 Jews who are generally incapable of working, also Jews over 60-years old. As heretofore only such Jews would be taken for the evacuation who do not have any particular connections and who are not in possession of any high decorations. Three thousand Jews from the occupied Dutch territories, 2,000 Jews from Berlin-45,000. The figure of 45,000 includes those unfit for work (old Jews and children). By use of a practical standard, the screening of the arriving Jews in Auschwitz should yield at least 10,000 to 45,000 people fit for work."

18 December 1942:

Stalin to FDR

"Thank you very much for the willingness to help us. The Anglo-American squadrons with crews are no longer needed in Transcaucasia. The main battles are being fought, and will be fought, on the Central Front and in the Voronezh area. I should be most grateful if you would expedite the dispatch of aircraft, especially fighters, but without crews, whom you now need badly for use in the areas mentioned. A feature of the Soviet Air Force is that we have more than enough pilots but suffer from a shortage of machines."

21 December 1942:

From a letter from Rosenberg to Sauckel: "The reports I have received show that the increase of the guerilla bands in the Occupied Eastern Territories is largely due to the fact that the methods used for procuring laborers in these regions are felt to be forced measures of mass deportations, so that the endangered persons prefer to escape their fate by withdrawing into the woods or going to the guerilla bands." …"Even if I in no way deny that the numbers demanded by the Reich Minister for Armament and Munitions as well as by the agricultural economy justify unusual and severe measures, I must, because I am answerable for the Occupied Eastern Territories, emphatically request that, in filling the quota demanded, measures be excluded the consequences and our toleration of which will someday be held against me and my collaborators."

30 December 1942:

FDR to Stalin: "In the event that Japan should attack Russia in the Far East I am prepared to assist you in that theater with an American Air force of approximately one hundred four-engine bombardment airplanes as early as practicable…"

5 January 1943:

From a Sauckel circular: "On 4 January 1943, at 8 o'clock in the evening, Minister Speer telephoned from the general headquarters of the Fuehrer giving the information that, by virtue of a decision of the Fuehrer it was no longer necessary, when recruiting skilled and unskilled labor in France, to have any particular regard for the French. Recruitment could be carried on there with pressure and more severe measures."

5 January 1943

Stalin to FDR: "Your message concerning the Far East received. I thank you for the readiness to send 100 bombers to the Far East for the Soviet Union. I must say, however, that what we need at present is aircraft, not in the Far East, where the USSR is not fighting, but on a front where a most cruel war is being waged against the Germans, that is, on the Soviet-German front. The arrival of these aircraft without pilots - because we have a sufficient number of pilots - on the South-Western or Central Front would play a notable part in the most important sectors of our struggle against Hitler. As regards the whole course of the war on our fronts, so far our offensive is, on the whole, making satisfactory progress."

6 January 1943:

From a record in Raeder's handwriting of an interview with Hitler: "...if the Fuehrer was anxious to demonstrate that the parting was of the friendliest character and wished that the name Raeder should continue to be associated with the Navy, particularly abroad, it would perhaps be possible to make an appointment to the Inspector General, giving appropriate publicity in the press, et cetera. But a new Commander-in-Chief of the Navy with full responsibility for this office must be appointed. The position of Inspector General, or whatever it was decided to call it, must be purely nominal. The Fuehrer accepted this suggestion with alacrity. The Inspector General could perhaps carry out special tasks for him, make tours of inspection, et cetera. The name of Raeder was still to be associated with the Navy. After Commander-in-Chief of the Navy had repeated his request, the Fuehrer definitely agreed to 30th January as his release date. He would like to think over the details."

8 January 1943:

FDR to Stalin

"After reading your reply to my radio concerning the Far East, I am afraid I did not make myself clear. As I previously explained reference South Caucasus, it is not practicable to send heavy bombers to Russia at this time other than in existing organized units. Our proposal regarding one hundred planes referred to a situation which would occur if hostilities were actually to break out between Japan and Russia…My deep appreciation for the continuing advances of your armies. The principle of attrition of the enemy forces on all fronts is beginning to work."

9 January 1943:

FDR to Stalin

"I have arranged that two hundred C-47 transport planes be assigned to you in 1943 beginning in January. Your mission here is being advised of the dates of delivery by months. I am going to do everything I can to give you another one hundred but you can definitely count on the two hundred planes referred to above."

10 January 1943:

From a memorandum by Raeder: "The Importance of German Surface Forces for Conducting the War by the Powers Signatory to the Three Power was planned by the leaders of the National Socialist Reich to give the German Navy by 1944-45 such a strength that it would be possible to strike at the British vital arteries in the Atlantic with sufficient ships, fighting power, and range...In 1939, the war having begun 5 years earlier, the construction of these forces was still in its initial stages..."

13 January 1943:

Stalin to FDR

"Thank you for your decision to send 200 transport planes to the Soviet Union…I was rather surprised at your proposal that General Bradley should inspect Russian military objectives in the Far East and elsewhere in the USSR. It should be perfectly obvious that only Russians can inspect Russian military objectives, just as US military objectives can be inspected by none but Americans. There should be no unclarity in this matter…My colleagues are upset by the fact that the operations in North Africa have come to a standstill and, I gather, for a long time, too. Would you care to comment on this matter?"

25 January 1943: From notes of a meeting at Warsaw between Frank and Kruger: "...(Kruger:) We are removing those who constitute a burden in this new colonization territory. Actually, they are the asocial and inferior elements. They are being deported; first brought to a concentration camp and then sent as labor to the Reich. From a Polish propaganda standpoint, this entire first action has an unfavorable effect. For the Poles say: 'After the Jews have been destroyed, then they will employ the same methods to get the Poles out of this territory and liquidate them just like the Jews."

25 January 1943:

From an address by Frank at labor conference meetings in the Government General: "We must remember that we who are gathered together here figure on Mr. Roosevelt's list of war criminals. I have the honor of being Number One. We have, so to speak, become accomplices in the world historic sense."

27 January 1943:

FDR and Churchill to Stalin

"We have been in conference with our military leaders and have decided on operations which are to be undertaken by the American and British forces in the first nine months of 1943. We wish to inform you of our intentions at once…We are in no doubt that the correct strategy is to concentrate on the defeat of Germany with a view to achieving an early and decisive victory in the European Theater. At the same time we must maintain sufficient pressure on Japan to retain the initiative in the Pacific…Our main desire has been to divert strong German land and air forces from the Russian front and to send Russia the maximum flow of supplies…Our immediate intention is to clear the Axis out of North Africa and set up navel and air stations to open: (1) an effective passage through the Mediterranean for military traffic, and (2) an intensive bombardment of important Axis targets in Southern Europe. We have made the decision to launch large-scale amphibious operations in the Mediterranean at the earliest possible moment. The preparations for these operations is now under way and will involve considerable concentration of forces, including landing craft and shipping, in Egypt and the North African ports. In addition we shall concentrate within the United Kingdom a strong American land and air force. These, combined with the British forces in the United Kingdom, will prepare themselves to reenter the continent of Europe as soon as practicable…As you are aware, we are already containing more than half the German Air Force in Western Europe and the Mediterranean. We have no doubt that our intensified and diversified bombing offensive, together with other operations which we are undertaking, will compel further withdrawals of German air and other forces from the Russian front…Our ruling purpose is to bring to bear upon Germany and Italy the maximum forces by land, sea and air which can be physically applied"

29 January 1943:

From a speech by Seyss-Inquart: "...It is also clear, now more than ever, that every resistance which is directed against this fight for existence must be suppressed. Some time ago the representatives of the churches had written to the Wehrmacht commander and to me, and they presented their ideas in regard to the execution of death sentences which the Wehrmacht commander announced in the meantime. To this I can say only the following: At the moment in which our men, fathers, and sons with iron determination look towards their fate in the East and unflinchingly and steadfastly perform their highest pledge, it is unbearable to tolerate conspiracies whose goal is to weaken the rear of this eastern front. Whoever dares this must be annihilated. We must be severe and become even more severe against our opponents. This is the command of a relentless sequence of events and for us, perhaps, inhumanly hard but our holy duty. We remain human because we do not torture our opponents. We must remain hard in annihilating them."

30 January 1943:

Stalin to FDR and Churchill

"…Thank you for informing me about the Casablanca decisions about operations to be undertaken by the US and British armed forces in the first nine months of 1943. Assuming that your decisions on Germany are designed to defeat her by opening a second front in Europe in 1943, I should be grateful if you would inform me of the concrete operations planned and of their timing. As to the Soviet Union, I can assure you that Soviet armed forces will do all in their power to continue the offensive against Germany and her Allies on the Soviet-German front. We expect to finish our winter campaign, circumstances permitting in the first half of February. Are troops are tired, they are in need of rest and they will hardly be able to carry on the offensive beyond that period."

5 February 1943:

FDR to Stalin

"As Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States of America I congratulate you on the brilliant victory at Stalingrad of the armies under your Supreme Command. The one hundred and sixty-two days of epic battle for the city which has for ever honored your name and the decisive result which all Americans are celebrating today will remain one of the proudest chapters of this war of the peoples united against Nazism and its emulators…"

11 February 1943:

12 days after the Doenitz had become Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy, this memorandum was circulated within the naval war staff in order to clear up certain misunderstandings as to the scope of the basic Hitler Order of 18 October 1942: "From the notice given by the 3rd Section of the Naval Operations Staff on 1 February 1943 it has been discovered that the competent departments of the General Staff of the Army, as well as those of the Air Force Operations Staff, have a wrong conception regarding the treatment of saboteurs. A telephone inquiry at the 3rd Section of the Operations Staff proved that this naval authority was not correctly informed either. In view of this situation, reference is made to Paragraph 6 of the Fuehrer Order of 18 October 1942 according to which commanders and officers who have neglected their duty in instructing their units about the order referring to treatment of saboteurs are threatened with punishment by court-martial. The first Fuehrer order concerning this matter of 18 October 1942 was given the protection of top secret merely because it stated therein (1) that according to the Fuehrer's views, the spreading of military sabotage organizations in the East and West may have tremendous consequences for our whole conduct of the war, and (2) that the shooting of uniformed prisoners acting on military orders must be carried out even after they have surrendered voluntarily and asked for pardon. On the other hand, the annihilation of sabotage units in battle is not at all to be kept secret; but on the contrary, to be currently published in the OKW reports. The purpose of these measures to act as a deterrent will not be achieved if those taking part in enemy commando operations would not learn that certain death and not safe imprisonment awaits them. As the saboteurs are to be annihilated immediately, unless their statements are first needed for military reasons, it is necessary that not only all members of the Armed Forces must receive instructions that these types of saboteurs, even if they are in uniform, are to be annihilated but also all departments of the home staff, dealing with this kind of questions, must be informed of the course of action which has been ordered…The annihilation and destruction, according to Paragraph 5 of the Fuehrer Order of 18 October 1942, do not apply to troops participating in large scale landing operations and large-scale airborne operations. The criterion is to be found in that, in the latter case, an open battle takes place, whereas, for instance, 10 or more people who land by sea or air, or drop by parachute not to fight an open battle but to destroy either a factory, a bridge, or a railway installation, would fall into the category of those who must be annihilated."

12 February 1943:

Churchill to Stalin: "Your message of January 30th…There are a quarter of a million Germans and Italians in Eastern Tunisia. We hope to destroy or expel these during April, if not earlier. When this is accomplished, we intend in July, or earlier if possible, to seize Sicily with the object of clearing the Mediterranean, promoting Italian collapse with the consequent effect on Greece and Yugoslavia and wearing down of the German Air Force; this is to be closely followed by an operation in the Eastern Mediterranean, probably against the Dodecanese…We are also pushing preparations to the limit of our resources for a cross-Channel operation in August, in which British and United States units would participate…Both operations will be supported by very large British and American air forces, and that across the Channel by the whole metropolitan Air Force of Great Britain.."

12 February 1943:

From a meeting of the Military Commanders and all responsible officials of the Reich labor service: "Gauleiter Sauckel likewise thanks the various services for the successful carrying out of the first action. Immediately after the beginning of the new year, he is obliged to announce further severe measures. There is a great new need of labor for the front as well as for the Reich armament industry...The situation at the front calls for 700,000 soldiers fit for front-line service. The armament industry would have to lose 200,000 key workers by the middle of March. I have received an order from the Fuehrer to find 200,000 foreign skilled workers as replacements and I shall need for this purpose 150,000 French skilled workmen, while the other 50,000 can be drawn from Holland, Belgium, and other occupied countries. In addition, 100,000 unskilled French workers are necessary for the Reich. The second action of recruitment in France makes it necessary that by the middle of March 150,000 skilled workers and 100,000 unskilled workmen and women be transferred to Germany."

16 February 1943:

From a meeting of the Central Planning Board in Berlin: "My collaborators and I having succeeded, after difficult discussions, in persuading Laval to introduce the law of compulsory labor in France, this law has now been so successfully extended, thanks to our pressure, that by yesterday three French age-groups had already been called up. So we are now legally qualified to recruit in France, with the assistance of the French Government, workers of three age groups whom we shall be able to employ henceforth in French factories, but among whom we shall also be able to choose some for our own needs in the Reich and send them to Germany."

16 February 1943:

Stalin to FDR: "…It appears that the date - February - fixed earlier for completing operations in Tunisia is now set back to April. There is no need to demonstrate at length the undesirability of this delay in operations against the Germans and Italians. It is now, when the Soviet troops are still keeping up their broad offensive, that action by the Anglo-American troops in North Africa is imperative. Simultaneous pressure on Hitler from our front and from yours in Tunisia would be a great positive significance for our common cause and would create most serious difficulties for Hitler and Mussolini. It would also expedite the operations you are planning in Sicily and the Eastern Mediterranean. As to the opening of a second front in Europe, in particular in France, it is planned, judging by your communication, for August or September. As I see it, however, the situation calls for shortening these time limits to the utmost and for the opening of a second front in the West at a date much earlier than the one mentioned. So that the enemy should not be given a chance to recover, it is very important, to my mind, that the blow from the West, instead of being put off till the second half of the year, be delivered in spring or early summer. According to reliable information at our disposal, since the end of December, when for some reason the Anglo-American operations in Tunisia were suspended, the Germans moved 27 divisions, including five armored divisions, to the Soviet-German front from France, the Low Countries and Germany. In other words, instead of the Soviet Union being aided by diverting forces from the Soviet-German front, what we get is relief for Hitler, who, because of the let-up in Anglo-American operations in Tunisia, was able to move additional troops against the Russians. The forgoing indicates that the sooner we make joint use of the Hitler camp’s difficulties at the front, the more grounds we shall have for anticipating early defeat for Hitler. Unless we take account of this and profit by the present moment to further our common interests, it may well be that, having gained a respite and rallied their forces, the Germans might recover. It is clear to you and us that such an undesirable miscalculation should not be made."

19 February 1943:

From notes of a meeting attended by Speer, Sauckel, and Field Marshal Milch: Sauckel: "If any prisoners are taken, they will be needed there." Milch: "We have made a request for an order that a certain percentage of men in the antiaircraft artillery must be Russians. Fifty thousand will be taken altogether, thirty thousand are already employed as gunners. It is an amusing thing that Russians must work the guns."

22 February 1943:

FDR to Stalin: "…I desire to state that I share your regret that the Allied effort in North Africa did not proceed in accordance with the schedule. It was interrupted by unexpected heavy rains that made the roads extremely difficult for both supplies and troops proceeding to the front lines from our landing ports. These rains made the fields and mountains impassable. I am fully aware of the adverse effect on the common Allied effort of this delay and I am taking every possible step to begin successful aggressive action against the forces of the Axis in Africa at the earliest possible moment with the purpose of accomplishing their destruction…I understand the importance of a military effort on the continent of Europe at the earliest date practicable in order to reduce Axis resistance to your heroic army. You may be sure that the American war effort will be projected on to the European Continent at as early a date subsequent to success in North Africa as transportation facilities can be provided by put maximum effort. We wish for the continuance of the success of your heroic army which is an inspiration to all of us."

23 February 1943:

From the newspaper Dernieres Nouvelles de Strasbourg: "In his speech at Karlsruhe Gauleiter Robert Wagner stressed that measures of total mobilization would be applied to Alsace and that the authorities would abstain from any bureaucratic working method. The Alsatian labor offices have already invited the first category of young women liable for mobilization to fill out the enlistment form. In principle, all women who until the present have worked only at home, who have had to care only for their husbands, and who have no other relatives, shall work a full day. Many married men who until now had never offered to help their wives with the household work will be obliged to put their shoulder to the wheel. They will work in the household and do errands. With a little goodwill, everything will work out. Women who have received a professional education shall be put, if possible, to tasks that relate to their professions, on condition that they have an important bearing on the war effort. This prescription applies only to all feminine professions which imply care given to other persons."

24 February 1943:

A letter from Sauckel to Hitler: "Plenipotentiary General for Allocation of Labor, to the Fuehrer general headquarters of the Fuehrer. My Fuehrer, I beg herewith to take leave of you before my intended journey to France. The purpose of my journey is: 1) To put at the disposal of the Reich, within the given time, skilled labor to replace German key workers being drafted into the Wehrmacht. May I add that Field Marshal Keitel and General Von Unruh received a communication from me yesterday to the effect that half of these replacements for key men, that is 125,000 French qualified skilled men, have already arrived in the Reich on I January 1943 and that a corresponding number of soldiers can be called to the colors. I shall now make sure in France that the second half shall arrive in the Reich by the end of March, or earlier if possible. The first French program was executed by the end of December. 2) To assure the necessary labor for the French dockyards for the carrying out of the programs drawn up by Grand Admiral Doenitz and Gauleiter Kaufmann. 3) To assure the necessary labor for the programs of the Luftwaffe. 4) To assure the necessary labor for the other German armament programs which are in progress in France. 5) To make available supplementary labor in agreement with State Secretary Backe, with a view to intensifying French agricultural production. 6) To have discussions, if necessary, with the French Government on the subject of the carrying out of the labor service, the calling up of age-groups, and so forth, with a view to activating the recruitment of labor for the benefit of the German war economy. "

2 March 1943:

From the Cardinal Secretary of State to Von Ribbentrop, Foreign Minister of the Reich: "The place where, above all, the religious situation, by its unusual gravity, calls for special consideration is the territory called the 'Reichsgau Wartheland.' Six bishops resided in that region in August 1939; now there is left only one. In fact, the Bishop of Lodz and his auxiliary were, in the course of the year 1941, confined first in a small district of the diocese and then expelled and exiled in the 'Generalgouvernement.' Another bishop, Monseigneur Michael Kozal, Auxiliary and Vicar General of Wloclawek, was arrested in the autumn of 1939, detained for some time in a prison in the city and later in a religious house in Lad, and finally was transferred to the concentration camp at Dachau. Since His Eminency the Cardinal Archbishop of Gniezno and Poznan and the Bishop of Wloclawek, who had gone away during the period of military operations, were not allowed to return to their Sees, the only bishop who now remains in the 'Warthegau' is His Excellency Monseigneur Valentine Dymek, Auxiliary of Poznan; and he, at least up to November 1942, was interned in his own house. If the lot of their Excellencies the Bishops has been a source of anxiety for the Holy See, the condition of an immense number of priests and members of religious orders has caused it, and still causes it, no less grief. In the territory now called 'Warthegau' more than 2,000 priests exercised their ministry before the war; they are now reduced to a very small number. According to accounts received from various quarters by the Holy See, in the first months of the military occupation not a few members of the secular clergy were shot or otherwise put to death, while others-some hundreds-were imprisoned or treated in an unseemly manner, being forced into employments unbecoming their state and exposed to scorn and derision. Then, while numbers of ecclesiastics were exiled or constrained in some other way to take refuge in the 'Generalgouvernement,' many others were transferred to concentration camps. At the beginning of October 1941 the priests from the dioceses of the 'Warthegau' detained in Dachau already numbered several hundreds; but their number increased considerably in that month following a sharp intensification of police measures which culminated in the imprisonment and deportation of further hundreds of ecclesiastics. Entire 'Kreise' (districts) remained thus completely deprived of clergy. In the city of Poznan itself the spiritual care of some 200,000 Catholics remained in the hands of not more than four priests. No less painful was the fate reserved for the regular clergy. Many religious were shot or otherwise killed; the great majority of the others were imprisoned, deported, or expelled. In the same way far-reaching measures were taken against the institutions preparing candidates for the ecclesiastical state. The diocesan seminaries of Gniezno and Poznan, of Wloclawek, and of Lodzwere closed. The seminary in Poznan for the training of priests destined to work among Polish Catholics abroad was also closed. The novitiates and houses of formation of the religious orders and congregations were closed. Not even the nuns were able to continue their charitable activities without molestation. For them was set up a special concentration camp at Bojanowo, where towards the middle of 1941 about 400 sisters were interned and employed in manual labor. To a representation of the Holy See made through the Apostolic Nunciature in Berlin (Memorandum N. 40.348 of June 11th, 1941) your Reich Ministry for Foreign Affairs replied in the Memorandum Poll III 1886 of September 28 of the same year that it was only a question of a temporary measure, taken with the consent of the Reich lieutenant for Wartheland, in order to supply the lack of housing for Polish Catholic sisters. In the same memorandum it was admitted that as a result of reorganization of charitable institutions many Catholic sisters were without employment. But,in spite of the fact that this measure was declared to be temporary, it is certain that towards the end of 1942 some hundreds of nuns were still interned at Bojanowo. It is established that for some time the religious were deprived even of spiritual help. Likewise in the matter of education and religious instruction of youth no attention was paid in the 'Warthegau' to the rights of the Catholic Church. All the Catholic schools were suppressed. The use of the Polish language in sacred functions, and even in the Sacrament of Penance, was forbidden. Moreover-and this is a matter worthy of special mention and is at variance with the natural law and with the dispositions accepted by the legal systems of all nations-for the celebration of marriage between Poles the minimum age limit was fixed at 28 years for men and 25 years for women. Catholic Action was so badly hit as to be completely destroyed. The National Institute, which was at the head of the whole Catholic Action movement in Poland, was suppressed; as a result all the associations belonging to it, which were flourishing, as well as all Catholic cultural, charity, and social service institutions, were abolished. In the whole of the 'Warthegau' there is no longer any Catholic press and not even a Catholic bookshop. Grave measures were repeatedly taken with regard to ecclesiastical property. Many of the churches closed to public worship were turned over to profane uses. From such an insult not even the Cathedrals of Gniezno, Poznan, Wloclawek, and Lodz were spared. Episcopal residences were confiscated, the real estate belonging to the seminaries, convents, diocesan museums, libraries, and church funds were confiscated or sequestered. Even before ecclesiastical property was affected, the allowances to the clergy had been abolished. The administrative regulations published by the lieutenant's of police for the application of the ordinance of September 13th, 1941 made the situation of the Catholics in that region still more difficult. For example, on November 19, 1941 came a decree of the Reich lieutenant by which among other things it was set forth that, as from the previous September 13th, the property of the former juridical persons of the Roman Catholic Church should pass over to the 'Romisch-katholische Kirche deutscher Nationalitat im Reichsgau Wartheland' insofar as, on the request of the above-mentioned 'Religionsgesellschaft' such property shall be recognized by the Reich lieutenant as 'non-Polish property.' In virtue of this decree practically all the goods of the Catholic Church in the 'Warthegau' were lost. If we pass from the 'Warthegau' to the other territories in the East, we unfortunately find there, too acts and measures against the rights of the Church and of the Catholic faithful, though they vary in gravity and extension from one place to another. In the provinces which were declared annexed to the German Reich and joined up with the Gaue of East Prussia, of Danzig West Prussia and of Upper Silesia, the situation is very like that described above in regard to seminaries, the use of the Polish mother-tongue in sacred functions, charitable works, associations of Catholic Action, the separation of the faithful according to nationality. There, too, one must deplore the closing of churches to public worship, the exile, deportation, the violent death of not a few of the clergy (reduced by two-thirds in the diocese of Culma and by at least a third in the diocese of Katowice), the suppression of religious instruction in the schools, and above all the complete suppression in fact of the Episcopate. Actually, after the Bishop of Culma, who had left during the military operations, had been refused permission to return to his diocese, there followed in February 1941 the expulsion of the Bishop of Plock and his auxiliary, who both died later in captivity; the Bishop, the venerable octogenarian Monseigneur Julian Anthony Nowowiejski, died at Dzialdowo on May 28th, 1941, and the auxiliary, Monseigneur Leo Wetmanski, 'in a transit camp' on October 10th of the same year. In the territory called the 'Generalgouvernement,' as in the Polish provinces which had been occupied by Soviet troops in the period between September 1939 and June 1941, the religious situation is such as to cause the Holy See lively apprehension and serious preoccupation. Without pausing to describe the treatment meted out in many cases to the clergy priests imprisoned, deported, and even put to death, the confiscation of ecclesiastical property, the closing of churches, the suppression even of associations and publications of simply and exclusively religious character, the closing of the Catholic secondary and higher schools and of the Catholic University of Lublin, let it suffice to recall two series of specially grave measures: those which affect the seminaries and those which weigh on the Episcopate. When the buildings of the various seminaries had been completely or in part occupied, the intention for some time (November 1940-February 1941) was to reduce these institutions for the training of priests to two-those of Krakow and Sandomierz; then the others revere permitted to reopen, but only on condition that no new students were admitted, which in practice inevitably means that all these institutions will soon be closed. Mention has several times been made of ecclesiastics deported or confined in concentration camps. The majority of them were transferred to the Altreich (Note: the Old Reich of Germany), where their number already exceeds a thousand. When the Holy See asked that they should be liberated and be permitted to emigrate to neutral countries of Europe or America (1940), the petition was refused; it was only promised that they should all be collected in the concentration camp at Dachau, that they should be dispensed from too hard labor, and that some should be permitted to say Mass, which the others could hear. The treatment of the ecclesiastics interned at Dachau, which, for a certain time in 1941 was in fact somewhat mitigated, worsened against the end of that year. Particularly sorrowful were the announcements which for many months in 1942 came from that camp of the frequent deaths of priests, even of some young priests among them. Polish Catholics are not allowed to contract marriage in the territory of the Altreich; just as requests for religious instruction or instruction in preparation for confession and Holy Communion for the children of these workers are, in principle, not accepted."

5 March 1943:
Notes from a meeting of the National Socialist Party in Kiev; Erich Koch, Reich Commissar for the Ukraine; excerpts from speech: "1. We are the master race and must govern hard but just.... 2. I will draw the very last out of this country. I did not come to spread bliss. I have come to help the Fuehrer. The population must work, work, and work again . . . for some people are getting excited that the population may not get enough to eat. The population cannot demand that. One has only to remember what our heroes were deprived of in Stalingrad .... We definitely did not come here to give out manna. We have come here to create the basis for victory. 3. We are a master race, which must remember that the lowliest German worker is racially and biologically a thousand times more valuable than the population here."

6 March 1943:

Notes of conference found in the German Foreign Office archives between Ribbentrop and Ambassador Oshima: "Oshima declared that he received a telegram from Tokyo, and he is to report by order of his Government to the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs the following: The suggestion of the German Government to attack Russia was the subject of a common conference between the Japanese Government and the Imperial headquarters during which the question was discussed in detail and investigated exactly. The result is the following: The Japanese Government absolutely recognize the danger which threatens from Russia and completely understand the desire of their German ally that Japan on her part will also enter the war against Russia. However, it is not possible for the Japanese Government, considering the present war situation, to enter into the war. They are rather of the conviction that it would be in the common interest not to start the war against Russia now. On the other hand, the Japanese Government would never disregard the Russian question. The Japanese Government have the intention to become aggressive again in the future on other fronts. The RAM (Ribbentrop) brought up the question, after the explanation by the Ambassador, how the continued waging of the war is envisaged in Tokyo. At present Germany wages the war against the common enemies, England and America, mostly alone, while Japan mostly behaves more defensively. However, it would be more correct that the powers allied in the Three Power Pact would combine their forces not only to defeat England and America, but also Russia. It is not good when one part must fight alone. One cannot overstrain the German national strength. He was inwardly concerned about certain forces at work in Tokyo, who were of the opinion, and propagated the same, that doubtless, Germany could merge from the battle victoriously and that Japan should proceed to consolidate her forces before she should further exert herself to the fullest extent...Then the RAM again brought up the question of the attack on Russia by Japan and he declared that, after all, the fight on the Burma front as well as in the South is actually more of a maritime problem; and on all fronts except those in China at best very few ground forces are stationed. Therefore the attack on Russia is primarily an Army affair, and he asked himself if the necessary forces for that would be available."

10 March 1943:

When German field commanders on the Eastern Front attempted to resist or restrain Sauckel's demands, because forced recruitment was swelling the ranks of the partisans and making the Army's task more difficult, Sauckel sent this telegram to Hitler. An excerpt: "...Therefore, my Fuehrer, I ask you to abolish all orders which oppose the obligation of foreign workers for labor and kindly to report to me whether my conception of the mission presented here is all right....If the obligation for labor and the forced recruiting of workers in the East is not possible any more, then the German war industries and agriculture cannot fulfill their tasks to the full extent....I myself have the opinion that our Army leaders should not give credence, under any circumstances, to the atrocity and defamatory propaganda campaign of the partisans. The generals themselves are greatly interested that the support for the troops is made possible in time. I should like to point out that hundreds of thousands of excellent workers going into the field as soldiers now cannot possibly be replaced by German women not used to work, even if they are trying to do their best. Therefore, I have to use the people of the Eastern Territories. I myself report to you that the workers belonging to all foreign nations are treated humanely, and correctly, and cleanly; are fed and housed well and are even clothed. On the basis of my own services with foreign nations I go as far as to state that never before in the world were foreign workers treated as correctly as they are now, in the hardest of all wars, by the German people."

11 March 1943:

From a monitored account of a talk by a German naval war reporter on the long wave propaganda service from Friesland: "Santa Lucia, in the West Indies, was an ideal setting for romance, but nowadays it was dangerous to sail in these waters - dangerous for the British and Americans and for all the colored people who were at their beck and call. Recently a U-boat operating in these waters sighted an enemy windjammer. Streams of tracer bullets were poured into the sails and most of the Negro crew leaped overboard. Knowing that this might be a decoy ship, the submarine steamed close, within 20 yards, when hand grenades were hurled into the rigging. The remainder of the Negroes then leaped into the sea. The windjammer sank. There remained only wreckage, lifeboats packed with men, and sailors swimming. The sharks in the distance licked their teeth in expectation. Such was the fate of those who sailed for Britain and America."

14 March 1943:

An extract from the war diary of the Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Operational Staff: "The Quartermaster General, together with the Economic Staff East, has proposed that the deportees should be sent either to prison camps or to reformatory labor camps in their own area and that deportation to Germany should take place only when the deportees are on probation and in less serious cases. In view of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, this proposal does not take sufficient account of the severity required and leads to a comparison with the treatment meted out to the 'peaceful population' which has been called upon to work. He recommends, therefore, transportation to concentration camps in Germany which have already been introduced by the Reichsfuehrer SS for his sphere and which he is prepared to introduce for the Armed Forces in the case of an extension to the province of the latter. The High Command of the Armed Forces therefore orders that partisan helpers and suspects who are not to be executed should be handed over to the competent Higher SS and Police Leader, and orders that the difference between 'punitive labor' and 'being set to labor in Germany' be made clear to the population."

16 March 1943:

Stalin to FDR

"…Anglo-American operations in North Africa, far from being accelerated, are being postponed till the end of April; indeed, even this date is given in rather vague terms. In other words, at the height of the fighting against Hitler’s troops - in February and March - the Anglo-American offensive in North Africa, far from being stepped up, had been called off altogether, and the time fixed for it has been set back. Meanwhile, Germany has succeeded in moving from the West 36 divisions, including six armored, to be used against the Soviet troops. The difficulties that this has created for the Soviet Army and the extent to which it has eased the German position on the Soviet-German front will be readily appreciated. Mr. Churchill had also informed me that the Anglo-American operation against Sicily is planned for June. For all its importance that operation can by no means replace a second front in France. But I fully welcome, of course, your intention to expedite the carrying out of this operation. At the same time I consider it my duty to state that the early opening of a second front in France is the most important thing. You will recall that you and Mr. Churchill thought it possible to open a second front as early as 1942 or this spring at the latest. The grounds for doing so were weighty enough. Hence it should be obvious why I stressed in my message of February 16 the need for striking in the West not later than this spring or early summer. The Soviet troops have fought strenuously all winter and are continuing to do so, while Hitler is taking important measures to rehabilitate and reinforce his Army for the spring and summer operations against the USSR; it is therefore particularly essential for us that the blow from the West be no longer delayed, that it be delivered this spring or early summer. I appreciate the considerable difficulties caused by a shortage of transport facilities, of which you advised me in your message. Nevertheless, I think I must give a most emphatic warning, in the interest of our common cause, of the grave danger with which further delay in opening a second front in France is fraught. That is why the vagueness of both your reply and Mr. Churchill’s as to the opening of a second front in France causes me concern, which I cannot help expressing."

17 March 1943:

Sauckel to Rosenberg: "After a protracted illness, my deputy for labor allocation in the Occupied Eastern Territories, State Councilor Peuckert, is going there to regulate the allocation of labor both for Germany and the territories themselves. I ask you sincerely, dear Party Member Rosenberg, to assist him to your utmost on account of the pressing urgency of Peuckert's mission. I may thank you already at this moment for the good reception accorded to Peuckert up to this time. He himself has been charged by me to co-operate fully and unreservedly with all bureaus of the EasternTerritories. Especially the labor allocation for German agriculture and likewise the most urgent armament production programs ordered by the Fuehrer, make the fastest importation of approximately 1 million men and women from the Eastern Territories within the next 4 months, a necessity. Starting 15 March the daily shipment must reach 5,000 female or male workers, while from the beginning of April this number has to be stepped up to 10,000, if the most urgent programs and the spring tillage and other agricultural tasks are not to suffer to the detriment of the food and of the Armed Forces. I have provided for the allotment of the draft quotas for the individual territories, in agreement with your experts for labor supply, as follows: Daily quota starting 15 March 1943: From General Kommissariat, WhiteRuthenia - 500 people: Economic Inspection, Center- 500 people; Reichskommissariat, Ukraine-3,000 people; Economic Inspection, South-1,000 people; total-5,000 people. Starting 1 April 1943, the daily quota is to be doubled corresponding to the doubling of the entire quota. I hope to visit personally the Eastern Territories towards the end of the month, and ask you once more for your kind support."

19 March 1943:

From a secret SS order: "The activity of the labor offices, that is, of recruiting commissions, is to be supported to the greatest extent possible. It will not be possible always to refrain from using force. During a conference with the chief of the labor avocation staffs, it was agreed that whatever prisoners could be released should be put at the disposal of the commissioner of the labor office. When searching villages or when it becomes necessary to burn down villages, the whole population will be put at the disposal of the commissioner by force...As a rule, no more children will be shot."

19 March 1943:

From a letter from the headquarters of one of the Commando groups, a section known as Einsatz Group C: "It is the task of the Security Police and of the Security Service (SD) to discover all enemies of the Reich, and fight against them in the interest of security, especially the security of the Army in the zone of operations. Besides the annihilation of active, avowed opponents, all other elements who by virtue of their convictions or their past might under favorable conditions actively appear as enemies are to be eliminated through preventive measures. The Security Police carries out this task according to the general directives of the Fuehrer, with all required severity. Energetic measures are especially necessary in territories endangered by the activity of partisan bands. The competence of the Security Police within the zone of operations is based on the 'Barbarossa' decrees. I deem the measures of the Security Police, carried out on a considerable scale during recent times, necessary for the two following reasons: 1. The situation at the front in my sector had become so serious that the population, partly influenced by Hungarians and Italians who were streaming back in confusion, were openly opposing us. 2. The strong expeditions by partisan bands, coming chiefly from the forest of Bryansk, were another reason. Besides that, other partisan groups formed from the population were appearing like mushrooms in all districts. The procurement of arms evidently provided no difficulties at all. It would have been inexcusable if we had observed this whole activity without taking measures against it. It is obvious that all such measures are accompanied by severity. I want to take up the significant points of these severe measures: 1) The shooting of Hungarian Jews; 2) the shooting of agriculturalists; 3) the shooting of children; 4) the burning to the ground of villages; 5) the shooting, 'while trying to escape,' of Security Service (SD) prisoners. Chief of Einsatz Group C confirmed once more the suitability of the measures executed and expressed his appreciation for the drastic steps taken. In consideration of the current political situation, especially in the armament industry in the fatherland, the measures of the Security Police are to be subordinated to the greatest extent to the recruiting of labor for Germany. In the shortest possible time the Ukraine has to place at the disposal of the armament industry 1 million workers, 500 of whom have to be sent from our territory daily....1. Special treatment is to be kept to a minimum. 2. The listing of communist functionaries, activists, and so on, is to take place only by roster for the time being, without arrests. It is, for instance, no longer feasible to arrest all the close relatives of a member of the Communist Party. Likewise members of the Komsomolz are to be arrested only if they were active in leading positions....5. The reporting of partisan bands as well as drives against them is not affected hereby. I point out, however, that all drives against those bands are to take place only with my approval. 6. The prisons are to be kept empty as a rule. We must be aware of the fact that the Slavs interpret all soft treatment on our part as weakness and that they will act accordingly, right away. If were strict our harsh Security Police measures through the above orders for the time being, it is done only for the following reason: the most important thing is the recruiting of workers. No check of persons to be sent into the Reich will be made. There are therefore no written certificates of political reliability or the like to be furnished. -Christensen, SS Sturmbannfuehrer and Commanding Officer."

30 March 1943:

From an article published in the Dernieres Nouvelles de Strasbourg: "Germans greet one another with 'Heil Hitler.' We do not want any more French greetings, which we still hear constantly in a thousand different forms. The elegant salutation 'Bonjour' is not made for these rough Alsatian throats, accustomed to the German tongue since the distant epoch of Osfried von Weissenburg. The Alsatian hurts our ears when he says 'boschurr.' When he says 'Au Revoir,' the French think they are listening to an Arabic word, which sounds like 'arwar.' Sometimes they say 'Adje' (Adieu). These phonetic monstrosities which disfigure our beautiful Alsatian-Germanic dialect resemble a thistle in a flower bed. Let us weed them out! They are not worthy of Alsace. Do you believe feminine susceptibility is wounded by saying 'Frau' instead of 'Madame'? We are sure that Alsatians will drop the habit of linguistic whims so that the authorities will not have to use rigorous measures against saboteurs of the German language."

16 April 1943:

From the minutes of a press conference in the Propagandaabteilung: "At the end of the conference the German commentator declared that on Tuesday, 20 April (the Fuehrer's birthday) the newspapers would consist of four pages instead of two, and on Wednesday, 21 April, they would consist of two pages instead of four. He asked the reporters present to stress the European orientation of the Fuehrer's political personality and to treat Franco-German relations very generously. A great deal of tact and reserve are necessary, however, in order not to give the newspapers the appearance of being no longer French, and in this way shocking public opinion."

20 April 1943:

From a copy of a letter from Rosenberg to Hitler on his birthday: "I beg of you, my Fuehrer, to give me a chance during my next audience to report to you orally on the whole extent and state of this art-seizure action. I beg you to accept a short, written, preliminary report of the progress and extent of the art-seizure action, which will be used as a basis for this later oral report, and also to accept three volumes of the provisional picture catalogues which, too, show only a part of the collection at your disposal. I shall deliver further catalogues, which are now being compiled, as they are finished. These photos represent an addition to the collection of 53 of the most valuable objects of art delivered some time ago to your collection. This folder also gives only a weak impression of the exceptional value and extent of these objects of art, seized by my service command (Dienststelle) in France and put into a safe place in the Reich. I shall take the liberty during the requested audience to give you, my Fuehrer, another 20 folders of pictures with the hope that this short occupation with the beautiful things of art, which are so near to your heart, will send a ray of beauty and joy into your care-laden and revered life."

21 April 1943:

Stalin to FDR

"The behavior of the Polish Government towards the USSR of late is, in the view of the Soviet Government, completely abnormal and contrary to all rules and standards governing relations between two allied states. The anti-Soviet slander campaign launched by the German fascists in connection with the Polish officers whom they themselves murdered in the Smolensk area, in German-occupied territory, was immediately seized upon by the Sikorski Government and is being fanned in every way in the Polish press. Far from countering the infamous fascist slander against the USSR, the Sikorski Government has not found it necessary to address questions to the Soviet Government or to request information on the matter. The Hitler authorities, having perpetrated a monstrous crime against the Polish officers, are now staging a farcical investigation, using for the purpose certain pro-fascist Polish elements picked by themselves in occupied Poland, where everything is under Hitler’s heel and where no honest Pole can open his mouth. Both the Sikorski and Hitler Governments have enlisted for their ‘investigation’ the aid of the International Red Cross, which under a terror regime of gallows and wholesale extermination of the civil population, is forced to take part in the investigation farce directed by Hitler. It is obvious that this ‘investigation,’ which, moreover, is being carried out behind the Soviet Governments back, cannot enjoy the confidence of anyone with a semblance of honesty. The fact that the anti-Soviet campaign has been started simultaneously in the German and Polish press and follows identical lines is indubitable evidence of contact and collusion between Hitler - the Allies’ enemy - and the Sikorski Government in this hostile campaign. At a time when the peoples of the Soviet Union are shedding their blood in a grim struggle against Hitler Germany and bending their energies to defeat the common foe of the freedom-loving democratic countries, the Sikorski Government is striking a treacherous blow at the Soviet Union to help Hitler tyranny. These circumstances compel the Soviet Government to consider that the present Polish Government, having descended to collusion with the Hitler Government, has, in practice, severed its relations of alliance with the USSR and adopted a hostile attitude to the Soviet Union. For those reasons the Soviet Government has decided to interrupt relations with that Government. I think it necessary to inform you of the foregoing, and I trust that the US Government will appreciate the motives that necessitated this forced step on the part of the Soviet Government."

26 April 1943:

FDR to Stalin

"…I cannot believe that Sikorski has in any way whatsoever collaborated with the Hitler gangsters. In my opinion, however, he had erred in taking up this particular question with the International Red Cross. Furthermore, I am inclined to think that Prime Minister Churchill will find a way of prevailing upon the Polish Government in London in the future to act with more common sense. I would appreciate it if you would let me know if I can help in any way in respect to this question and particularly in connection with looking after any Poles which you may desire to send out of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Incidentally, I have several million Poles in the United States, a great many of whom are in the Army and Navy. I can assure you that all of them are bitter against the Hitlerites. However, the overall situation would not be helped by the knowledge of a complete diplomatic break between the Soviet and Polish Governments."

27 April 1943:

From a letter addressed to a number of concentration camp commanders, signed by Plucks, SS Brigadefuehrer and Major General of the Waffen-SS: "The Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police has decided after consultation, that in the future only mentally sick prisoners may be selected for action 14-F-13 by the medical commissions appointed for this purpose. All other prisoners incapable of working (tubercular cases, bedridden cripples, etc., are to be basically excepted from this action. Bedridden prisoners are to be drafted for suitable work which they can perform in bed. The order of the Reichsfuehrer SS is to be obeyed strictly in the future. Therefore requests for fuel for this purpose are unnecessary."

29 April 1943:

Stalin to FDR

"I am sorry to say your reply did not reach me until April 27, whereas on April 25 the Soviet Government was compelled to interrupt relations with the Polish Government. As the Polish Government for nearly two weeks, far from ceasing a campaign hostile to the Soviet Union and beneficial to none but Hitler, intensified it in its press and on the radio, Soviet public opinion was deeply outrages by such conduct, and hence the Soviet Government could no longer defer action. It may well be that Mr. Sikorski himself has no intention of collaborating with the Hitler gangsters. I should be happy to see this surmise borne out in facts. But my impression is that certain pro-Hitler elements - either inside the Polish Government or its environment - have induced Mr. Sikorski to follow them, with the result that the Polish Government has come to be, possibly against its own will, a tool in Hitler’s hands in the anti-Soviet campaign of which you are aware. I, too, believe that Prime Minister Churchill will find ways to bring the Polish Government to reason and help it proceed henceforth in a sprit of common sense. I may be wrong, but I believe that one of our duties as Allies is to prevent this or that Ally from taking hostile action against another Ally to the joy and benefit of the common enemy. As regards Polish subjects in the USSR and their future, I can assure you that Soviet Government agencies have always treated and will continue to treat them as comrades, as people near and dear to us. It should be obvious that there never has been, nor could have been, any question of their being deported from the USSR. If, however, they themselves wish to leave the USSR, the Soviet Government agencies will not hinder them, just as they have never done, and will, in fact, try to help them."

5 May 1943:

FDR to Stalin

"…the simplest and most practical method that I can think of would be an informal and completely simple visit for a few days between you and me. I fully appreciate the desirability for you to stay in daily touch with your military operations; I also find it inadvisable to be away from Washington more than a short time. The first relates to timing. There is always the possibility that the historic Russian defense, followed by taking the offensive, may cause a crack-up of Germany next winter. In such a case we must be prepared for the many next steps. We are none of us prepared today. Therefore, it is my belief that you and I ought to meet this summer. The second problem is where to meet. Africa is almost out of the question in summer and Khartoum is British territory. Iceland I do not like because for both you and me it involves rather difficult flights, and, in addition, would make it, quite frankly, difficult not to invite Prime Minister Churchill at the same time…I greatly hope our forces will be in complete control of Tunisia by the end of May, and Churchill and I next week will be working on the second phase of the offensive. Our estimates of the situation are that Germany will deliver an all-out attack on you this summer, and my staff people think it will be directed against the middle of your line. You are doing a grand job. Good luck!"

17 May 1943:

Sauckel to Hitler: "In addition to the labor allotted to the total German economy by the Arbeitseinsatz since I took office, the Organization Todt was supplied with new labor continually.... Thus the Arbeitseinsatz has done everything to help make possible the completion of the Atlantic Wall."

20 May 1943:

FDR to Stalin

"I know that the following American estimates of Axis losses in North Africa during the period December 8, 1940, to May 12, 1943, will be of interest to you…1. Total personnel losses: 625,000. 2. Total plane losses (in North Africa and in the Mediterranean): 7,596 destroyed, 4,499 damaged. 3. Total tank losses: Not less than 2,100. 4. Total losses of merchant ships: 625 ships sunk (approximately 2,200,000 tons) and 371 ships damaged (approximately 1,600,000 tons). 5. Italian losses in East Africa: 150,000 (exclusive of natives)."

20 May 1943:

Standing Order of the U-boat Command Number 511: "1. As far as accommodation facilities on board permit, captains and chief engineers of sunken ships are to be brought in. The enemy tries to thwart this intention and has issued the following order: (a) masters are not allowed to identify themselves when questioned, but should if possible use sailors selected especially for this purpose; (b) crew has to state that masters and chief engineers remained on board. If in spite of energetic questioning it is not possible to find the masters or the chief engineers, then other ships' officers should be taken aboard. 2. Masters and officers of neutral ships, which, according to Standing Order Number 101, can be sunk (for instance, Swedish ships outside Goteborg traffic), are not to be brought in because internment of these officers would violate international law. 3. In case ship officers cannot be taken prisoner, other white members of the crew should be taken along as far as accommodation facilities and further operations of the craft permit, for the purpose of interrogation for military and propaganda purposes. 4. In case of the sinking of a single cruising destroyer, corvette, or escort vessel, try at all costs to take prisoners, if that can be done without endangering the boat. Interrogation of the prisoners at transit camps...can produce valuable hints as to antisubmarine tactics, devices, and weapons used by the enemy; the same applies to air crews of shot-down planes."

26 May 1943: Stalin to FDR

"…I agree that this summer - possibly as early as June - we should expect the Hitlerites to launch a major new offensive in the Soviet-German front. Hitler has already concentrated about 200 German divisions and up to 30 divisions of his allies for use against us. We are getting ready to repel the new German offensive and to launch counter-attacks, but we are short of aircraft and aircraft fuel. Of course, it is at the moment impossible to foresee all the military and other steps that we may have to take. That will depend on the course of events on our front. A good deal will also depend on the speed and vigor with which Anglo-American military operations are launched in Europe. I have mentioned these important circumstances to explain why my reply to your suggestion for a meeting between us cannot be quite specific as yet. I agree that the time is ripe for such a meeting and that it should not be delayed. But I beg you to assess properly the importance of the circumstances I have referred to, because the summer months will be exceedingly trying for the Soviet armies. As I do not know how events will develop on the Soviet-German front in June, I shall not be able to leave Moscow during that month. I therefore suggest holding the meeting in July or August. If you agree, I shall let you know two weeks before the date of the meeting just when it could be held in July or August. If, after being notified by me, you agree to the date suggested, I could arrive in time…"

29 May 1943:

From telegraphic report Number 3,486: "We must wait and see whether Laval is really willing to apply reprisal measures in a practical way. All those present at the meetings were in agreement that such measures should be taken in any event, as rapidly as possible, against families of well-known personages who had become resistants. (For example, members of the families of Generals Giraud, Juin, Georges, the former Minister of the Interior, Pucheu, the Inspector of Finance Couve De Murville, Leroy-Beaulieu, and others. The measures may also be carried out by the German authorities, since the persons who have become resistants are to be considered as foreigners belonging to an enemy power and the members of their families are also to be considered as such. In the opinion of those present, the members of these families should be interned; the practical carrying-out of this measure and its technical possibilities must be carefully examined .... We might also study the question of whether these families should be interned in regions particularly exposed to air attacks, for instance, in the vicinity of dams, or in industrial regions which are often bombed. A list of families who are considered liable for internment will be compiled in collaboration with the Embassy."

4 June 1943:

From Cardinal Archbishop of Malines to General Von Falkenhausen, Military Commander in Belgium: "By an oral communication, of which I have asked in vain for the confirmation in writing, the Chief of the Military Administration Raeder has informed me that in case Monseigneur the Rector of the Catholic University of Louvain should persist in refusing to furnish the list with the addresses of the first year students, the occupying authority will take the following measures:

Close down the university; forbid the students to enroll in another university; subject all the students to forced labor in Germany and, should they evade this measure, take reprisals against their families. This communication is all the more surprising, as a few days previously, following a note addressed to your Excellency by Monseigneur the Rector, the latter received from the Kreiskommandant of Louvain a notification that the academic authority would have no further trouble with regard to the lists. It is true that the Chief of Military Administration Raeder informed me that this answer was due to a misunderstanding. As President of the Board of the University of Louvain, I have informed the Belgian bishops, who make up this board, of the serious nature of the communication which I have received; and I have the duty to inform you, in the name of all the bishops, that it is impossible for us to advise Monseigneur the Rector to hand over the lists of his students, and that we approve the passive attitude which he has observed up to now. To furnish the lists would, in effect, imply positive co-operation in measures which the Belgian bishops have condemned in the pastoral letter of 15 March 1943 as being contrary to international law, to natural rights, and to Christian morality. If the University of Louvain were subjected to sanctions because it refuses this co-operation, we consider that it would be punished for carrying out its duty and that however hard and painful the difficulties it would have to undergo temporarily, its honor at least would not be sullied. We believe, with the famous Bishop of Milan, St. Ambrose, that honor is above everything----'Nihil praeferandum honestati.' Moreover, Your Excellency cannot be ignorant of the fact that the Catholic University of Louvain is a dependency of the Holy See. Canonically established by the Papacy, it is under the authority and the control of the Roman Congregation of Seminaries and Universities and it is the Holy See which approved the appointment of Monseigneur Van Wayenberg as Rector Magnifique of the University. If the measures announced were to be carried out, it would constitute a violent attack on the rights of the Holy See. Consequently His Holiness the Pope will be informed of the extreme dangers which threaten our Catholic University."

4 June 1943:

FDR to Stalin: "Basic strategy in the recent decisions approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff…In respect support of the USSR, the following decisions were made: the air offensive now being mounted against enemy-held Europe will be intensified, for the three-fold purpose of destruction of enemy industry, of whittling down of German fighter plane strength, and for the breaking down of German civil moral…In March, there were about 350 United States heavy bombers in England. At the present time there are about 700. Plans call for 900 at the end of June, 1,150 at the end of September and 2,500 by the first of April. It has been decided to put Italy out of the war at the earliest possible moment…The collapse of Italy will greatly facilitate the carrying out of the air offensive against South and East Germany, will continue the attrition of their fighter strength and will jeopardize the Axis position in the Balkan area. With Africa firmly in our hands, it was decided that it was now feasible to resume the concentration of ground forces in England…there should be a sufficiently large concentration of men and material in the British Isles in the spring of 1944 to permit a full-scale invasion of the continent at that time. The great air offensive will then be at its peak. A certain number of landing craft have necessarily been sent to the South-west Pacific, the Aleutians, and to the Mediterranean. The necessity of so doing has of course reduced by that extent the number of such boats sent to England. This has been the most important limiting factor as far as operations out of England have been concerned. The decisions enumerated and explained above are believed to be such that the enemy will be forced to disperse his ground forces to an extensive degree, both to oppose actual attacks and to guard against the possibility of attack. He will in addition be subject to heavy and continuous activity in the air. When signs of Axis weakness become apparent in any quarter, actual attacks and threats of attack will easily and quickly be translated into successful operations. We believe that these decisions as stated herein will require the full resources which we will be able to bring to bear."

5 June 1943:

From a report by the German General Commissioner for Minsk: "...again a heavy destruction of the population must be expected. If only 492 rifles are taken from 4,500 enemy dead, this discrepancy shows that among these enemy dead were numerous peasants from the country. The battalion Dirlewanger especially has a reputation for destroying many human lives. Among the 5,000 people suspected of belonging to bands, there were numerous women and children. By order of the chief of anti-partisan units, SS Obergruppenfuehrer Vondem Bach, units of the Wehrmannschaften have also participated in the operation. SA Standartenfuehrer Kunze was in command of the Wehrmannschaften, among whom there were also 90 members from my office and from the District Commissariat of Minsk. Our men returned from the operation yesterday without losses."

5 June 1943:

From a letter addressed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Paris: "In the course of the conference which took place yesterday with the representatives of the High Command West and the SD, the following was agreed on concerning measures to be taken: The aim of these measures must be to prevent, by precautionary measures, the escape from France of any more well-known soldiers and at the same time to prevent these personages from organizing a resistance movement in the event of an attempted landing in France by the Anglo-Saxon powers. The circle of officers here concerned comprises all who, by their rank and experience or by their name, would considerably strengthen the military command or the political credit of the resistants, if they should decide to join them. In the event of military operations in France we must consider them as being of the same importance. The list has been drawn up in agreement with the High Command West, the Chief of the Security Police, and the General of the Air Force in Paris...In view of the present general situation and the contemplated security measures, all the authorities here consider it undesirable for these generals to remain in French custody, as the possibility must be considered that either through negligence or by intentional acts of the guard personnel, they might escape and regain their liberty...General Warlimont had asked the Commander-in-Chief of the Western Front to raise the question of reprisal measures against the relatives of persons who had joined the resistance and to submit any proposals...President Laval declared himself ready, not long ago, to take measures of this kind on behalf of the French Government; but to limit himself to the families of some particularly distinguished persons."

11 June 1943:

Stalin to FDR: "…the opening of a second front in Europe, previously postponed from 1942 till 1943, is now being put off again, this time till the spring of 1944. Your decision creates exceptional difficulties for the Soviet Union, which, straining all its resources, for the past two years, has been engaged against the main forces of Germany and her satellites, and leaves the Soviet Army, which is fighting not only for its country, but also for its Allies, to do the job alone, almost single-handed, against an enemy that is still very strong and formidable. Need I speak of the disheartening negative impression that this fresh postponement of the second front and the withholding from our Army, which has sacrificed so much, of the anticipated substantial support by the Anglo-American armies, will produce in the Soviet Union - both among the people and in the Army? As for the Soviet Government, it cannot align itself with this decision, which, moreover, was adopted without its participation and without any attempt at a joint discussion of this highly important matter and which may gravely affect the subsequent course of the war."

19 June 1943:

From a report by Frank to Hitler

"In the course of time, a series of measures, or of consequences of the German rule, have led to a substantial deterioration of the attitude of the entire Polish people to the Government General. These measures have affected either individual professions or the entire population and frequently also - often with crushing severity - the fate of individuals. Among these are in particular: 1. The entirely insufficient nourishment of the population, mainly of the working classes in the cities, the majority of which are working for German interests. Until the war of 1939 their food supplies, though not varied, were sufficient and were generally assured owing to the agrarian surplus of the former Polish State and in spite of the negligence on the part of their former political leadership. 2. The confiscation of a great part of the Polish estates, expropriation without compensation, and evacuation of Polish peasants from maneuver areas and from German settlements. 3. Encroachments and confiscation's in the industries, in commerce and trade, and in the field of other private property. 4. Mass arrests and shootings by the German Police who applied the system of collective responsibility. 5. Extreme rigorous methods of recruiting workers. 6. The extensive paralyzing of cultural life. 7. The closing of high schools, colleges, and universities. 8. The limitation, indeed the complete elimination, of Polish influence from all spheres of State administration. 9. Curtailment of the influence of the Catholic Church, limiting its extensive influence-an undoubtedly necessary move - and, in addition, until quite recently, often at the shortest notice, the closing and confiscation of monasteries, schools, and charitable institutions."

17 June 1943:

From a secret report of a conference between the Commissioner General of Zhitomir and Alfred Rosenberg in the community of Vinnitza: "The symptoms created by the recruiting of workers are, no doubt, well known to the Reich Minister through reports and his own observations. Therefore I shall not repeat them. It is certain that a recruitment of labor in the true sense of the word can hardly be spoken of. In most cases it is nowadays a matter of actual conscription by force…But as the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor (Sauckel) explained to us the gravity of the situation, we had no alternative. I consequently have authorized the commissioners of the areas to apply the severest measures in order to achieve the imposed quota. That a lowering of morale is coupled with this needs no further proof. It is nevertheless essential to win the war on this front too. The problem of labor mobilization cannot be handled with gloves."

24 June 1943:

Stalin to Churchill

"…Last February, when you wrote to me about those plans and the date for invading Western Europe, the difficulties of that operation were greater than they are now. Since then the Germans have suffered more than one defeat: they were pushed back by our troops in the South, where they suffered appreciable loss; they were beaten in North Africa and expelled by the Anglo-American troops; in submarine warfare, too, the Germans found themselves in a bigger predicament than ever, while Anglo-American superiority increased substantially; it is also known that the Americans and British have won air superiority in Europe and that their navies and mercantile marines have grown in power. It follows that the conditions for opening a second front in Europe during 1943, far from deteriorating, have, indeed, greatly improved. That being so, the Soviet Government could not have imagined that the British and US Government’s would revise the decision to invade Western Europe, which they had adopted early this year. In fact, the Soviet Government was fully entitled to expect that the Anglo-American decision would be carried out, that appropriate preparations were under way and that the second front in Western Europe would at last be opened in 1943. That is why, when you now write that ‘it would be no help to Russia if we threw away a hundred thousand men in a disastrous cross-Channel attack’…a statement of this kind in relation to the Soviet Union is utterly groundless and directly contradicts your previous and responsible decisions…There is no need to say that the Soviet Union cannot become reconciled to this disregard of vital Soviet interests in the war against the common enemy. You say that you ‘quite understand’ my disappointment. I must tell you that the point here is not just the disappointment of the Soviet Government, but the preservation of its confidence in its Allies, a confidence which is being subjected to severe stress. One should not forget that it is a question of saving millions of lives in the occupied areas of Western Europe and Russia and of reducing the enormous sacrifices of the Soviet armies, compared with which the sacrifices of the Anglo-American armies are insignificant."

28 June 1943:

A partial translation of a report from the chief of Main Office III with the High Command in Minsk sent to Ministerialdirektor Riecke, a top official in the Rosenberg Ministry: "Thus recruitment of labor for the Reich, however necessary, has had disastrous effects, for the recruitment measures in the last months and weeks were absolute manhunts, which have an irreparable political and economic effect.... From... White Ruthenia approximately 50,000 people have been obtained for the Reich so far. Another 130,000 are to be taken. Considering the 2,400,000 total population. . . the fulfillment of these quotas is impossible..."

16 July 1943:

FDR to Stalin: "Following the unfortunate sinking of one of your ships in the North Pacific, for which I am deeply sorry, I have directed that every possible precaution be taken in the future. Although I have no detailed news, I think I can safely congratulate you on the splendid showing your armies are making against the German offensive at Kursk. I hope to hear from you soon about the other matter which I still feel to be of great importance."

5 August 1943:

From a directive to all the departments of the SS Supreme Command, issued from Himmler's field headquarters: "Referring to Item 4 of the above-mentioned order, I order that all young female prisoners capable of work are to be sent to Germany for work, through the agency of Reich Commissioner Sauckel. Children, old women, and old men are to be collected and put to work in the women's and children's camps established by me on estates, as well as on the border of the evacuated area."

8 August 1943:

Stalin to FDR: "…Contrary to our expectations, the Germans launched their offensive in July, not in June, and now fighting is in full swing on the Soviet-German front. The Soviet armies have, as you know, repulsed the July offensive of the Hitlerites, switched to the offensive, taking Orel and Belgogrod, and are still pressing the enemy…I hope you will appreciate that in these circumstances I cannot start on a distant journey…I have no objection to Mr. Churchill attending the conference and to the bipartite conference being turned into a tripartite one. I still hold this view provided you have no objections…I take this opportunity to congratulate you and the Anglo-American forces on their outstanding success in Sicily, which had led to the fall of Mussolini and his gang…"

10 August 1943:

From an order signed by Himmler: "It is not the task of the police to interfere in clashes between Germans and English and American terror fliers who have bailed out."

14 August 1943:

From a letter to General Berard from the President of the French Delegation of the Armistice Commission: "Dear General, "From the beginning of the war, the treasure of Strasbourg Cathedral and the property of certain parishes of this diocese had been entrusted by Monseigneur Ruch, Bishop of Strasbourg, to the Beaux-Arts Department. This department had put them in a safe place in the castles of Hautefort and of Bourdeilles in Dordogne, where they still were on the date of 20 May 1943. The treasure and this property included, in particular, the pontificalia reserved for the exclusive use of the Bishop, several of which were his personal property, the relics of saints, vessels, or objects for the performance of ceremonies. After having sought on several occasions-but in vain-to obtain the consent of Monseigneur Ruch, the Ministerial Counsellor Kraft, on 20 May, requested not only the prefect of Dordogne, but also the director of religious matters, for authority to remove the objects deposited. Faced with the refusal of these high officials, he declared that the repatriation to Alsace of the property of the Catholic Church would be entrusted to the Sicherheitspolizei. As a result, at dawn on 21 May, the castles of Hautefort and Bourdeilles were opened and occupied by troops, despite the protests of the guardian. The sacred objects were placed in trucks and taken to an unknown destination. This seizure, moreover, was extended to consecrated vessels and ceremonial objects and the relics of saints worshipped by the faithful. The seizure of these sacred objects by laymen not legally authorized and the conditions under which the operation was carried out aroused the emotion and unanimous reprobation of the faithful."

18 August 1943:

From a letter sent by the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force to the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht: "The Commander-in-Chief, Air General Staff, proposes to erect prisoner-of-war camps in the residential quarters of cities, in order to obtain a certain protection thereby...In view of the above reason, consideration should be given to the immediate erection of such camps in a large number of cities which appear to be endangered by air attacks. As the discussions with the city of Frankfurt ... have shown, the towns will support and speed up the construction of the camps by all available means...So far, there are in Germany about 8,000 prisoners of war of the British and American Air Forces (without counting those in hospitals). By evacuating the camps actually in existence, which might be used to house bombed-out people, we should immediately have at our disposal prisoners of war for a fairly large number of such camps."

19 August 1943:

FDR and Churchill to Stalin: "On August 15th the British Ambassador at Madrid reported that General Castellano had arrived from Badoglio…to say that Italy was willing to surrender unconditionally provided that she could join the Allies…We are not prepared to enter into any bargain with Badoglio’s Government to induce Italy to change sides; on the other hand there are many advantages and a great speeding of the campaign which might follow therefrom. We shall begin our invasion of the mainland of Italy probably before the end of this month and about a week later we shall make our full-scale thrust at ‘Avalanche.’ It is very likely that Badoglio’s Government will not last so long. The Germans have one or more armored divisions outside Rome and once they think that the Badoglio Government is playing them false, they are quite capable of overthrowing it…We are very desirous of emphasizing to you again the importance of our all three meeting…"

22 August 1943:

Stalin to FDR and Churchill: "…I received your message with large omissions and without the closing paragraphs. It should be said, therefore, that the Soviet Government has not been kept informed of the Anglo-American negotiations with the Italians…I think the time is ripe for us to set up a military-political commission of representatives of the three countries - the USA, Great Britain and the USSR - for consideration of problems related to negotiations with various Governments falling away from Germany. To date it has been like this: the USA and Britain reach agreement between themselves while the USSR is informed of the agreement between the two Powers as a third party looking passively on. I must say that this situation cannot be tolerated any longer. I propose setting up the commission and making Sicily its seat for the time being. I am looking forward to receiving the full text of your message on the negotiations with Italy."

28 August 1943:

Copenhagen: "Claims of the Reich Government: The Danish Government must immediately declare the entire country in a state of military emergency. The state of military emergency must include the following measures: 1. Prohibition of public gatherings of more than five persons. 2. Prohibition of all strikes and of any aid given to strikers. 3. Prohibition of all meetings in closed premises or in the open air; prohibition to be in the streets between 2030 hours and 0530 hours; closing of restaurants at 1930 hours. By I September 1943 all firearms and explosives to be handed over. 4. Prohibition to hamper in any way whatsoever Danish nationals because of their collaboration or the collaboration of their relatives with the German authorities, or because of their relations with the Germans. 5. Establishment of a press censorship with German collaboration. 6. Establishment of courts-martial to judge acts contravening the measures taken to maintain order and security. Infringement of the measures mentioned above will be punished by the most severe penalties which can be imposed in conformity with the law in force concerning the power of the Government to take measures to maintain calm, order, and security. The death penalty must be introduced without delay for acts of sabotage and for any aid given in committing these acts, for attacks against the German forces, for possession after 1 September 1943 of firearms and explosives. "The Reich Government expects to receive today before 1600 hours the acceptance by the Danish Government of the above-mentioned demands."

26 August 1943:

FDR and Churchill to Stalin: "The following is the decision as to the military operations to be carried out during 1943 and 1944 which we have arrived at in our conference at Quebec just concluded. We shall continue the bomber offensive against Germany from bases in the United Kingdom and Italy on a rapidly increasing scale. The objectives of this air attack will be to destroy the air combat strength of Germany, to dislocate her military, economic and industrial system and to prepare the way for an invasion across the Channel. A large-scale building-up of American forces in the United Kingdom is now under way. It will provide an assemblage force of American and British divisions for operations across the Channel. Once a bridgehead on the Continent has been secured it will be reinforced steadily by additional American troops at the rate of from three to five divisions a month. This operation will be the primary American and British air and ground effort against the Axis. The war in the Mediterranean is to be pressed vigorously. In that area our objectives will be the elimination of Italy from the Axis alliance and the occupation of Italy, as well as Corsica and Sardinia, as bases for operations against Germany. In the Balkans operations will be limited to the supply by air and sea transport of the Balkan guerrillas, minor commando raids and the bombarding of strategic objectives. In the Pacific and in South-east Asia we shall accelerate our operations against Japan, to cut her communications and to secure bases from which Japan proper may be bombed."

3 September 1943:

From a document issued by the Fuehrer's headquarters: "1) The Commander-in-Chief, Air General Staff, is planning the erection of further camps for air force prisoners, as the number of new prisoners is mounting to more than 1,000 a month, and the space available at the moment is insufficient. The Supreme Commander of the Luftwaffe proposes to establish these camps within residential quarters of cities, which would constitute at the same time a protection for the Populations of the town and, in addition, to transfer all the existing camps, containing about 8,000 British and American Air Force prisoners, to larger towns threatened by enemy air attack..."2) The Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht, Chief of War Prisoners, has approved this project in principle."

4 September 1943:

FDR and Churchill to Stalin: "…The military situation there (Italy) is both critical and hopeful. The mainland invasion begins almost immediately while the heavy blow called ‘Avalanche’ will be delivered in the next week or so. The difficulties of the Italian Government and people in escaping the clutches of Hitler may make a still more daring move necessary, for this General Eisenhower will require as much Italian help as he can get. The acceptance of the terms by the Italians is largely supported by the fact that we shall send an air-borne division to Rome to help them hold off the Germans who have gathered Panzer strength near there and who may replace the Badoglio Government with a Quisling administration probably headed by Farinacci…We are, of course, anxious that the Italian surrender be to the Soviet Union as well as to the United States and Britain. The date of the surrender announcement must, of course, be fitted in with the military coup."

10 September 1943:

FDR and Churchill to Stalin: "We are pleased to tell you that General Eisenhower has accepted the unconditional surrender of Italy, terms of which were approved by the Unites States, the Soviet Republics and the United Kingdom. Allied troops have landed near Naples and are now in contact with German forces. Allied troops are also making good progress in the southern end of the Italian peninsula."

11 September 1943:

From a letter sent by Dr. Gomet, Secretary of the Council of the Departmental College of Doubs of the National Order of Physicians to the chief medical officer of the Feldkommandantur in Besancon: "Dear Doctor and Colleague, I have the honor to deliver to you the note which I drafted at your request and sent to our colleagues of the department in a circular of 1 September. My conscience compels me on the other hand, to take up another subject with you. Quite recently I had to treat a Frenchman who had wounds and multiple ecchymosis on his face and body, as a result of the torture apparatus employed by the German security service. He is a man of good standing, holding an important appointment under the French Government; and he was arrested because they thought he could furnish certain information. They could make no accusation against him, as is proved by the fact that he was freed in a few days, when the interrogation to which they wanted to subject him was finished. He was subjected to torture, not as a legal penalty or in legitimate defense; but for the sole purpose of forcing him to speak under stress of violence and pain. As for myself, representing the French medical body here, my conscience and a strict conception of my duty compel me to inform you of what I have observed in the exercise of my profession. I appeal to your conscience as a doctor and ask you whether by virtue of our mission of protecting the physical health of our fellow beings, which is the mission of every doctor, it is not our duty to intervene."

4 October 1943:

From a speech by Himmler to SS Gruppenfuehrer: "Now I come to our own development, to that of the SS in the past months. Looking back on the whole war, this development was fantastic. It took place at an absolutely terrific speed. Let us look back a little to 1939. At that time we were a few regiments, guard units, 8,000 to 9,000 strong-that is, not even a division, all in all 25,000 to 28,000 men at the outside. True, we were armed, but we really only got our artillery regiment as our heavy arm 2 months before the war began...In the hard battles of this year, the Waffen-SS has been welded together in the bitterest hours from the most varied divisions and sections out of which it was formed: Bodyguard units, military SS, Death's-Head Units, and then the Germanic SS. Now when our Divisions 'Reich,' 'Death's-Head,' the Cavalry Division, and 'Viking' were together, everyone knew in these last weeks: 'Viking' is at my side, 'Reich' is at my side,' Death's-Head' is at my side. Thank God, now nothing can happen to us…It would be an evil day if the main offices, in performing their tasks with the best, but mistaken, intentions made themselves independent by each having a downward chain of command. I really think that the day of my overthrow would be the end of the SS. It must be, and so come about, that this SS organization with all its branches-the General SS which is the common basis of all of them, the Waffen-SS, the regular uniformed police, the Sipo, with the whole economic administration, schooling, ideological training, the whole question of kindred is, even under the 10th Reichsfuehrer SS, one bloc, one body, one organization...The regular uniformed police and Sipo, General SS and Waffen-SS, must now gradually amalgamate, too, just as this is and must be the case within the Waffen-SS. This applies to matters concerning filling of posts, recruiting, schooling, economic organization, and medical services. I am always doing something towards this end, a bond is constantly being drawn around these sections of the whole to cause them to grow together. Alas, if these bonds should ever be loosened, then everything-you may be sure of this-would sink back quickly into its old insignificance within one generation."

7 October 1943:

From Operation Order Atlantic Number 56: "Rescue ships: A so-called rescue ship is generally attached to every convoy, a special ship of up to 3,000 gross registered tons, which is intended for the picking up of survivors after U- boat attacks. These ships are for the most part equipped with a shipborne aircraft and large motorboats, are strongly armed with depth charge throwers, and are very maneuverable, so that they are often taken for U-boat traps by the commander...In view of the desired destruction of ships' crews, their sinking is of great value."


4 November 1943:

From a speech by Streicher: "It is actually true that the Jews have so to speak disappeared from Europe and that the Jewish 'Reservoir of the East,' from which the Jewish pestilence has for centuries beset the peoples of Europe, has ceased to exist. But the Fuehrer of the German people at the beginning of the war prophesied what has now come to pass."

10 November 1944:

From a Speer circular: "All men and women of the NSDAP, its subsidiaries and affiliated bodies in the works will, in accordance with instructions from their Kreisleiter, be warned by their local group leaders (Ortsgruppenleiter) and be put under obligation to play their part in keeping foreigners under the most careful observation. They will report the least suspicion to the works foreman, which he will pass on to the defense deputy or, where such a deputy has not been appointed, to the police department concerned, while at the same time reporting to the works manager and the local group leader will exert untiringly and continuously their influence on foreigners, both in word and deed, in regard to the certainty of German victory and the German will to resist, thus producing a further increase of output in the works. Party members, both men and women, and members of Party organizations and affiliated bodies must be expected more than ever before to conduct themselves in an exemplary manner."

7 November 1943:

From a speech by General Jodl at Munich before an audience of Gauleiter: "The dilemma of manpower shortage has led to the idea of making more thorough use of the manpower reserves in the territories occupied by us. Here right and wrong conceptions are mixed together. I believe that as far as labor is concerned, the utmost has been done, but where this is not yet the case, it would appear preferable from the political point of view to abstain from compulsory measures and instead to aim at order and economic effort. In my opinion, however, the time has now come to take steps with remorseless vigor and resolution in Denmark, Holland, France, and Belgium to compel thousands of idle persons to carry out fortification work, which takes precedence over all other tasks. The necessary orders for this have already been given."

25 November 1943:

From a Bormann circular: "...Individual Gau administrations often refer in reports to a too indulgent treatment of prisoners of war on the part of the guard personnel. In many places, according to these reports, the guarding authorities have even developed into protectors and caretakers of the prisoners of war. I informed the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces of these reports, with the comment that the productive German working population absolutely cannot understand it if, in a time when the German people is fighting for existence or nonexistence, prisoners of war-hence our enemies-are leading a better life than the German working man and that it is an urgent duty of every German who has to do with prisoners of war, to bring about a complete utilization of their manpower. The chief of prisoner-of-war affairs in the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces has now given the unequivocal order, attached hereto in copy form, to the commanders of prisoners of war in the military districts. I request that this order be brought orally to the attention of all Party office holders in the appropriate manner. In case that in the future, complaints about unsuitable treatment of prisoners of war still come to light, they are to be immediately communicated to the commanders of the prisoners of war with a reference to the attached order."

29 November 1943:

FDR to Stalin: "I would like to arrange with you at this time for the exchange of information and for preliminary planning as may be appropriate under the present conditions for eventual operations against Japan when Germany has been eliminated from the war…it is our opinion that the bombing of Japan from your Maritime Provinces, immediately following the beginning of hostilities between the USSR and Japan, will be of utmost importance, as it will enable us to destroy Japanese military and industrial centers…Our objective is to base the maximum bomber force possible, anywhere from 100 to 1,000 four-engine bombers, with their maintenance and operating crews in that area…We would of course meet any conditions you might prescribe in this regard. If the above arrangements are worked out now, I am convinced that the time of employment of our bombers against Japan will be materially advanced."

7 December 1943:

FDR and Churchill to Stalin: "In the Conference just concluded in Cairo we have reached the following decisions regarding the conduct of the was against German in 1944 in addition to agreements arrived at by the three of us at Tehran. With the purpose of dislocating the German military, economic and industrial system, destroying the German air combat strength, and paving the way for an operation across the Channel the highest strategic priority will be given to the bomber offensive against Germany. The operation scheduled for March in the Bay of Bengal has been reduced in scale in order to permit the reinforcement of amphibious craft for operations in Southern France. We have directed the greatest effort be made to increase the production of landing craft in the United States and Great Britain to provide reinforcement of cross-Channel operations. The diversion from the Pacific of certain landing craft has been ordered for the same purpose."

17 December 1943:

From a speech by Doenitz: "I am a firm adherent of the idea of ideological education. For what is it in the main? Doing his duty is a matter of course for the soldier. But the full value, the whole weight of duty done, is only present when the heart and spiritual conviction have a voice in the matter. Doing his duty is then quite different from what it would be if I only carried out my task literally, obediently, and faithfully. It is therefore necessary for the soldier to support the execution of his duty with all his mental, all his spiritual energy; and for this his conviction, his ideology are indispensable. It is therefore necessary for us to train the soldier uniformly, comprehensively, that he maybe adjusted ideologically to our Germany. Every dualism, every dissension in this connection, or every divergence or unpreparedness simply a weakness in all circumstances. He in whom this grows and thrives in unison is superior to the other. Then indeed the whole importance, the whole weight of his conviction comes into play. It is also nonsense to say that the soldier or the officer must have no politics. The soldier embodies the state in which he lives, he is the representative, the articulate exponent of his state. He must therefore stand with his whole weight behind this state. We must travel this road out of our deepest conviction. The Russian travels along it. We can only maintain ourselves in this war if we take part in it, with holy zeal, with all our fanaticism...I alone cannot do this, but it can be done only with the aid of the man who holds the production of Europe in his hand with Minister Speer. My ambition is to have as many warships for the Navy as possible so as to be able to fight and to strike. It does not matter to me who builds them."

8 January 1944:

From a radio speech by Fritzsche: "It is revealed clearly once more that not a new system of government, not a young nationalism, and not a new and well-applied socialism brought about this war. The guilty ones are exclusively the Jews and the plutocrats. If discussion of the postwar problems brings this to light so clearly, we welcome it as a contribution for later discussions and also as a contribution to the fight we are waging now, for we refuse to believe that world history will entrust its future development to those powers which have brought about this war. This clique of Jews and plutocrats have invested their money in armaments and they had to see to it that they would get their interests and sinking funds; hence they unleashed this war."

9 January 1944:

From the Fuehrer's headquarters, signed by Jodl: "...It is of no importance to establish documentary proof of breaches of international law. What is important, however, is the collection of material suitable for a propaganda presentation of a display trial. A display trial as such is therefore not meant actually to take place but merely to be a propaganda presentation of cases of breaches of international law by enemy soldiers, who will be mentioned by name and who have already either been punished with death or are awaiting the death penalty The Chief of the OKW asks the Chief of the Foreign Department to bring with him pertinent documents for his next visit to the Fuehrer's headquarters."

12 January 1944:

From a speech by Frank before German political leaders at Krakow: "Once the war is won, then, for all I care, mincemeat can be made of the Poles and the Ukrainians and all the others who run around here; it doesn't matter what happens."

23 January 1944:

FDR and Churchill to Stalin: "With regard to handing over to Soviet Russia of the Italian shipping asked for by the Soviet Government at the Moscow Conference and agreed to with you by us at Tehran…we think it would be dangerous to our triple interests actually to carry out any transfer or to say anything about it to the Italians until their cooperation is no longer of operational importance…The British battleship Royal Sovereign has recently completed refitting in the United States. She is fitted with radar for all types of armament. The United States will make one light cruiser available at approximately the same time. His Majesty’s Government and the United States Government are willing for their part these vessels should be taken over at British ports by Soviet crews and sailed to North Russian ports. You could then make such alterations as you find necessary for Arctic conditions. These vessels would be temporarily transferred on loan to Soviet Russia and would fly the Soviet flag until, without prejudice to the military operations, the Italian vessels can be made available…"

29 January 1944:

Stalin to FDR and Churchill

"…I must say that after getting your joint favorable reply to my question in Tehran about transferring Italian ships to the Soviet Union before the end of January 1944, I had considered the matter settled; it never occurred to me that that decision reached and agreed to by the three of us could be revised in any way, All the more so because we agreed at the time that the matter would be fully settled with the Italians during December and January. Now I see that this is not the case and that nothing has been said to the Italians on this score. However, in order not to delay settlement of this matter, which is so vitally important to our common fight against Germany, the Soviet Union is willing to accept your proposal…"

11 February 1944:

FDR to Stalin

"I have been following the recent developments in your relations with Poland with the closest attention…I neither desire nor intend to attempt to suggest much less to advise you in any way as to where the interests of Russia lie in this matter since I realize to the full that the future security of your country is rightly your primary concern…I fully appreciate your desire to deal only with a Polish Government in which you can repose confidence and which can be counted upon to establish permanent friendly relations with the Soviet Union, but it is my earnest hope that while this problem remains unsolved nothing should be done to transform this special question into one adversely affecting the larger issues of future international collaboration. While public opinion is forming in support of the principle of international collaboration, it is essentially incumbent upon us to avoid any action which might appear to counteract the achievement of our long-range objective. I am told by Prime Minister Churchill that he is endeavoring to persuade the Polish Prime Minister to make a clean-cut acceptance as a basis for negotiation of the territorial changes which have been proposed by your Government…the first consideration at this time should be that Polish guerrillas should work with and not against your advancing troops. That is of current importance and as a step of some assurance on the part of all Poles would be a great advantage."

16 February 1944:

Stalin to FDR

"Your message on the Polish question to hand. It goes without saying that a correct solution of this problem is of great importance both to the USSR and to our common cause. There are two major points to be considers: first, the Soviet-Polish frontier and, second, the composition of the Polish Government…the Soviet Government has officially declared that it does not consider the 1939 boundary final, and has agreed to the Curzon Line as the new frontier line between the USSR and Poland. We had grounds for anticipating an appropriate declaration on recognition on the part of the Polish Government…But the Polish Government in London refused to budge, and continued to insist in official statements that the frontier imposed upon us under the Riga Treaty at a difficult moment should be left unchanged. Hence, there is no basis for agreement…It is clear that the Polish Government, in which the main role is played by pro-fascist, imperialist elements hostile to the Soviet Union, such as Sosnkowski, and in which there are hardly any democratic elements, can have no basis in Poland…such a Polish Government is incapable of establishing friendly relations with the Soviet Union and it cannot be anticipated that it will not sow discord among the democratic countries which, on the contrary, would like to strengthen their unity. It follows that a radical improvement in the composition of the Polish Government is an urgent matter…"

26 February 1944:

Stalin to FDR and Churchill

"…My thanks to you and the Prime Minister for the news about the temporary transfer to the Soviet Union of eight destroyers and four submarines, as well as a battleship and 20,000 tons of merchant shipping by Great Britain and a cruiser and 20,000 tons of merchant shipping by the United States. Mr. Kerr has expressly warned us that all the destroyers are old ones so I have misgivings about their combat qualities. It seems to me that British and US Navies should find no difficulty in assigning, out of eight destroyers, at least four modern, not old, ones. I still hope that you and the Prime Minister will find it possible to transfer at least four modern destroyers. As a result of military operations by Germany and Italy we have lost a substantial part of our destroyers. It is, therefore, very important for us to have that loss repaired at least in part."

1 March 1944:

Sauckel at a meeting of the Central Planning Board: "The most abominable point against which I have to fight is the claim that there is no organization in these districts properly to recruit Frenchmen, Belgians, and Italians and to dispatch them to work. So I have even proceeded to employ and train a whole staff of French and Italian agents of both sexes who for good pay, just as was done in olden times for 'shanghaiing,' go hunting for men and dupe them, using liquor as well as persuasion in order to dispatch them to Germany. Moreover, I have charged several capable men with founding a special labor allocation organization of our own, and this by training and arming, under the aegis of the Higher SS and Police Fuehrer, a number of indigenous units; but I still have to ask the munitions ministry for arms for these men. For during the last year alone several dozens of high-ranking labor allocation officials of great ability have been shot. All these means must be used, grotesque as it may sound, to refute the allegation that there is no organization to bring labor to Germany from these countries."

3 March 1944:

Stalin to Churchill

"…Now that I have read the detailed record of your conversations with the leaders of the Polish émigré Government, I am more convinced than ever that men of their type are incapable of establishing normal relations with the USSR…I have already written to the President that the time is not yet ripe for a solution of the problem of Soviet-Polish relations. I am compelled to reaffirm the soundness of this conclusion."

9 March 1944:

FDR and Churchill

"Although the Prime Minister instructed Ambassador Clark Kerr to tell you the destroyers we are lending you are old, this was only for the sake of absolute frankness. In fact they are good, serviceable ships, quite efficient for escort duty. There are only seven fleet destroyers in the whole Italian Navy. Moreover, these Italian destroyers when we do get them are absolutely unfitted for work in the North without lengthy refit. Therefore we thought the eight which the British Government had found would be an earlier and more convenient form of help to you. The Prime Minister regrets that he cannot spare any new destroyers at the present time. He lost two the week before last, one in the Russian convoy, and for landing at ‘Overlord’ alone he has to deploy, for close in-shore work against batteries no fewer than forty-two destroyers, a large portion of which may be sunk. Every single vessel that he has of this class is being used to the utmost pressure in the common cause. The movement of the Japanese Fleet to Singapore creates a new situation for us in the Indian Ocean. The fighting in Anzio bridgehead and generally throughout the Mediterranean is at its height. The vast troop convoys are crossing the Atlantic with the United States Army of Liberation. The Russian convoys are being run up to the last minute before ‘Overlord’ with very heavy destroyer escorts. Finally there is ‘Overlord’ itself. The Presidents position is similarly strained but in this case mainly because of the great scale and activity of the operations in the Pacific…"

12 March 1944:

From a speech made by Doenitz to the German Navy and the German people on Heroes' Day: "German men and women! ...What would have become of our country today, if the Fuehrer had not united us under National Socialism! Split into parties, beset with the spreading poison of Jewry and vulnerable to it, and lacking, as a defense, our present uncompromising ideology, we would long since have succumbed to the burdens of this war and been subject to the merciless destruction of our adversaries..."

18 March 1944:

FDR to Stalin

"I have today dispatched by air a personal letter to President Inonu on the subject of chrome, as I am impressed by the importance of Turkish chrome to Germany…I feel sure that you will concur, but please let me know if this action runs counter to any steps you are now taking or contemplating so that I can halt delivery of the letter. The text of my letter to President Inonu reads in paraphrase as follows: "Almost every day in the week there are many matters about which I would like to talk to you and I greatly wish that you and I were not thousands of miles apart. At this time I want to write you on the subject of chrome. As you are aware, the Russians by the capture of Nikopol have succeeded in denying an important source of manganese to the Germans. For many purposes Turkish chrome ore can be substituted for manganese, and the denial to the Germans of manganese from Nikopol consequently multiplies the importance of chrome from Turkey to the German war production. It is obvious that it has now become a matter of grave concern to the United Nations that large supplies of chrome ore continue to move to Germany from Turkey. You can best decide how the Germans are to be denied further access to Turkish chrome ore. Know of your inventive genius, I hope you will find some method to bring this about. I firmly believe that you will recognize this opportunity for a unique contribution to be made by Turkey to what really is the welfare of the world. It is needless to tell you how very happy I was in our talks in Cairo and I feel that now you and I can talk to each other as old friends. I send all my good wishes and count on our meeting again in the near future." I am sending Mr. Churchill a similar telegram."

20 March 1944:

Stalin to FDR

"I have received your message setting forth the draft of your letter to the President of Turkey about Turkish deliveries of chrome to Germany. The representation you suggest making to the Turks is, I think, most timely, although I must say that I have little hope of positive results."

23 March 1944:

Stalin to Churchill

"I have lately received two messages from you on the Polish question…I was struck by the fact that both your messages and particularly Kerr’s statement bristle with threats against the Soviet Union. I should like to call your attention to this circumstance because threats as a method are not only out of place in relations between Allies, but also harmful, for they may lead to opposite results. The Soviet Unions efforts to uphold and implement the Curzon Line are referred to in one of your messages as a policy of force. This implies that you are now trying to describe the Curzon Line as unlawful and the struggle for it as unjust. I totally disagree with you. I must point out that at Tehran you, the President and myself were agreed that the Curzon Line was lawful…Does this mean that you no longer recognize what we agreed on in Tehran and are ready to violate the Tehran agreement? I have no doubt that had you persevered in your Tehran stand the conflict with the Polish émigré Government could have been settled…You say in your message of March 7 that the problem of the Polish-Soviet frontier will have to be put off till the armistice conference is convened. I think there is a misunderstanding here. The Soviet Union is not waging nor does it intend to wage war against Poland. It has no conflict with the Polish people and considers itself an ally of Poland and the Polish people. That is why it is shedding its blood to free Poland from German oppression. It would be strange, therefore, to speak of an armistice between the USSR and Poland. But the Soviet Union is in conflict with the Polish émigré Government, which does not represent the interests of the Polish people or express their aspirations…you tell me of your intention to make a statement in the House of Commons to the effect that all territorial questions must await the armistice or peace conferences of the victorious Powers and that in the meantime you cannot recognize any forcible transference’s of territory. As I see it you make the Soviet Union appear as being hostile to Poland, and virtually deny the liberation nature of the war waged by the Soviet Union against German aggression. That is tantamount to attributing to the Soviet Union something which is nonexistent, and, thereby, discrediting it. I have no doubt that the people of the Soviet Union and world pubic opinion will evaluate your statement as a gratuitous insult to the Soviet Union. In your message you express the hope that the breakdown over the Polish question will not affect our cooperation in other spheres. As far as I am concerned, I have been, and still am, for cooperation. But I fear that the method of intimidation and defamation, if continued, will not benefit our cooperation."

18 April 1944: FDR and Churchill to Stalin "Pursuant to our talks at Tehran, the general crossing of the sea will take place around ‘R’ date, which Generals Deane and Burrows have recently been directed to give to the Soviet General Staff. We shall be acting at our fullest strength. We are launching an offensive on the Italian mainland at maximum strength about mid-May. Since Tehran your armies have been gaining a magnificent series of victories for the common cause. Even in the month when you thought they would not be active they have gained these great victories. We send you our very best wishes and trust that your armies and ours, operating in unison in accordance with our Tehran agreement, will crush the Hitlerites."

22 April 1944:

Stalin to FDR and Churchill

"…The Soviet Government is gratified to learn that in accordance with the Tehran agreement the sea crossing will take place at the appointed time…and that you will be acting at full strength. I am confident that the planned operation will be a success. I hope that the operations you are undertaking in Italy will likewise be successful. As agreed at Tehran, the Red Army will launch a new offensive at the same time so as to give maximum support to the Anglo-American operations. Please accept my thanks for the good wishes you have expressed on the occasion of the Red Army’s success. I subscribe to your statement that your armies and our own, supporting each other, will defeat the Hitlerites and thus fulfil their historic mission."

4 May 1944:
Churchill to (British Foreign Secretary) Anthony Eden: "...broadly speaking the issue is: are we going to acquiesce in the Communization of the Balkans and perhaps Italy?...I am of the opinion on the whole that we ought to come to a definite conclusion about it, and that if our conclusion is that we resist the Communist infusion and invasion we should put it to them plainly at the best moment that military events permit. We should have to consult the United States first...Evidently we are approaching a showdown with the Russians about their Communist intrigues in Italy, Yugoslavia, and Greece. I think their attitude becomes more difficult every day..."

12 May 1944:

From a letter from the Chief of Office Group D of WVHA

"There is cause to call attention to the fact that in every case permission for assignment has to be requested here before assignment of prisoners is made for experimental purposes. To be included in this request are number, kind of custody, and in case of Aryan prisoners, exact personal data, file number in the Reich Security Main Office, and the reason for detainment in the concentration camp. Herewith, I explicitly forbid assignment of prisoners for experimental purposes without permission."

14 May 1944:

FDR and Churchill to Stalin

"In order to give the maximum strength to the attack across the sea against Northern France, we have transferred part of our landing craft from the Mediterranean to England. This, together with the need for using our Mediterranean land forces in the present Italian battle makes it impracticable to attack the Mediterranean coast of France. We are planning to make such an attack later, for which purpose additional landing craft are being sent to the Mediterranean from the United States. In order to keep the greatest number of German forces away from Northern France and the Eastern Front, we are attacking the Germans in Italy at once on a maximum scale and, at the same time, are maintaining a threat against the Mediterranean coast of France."

15 May 1944:

Stalin to FDR and Churchill

"Your joint message received. You can best decide how and in what way to allocate your forces. The important thing, of course, is to ensure complete success for ‘Overlord.’ I express confidence also in the success of the offensive launched in Italy."

23 May 1944:

FDR to Stalin

"I would appreciate receiving your views on my making a statement to be issued after ‘D’ day along the following lines in place of a tripartite statement to be issued by the Soviet, United States, and British Governments: "A suggestion has been made that the Allied Governments issue a joint statements to the people of Germany and their sympathizers in which emphasis would be placed on the recent landings made on the European continent. I have not agreed with this as I might overemphasize the importance of these landings. What I desire to express to the German people and their sympathizers is that their defeat is inevitable. I also wish to emphasize to them that it is unintelligent on their part to continue in the war from now on. They must realize in their hearts that, with their present objectives and their present leaders, it is inevitable that they will be totally defeated. From now on, every German life lost is an unnecessary loss. It is true, from a cold-blooded point of view, that the Allies will also suffer losses. However, the Allies outnumber so greatly Germany in population and in resources that the Germans on a relative basis will be harder hit - down to the last family - than the Allies, and mere stubbornness will never help Germany in the long run. It has been made abundantly clear by the Allies that they do not seek the total destruction of the People of Germany. What they seek is the total destruction of the philosophy of those Germans who have stated that they could subjugate the world. The Allies desire to attain the long-term goal of human freedom - greater real liberty - political, intellectual, and religious, and a greater justice, economic and social. We are being taught by our times that no group of men can ever be sufficiently strong to dominate the entire world. The United States Government and the people of the United States - with almost twice the population of Germany - send word to the German people that this is the time for them to abandon the teachings of evil. By far the greater part of the population of the world of nearly two billion people feel the same way. It is only Germany and Japan who stand out against all the rest of humanity. In his heart every German knows that this is true. Germany and Japan have made a disastrous and terrible mistake. Germany and Japan must atone reasonably for the wanton destruction of lives and property which they have committed. They must renounce the philosophy which has been imposed upon them - the falsity of this philosophy must be very clear to them now. The more quickly the fighting and the slaughter shall terminate, the more rapidly shall arrive a more decent civilization in the entire world. The attacks which the American, the British, and the Soviet Union and their associates are now making in the European theater will, we hope, continue with success. However, the people of Germany must realize that these attacks are only a part of many which will increase in volume and number until victory, which is inevitable, is attained." Prime Minister Churchill has agreed to follow me with a message along the above lines."

25 May 1944:

FDR to Stalin

"I am sending you two scrolls for Stalingrad and Leningrad, which cities have won the wholehearted admiration of the American people. The heroism of the citizens of these two cities and the soldiers who so ably defended them has not only been an inspiration to the people of the United States, but has served to bind even more closely the friendship of our two nations. Stalingrad and Leningrad have become synonyms for the fortitude and endurance which has enabled us to resist and will finally enable us to overcome the aggression of our enemies. I hope that in presenting these scrolls to the two cities you will see fit to convey to their citizens my own personal expressions of friendship and admiration and my hope that our peoples will continue to develop that close understanding which has marked our common effort."

26 May 1944:

Stalin to FDR

"Your communication on a statement to the people of Germany has reached me. In view of the experience of the war against the Germans and the German character I do not think that your suggested statement would have a positive effect, seeing that it is to be synchronized with the beginning of the landing and not with the moment when the Anglo-American landing and the forthcoming offensive of the Soviet armies will have registered notable success. As to the nature of the statement, we can return to this when circumstances favor publication."

27 May 1944:

FDR to Stalin

"With reference to my message of May 23 proposing for consideration a message to be issued by me with the purpose of influencing the German people, I am informed that the suggestion is not approved by the Prime Minister of Great Britain and his Cabinet. Because the proposed statement is not of essential importance and in view of a definite and positive objection by the British Government, I propose to do nothing in the way of a statement of that nature at the present time."

29 May 1944:

From a propaganda piece by Goebbels: "It is only possible with the aid of arms to secure the lives of enemy pilots who were shot down during such attacks, for they would otherwise be killed by the sorely tried population. Who is right here? The murderers who, after their cowardly misdeeds, await a humane treatment on the part of their victims, or the victims who wish to defend themselves according to the principle: 'An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth'? This question is not hard to answer. It seems to us hardly possible and tolerable to use German police and soldiers against the German people when it treats murderers of children as they deserve."

30th of May 1944:

From a circular letter written by Reichsleiter Bormann: "Several instances have occurred where members of the crews of such aircraft, who have bailed out or who have made forced landings, were lynched on the spot immediately after capture by the populace, which was incensed to the highest degree. No police measures or criminal proceedings were invoked against the German civilians who participated in these incidents."

31 May 1944
Churchill to FDR:

"...There have recently been disquieting signs of a possible divergence of policy between ourselves and the Russians in regard to the Balkan countries, and in particular towards Greece. We therefore suggested to the Soviet Ambassador here that we should agree between ourselves as a practical matter that the Soviet Government would take the lead in Rumanian affairs, while we would take the lead in Greek affairs, each government giving the other help in the respective countries. Such an arrangement would be a natural development of the existing military situation, since Rumania falls within the sphere of the Russian armies and Greece with the Allied command under General Wilson in the Mediterranean 2. The Soviet Ambassador here told Eden on May 18 that the Soviet government agreed with this suggestion, but before giving any final assurance in the matter they would like to know whether we had consulted the United States government and whether the latter had also agreed to this arrangement 3. I hope you may feel able to give this proposal your blessing. We do not of course wish to carve up the Balkans into spheres of influence..."

1 June 1944:

Standing Order of U-boat Command: 1. Statements of prisoners are the safest and best source of information regarding enemy tactics, weapons, location appliances and methods. Prisoners from planes and destroyers may be of the greatest importance to us; therefore, as far as possible and without endangering the boat, the utmost is to be done to take such prisoners. 2. As prisoners are extremely willing to talk when captured, interrogate them at once on board. It is of special interest to know the manner of locating U-boats by aircraft, whether by radar or by passive location methods; for instance, by ascertaining, through electricity or heat, the location of the boat. Report prisoners taken as soon as possible in order to hand them over to returning boats."

6 June 1944
Churchill to Stalin:

"Everything (Overlord) has started well. The mines, obstacles, and land batteries have been largely overcome. The air landings were very successful, and on a large scale. Infantry landings are proceeding rapidly, and many tanks and self-propelled guns are already ashore. Weather outlook moderate to good."

6 June 1944
Stalin to Churchill:

"I have received your communication about the success of 'Overlord' operations. It gives joy to all of us and hope of further successes. The summer offensive of Soviet forces, organized in accordance with the agreement at the Teheran Conference, will begin towards the middle of June on one of the most important sectors of the front. The general offensive of the Soviet forces will develop by stages by means of the successive bringing of armies into offensive operations. At the end of June and during July offensive operations will become a general offensive of the Soviet forces. I shall not fail to inform you in due course of the progress of offensive operations."

7 June 1944 Churchill to Stalin:

"I am well satisfied with the situation up to noon today, 7th. Only at one American beach has there been serious difficulty, and that has now been cleared up. Twenty-thousand airborne troops are safely landed behind the flanks of the enemies lines, and have made contact in each case with the American and British seaborne forces. We got across with small loses. We had expected to lose about 10,000 men. By tonight we hope to have the best part of a million men ashore, including a considerable quantity of armor (tanks), all landed from special ships or swimming ashore by themselves. In this latter class of tanks there have been a good many casualties, especially on the American front, owing to the waves overturning the swimming tanks. We must now expect heavy counterattacks..."

8 June 1944:

From Gauleiter Wagner to the Chief of the Court of Appeals in Karlsruhe: "Especially in Alsace it is required that the sentences for refusal of military service should be intimidating. But upon those trying to evade military service, for fear of personal danger, this intimidating effect can be produced only by the death penalty, the more so, as an Alsatian bent upon escaping military service by emigration counts generally on an early victory of the enemy and, therefore, in case of conviction with punishment other than death, with a near cancellation of the penalty. The death penalty is, therefore, to be applied in all cases in which after 6 June 1944 an evasion of military service is attempted by illegal emigration, irrespectively of any other legal practice used in Germany proper."

8 June 1944: Churchill to Lord Halifax:

"...There is no question of spheres of influence. We all have to act together, but someone must play the hand. It seems reasonable that the Russians should deal with the Rumanians and the Bulgarians, upon whom their armies are impinging, and that we should deal with the Greeks, who are in our assigned theater, who are our old Allies, and for whom we sacrificed 40,000 men in 1941. I have reason to believe that the President is in entire agreement with the line I am taking about Greece. The same is true of Yugoslavia. I keep him constantly informed, but on the whole we, His Majesty's Government, are playing the hand, and have to be very careful to play it agreeably with the Russians...On the other hand, we follow the lead of the United States in South America as far as possible, as long as it is not a question of our beef and mutton. On this we naturally develop strong views on account of the little we get."

11 June 1944: FDR to Churchill:

"...Briefly, we acknowledge that the military responsible government in any given territory will inevitably make decisions required by military developments, but are convinced that the natural tendency for such decisions to extend to other than military fields would be strengthened by an agreement of the type suggested. In our opinion, this would certainly result in differences between you and the Soviets and in the division of the Balkans into spheres of influence despite the declared intention to limit the arrangements to military matters. We believe efforts should be made to establish consultative machinery to dispel misunderstandings and restrain the tendency toward the development of exclusive spheres."

11 June 1944: Churchill to FDR:

"...I am much concerned to receive your message. Action is paralyzed if everybody is to consult everybody else about everything before it is taken. Events will always outstrip the changing situations in these Balkan regions. Somebody must have the power to plan and act. A Consultative Committee would be a mere obstruction, always overridden in any case of emergency by direct interchanges between you and me, or either of us and Stalin...The Russians are ready to let us take the lead in the Greek business, which means that EAM and all its malice can be controlled by the national forces of Greece. Otherwise civil war and ruin to the land you care about so much. I always reported to you, and I always will report to you. You shall see every telegram that I send. I think you might trust me in this...the Russians are about to invade would be a good thing to follow the Soviet leadership, considering that neither you nor we have any troops there at all and that they will probably do what they like anyhow...I see no difficulty whatever in our addressing the Russians at any time on any subject, but please let them go ahead upon the lines agreed as they are doing all the work...To sum up, I propose that we agree that the arrangements I set forth in my message of May 31 may have a trial of three months, after which it must be reviewed by the three powers."

11 June 1944: Stalin to Churchill:

"...As is evident, the landing, conceived on a grandiose scale, has succeeded completely. My colleagues and I cannot but admit that the history of warfare knows no other like undertaking from the point of view of its scale, its vast conception, and its masterly execution. As is well known, Napoleon in his time failed ignominiously in his plan to force the Channel. The hysterical Hitler, who boasted for two years that he would effect a forcing of the Channel, was unable to make up his mind even to hint at attempting to carry out his threat. Only our Allies have succeeded in realizing with honor the grandiose plan of the forcing of the Channel. History will record this deed as an achievement of the highest degree..."

12 June 1944:

Excerpts from a top-secret memorandum prepared for the Nazi Ministry of the Occupied Territories and approved by Rosenberg: "The Army group center has the intention to apprehend 40,000-50,000 youths at the ages of 10 to 14 who are in the Army territory and to transport them to the Reich...It is intended to allot these juveniles primarily to the German trades as apprentices to be used as skilled workers after 2 years' training. This is to be arranged through the Organization Todt which is especially equipped for such a task by means of its technical and other setups. This action is being greatly welcomed by the German trade since it represents a decisive measure for the alleviation of the shortage of apprentices....This action is aimed not only at preventing a direct reinforcement of the enemy's military strength but also at a reduction of his biological potentialities as viewed from the perspective of the future. These ideas have been voiced not only by the Reichsfuehrer SS but also by the Fuehrer. Corresponding orders were given during last year's withdrawals in the southern sector...."

14 June 1944
Churchill to Stalin:

"...Two days ago, the number of prisoners was 13,000, which is more than all the killed and wounded we had lost up to that time. Therefore it may be said that the enemy have lost nearly double what we have, although we have been continuously on the offensive. During yesterday the advances were quite good, though the enemy resistance is stiffening as his strategic reserves are thrown into the battle. I should think it quite likely tat we should work up to a battle of about a million a side, lasting through June and July. We plan to have about two million there by mid-August."

14 June 1944: Churchill to FDR:

"I had a jolly day on Monday on the beaches (Normandy) and inland...After doing much laborious duty we went and had a plug at the Hun from our destroyer, but although the range was 6000 yards he did not honor us with a reply...A great deal more has to be done, and I think more troops are needed. We are working up to a battle which may well be a million a side. The Chiefs of Staff are searching about for the best solution of these problems as between the Mediterranean and 'Overlord.' How I wish you were here!"

14 June 1944
Churchill to FDR:

"...I am deeply grateful to you for your telegram. I have asked the foreign Secretary to convey the information to Molotov and to make it clear that the reason for the three months limit is in order that we should not prejudge the question of establishing postwar spheres of influence."

22 June 1944:

OKW memorandum initialed by Warlimont: "The Operations Staff agrees with the view taken in the letter of the army group judge to the Supreme Commander Southwest of 20 May 1944. The Fuehrer Order is to be applied even if the enemy employs only one person for a task. Therefore, it does not make any difference if several persons or a single person take part in a commando operation. The reason for the special treatment of participants in a commando operation is that such operations do not correspond to the German concept of usage and customs of warfare."

23 June 1944:

From a message by Warlimont: "Supreme Command West; teletype message Number 1750/44; top secret; 23 June 1944. The treatment of enemy commando groups has so far been carried out according to the order referred to. With the large-scale landing achieved, a new situation has arisen. The order referred to directs, in Paragraph 5, that enemy soldiers who are taken prisoner in open combat or surrender within the limits of normal combat operations (such as large-scale landing operations and undertakings) are not to be treated according to Paragraphs 3 and 4. It must be established in a form easily understood by the troops how far the concept 'within the limits of normal combat operations, etc., is to be extended. Considerable reprisals against our own prisoners must be expected if its contents become known. The application of Number 5 for all enemy soldiers in uniform penetrating from the outside into the occupied western territories is held by the Supreme Command West to be the most correct and clearest solution...1. The Commando Order remains basically in effect, even after the enemy landing in the West. 2. Number 5 of the order is to be clarified to the effect that the order is not valid for those enemy soldiers in uniform who are captured in open combat in the immediate combat area of the beachhead by our troops committed there, or who surrender. Our troops committed in the immediate combat area means the divisions fighting on the front line as well as reserves up to and including corps headquarters. 3. Furthermore, in doubtful cases, enemy personnel who have fallen into our hands alive are to be turned over to the SD, upon whom it is incumbent to determine whether the Commando Order is to be applied or not. 4. Supreme Command West is to see to it that all units committed in its zone are orally acquainted in a suitable manner with the order concerning the treatment of members of commando undertakings of 18 October 1942, along with the above explanation."

23 June 1944
Churchill to FDR:

"The Russians are the only power that can do anything in Rumania, and I thought it was agreed between you and me that...they should try to give coherent direction to what happened there. In point of fact we have all three cooperated closely in handling in Cairo the recent Rumanian peace-feelers. On the other hand, the Greek burden rests almost entirely upon us...I cannot admit that I have done anything wrong in this matter. It would not be possible for three people in different parts of the world to work together effectively if no one of them may make a suggestion to either of the others without simultaneously keeping the third informed. A recent example of this is the message you have sent quite properly to Uncle Joe about your conversations with the Poles, of which as yet I have heard nothing from you. I am not complaining at all of this, because I know we are working for the general theme and purposes, and I hope you will feel that has been so in my conduct of the Greek affair...I am keeping you constantly informed, and I hope to have your confidence and help within the spheres of action in which initiative is assigned to us."

25 June 1944:

OKW's reply to the inquiry from the Supreme Command West, signed by Keitel, initialed by Warlimont and Jodl: "Subject: Treatment of commando participants. 1. Even after the landing of Anglo-Americans in France, the order of the Fuehrer on the annihilation of terror and sabotage units of 18 October 1942 remains fully in force. Enemy soldiers in uniform in the immediate combat area of the bridgehead, that is, in the area of the divisions fighting in the most forward lines, as well as of the reserves up to the corps commands, according to Number 5 of the basic order of 18 October 1942, remain exempted. 2. All members of terror and sabotage units, found outside the immediate combat area, who include fundamentally all parachutists, are to be killed in combat. In special cases, they are to be turned over to the SD. 3. All troops committed outside the combat area of Normandy are to be informed about the duty to destroy enemy terror and sabotage units briefly and succinctly, according to the directives issued for it. 4. Supreme Commander West will report immediately daily how many saboteurs have been liquidated in this manner. This applies especially also to undertakings by the military commanders. The number is to be published daily in the Armed Forces communique to exercise a frightening effect, as had already been done toward previous commando undertakings in the same manner."

25 June 1944 Churchill to Stalin:

"We now rejoice in the opening results of your immense operations, and will not cease by every human means to broaden our fronts engaged with the enemy and to have the fighting kept at the utmost intensity...We have had bitter fighting on the British front, where four out of five Panzer divisions are engaged...You may safely disregard all the German rubbish about the results of their flying bomb. It has had no appreciable effect upon the production or life of London. Casualties during the seven days it has been used are between ten and eleven thousand. The streets and parks remain full of people enjoying the sunshine when off work or duty. Parliament debates continuously throughout the alarms. The rocket development may be more formidable when it comes. The people are proud to share in a small way the perils of our own soldiers and of your soldiers, who are highly admired in Britain. May good fortune attend your new onfall."

27 June 1944: Stalin to Churchill:

"...If the scale of military operations in Northern France is becoming increasingly powerful and dangerous for Hitler, the successful development of the Allies' offensive in Italy is also worthy of every attention and applause. We wish you new successes. Concerning our offensive, it can be said that we shall not give the Germans a breathing-space, but shall continue to widen the front of our offensive operations by increasing the strength of our onslaught against the German armies. You will of course agree with me that this is indispensable for our common cause. As regards the Hitlerite flying bombs, this expedient, it is clear, can have no serious importance either for operations in Normandy, or for the population of London, whose bravery is known to all."

27 June 1944
FDR to Churchill:

"...It appears that both of us have inadvertently taken unilateral action in a direction that we both now agree to have been expedient for the time being. It is essential that we should always be in agreement in matters bearing on our Allied war effort..."

27 June 1944 Churchill to FDR:

"...You may be sure I shall always be looking to our agreement in all matters before, during, and after..."

29 June 1944:

Excerpts of a letter from Paul Saab, a district commissioner in the territory of Wassilkov, to Rosenberg: "According to a charge by the Supreme Command of the Army, I burned down several houses... in the territory of Wassilkov, Ukraine, belonging to insubordinate people ordered to labor service-this accusation is true....During the year of 1942 the conscription of workers was accomplished nearly exclusively by way of propaganda. Only rarely was force necessary. But in August 1942, measures had to be taken against two families in the villages of Glevenka and Soliony-Shatior, each of which were to supply one person for labor. Both had been requested in June for the first time but had not obeyed, although requested repeatedly. They had to be brought in by force, but succeeded twice in escaping from the collecting camp in Kiev or while in transit. Before the second arrest, the fathers of both of the workers were taken into custody as hostages to be released only when their sons appeared. When, after the second escape, the re-arrest of both the young men and the fathers was ordered, the police patrols detailed to do this, found the houses empty....At that time I decided at last to take measures to show the increasingly rebellious Ukrainian youth that our orders have to be followed. I ordered the burning of the houses of the two fugitives. The result was that in the future people obeyed, willingly, orders concerning labor obligations. However, the practice of burning houses has not become known for the first time by my actions, but was suggested in a secret letter from the Reich Commissioner for Allocation of Labor (Note: Sauckel) specifically as a coercive measure in case other measures should fail. This harsh punishment was acceptable to the local population because previous to this step both families had ridiculed on every hand the duty-conscious people who sent their children partly voluntarily to the labor allocation...After initial successes, a passive resistance of the population started, which finally forced me to turn again to arrests, confiscation’s, and transfers to labor camps. After a whole transport of conscripted laborers overcame the police at the railroad station in Wassilkov and escaped, I saw again the necessity for strict measures. A few ringleaders, who of course had long since escaped, were located in Plissezkoje and in Mitnitza. After repeated attempts to get hold of them, their houses were burned down...My actions toward fugitive labor draftees were always reported to District Commissioner Dohrer, of the Wassilkov office, and to the Commissioner General in Kiev. Both of them knew the circumstances and agreed with my measures because of their success."

1 July 1944:

From the minutes of a meeting between the Doenitz and Hitler: "...Regarding the general strike in Copenhagen, the Fuehrer says that the only weapon to deal with terror is terror. Court-martial proceedings create martyrs. History shows that the names of such men are on everybody's lips, whereas there is silence with regard to the many thousands who have lost their lives in similar circumstances without court-martial proceedings."

1 July 1944
Churchill to Stalin:

"The battle is hot in Normandy. The June weather has been tiresome. Not only did we have a gale on the beaches worse than any in the summertime records of many years, but there has been a great deal of cloud. This denies us the full use of our overwhelming air superiority, and also helps the flying bombs to get through to London. However, I hope that July will show an improvement. Meanwhile the hard fighting goes in our favor, and although eight Panzer divisions are in action against the British sector we still have a good majority of tanks. We have well over three-quarters of a million British and Americans ashore, half and half. The enemy is burning and bleeding on every front at once, and I agree with you that this must go on to the end."

10 July 1944: Field Marshal Smuts to Churchill:

"In view of the spectacular Russian advance, and of the capture of Caen, which forms a welcome pendant, the Germans cannot, as things are now developing, face both fronts. They will soon have to decide whether to throw their main weight against the attack from the east or that from the west. Knowing what to expect from a Russian invasion, it is likely that they will decide on concentrating on the Russian front. This will help to ease our task in the west. Having broken through at Caen, it is essential that we should maintain the initiative and offensive without pause, and advance to the rear of the German flying bomb bases as soon as possible...I continue to hope that in the end your strategy will again prove successful, backed as it is by every sound military as well as political consideration."

14 July 1944:

Churchill to Foreign Secretary Eden: "This requires careful handling. It is quite possible that rich Jews will pay large sums of money to escape being murdered by the Huns. It is tiresome that this money should get into the hands of ELAS (Greek Communist partisans), but why on Earth we should go and argue with the United States about it I cannot conceive. We should take a great responsibility if we prevented the escape of Jews, even if they should be rich Jews. I know it is the modern view that all rich people should be put to death wherever found, but it is a pity that we should take up that attitude at the present time. After all, they have no doubt paid for their liberation so high that in the future they will only be poor Jews, and therefore have the ordinary rights of human beings."

15 July 1944:

From an internal Nazi report: "By July 15, 1944, the following had been scientifically inventoried: 21,903 Works of Art: 5,281 paintings, pastels, water colors, drawings; 684 miniatures, glass and enamel paintings, illuminated books and manuscripts; 583 sculptures, terra cottas, medallions, and plaques; 2,477 articles of furniture of art historical value; 583 textiles (tapestries, rugs, embroideries, Coptic textiles); 5,825 objects of decorative art (porcelains, bronzes, faience, majolica, ceramics, jewelry, coins, art objects with precious stones); 1,286 East Asiatic art works (bronzes, sculpture, porcelains, paintings, folding screens, weapons); 259 artworks of antiquity (sculptures, bronzes, vases, jewelry, bowls, engraved gems, terra cottas)."

21 July 1944:

From a speech by Doenitz: "Men of the Navy! Holy wrath and unlimited anger fill our hearts because of the criminal attempt which was to have cost the life of our beloved Fuehrer. Providence wished it otherwise, watched over and protected our Fuehrer, and did not abandon our German fatherland in the fight for its destiny."

27 July 1944:
Churchill to General Montgomery: "It was announced from SHAEF last night that the British had sustained 'quite a serious setback.' I am not aware of any facts that justify such a statement...It certainly seems very important for the British Army to strike hard and win through; otherwise there will grow comparisons between the two armies which will lead to dangerous recriminations and affect the fighting value of the Allied organization..."

27 July 1944
General Montgomery to Churchill: "I know of no 'serious setback.' Enemy has massed great strength in area south of Caen to oppose our advance in that quarter. Very heavy fighting took place yesterday and the day before, and as a result the troops of the Canadian Corps were forced back 1000 yards from the farthest positions they had reached...The enemy strength south of Caen astride the Falaise road is now very great, and greater than anywhere else on the whole Allied front. I therefore do not intend to attack him there. Instead I am planning to keep the enemy forces tied to that area and to put in a very heavy blow with six divisions from the Caumont area, where the enemy is weaker. This blow will tend to make the American progress quicker."

30 July 1944:

From an order issued by Keitel

"Subject: Treatment of members of foreign 'Military Missions' captured together with partisans. In the areas of the High Command Southeast and Southwest, members of foreign so-called 'Military Missions' (Anglo-American as well as Soviet-Russian) captured in the course of the struggle against partisans shall not receive the treatment as specified in the special orders regarding the treatment of captured partisans. Therefore they are not to be treated as prisoners of war but in conformity with the Fuehrer's order concerning the annihilation of terror and sabotage troops of 18 October 1942. This order shall not be transmitted to units subordinate to the corps commands and the equivalent staffs of the other branches of the Armed Forces, and is to be destroyed after being made known. The Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht, Keitel"

4 August 1944
Churchill to Stalin:

"At urgent request of Polish Underground we are developing, subject to weather, about sixty tons of equipment and ammunition into the southwest quarter of Warsaw, where it is said a Polish revolt against the Germans is in fierce struggle. Thay also say that they appeal for Russian aid, which seems to be very near. They are being attacked by one and a half German divisions. This may be of help to your operation."

5 August 1944
Stalin to Churchill:

"I have received your message about Warsaw. I think that the information which has been communicated to you by the Poles is greatly exaggerated and does not inspire confidence. One could reach that conclusion even from the fact that the Polish emigrants have already claimed for themselves that they all but captured Vilna with a few stray units of the Home Army, and even announced that on the radio. But that of course does not in any way correspond to the facts. The Home Army of the Poles consists of a few detachments which they incorrectly call divisions. They have neither artillery nor aircraft nor tanks. I cannot imagine how such detachments can capture Warsaw, for the defense of which the Germans have produced four tank divisions, among them the Hermann Goering Division."

6 August 1944
Churchill to Eden:

"...The behavior of EAM (Greek Communist Partisans) is absolutely intolerable. Obviously they are seeking nothing but the Communization of Greece during the confusion of war, without allowing the people to decide in any manner understood by democracy. 2. We cannot take a man up as we have done Papandreou and let him be thrown to the wolves at the first snarlings of the miserable Greek banditti. Difficult as the world is now, we shall not make our course easier by abandoning people whom we have encouraged to take on serious jobs by promises of support...Should matters go downhill and EAM become master we should have to reconsider keeping any of our mission there and put the Greek people bluntly up against Bolshevism. The case seems to me to have reached the following point: either we support Papandreou, if necessary with force as we have agreed, or we disinterest ourselves utterly in Greece."

6 August 1944
Churchill to CIGS:

"...It may be that within a month or so we shall have to put 10,000 to 12,000 men into Athens...Such a force should be embarked now, and would probably be in time for the political crisis...there is no question of trying to dominate Greece or going outside the immediate curtilage of Athens, but this is the center of government...If you have a better plan, let me know it. It is to be presumed that the Germans have gone or are streaking away to the north, and that the force landed at the Piraeus would be welcomed by the great majority of the population of Athens, including all the notables. The utmost secrecy must enwrap this project..."

6 August 1944:
Churchill to Harry Hopkins:

"I am grieved to find that even splendid victories and widening opportunities do not bring us together on strategy...Bowing to the United States Chiefs of Staff under recorded protest and the overriding of our views, we have done everything in human power, including the provision of nearly one-half the navel forces about to be engaged. If nothing can be done to save the situation I earnestly pray the American view may be right...I admit the arguments against late changes on plans, but they ought to be fairly weighed against what seems to us to be the overwhelming case for strengthening the main battle, and thus possibly finishing up with Hitler this year. 6. You know the great respect I have for Marshall, and if you feel able to embroil yourself in these matters I should be glad if you would bring my views before him, especially the later paragraphs, which are my reply to any complaint he may have that I supported 'Anvil' at Teheran and have turned against it since."

7 August 1944
Harry Hopkins to Churchill:

"While there has been no reply as yet from the President to your message relative to the same matter, I am sure his answer will be in the negative. While I have seen no analysis of the logistics involved, I am absolutely certain you will find the supply problem insurmountable...It seems to me that our tactical position today in 'Overlord' is precisely as planned and as we anticipated it would be when 'Anvil' was laid on. To change the strategy now would be a great mistake, and I believe would delay rather than aid in our conquest of France."

8 August 1944: FDR to Churchill:

"I have consulted by telegraph with my Chiefs of Staff, and am unable to agree that the resources allocated to 'Dragoon' (was Anvil) should be considered available for a move into France via ports on the coast of Brittany. On the contrary, it is my considered opinion that 'Dragoon' should be launched as planned at the earliest practicable date, and I have full confidence that it will be successful and of great assistance to Eisenhower in driving the Huns from France."

8 August 1944
Churchill to FDR: "...I pray God that you may be right. We shall of course do everything in our power to help you achieve success."

12 August 1944:
Field Marshal Smuts to Churchill: "...we can afford to ignore the theaters for which large forces have been kept in the Middle East and assemble whatever we have to strengthen Alexander's move, which may lead to very great results both in the Balkans and in Hitler's European fortress. I would cut off the frills elsewhere in order to improve the alluring chances before this move. A front extending along Northern Italy, the Adriatic, and the route through Trieste to Vienna is one worthy of our concentrated effort...A decisive stage has now been reached in the war, and an all-out offensive on all three main fronts against Germany must lead to the grand finale this summer. If the present tremendous successful offensive can only be maintained the end cannot long be deferred, especially in view of what we now know of conditions inside the German Army...Southern France has ceased to be a theater of real military significance, and our large forces and resources detached for it will have small bearing on the tremendous decisions elsewhere. I even doubt if the enemy will trouble to reinforce it."

12 August 1944: Churchill to Marshal Tito: "The desire of His Majesty's Government is to see a united Yugoslav Government, in which all Yugoslavs resisting the enemy are represented, and a reconciliation between the Serbian people and the National Liberation Movement...If it should turn out that any large quantities of ammunition sent by His Majesty's Government are used for fratricidal strife other than self-defense, it would effect the whole question of Allied supplies, because we do not wish to be involved in Yugoslav political differences...His Majesty's Government, while regarding Marshal Tito and his brave men with the utmost admiration, are not satisfied that that sufficient recognition has been given to the power and rights of the Serbian people, or to the help which has been given, and will be continued, by His Majesty's Government."

12 August 1944
Churchill to Stalin: "...(I have received a) distressing message from the Poles in Warsaw, who after ten days are still fighting against considerable German forces who have cut the city in three...They implore machine guns and ammunition. Can you not give them some further help, as the distance from Italy is so great?"

14 August 1944:
Churchill to Eden: "It will cause the Russians much annoyance if the suggestion that the Polish patriots in Warsaw were deserted gets afoot, but they can easily prevent it by operations well within their power. It certainly is very curious that at the moment when the Underground Army has revolted, the Russian Armies should have halted their offensive against Warsaw and withdrawn some distance. For them to send in all the quantities of machine-guns and ammunition required by the Poles for their heroic fight would only involve a flight of 100 miles...But what have the Russians done? I think it would be better if you sent a message to Stalin through Molotov referring to the implications that are afoot in many quarters and requesting that the Russians send all the help they can. This course would be more impersonal than that I should do it through Stalin..."

14 August 1944 Churchill to FDR: "I have had meetings the last two days with Marshal Tito and the Yugoslav Prime Minister....The two leaders reached a satisfactory agreement on a number of practical questions. They agreed that all Yugoslav navel forces will now be united in the struggle under a common flag. This agreement...will enable us with more confidence to increase our supplies of war material to the Yugoslav forces....I am informing Marshal Stalin of the result of these meetings."

15 August 1944:

From a report from Office Group D of WVHA: "With reference to the above-mentioned telephone call, I am sending herewith a report on the actual number of prisoners for 1 August 1944 and of the new arrivals already announced, as well as the clothing report for 15 August 44. (1) The actual number on 1 August 44 consisted of: a) male prisoners, 379,167; b) female prisoners, 145,119. In addition, there are the following new arrivals already announced: 1) From the Hungary program (anti-Jewish action), 90,000; 2) from Litzmannstadt (police prison and ghetto), 60,000; 3) Poles from the Government General, 15,000; 4) convicts from the Eastern Territories, 10,000; 5) former Polish officers, 17,000; 6) from Warsaw (Poles), 400,000; 7) continued arrivals from France approximately 15,000 to 20,000. Most of the prisoners are already on the way and will be received into the concentration camps within the next few days."

16 August 1944:
Stalin to Churchill:

"...having familiarized myself more closely with the Warsaw affair, I am convinced that the Warsaw action represents a reckless and terrible adventure which is costing the population large sacrifices. This would not have been if the Soviet Command had been informed before the beginning of the Warsaw action and if the Poles had maintained contact with it. In the situation which has arisen the Soviet command has come to the conclusion that it must disassociate itself from the Warsaw adventure, as it cannot take either direct or indirect responsibility for the Warsaw action."

16 August 1944:
Churchill to Eden: "...Regarding our expedition to Greece...I have strongly emphasized that the operation must be regarded as one of reinforced diplomacy and policy rather than an actual campaign, and that is to be confined to Athens...the Greek Government would follow almost immediately, and within a few hours should be functioning in Athens, where the people would probably receive the British parachutists with rapture. The arrival of the parachutists in the neighborhood of Athens could be effected with complete surprise, and might well be effected before EAM had taken any steps to seize the capital...It is of course necessary in an integrated Anglo-American Staff that the Americans should share in planning such a movement. They have up to now shared fully in postwar planning for Greece in common with the rest of the Mediterranean. American carrying aircraft will be needed for the operation..."

17 August 1944
Churchill to FDR: "We have always marched together in complete agreement about Greek policy, and I refer to you on every important point...If there is a long hiatus after German authorities have gone from the city before organized government can be set up it seems very likely that EAM and Communist extremists will attempt to seize the city and crush all other forms of Greek expression but their own...I do not expect you will relish more than I do the prospect either of chaos and street fighting or of a tyrannical Communist Government being set up...I therefore think that we should make preparations through the Allied Staff in the Mediterranean to have in readiness a British force, not exceeding 10,000 men, which could be sent by the most expeditious means into the capital when the time is ripe. The force would include parachute troops, for which the help of your Air Force will be needed..."

17 August 1944:

From a directive of the OKW: "Subject: Treatment of War Prisoners-Increase in Production. The measures taken until now with regard to the treatment of war prisoners and the increasing of their production have not given the hoped-for results. The offices of the Party and those of economy continually complain of the poor labor output of all the war prisoners. The object of this circular is to make known the directives for prisoners of war made in agreement with all interested offices of the Party and State. Accordingly all guard companies and their auxiliaries are to be given detailed instructions. I. Collaboration with the Hoheitstrager of the NSDAP. The cooperation of all officers in charge of war prisoners with the Hoheitstrager of the Party must be intensified to an even greater extent. To this end the commanders of the prisoners-of-war camps shall immediately detail, for all the Kreise in their command, an energetic officer acquainted with all questions concerning prisoners of war, to act as liaison officer to the Kreisleiter. This officer shall have the duty of settling in closest collaboration with the Kreisleiter, according to the instructions of the camp commander, all questions concerning prisoners of war which. might be of public interest. The aim of this collaboration must be: (a) To increase the labor output of war prisoners; (b) to solve all arising difficulties quickly and on the spot; to organize the employment of war prisoners in the Kreise in such a way that it meets with the political, military, and economic requirements. The Chancellery of the Party will give the necessary orders to the Gauleiter and the Kreisleiter. 2. Treatment of prisoners of war. The treatment of prisoners of war shall be dictated, within limits compatible with security, by the sole purpose of increasing the labor output to the utmost extent. In addition to just treatment, providing the prisoners with the food due them according to stipulations, and with proper billets, supervision of the labor output is necessary to achieve this highest possible production. Available means must be employed with extreme rigor as regards lazy and rebellious prisoners."

18 August 1944 Churchill to Eden: "I have seen the extremely lukewarm telegram of August 15 from the American Joint Chiefs of Staff to General Eisenhower...The air authorities out here assured me that the Americans wished to send help from England to Warsaw, and that the operation was quite practicable, providing of course that the Russians gave their consent. It seems hardly credible to me that the request for landing facilities would have been submitted to the Russians unless the practicability of the operation had been examined by General Dolittle. It is most important that you should find out if it is practicable or not. Before the President, or I, or both, make any personal or joint appeals to Stalin it is of course necessary that the military difficulties should be resolved."

18 August 1944 Churchill to FDR:

"An episode of profound gravity is created by the Russian refusal to permit American aircraft to bring succor to the heroic insurgents in Warsaw, aggravated by their own complete neglect to provide supplies by air when only a few score of miles away. If, as is almost certain, a wholesale massacre follows the German triumph in that capital no measure can be put upon the full consequences that will arise. 2. I am prepared to send a personal message to Stalin if you think this wise, and if you will yourself send a separate similar message. Better far than two separate messages would be a joint message signed by us both. 3. The glorious and gigantic victories being achieved in France by the United States and British forces are vastly changing the situation in Europe, and it may well be that the victory gained by our armies in Normandy will eclipse in magnitude anything that the Russians have achieved on any particular occasion. I feel therefore that they will have some respect for what we say so long as it is expressed plainly and simply. We are nations serving high causes and must give true counsels towards world peace even at the risk of Stalin resenting it. Quite possibly he wouldn't."

20 August 1944: Churchill and FDR to Stalin:

"We are thinking of world opinion if the anti-Nazis in Warsaw are in effect abandoned. We believe that all three of us should do the utmost to save as many of the patriots there as possible. We hope that you will drop immediate supplies and munitions to the patriot Poles in Warsaw, or will you agree to help our planes in doing it quickly? We hope you will approve. The time element is of extreme importance."

22 August 1944: Stalin to Churchill and FDR:

"I have received the message from you and Mr. Roosevelt about Warsaw. I wish to express my opinions. Sooner or later the truth about the group of criminals who have embarked on the Warsaw adventure in order to seize power will become known to everybody. These people have exploited the good faith of the inhabitants of Warsaw, throwing many almost unarmed people against the German guns, tanks, and aircraft. A situation has arisen in which each new day serves, not the Poles for the liberation of Warsaw, but the Hitlerites who are inhumanly shooting down the inhabitants of Warsaw. From the military point of view, the situation which has arisen, by increasingly directing the attention of the Germans to Warsaw, is just as unprofitable for the Red Army as for the Poles. Meanwhile the Soviet troops, which have recently encountered new and notable efforts by the Germans to go over to the counterattack, are doing everything possible to smash these counterattacks of the Hitlerites and to go over to a new wide-scale attack in the region of Warsaw. There can be no doubt that the Red Army is not sparing its efforts to break the Germans round Warsaw and to free Warsaw for the Poles. That will be the best and most effective help for the Poles who are anti-Nazis."

22 August 1944 Churchill to Eden: "...I like Papandreou, and there are great advantages in the removal of the Greek Government from the Ciaro atmosphere. I think it will do good to have an alert Greece both of foes and friends such as will be produced by its movement. But, while the military affairs are being planned and sorted out here under my direction in accordance with the wishes you expressed, a date cannot be fixed; it must be fitted with other needs, unless the situation itself takes charge. I cannot be ready to act for a month, but thereafter we may be able to pounce when the going is good..."

23 August 1944
Churchill to British Minister of Information: "Is there any stop to the publicity for the facts about the agony of Warsaw, which seems, from the papers, to have been practically suppressed? It is not for us to cast reproaches on the Soviet Government, but surely the facts should be allowed to speak for themselves? There is no need to mention the strange and sinister behavior of the Russians, but is there any reason why the consequences of such behavior should be made public?"

24 August 1944 FDR to Churchill: "...Stalin's reply to our joint proposal for assisting the Warsaw Poles is far from encouraging. The supply of the Warsaw Poles is, I am informed, impossible unless we are permitted to land and take off from Soviet airfields. Their use for the relief of Warsaw is at present prohibited by the Russian authorities. I do not see what further steps we can take at the present time that promise results."

25 August 1944:
Churchill to FDR: "As Stalin's reply evades the definite question asked and adds nothing to our knowledge, I propose a reply on the following lines...(draft text inserted)...In the event of his failing to reply to this my feeling is that we ought to send the planes and see what happens. I cannot believe that they would be ill-treated or detained..."

26 August 1944:
FDR to Churchill: "I do not consider it would prove advantageous to the long-range general war prospect for me to join with you in the proposed message to Stalin, but I have no objection to your sending such a message if you consider it advisable to do so. In arriving at this conclusion I have taken into consideration Uncle J.'s present attitude toward the relief of the Underground forces in Warsaw, as indicated in his message to you and to me, his definite refusal to allow the use by us of Russian airfields for that purpose, and the current American conversations on the subject of the subsequent use of other Russian bases... ...I have no objections to your making preparations to have in readiness a sufficient British force to preserve order in Greece when the German forces evacuate that country. There is also no objection to the use by General Wilson of American transport airplanes that are available at that time..."

26 August 1944: Churchill to Field Marshal Smuts: "...So far 'Anvil' has had the opposite effects for which its designers intended. First, it has attracted no troops away from General Eisenhower at all. On the contrary...about five divisions have been deployed against Eisenhower, which would not have happened had we continued our advance here in the direction of the Po, and ultimately on the great city (Vienna). I hope that we may achieve this. Even if the war comes to an end suddenly I can see no reason why our armor should not slip through and reach it, as we can."

28 August 1944 Churchill to FDR:

"General Alexander received a telegram from SHAEF asking for efforts to be made to prevent the withdrawal of more (German) divisions from the Italian front. This of course was the consequence of the great weakening of our armies in Italy...The plan is that the Eighth Army of ten divisions, very heavily weighted in depth, will endeavor to pierce the Gothic Line and turn the whole enemies position...if all goes well I hope that the advance will be much more rapid after that and that the continued fighting will prevent further harm being done to Eisenhower by the withdrawal of divisions from Italy..."

30 August 1944 Field Marshal Smuts to Churchill:

"...please do not let strategy absorb all your attention to the damage of the greater issue now looming up...From now on it would be wise to keep a very close eye on all matters bearing on the future settlement of Europe. This is the crucial issue on which the future of the world for generations will depend..."

31 August 1944
Churchill to Field Marshal Smuts:

"...My object now is to keep what we have got in Italy...With this I hope to turn and break the Gothic Line, break into the Po Valley, and ultimately advance by Triest and the Ljubljana Gap to Vienna. Even if the war came to an end at an early date I have told Alexander to be ready for a dash with armored cars..."

31 August 1944 FDR to Churchill:

"I was very glad to receive your account of the way in which General Wilson had concentrated his forces in Italy and has now renewed the offensive. My Chiefs of Staff feel that a vigorous attack, using all the forces available, should force the enemy into the Po Valley. The enemy may then choose to withdraw entirely from Northern Italy. Since such action on his part may enable the enemy to release divisions for other fronts, we must do our best to destroy his forces while we have them in our grasp. I am sure General Wilson has this as his objective. With an offensive under way and being pressed full strength in Italy, I am sure that General Eisenhower will be satisfied that everything possible is being done in the Mediterranean to assist him by mauling German divisions which might otherwise be moved against his forces in the near future...It is my thought that we should press the German Army in Italy vigorously with every faculty we have available, and suspend decisions of the future use of General Wilson's armies until the results of his campaign are better known and we have better information as to what the Germans may do..."

31 August 1944 Churchill to FDR:

"All operations in Italy are conceived and executed by General Alexander...he is now in contact for twenty miles on the Adriatic flank with the Gothic Line...I have impressed most strongly upon General Alexander the importance of pressing with his utmost strength to destroy the enemies armed forces as well as turn his line. It will not be easy for the Germans to effect a general retreat...Only the direct route to Germany is open. We shall do our utmost to engage, harry, and destroy the enemy. The decisive battle has yet however to be fought....As to the future, continuous employment against the enemy will have to be found...This employment can only take the form of a movement first to Istria and Trieste and ultimately upon Vienna. Should the war come to an end in a few months, as may well be possible, none of these questions will arise..."

4 September 1944
Churchill to FDR:

"I share your confidence that the Allied divisions we have in Italy are sufficient to do the task before them and that the battle commander will press the battle unrelentingly with the objective of shattering the enemy forces. After breaking the German forces on the Gothic Line we must go on to use our divisions in the way which best aids General Eisenhower's decisive drive into the enemy homeland...I strongly feel that we must not stint in any way the forces needed to break quickly through the western defenses of Germany...With the present chaotic conditions of the Germans in Southern France, I hope that a junction of the north and south forces may be obtained at a much earlier date than was first anticipated..."

4 September 1944:

The Women of Warsaw to the Pope:

"Most Holy Father, we Polish women in Warsaw are inspired with sentiments of profound patriotism and devotion to our country. For three weeks, while defending our fortress, we have lacked food and medicine. Warsaw is in ruins. The Germans are killing wounded in hospitals. They are making women and children march in front of them to protect their tanks. There is no exaggeration of reports of children who are fighting and destroying tanks with bottles of petrol. We mothers see our sons dying for freedom and the fatherland. Our husbands, our sons, and our brothers are not considered by the enemy to be combatants. Holy Father, no one is helping us. The Russian armies which have been for three weeks at the gates of Warsaw have not advanced a step. The aid coming to us from Great Britain is insufficient. The world is ignorant of our fight. God alone is with us..."

4 September 1944:

The British War Cabinet to the Soviet Government:

"...public opinion in this country is deeply moved by the events in Warsaw and the terrible sufferings of the Poles there. Whatever the rights or wrongs about the beginnings of the Warsaw rising, the people of Warsaw themselves cannot be held responsible for the decision taken. Our people cannot understand why no material help has been sent from outside to the Poles in Warsaw. The fact that such help could not be sent on account of your governments refusal to allow United States aircraft to land on aerodromes in Russian hands is now becoming publicly known. If on top of all this the Poles of Warsaw should now be overwhelmed by the Germans, as we are told they must be within two or three days, the shock of public opinion here will be incalculable. The War Cabinet themselves find it hard to understand your governments refusal to take account of the obligations of the British and American Governments to help the Poles of Warsaw. Your Governments action in preventing this help being sent seems to us at variance with the spirit of Allied cooperation to which you and we attach so much importance both for the present and the future..."

5 September 1944:

FDR to Churchill:

"...I am informed by my Office of Military Intelligence that the fighting Poles have departed from Warsaw and that the Germans are now in full control. The problem of relief for the Poles of Warsaw has therefore unfortunately been solved by delay and by German action, and there now appears to be nothing we can do to assist them. I have long been distressed by our inability to give adequate assistance to the heroic defenders of Warsaw, and I hope that we may together still be able to help Poland to be among the victors in this war with the Nazis."


8 September 1944:

Churchill to General Ismay:

"...At the present time we are at a virtual standstill and progress will be very slow. I trust the assumption of a decisive Russian offensive on the Eastern Front will be realized; but it is at present only an assumption...No one can tell what the future may bring forth. Will the Allies be able to advance in strength through the Siegfried Line into Germany during September, or will their forces be so limited by supply conditions and the lack of ports as to enable the Germans to consolidate on the Siegfried Line? Will the Germans withdraw from Italy?-in which case they will greatly strengthen their internal position. Will they be able to draw on their forces, at one time estimated at between 25 and 30 divisions, in the Baltic States? The fortifying and consolidating effect of a stand on the frontier of the native soil should not be underrated. It is at least as likely that Hitler will be fighting on January 1 as that he will collapse before then. If he does collapse before then, the reasons will be political rather than military."

12 September 1944:

Churchill to General Ismay:

"The British share in this war may take the form either of direct participation in particular United States enterprises in the Far East or of British diversionary enterprises on a major scale calculated to wear down the enemy forces by land and air, and also to regain British possessions conquered by the Japanese. Of the two, I favor the latter...our policy should be to give navel assistance on the largest scale to the main American operation, but to keep our own thrust to Rangoon as a preliminary operation, or one of the preliminary operations, to a major attack of Singapore. Here is the supreme British objective in the whole of the Indian and Far Eastern theaters. It is the only prize that will restore British prestige in this region, and in pursuing it we render the maximum aid to the United States operations by engaging the largest numbers of the enemy in the most intense degree possible and at the earliest moment."

12 September 1944:

From a report prepared by the chief hygienist in the Office of the Reich Surgeon of the SS and Police: "On 11 September 1944, in the presence of SS Sturmbannfuehrer Dr. Ding, Dr. Widmann, and the undersigned, experiments with aconite nitrate bullets were carried out on five persons who had been sentenced to death. The caliber of the bullets used was 7.65 millimeters, and they were filled with poison in crystal form. Each subject of the experiment received one shot in the upper part of the left thigh, while in a horizontal position. In the case of two persons, the bullets passed clean through the upper part of the thigh. Even later no effect from the poison could be seen. These two subjects were therefore rejected...The symptoms shown by the three condemned persons were surprisingly the same. At first, nothing special was noticeable. After 20 to 25 minutes, a disturbance of the motor nerves and a light flow of saliva began, but both stopped again. After 40 to 44 minutes, a strong flow of saliva appeared. The poisoned persons swallowed frequently; later the flow of saliva is so strong that it can no longer be controlled by swallowing. Foamy saliva flows from the mouth. Then a sensation of choking and vomiting starts. At the same time there was pronounced nausea. One of the poisoned persons tried in vain to vomit. In order to succeed he put four fingers of his hand, up to the main joint, right into his mouth. In spite of this, no vomiting occurred. His face became quite red. The faces of the other two subjects were already pale at an early stage. Other symptoms were the same. Later on the disturbances of the motor nerves increased so much that the persons threw themselves up and down, rolled their eyes, and made aimless movements with their hands and arms. At last the disturbance subsided, the pupils were enlarged to the maximum, the condemned lay still. Rectal cramps and loss of urine was observed in one of them. Death occurred 121, 123, and 129 minutes after they were shot."

13 September 1944:

Churchill to War Cabinet:

"The Conference (Second Quebec Conference) has opened in a blaze of friendship. The staffs are in almost complete agreement already. There is to be no weakening of Alexander's army till Kesselring has bolted beyond the Alps or been destroyed...The idea of our going to Vienna, if the war lasts long enough and if other people do not get there first, is fully accepted here..."

13 September 1944:

Churchill to General's Wilson and Alexander:

"Everything has opened here very well so far as your affairs are concerned...Pray therefore address yourselves to this greatly improved situation in a spirit of audacious enterprise. The Americans talk without any hesitation of our pushing on to Vienna, if the war lasts long enough. I m greatly relieved at the reception all our ideas have met here. We must turn these advantages to the best account."

20 September 1944:

Field-Marshal Smuts to Churchill:

"The crisis arising from the deadlock with Russia in World Organization talks fills me with deep concern...A clash at the present juncture should be avoided at all costs. In the event of unanimity for the powers being adopted, even including their voting on questions directly concerning their interests, the result will require that the USA and the UK should exert all their influence to get Russia to act moderately and sensibly and not to flout world opinion. And in this it is likely that they will be largely successful. Should Russia prove intransigent it may be necessary for the Organization to act, but the blame will attach to her. The principle of unanimity will at the worst only have the effect of a veto, of stopping action wherever it may be wise, or even necessary. Its effect will be negative. It will retard action. But it will also render it impossible for Russia to embark on courses not approved by the USA and the UK. A brake like unanimity may not be so bad a thing to have where people are drunk with power. I do not defend it; I dislike it; but I do not consider it at present so bad an instrument that on this issue the future of world peace and security should be sacrificed...the Great Powers should endeavor to find some modus vivendi, even if only of a temporary character, which would prevent a catastrophe of the first magnitude. Where so much is at stake for the future we simply must agree, and cannot afford to differ."

26 September 1944:

Field-Marshal Smuts to Churchill:

"...the more firmly Russia can establish herself in the saddle now the farther she will ride in the future and the more precarious our holdfast will become. Our position in the Mediterranean and in Western Europe must be strengthened rather than weakened. In neither of these areas we may have the support of Russia, or even Gaullist France. From this standpoint the future dispositions as regards Germany assume an importance for us which may be far greater and very different from that which they appear to have at present. A new situation will be created for us in Europe and the world by the elimination of Germany through this war. This calls for a searching reconsideration of our entire foreign policy for the future. While a World Organization is necessary, it is equally essential that our Commonwealth and Empire should emerge from this ordeal as strong and as influential as possible, making us an equal partner in every sense for the other Big Two..."

27 September 1944:

Field-Marshal Smuts to Churchill:

" has to be feared that after the war against Germany is won war fever in the United States will cool off and American ardor be transferred to trade and industry...Division of zones in Germany between the United Kingdom and United States appears fair. The destiny of Prussia under occupied by the Russians seems likely to be a Bolshevised Soviet province or protectorate. So much for Hitler's dream. But it shows that Europe's 2,000 year old problem of Germany will remain as great as ever..."

27 September 1944:

Churchill to Stalin:

" is the Russian Army that tore the guts out of the German military machine, and is at the present moment holding by far the larger portion of the enemy on its front. 2. I have just returned from long talks with the President, and I can assure you of our intense conviction that on the agreement of our three nations...stand the hopes of the world. I feel very sorry to learn that you had not been feeling well lately, and that your doctors did not like your taking long journeys by air...but it may be the course of the war, even before Christmas, may alter the picture along the Baltic shore to such an extent that your journey will not be tiring or difficult...I most earnestly desire, and so, I know, does the President, the intervention of Soviet Russia in the Japanese war, as promised by you at Teheran as soon as the German Army was beaten and destroyed. The opening of a Russian military front against Japan would force them to burn and bleed, especially in the air, in a manner which would vastly accelerate their defeat. From all I have learned about the internal state of Japan and the sense of hopelessness weighing on their people, I believe it might well be that once the Nazis are shattered a triple summons to Japan to surrender, coming from our three Great Powers, might be decisive. Of course, we must go into all these plans together..."

28 September 1944:

FDR to Churchill:

"I have rad with great interest your telegram from Field-Marshal Smuts, and I think we are all in agreement with him as to the necessity of having the USSR as a fully accepted and equal member of any association of great powers formed for the purpose of preventing international war. It should be possible to accomplish this by adjusting our differences through compromise by all the parties concerned, and this ought to tide things over for a few years until the child learns how to toddle."

29 September 1944:

Churchill to FDR:

"...Stalin has not yet responded to our suggestion. The two great objects we have in mind would be, firstly, to clinch his coming in against Japan, and secondly, to try to effect am amicable settlement with Poland. There are other points too concerning Yugoslavia and Greece which we would also discuss. We should keep you informed of every point...That Germany is not going to be conquered this year seems pretty clear. In a telegram I have seen that Omar Bradley is already thinking in terms of an operation across the Rhine in the middle of November, and I have noted other signs of stiffening resistance..."

29 September 1944:

Stalin to Churchill:

"...At the present time the Soviet armies are busy with the liquidation of the group of German armies along the Baltic which threaten our right flank. Without the liquidation of this group, it is not possible for us to penetrate deeply into Eastern Germany. Besides that, our armies have two nearer tasks: to remove Hungary from the war, and to probe the defense of the Germans on the Eastern Front by means of an attack by our troops, and, given favorable conditions, to overcome it."

30 September 1944:

Stalin to Churchill:

"...I share your conviction that firm agreement between the three leading powers constitutes a true guarantee of future peace and answers to the best hopes of all peace-loving peoples. The continuation of our governments in such a policy in the postwar period as we have achieved during this great war will, it seems to me, have a decisive influence. Of course, I have a great desire to meet with you and the President. I attach great importance to it from the point of view of the interests in our common business. But, as far as I am concerned, I must make one reservation. The doctors advise me not to undertake long journeys. For a certain period I must take account of this. I warmly welcome your wish to come to Moscow in October. We shall have to consider military and other questions, which are of great importance...As regards Japan, our position is the same as it was at Teheran..."

7 November 1944:

Churchill to Eden

"In my opinion, having paid the price we have to Russia for freedom of action in Greece, we should not hesitate to use British troops to support the Royal Hellenic Government under M. Papandreou. 2. This implies that British troops should certainly intervene to check acts of lawlessness. Surely M. Papandreou can close down E.A.M. newspapers if they call a newspaper strike. 3. I hope the Greek Brigade will soon arrive, and will not hesitate to shoot when necessary…" 11 November 1944 Stalin to FDR "I congratulate you on your reelection. I am confident that under your tried and tested leadership the American people will, jointly with the peoples of the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the other democratic countries, round off the struggle against the common foe and ensure victory in the name of liberating mankind from Nazi tyranny."

15 November 1944:

Churchill to FDR

"…Thank you for your kind wishes about the Paris - de Gaulle trip. I certainly had a wonderful reception from about half a million French in the Champs Elysees, and also from the partly Opposition Centre at the Hotel de Ville. I re-established friendly private relations with de Gaulle…You may be sure that our discussions about important things took place only on an ad referendum basis to the three great powers, and of course especially to you, who have by far the largest forces in France…He is of course anxious to obtain full modern equipment for eight more divisions, which can only be supplied by you. S.H.E.A.F. reasonably contends that these will not be ready for the defeat of Germany in the field and that shipping must be devoted to the upkeep of the actual forces that will win the battles of the winter and spring. I reinforced this argument. At the same time I sympathize with the French wish to take over more of the line, to have the best share they can in the fighting or what is left of it - and there may be plenty - and not to have to go into Germany as a so-called conqueror who has not fought. I remarked that this is a sentimental point which ought nevertheless to receive consideration. The important thing for France was to have an Army prepared for the task which it would actually have to discharge, namely, their obligation first to maintain a peaceful and orderly country behind the front of our armies, and secondly to assist in holding down parts of Germany later on. On the second point the French pressed very strongly to have a share in the occupation of Germany, not merely as sub-participation under British or American command, but as a French command. I expressed my sympathy with this, knowing well that there will be a time not many years distant when the American armies will go home and when the British will have great difficulty in maintaining large forces overseas, so contrary to our mode of life and disproportionate to our resources, and I urged them to study the type of army fitted for that purpose, which is totally different from the organization by divisions required to break the resistance of a modern war-hardened enemy army. They were impressed by this argument, but nevertheless pressed their view…It is evident however that there are a number of questions which press for decision at a higher level than that of the High Commands, without which decisions no clear guidance can be given. Here is another reason why we should have triple meeting if U.J. will not come, or a quadruple meeting if he will. In the latter case the French would be in on some subjects and out on others. One must realize that before five years are out a French army must be made to take on the main task of holding down Germany…"

16 November 1944 Churchill to de Gaulle:

"…I shall always recall as one of the proudest and most moving occasions of my life the wonderful reception which the people of Paris gave to their British guests on this our first visit to your capital since its liberation. I was also most grateful for the chance to see for myself something of the ardor and high quality of French troops, which are completing the liberation of their native soil under the skillful leadership of General de Lattre de Tasigny. The welcome extended to us was indeed a happy augury for that continued friendship between our two countries essential to the safety and to the future peace of Europe."

20 November 1944:

Stalin to Churchill

"Thank you for your information about your conversations with de Gaulle. I have acquainted myself with your communication with interest. I have nothing against your proposal about a possible meeting between us three and the French, provided the President also agrees with this, but it is necessary first to settle definitely about the time and place of the meeting between us three. General de Gaulle expressed recently his wish to come to Moscow to establish contact with the leaders of the Soviet Government. We replied agreeing to this. The French are expected to arrive in Moscow towards the end of this month. The French have not yet specified the questions they would wish to discuss. In any case, after our conversation with General de Gaulle I will let you know about it."

25 November 1944:

Churchill to Stalin

"Your message of November 20. I am glad de Gaulle is coming to see you, and I hope you will talk over the whole field together. There has been some talk in the Press about a Western bloc. I have not yet considered this. I trust first of all to our Treaty of Alliance and close collaboration with the United States to form the mainstays of a World Organization to ensure and compel peace upon the tortured world. It is only after and subordinate to any such world structure that European arrangements for better comradeship should be set on foot, and in these matters we shall have no secrets from you, being well assured that you will keep us equally informed of what you feel and need. 2 The battle in the West is severe and the mud frightful. The main collision is on the Aix-la-Chapelle-Cologne. This is by no means decided in our favor yet, though Eisenhower still has substantial reserves to throw in. To the northwest Montgomery’s armies are facing north, holding back the Germans on the line of the Dutch Maas. The river permits us an economy of force on this front. To the east we are making slow and steady progress and keeping the enemy in continual battle…In a week or ten days it should be possible to estimate whether the German armies will be beaten decisively west of the Rhine. If they are we can go on in spite of the weather. Otherwise there may be some lull during the severity of the winter, after which one more major onslaught should break the organized German resistance in the West. 4. Do you think it is going to be a hard winter, and will this suit your strategy? We all greatly liked your last speech. Please do not fail to let me know privately if anything troublesome occurs, so that we can smooth it away and keep closing the grip on Nazidom at its most intense degree."

25 November 1944:

Churchill to de Gaulle

"If you think well, please give the following message from me to Lattre: I send all my congratulations on the brilliant exploits of your young army. It must be wonderful to be a Frenchman twenty years old with good weapons in his hands and France to avenge and save."

4 October 1944:

Churchill to FDR

"…We want to elicit the time it will take after the Germans downfall for a superior Russian Army to be gathered opposite the Japanese on the frontiers of Manchukuo, and to hear from them the problems of this campaign, which are peculiar owing to the lines of communication being vulnerable in the later stages. Of course, the bulk of our business will be the Poles; but you and I think so much alike about this that I do not need any special guidance as to your views. The point of Dumbarton Oaks will certainly come up, and I must tell you that we are pretty clear that the only hope is that the Great Powers are agreed (i.e., unanimous). It is with regret that I have come to this conclusion, contrary to my first thought. Please let me know if you have any wishes about this matter…"

4 October 1944:

FDR to Churchill

"I can well understand why you feel that an immediate meeting between yourself and Uncle Joe is necessary before the three of us can get together. The questions which you will discuss there are ones which are of course of real interest to the United States, as I know you will agree. I have therefore instructed Harriman to stand by and to participate as my observer, if agreeable to you and Uncle Joe, and I have so informed Stalin. While naturally Averell will not be in a position to commit the United States - and I could not permit anyone to commit me in advance - he will be able to keep me fully informed, and I have told him to return and report to me as soon as the Conference is over. I am only sorry that I cannot be with you myself, but I am prepared for a meeting of the three of us any time after the elections here, for which your meeting with Uncle Joe should be a useful prelude, and I have so informed Uncle Joe. Like you, I attach the greatest importance to the continued unity of our three countries. I am sorry that I cannot agree with you however that the voting question should be raised at this time. That is a matter which the three of us can, I am sure, work out together, and I hope you will postpone discussion of it until our meeting. There is, after all, no immediate urgency about this question, which is so directly related to public opinion in the United States and Great Britain and the United Nations. I am asking our military people in Moscow to make available to you our Joint Chief’s statement to Stalin. You carry my best wishes with you, and I will eagerly await word of how it goes."

5 October 1944:

Churchill to FDR

"Thank you very much for what you say, and for your good wishes. I am very glad that Averell will sit in at all principle conferences, but you would not, I am sure, wish this to preclude private tete-a-tete between you and U.J. or Anthony and Molotov, as it is often under such conditions that the best progress is made. You can rely on me to keep you constantly informed of everything that effects our joint interests, apart from the reports Averell will send. 2. I gather from your last sentence but one that you have sent some general account of your Pacific plans to your people in Moscow, which will be imparted to U.J., and which I shall see on arrival. This will be most convenient. 3. Should U.J. raise the question of voting, as he very likely will do, I will tell him that there is no hurry about this and that I am sure we can get it settled when we are all three together."

9 October 1944:

Churchill arrives in Moscow. Soon, he and Stalin are discussing spheres of influence in the Balkans. Churchill’s account: "The moment was apt for business, so I said, "Let us settle our affairs in the Balkans. Your armies are in Rumania and Bulgaria. We have interests, missions, and agents there. Don’t let us get at cross-purposes in small ways. So far as Britain and Russia are concerned, how would it do for you to have ninety per cent predominance in Rumania, for us to have ninety per cent of the say in Greece, and go fifty-fifty about Yugoslavia?" While this was being translated I wrote out on half a sheet of paper: Rumania Russia 90% The others 10% Greece Great Britain 90% (in accord with USA) Russia 10% Yugoslavia 50-50% Hungary 50-50% Bulgaria Russia 75% The others 25% I pushed this across to Stalin, who had by then heard the translation. There was a slight pause. Then he took his blue pencil and made a large tick upon it, and passed it back to us. It was all settled in no more time than it takes to sit down…After this there was a long silence. The penciled paper lay in the center of the table. At length I said, "Might it not be thought rather cynical if it seemed we had disposed of these issues, so fateful to millions of people, in such an offhand manner? Let us burn the paper." "No, you keep it," said Stalin"

10 October 1944:

Churchill and Stalin (from Moscow) to FDR

"…We have agreed not to refer in our discussions to Dumbarton Oaks issues, and that these shall be taken up when we three can meet together. We have to consider the best way of reaching an agreed policy about the Balkan countries, including Hungary and Turkey. We have arranged for Mr. Harriman to sit in as an observer at all meetings where business of importance is to be transacted and for General Deane to be present whenever military topics are raised. We have arranged for technical contacts between our high officers and General Deane on military aspects, and for any meetings which may be necessary later in our presence and that of the two Foreign Secretaries, together with Mr. Harriman. We shall keep you fully informed ourselves about the progress we make. We take this occasion to send you our heartiest good wishes and to offer congratulations on the prowess of United States forces and upon the conduct of the war in the West by General Eisenhower."

10 October 1944:

Churchill (from Moscow) to FDR

"…The pressure in Dutch salient seems to me growing very severe, and our advances are slow and costly. In these circumstances we have with much sorrow had to recommend that we should put off "Dracula" (the amphibious attack on Rangoon) from March to November and leave the British 3d Division in France, as well as sending there the 52d Division, one of our best, about 22,000 strong in fighting troops, and the 6th Airborne Division to the Netherlands. Eisenhower is counting on these for the impending operation on the Rhine, and of course this was much the quickest way to bring additional troops to France. 3. Could you not deflect two, or better still three, American divisions to the Italian front, which would enable them to join Mark Clarks Fifth Army and add the necessary strength to Alexander? They would have to be there in three or four weeks. I consider the fact that we shall be sending Eisenhower these extra two divisions gives me a case for your generous consideration. 4. With regard to Istria, Trieste, etc., General Wilson is forwarding his plan to Combined Chiefs of Staff. This plan will be in accord with over-all strategic objective, namely, the expulsion from or destruction in Italy of Kesselring’s army."

11 October 1944:

Churchill (from Moscow) to FDR

"We have found an extraordinary atmosphere of goodwill here, and we have sent you a joint message. You may be sure we shall handle everything so as not to commit you. The arrangements we have made with Averell are, I think, satisfactory to him, and do not preclude necessary contacts, which we must have to do any good. Of all these I shall give you a faithful report. 2. It is absolutely necessary we should try to get a common mind about the Balkans, so that we may prevent civil war from breaking out in several countries, when probably you and I would be in sympathy with one side and U.J. with the other. I shall keep you informed of all this, and nothing will be settled except preliminary agreements between Britain and Russia, subject to further discussion and melting down with you. On this basis I am sure you will not mind our trying to have a full meeting of the minds with the Russians. 3. I have not yet received your account of what part of the Pacific operations we may mention to Stalin and his officers. I should like to have this, otherwise in conversation with him I may go beyond what you wish to be said. Meanwhile, I will be very careful. We have not touched upon Dumbarton Oaks, except to say it is barred, at your desire. However, Stalin at lunch today spoke in praise of the meeting and of the very great measure of agreement that has been arrived at there. Stalin also in his speech at this luncheon animadverted harshly upon Japan as being an aggressor nation. I have little doubt from our talks that he will declare was upon them as soon as Germany is beaten. But surely Averell and Deane should be in a position not merely to ask him to do certain things, but also to tell him, in outline at any rate, the kind of things you are going to do yourself, and we are going to help you do."

12 October 1944: FDR to Churchill and Stalin "Thanks for your joint message of October 10. I am most pleased to know that you are reaching a meeting of your two minds as to international policies in which, because of our present and future common efforts to prevent international wars, we are all interested."

12 October 1944: Churchill to Colleagues in London: "The system of percentage is not intended to prescribe the numbers sitting on commissions for different Balkan countries, but rather to express the interests and sentiment with which the British and Soviet Governments approach the problems of these countries, and so that they might reveal their minds to each other in some way that could be comprehended. It is not intended to be more than a guide, and of course in no way commits the United States, nor does it attempt to set up a rigid system of spheres of interest. It may, however help the United States to see how their two principle Allies feel about these regions when the picture is presented as a whole. 2. Thus it is seen that quite naturally Soviet Russia has vital interests in the countries bordering on the Black Sea, by one of whom, Rumania, she has been most wantonly attacked with twenty-six divisions, and with the other of whom, Bulgaria, she has ancient ties. Great Britain feels it right to show particular respect to Russian about these two countries, and to the Soviet desire to take the lead in a practical way in guiding them in the name of the common cause. 3. Similarly, Great Britain has a long tradition of friendship with Greece…4. Coming to the case of Yugoslavia, the numerical symbol 0f 50-50 is intended to be the foundation of joint action and an agreed policy between the two Powers now closely involved, so as to favor the creation of a united Yugoslavia after all elements there have been joined together to the utmost in driving out the Nazi invaders. It is intended to prevent, for instance, armed strife between Croats and Slovenes on the one side and powerful and numerous elements in Serbia on the other, and also to produce a joint and friendly policy towards Marshal Tito, while ensuring that weapons furnished to him are used against the common Nazi foe rather than for internal purposes. Such a policy, pursued in common by Britain and Soviet Russia, without any thought of advantages to themselves, would be of real benefit. 5. As it is the Soviet armies which are obtaining control of Hungary, it would be natural that a major share of influence should rest with them, subject of course to agreement with Great Britain and probably the United States, who, though not actually operating in Hungary, must view it as a Central European and not a Balkan State. 6. It must be emphasized that this broad disclosure of Soviet and British feelings in the countries mentioned above is only an interim guide for the immediate war-time future, and will be surveyed by the Great Powers when they meet at the armistice or peace table to make a general settlement of Europe."

12 October 1944:

Churchill to Hopkins

"Everything is most friendly here, but the Balkans are in a sad tangle. Tito, having lived under our protection for three or four months at Vis, suddenly departed, leaving no address, but keeping sentries over his cave to make out that he was still there. He then proceeded to Moscow, where he conferred, and yesterday M. Molotov confessed this fact to Mr. Eden. The Russians attribute this graceless behavior to Tito’s suspicious peasant upbringing, and say they did not tell us out of respect for his wish for secrecy. The Bulgarians are treating our people ill, having arrested some of our officers remaining both in Greece and Yugoslavia. I saw a tale of their having treated very cruelly American officers when prisoners of theirs. Russian attitude is that they are of course willing to indict Bulgaria for her many offences, but only in the spirit of a loving parent - "This hurts me more than it does you." They are taking great interest in Hungary, which, they mentioned erroneously, was their neighbor. They claim fullest responsibility in Rumania, but are prepared largely to disinterest themselves in Greece. All these matters are being flogged out by Mr. Eden and Molotov…We have so many bones to pick about the Balkans at the present time that we would rather carry the matter a little further a deux in order to be able to talk more bluntly than at a larger gathering. I will cable fully to the president about this in a day or two. Will you very kindly show this to him? I shall be very glad to hear from him." 14 October 1944 "…There is no doubt that the French have been co-operating with Supreme Headquarters and that their Provisional Government has the support of the majority of the French people. I suggest therefore that we can now safely recognize General de Gaulle’s Administration as the Provisional Government of France…"

6 October 1944:

FDR to Churchill

"I appreciate your report on the Italian campaign, where, up to the present, our combined effort has cost us nearly 200,000 casualties, 90,000 of them American. My Chiefs of Staff accept Wilson’s estimate that we cannot expect to destroy Kesselring’s army this winter and that the terrain and weather conditions in the Po valley will prevent any decisive advance this year. They further consider that the Germans are free to transfer five or six divisions from Italy to the Western Front whenever they consider such action more profitable than using these divisions in containing our forces south of the Po. Provision of additional US divisions will not effect the campaign in Italy this year. All of us are now faced with an unanticipated shortage of man-power, and overshadowing all other military problems is the need for quick provision of fresh troops to reinforce Eisenhower in his battle to break into Germany and end the European war. While the divisions in Italy are undoubtedly tiring as a result of fighting in the present battle since August 25, Eisenhower is now fighting the decisive battle of Germany with divisions which have been in continuous combat since they landed on the Normandy beaches in the first part of June. The need for building up additional divisions on the long front from Switzerland to the North Sea is urgent. Even more urgent is the need for fresh troops to enable Eisenhower to give some rest to our front-line soldiers, who have been the spear-point of the battle since the first days in Normandy. On the basis of General Marshall’s reports on the present situation we are now taking the very drastic step of sending the infantry regiments of the divisions ahead of the other units in order that General Eisenhower may be able to rotate some of our exhausted front-line soldiers. Diversion of any forces to Italy would withhold from France vitally needed fresh troops, while committing such forces to the high attrition of an indecisive winter campaign in Northern Italy. I appreciate the hard and difficult task which our armies in Italy have faced and will face, but we cannot withhold from the main effort forces which are needed in the Battle of Germany. From General Marshall’s reports on the problem now facing General Eisenhower, I am sure that both of them will agree with my conviction that no divisions should be diverted from their destination in France."

16 October 1944:

Churchill to the King

"…Here in Moscow the weather is brilliant but crisp, and the political atmosphere is extremely cordial. Nothing like it has been seen before. The Prime Minister and Mr. Eden in their various talks with Marshal Stalin and M. Molotov have been able to deal with the most delicate problems in a frank, outspoken manner without the slightest sign of giving offense…it has been possible to touch on many grave matters in an easy fashion. The nights are very long, lasting until three or even four o’clock; but the Prime Minister also keeps late hours, and much work is done from about noon onwards, with conferences of various kinds…4. The day before yesterday was "All Poles Day." Our lot from London are, as your Majesty knows, decent but feeble, but the delegates from Lublin could hardly have been under any illusions as to our opinion of them. They appeared to me to be purely tools, and recited their parts with well-drilled accuracy. I cross-examined them fairly sharply, and on several points Marshal Stalin backed me up. We shall be wrestling with our London Poles all today, and there are some hopes that we may get a settlement. If not we shall have to hush the matter up and spin it out until after the (American) Presidential election…"

20 October 1944:

FDR to Churchill

"I think until the French set up a real zone of interior that we should make no move towards recognizing them as a Provisional Government. The enlargement of the Consultative Assembly, which has already been extended and made more representative, is almost as important, and I should be inclined to hang recognition on the effective completion of both these acts. I would not be satisfied with de Gaulle merely saying that he was going to do it…" 20 October 1944 Churchill to Stalin "Eden and I have come away from the Soviet Union refreshed and fortified by the discussions which we had with you, Marshal Stalin, and with your colleagues. This memorable meeting in Moscow has shown that there are no matters that cannot be adjusted between us when we meet together in frank and intimate discussion…May we soon meet again."

22 October 1944:

Churchill to FDR

"…Mikolajczyk is going to urge upon his London colleagues the Curzon Line, including Lvov, for the Russians. I am hopeful that even in the next fortnight we may get a settlement. If so I will cable you the exact form so that you can say whether you want it published or delayed. 5. On major war criminals U.J. took an unexpectedly ultra-respectable line. There must be no executions without trial; otherwise the world would say we were afraid to try them. I pointed out the difficulties in international law, but he replied if there were no more trials there must be no death sentences, but only life-long confinements. 6. We also discussed informally the future partition of Germany. U.J. wants Poland, Czecho, and Hungary to form a realm of independent, anti-Nazi, pro-Russian States, the first two of which might join together. Contrary to his previously expressed view, he would be glad to see Vienna the capital of a federation of South German States, including Austria, Bavaria, Wurttemberg, and Baden. As you know, the idea of Vienna becoming the capital of a large Danubian federation has always been attractive to me, though I should prefer to add Hungary, to which U.J. is strongly opposed. 7. As to Prussia, U.J. wished the Ruhr and the Saar detached and put out of action and probably under international control, and a separate State formed in the Rhineland. He would also like the internationalization of the Kiel Canal. I am not opposed to this line of thought. However, you may be sure that we came to no fixed conclusions pending the triple meeting. 8. I was delighted to hear from U.J. that you had suggested a triple meeting toward the end of November at a Black Sea port. I think this is a very fine idea, and hope you will let me know about it in due course. I will come anywhere you two desire…"

22 October 1944:

FDR to Churchill

"I am delighted to learn of your success at Moscow in making progress toward a compromise solution of the Polish problem. When and if a solution I arrived at I should like to be consulted as to the advisability from this point of view of delaying its publication for about two weeks. You will understand. Everything is going well here at the present time. Your statement of the present attitude of Uncle J. towards war criminals, the future of Germany, and the Montreux Convention is most interesting. We should discuss these matters, together with our Pacific war effort, at the forthcoming three-party meeting."

2 December 1944 Stalin to Churchill "There is every evidence that de Gaulle and his French friends having arrived in the Soviet Union will raise two questions: 1. The conclusion of a French-Soviet Pact of Mutual Assistance similar to the Anglo-Soviet Pact. We can hardly object. But I should like to know your view on this subject. Please give your advice. 2. De Gaulle will probably raise the question of changing Frances eastern frontier and extending the French frontier to the left bank of the Rhine. It is also common knowledge that there is a scheme for forming a Rhenish-Westphalian province under international control. Possibly French participation in this control is also contemplated. Thus the proposal of the French to transfer the boundary line to the Rhine will compete with the scheme for creating a Rhine province under international control. Please give your advice on this question also. I have sent a similar message to the President." 3 December 1944 Stalin to Churchill "The meeting with de Gaulle has provided an opportunity for a friendly exchange on views on Franco-Soviet relations. During the conversations General de Gaulle persisted, as I had expected, with two main questions: the frontier of France on the Rhine and the conclusion of a Franco-Soviet Pact of Mutual Assistance of the type of the Anglo-Soviet Treaty. As regards the frontier of France on the Rhine, I expressed myself to the effect that it was impossible to decide this question without the knowledge and agreement of our chief Allies, whose armies are waging a battle of liberation against the enemy on the territory of France. I emphasized the complexity of a solution to this question. With regard to the proposal of a Franco-Soviet Pact of Mutual Assistance, I pointed out the necessity of this question from all side and the necessity for clarification of the juridical aspect of such a pact, in particular of the question who would ratify such a pact in France in the present conditions. Consequently the French still have to furnish a number of explanations, which we have up to now not received from them. In sending you this information I shall be grateful for a reply from you and your comments on these questions. I have conveyed the same message to the President. I send my best wishes."

3 December 1944:

Churchill to Smuts

"…In spite of Metz and Strasbourg and other successes, we have of course sustained a strategic reverse on the Western Front. Before this offensive was launched we placed on record our view that it was a mistake to attack against the whole front and that a far greater mass should have been gathered at the point of desired penetration. Montgomery’s comments and predictions beforehand have in every way been borne out. I imagine some readjustments will be made giving back to Montgomery some of the scope taken from him after the victory he gained in Normandy. You must remember however that our Armies are only about one-half the size of the American and will soon be little more than one-third. All is friendly and loyal in the military sphere in spite of the disappointment sustained. We must now regroup and reinforce the Armies for a spring offensive. There is at least one full-scale battle to fight before we get to the Rhine in the north, which is the decisive axis of advance. I am trying meanwhile to have Holland cleaned up behind us. But it is not so easy as it used to be for me to get things done. 3. Our armies in Italy were delayed by ‘Anvil’ and greatly weakened for its sake. Consequently we cleared the Apennines only to find the valley of the Po a bog. Thus both in the mountains and on the plains our immense armor superiority has been unable to make itself felt, and now the bad weather in Italy, as on the Western Front, greatly diminishes the tactical air-power in which we have so great a preponderance. Hitherto in Italy we have held twenty-eight German divisions, and therefore no reproach can be made against our activities. On the contrary, General Marshall is astonished we have done so well. This is only however because the Germans delayed a withdrawal through the Brenner and Ljubljana, presumably in order to bring their forces home from the Balkans. We cannot look for any very satisfactory events in Northern Italy at present, though we are still attacking…"

4 December 1944:

From a memorandum signed by Doenitz and distributed to Hitler, Jodl, Speer, and the Supreme Command of the Air Force: "Furthermore, I propose reinforcing the shipyard working parties by prisoners from the concentration camps, and as a special measure for relieving the present shortage of coppersmiths, especially in U-boat construction, I propose to divert coppersmiths from the reduced construction of locomotives to shipbuilding...Since, elsewhere, measures for exacting atonement taken against whole working parties amongst whom sabotage occurred, have proved successful, and, for example, the shipyard sabotage in France was completely suppressed, possibly similar measures for the Scandinavian countries will come under consideration."

5 December 1944:

Churchill to General Scobie (Athens)

"I have given instructions to General Wilson to make sure that all forces are left with you and all possible reinforcements are sent to you. 2. You are responsible for maintaining order in Athens and for neutralizing or destroying all E.A.M.-E.L.A.S. bands approaching the city. You may make any regulations you like for strict control of the streets or for the rounding up of any number of truculent persons. Naturally E.L.A.S. will try to put women and children in the van where shooting may occur. You must be clever about this and avoid mistakes. But do not hesitate to fire at any armed male in Athens who assails the British authority of some Greek Government, and Papandreou is being told be Lepper to stop and help. Do not however hesitate to act as if you were in a conquered city where a local rebellion is in progress. 3. With regard to E.L.A.S. approaching from the outside, you should surely be able with your armor to give some of these a lesson which will make others unlikely to try. You may count upon my support in all reasonable and sensible action taken on this basis. We have to hold and dominate Athens. It would be a great thing for you to succeed in this without bloodshed if possible, but also bloodshed if necessary."

5 December 1944:

Churchill to Ambassador Leeper (Athens)

"This is no time to dabble in Greek politics or to imagine that Greek politicians of varying shades can affect the situation. You should not worry about Greek Government compositions. The matter is one of life or death. 2. You must urge Papandreou to stand to his duty, and assure him that he will be supported by all of our forces if he does so. The day has long since passed when any particular group of Greek politicians can influence this mob rising. His only chance is to come through with us. 3. I have put the whole question of the defense of Athens and the maintenance of law and order in the hands of General Scobie, and have assured him that he will be supported in the use of whatever force is necessary. Henceforth you and Papandreou will conform to his directions in all matters affecting public order and security. You should both support Scobie in every possible way, and you should suggest to him any means that occur to you of making his action more vigorous and decisive."

5 December 1944:

Stettinius’s US State Department Press Release

"The Department of State has received a number of inquires from correspondents in regard to the position of this Government concerning the recent cabinet crisis in Italy. The position of this Government has been consistently that the composition of the Italian Government is purely an Italian affair except in the case of appointments where important military factors are concerned. This Government has not in any way intimated to the Italian Government that there would be any opposition on its part to Count Sforza. Since Italy is an area of combined responsibility, we have affirmed to both the British and Italian Governments that we expect the Italians to work out their problems of government along democratic lines without influence from outside. This policy would apply to an even more pronounced degree with regard to governments of the United Nations in their liberated territories."

5 December 1944:

Churchill to Stalin

"Your telegram about de Gaulle’s visit and the two questions he will raise. We have no objection whatever to a Franco-Soviet Pact of Mutual Assistance similar to the Anglo-Soviet Pact. On the contrary, His Majesty’s Government consider it desirable and an additional link between us all. Indeed, it also occurs to us that it might be best of all if we were to conclude a tripartite treaty between the three of us which would embody our existing Anglo-Soviet Treaty, with any improvements. In this way the obligations of each one of us would be identical and linked together. Please let me know if this idea appeals to you, as I hope it may. 2. The question of changing the eastern frontier of France to the left bank of the Rhine, or alternatively of forming a Rhenish-Westphalian province under international control, together with other alternatives, ought to await settlement at the peace table. There is however no reason why when three heads of governments meet we should not come much closer to conclusions about all this than we have done so far. As you have seen, the President does not expect de Gaulle to come to the meeting of the three. I would hope that this could be modified to his coming in later on, when decisions especially affecting France were under discussion…I am keeping the President informed."

6 December 1944:

Churchill to FDR

"As we are unable to meet, I feel that the time has come for me to place before you the serious and disappointing war situation which faces us at the close of this year. Although many fine tactical victories have been gained on the Western Front and Metz and Strasbourg are trophies, the fact remains that we have definitely failed to achieve the strategic object which we gave to our armies five weeks ago. We have not yet reached the Rhine in the northern part and the most important sector of the front, and we shall have to continue the great battle for many weeks before we can hope to reach the Rhine and establish our bridgeheads. After that, again we advance through Germany. 2. In Italy the Germans are still keeping twenty-six divisions - equivalent to perhaps sixteen full strength or more - on our front. They could however at any time retreat…We have secured weighty advantages from ‘Dragoon’ (the landing in Southern France) for the battle on the main front…On account of the obstinacy of the German resistance on all fronts, we did not withdraw the five British and British-Indian divisions from Europe in order to enable Mountbatten to attack Rangoon in March…The vast-scale operations which you have conducted in the Pacific are at present the only part of the war where we are not in a temporary state of frustration. 6. We have however, happily, to consider what the Russians will do. We have Stalin’s promise of a winter campaign, starting, I presume, in January. On most of his immense front he seems to have been resting and preparing, though only about three or four German divisions have come over to face Eisenhower…I have tried to survey the whole scene in its scope and proportion, and it is clear that we have to face, in varying degrees of probability: (a) A considerable delay in reaching, still more in forcing, the Rhine on the shortest road to Berlin. (b) A marked degree of frustration in Italy. (c) The escape home of a large part of the German forces in the Balkan Peninsula. (d) Frustration in Burma. (e) Elimination of China as a combatant. When we contrast these realities with the rosy expectations of our peoples, in spite of our joint efforts to damp them down, the question very definitely arises, ‘What are we going to do about it?’…"

6 December 1944:

FDR to Stalin

"…In regard to a proposed Franco-Soviet Pact along the lines of the Anglo-Soviet Pact of Mutual Assistance, this government would have no objection in principle if you and General de Gaulle considered such a pact in the interests of both of your countries and European security in general. I am in complete agreement with your replies to General de Gaulle with regard to the post-war frontier of France. It appears to me at the present time that no advantage to our common war effort would result from an attempt to settle this question now and that its settlement subsequent to the collapse of Germany is preferable."

6 December 1944:

FDR to Churchill

"You will have seen from my reply to Stalin on his talks with de Gaulle that our views are identical on the two questions which he raised. I still adhere to my position that any attempt to include de Gaulle in the meeting of the three of us would merely introduce a complicating and undesirable factor…I fully appreciate the advantages which you see in a possible tripartite Anglo-Franco-Soviet Pact. I am somewhat dubious, however, as to the effect of such an arrangement on the question of an International Security Organization, to which, as you know, I attach the very highest importance. I fear that a tripartite pact might be interpreted by public opinion here as a competitor to a future World Organization, whereas a bilateral arrangement between France and the Soviet Union similar to the Soviet-British Pact would be more understandable. I realize however that this is a subject which is of primary concern to the three countries involved."

7 December 1944:

Stalin to Churchill

"I have received your reply to my message about a Franco-Soviet Pact and about the frontier of France on the Rhine. I thank you for your advice. At the time of receiving your reply we had already begun discussions with the French about the pact. Your proposal in preference for a tripartite Anglo-Franco-Soviet Pact as an improvement in comparison with the Anglo-Soviet Pact has been approved by myself and my colleagues. We have made a proposal to de Gaulle for the inclusion of such a tripartite pact, but we have not yet had his reply. I have delayed my reply to your other messages. I hope to reply soon."

8 December 1944:

General Scobie (Athens) to Churchill

"Increased activities on the part of the rebels and widespread sniping limited progress during the fighting, which continued throughout yesterday. By midday the total of rebel prisoners under military guard was 35 officers, 524 other ranks. These figures do not include those held by the police, as it is difficult to obtain accurate figures for them…In face of strong opposition our troops were forced to withdraw in one area. In the area being cleared by the Greek Mountain Brigade an attack was made by the rebels from the flank. The attack was held, but delayed progress of the brigade."

8 December 1944:

Churchill to General Scobie (Athens)

"There is much talk in the Press tonight of a peace offer by E.L.A.S. Naturally we should be glad to have this matter settled, but you should make quite sure, so far as your influence goes, that we do not give away for the sake of kindness what has been won by our troops. It would seem to me that anything less satisfactory than the terms agreed upon before the revolt took place should not be accepted. Also it is difficult to see how E.A.M. leaders, with their hands wet with Greek and British blood, should resume their places in the cabinet. This however might be got over. The great thing is to proceed with caution and to consult us about the terms when they are made. The clear objective is the defeat of E.A.M. The ending of the fighting is subsidiary to this. I am ordering large reinforcements to come to Athens, and Field-Marshal Alexander will probably be with you in a few days. Firmness and sobriety are what are needed now, and not eager embraces, while the real quarrel is unsettled. Keep us informed before any compromise is settled in which you or Lepper are concerned."

9 December 1944:

Churchill to General Wilson (Italy)

"You should send further reinforcement to Athens without the slightest delay. The prolongation of the fight has many dangers. I warned you of the paramount importance of this conflict. At least two more brigades should hurry to the scene. 2. In addition to the above, why does not the Navy help all the time instead of only landing a small number in a crisis? You guaranteed most strongly that you had already sent enough soldiers."

9 December 1944:

Churchill to Hopkins

"…I was very much upset by the last sentence of the Stettinius Press release (December 5), which seemed to reflect on the whole of our foreign policy in Belgium, where we acted under your orders, and in Greece, where our action was fully approved at Quebec. Naturally, the prolongation and severity of the fighting in Athens with E.L.A.S. causes me anxiety…I hope you will tell our great friend that the establishment of law and order in and around Athens is essential to all future measures of magnanimity and consolation towards Greece. After this is established will be the time for talking. My guiding principle is ‘No peace without victory.’ It is a great disappointment to me to have been set upon in this way by E.L.A.S. when we came loaded with good gifts and anxious only to form a united Greece which could establish its own destiny. But we have been set upon, and we intend to defend ourselves. I consider we have a right to the President’s support for the policy we are following. If it can be said in the streets of Athens that the United States are against us, then more British blood will be shed and much more Greek. It grieves me very much to see signs of our drifting apart at a time when unity becomes ever more important, as danger recedes and faction arises…"

10 December 1944:

General Scobie to Churchill

"We should at once inform you should any peace offer be made by E.L.A.S., but neither the Ambassador nor I know of any such approach. I have clearly before me the objective you mention. While any one party is able to back its views with a private army Greece can never achieve peace and stability. Fighting may, I hope, be restricted to Athens-Piraeus, but I am ready to see it through in the rest of the countries if necessary. It is a pity that tear gas may not be used. It would be of great help in this city fighting. Your assurance that large reinforcements are being sent is most welcome…"

10 December 1944:

Stalin to Churchill

"I communicated to General de Gaulle your opinion about your preference for an Anglo-Franco-Soviet Pact of Mutual Assistance, and spoke in favor of accepting your proposal. However, General de Gaulle insisted on concluding a Franco-Soviet Pact, saying that a three party pact should be concluded at the next stage, as that question demanded preparation. At the same time a message came from the President, who informed me that he had no objection to a Franco-Soviet Pact. In the result we reached agreement about concluding a pact and it was signed today…"

10 December 1944:

FDR to Churchill

"…Perhaps I am not close enough to the picture to feel as disappointed about the war situation as you are, and perhaps also because six months ago I was not as optimistic as you were on the time element. On the European Front I always felt that the occupation of Germany up to the Rhine would be a very stiff job. Because in the old days I bicycled over most of the Rhine terrain, I have never been optimistic as to the ease of getting across the Rhine with our joint armies as many of the commanding officers have been. However, our agreed broad strategy is developing according to plan. You and I are now in the position of Commanders-in-Chief who have prepared their plans, issued their orders, and committed their resources to battle according to those plans and orders. For the time being, even if a little behind schedule, it seems to me the prosecution and outcome of the battles lie with our field commanders, in whom we have every confidence. We must remember that the winter season is bringing great difficulties, but our ground and air forces are day by day chewing up the enemy’s dwindling manpower and resources, and our supply flow is much improved with the opening of Antwerp. General Eisenhower estimates that on the Western front line he is inflicting losses in excess of the enemy’s capability to form new moments. I still cannot see clearly just when, but soon a decisive break in our favor is bound to come. As to the Italian front, Alexander’s forces are doing their bit in keeping those German divisions in Italy, and we must remember that the Germans are really free to withdraw to the line of the Alps if they so decide. The same thing applies to their troops in the Balkans. I have never believed that we had the power to capture any large German forces in the Balkans without assistance by the Russians. On the Russian front we also give full allowance for the vile weather, and the Russians seem to be doing their bit at the present time. This of course you know more about than I do. The Far Eastern situation is of course on a somewhat different footing, and I am not at all happy about it…"

13 December 1944:

FDR to Churchill

"I have been as deeply concerned as you have yourself in regard to the tragic difficulties you have encountered in Greece. I appreciate to the full the anxious and difficult alternatives with which you are faced. I regard my role in this matter as that of a loyal friend and ally whose one desire is to be of any help possible in the circumstances. You may be sure that in putting my thoughts before you I am constantly guided by the fact that nothing can in any way shake the unity and association between our two countries in the great tasks to which we have set our hands. As anxious as I am to be of the greatest help to you in this trying situation, there are limitations, imposed in part by traditional policies of the United States and in part by the mounting adverse reaction of public opinion in this country. No one will understand better than yourself that I, both personally and as Head of State, am necessarily responsive to public feeling. It is for these reasons that it has not been possible for this Government to take a stand along with you in the present course of events in Greece. Even an attempt to do so would bring only temporary value to you, and would in the long run do injury to our basic relationships. I don’t need to tell you how much I dislike this state of affairs between you and me. My hope is to see it rectified so that we can go along, in this as in everything, shoulder to shoulder. I know that you, as the one on whom the responsibility rests, desire with all your heart a satisfactory solution to the Greek problem, and particularly one that will bring peace to that ravaged country. I will be with you whole-heartedly in any solution which takes into consideration the factors I have mentioned above…"

13 December 1944:

From a secret report of the German Chief of Police in Belgium: "The increasing incitement of the population, by enemy radio and enemy press, to acts of terrorism and sabotage the passive attitude of the population, particularly that of the Belgian administration, the complete failure of the public prosecutors, the examining judges, and of the police to disclose and prevent terrorist acts, have finally led to preventive and repressive measures of the most rigorous kind, that is to say, to the execution of persons closely related to the culprits. Already on 19 October 1941, on the occasion of the murder of two police officials in Tournai, the Military Commander-in-Chief declared through an announcement appearing in the press that all the political prisoners in Belgium would be considered as hostages with immediate effect. In the provinces of the north of France, subject to the jurisdiction of the same Military Commander-in-Chief, this ordinance was already in force as from 26 August 1941. Through repeated notices appearing in the press the civilian population has been informed that political prisoners taken as hostages will be executed if the murders continue to be committed. As a result of the assassination of Teughels, Rexist major of Charleroi, and other attempts at assassination of public officials, the Military Commander-in-Chief has been obliged to order, for the first time in Belgium, the execution of eight terrorists. The date of the execution is 27 November 1942."

14 December 1944: Churchill to FDR

"I will send you over the week-end a considered answer to your telegram, for the kindly tone of which I thank you. I hope that the British reinforcements now coming steadily into Attica may make a more healthy situation in Athens. You will realize how very serious it would be if we withdrew, as we easily could, and the result was a frightful massacre, and an extreme Left Wing regime under Communist inspiration installed itself, as it would, in Athens. My Cabinet colleagues here of all parties are not prepared to act in a manner so dishonorable to our record and name. Ernest Bevin’s speech to the Labour conference won universal respect. Stern fighting lies ahead, and even danger to our troops in Athens. The fact that you are supposed to be against us, in accordance with the last sentence of Stettinius’s Press release (5 December), has added, as I feared, to our difficulties and burdens. I think it probable that I shall broadcast to the world on Sunday night and make manifest the purity and disinterestedness of our motives throughout, and also our resolves…"

14 December 1944: Smuts to Churchill

"I am very distressed at the anxiety and trouble which the situation in Greece is causing you and the Cabinet…We may, I fear, find, if private Partisan armies and underground movements are kept alive, the peace degenerating in civil convulsions and anarchy not only in Greece but elsewhere also in Europe…"

15 December 1944: Churchill to Canadian Prime Minister King

"…To my mind the essential point is that, having obtained the written assent of all parties, including the E.A.M., the Greek Prime Minister invited British troops to enter Greece to keep order and safeguard supplies. We accepted this invitation, and must still do our best to carry it out. The task is ungrateful, but we could not in honor shirk our responsibilities. With tempers inflamed on both sides of Athens, the situation is inevitably difficult…"

16 December 1944:

Hopkins to Churchill: "Public opinion here is deteriorating rapidly because of the Greek situation and your statements in Parliament about the United States and Poland. With the battle joined as it is in Europe and Asia, with every energy required on everyone’s part to defeat the enemy, I confess I find myself greatly disturbed at the diplomatic turn of events, which throw into the public gaze our severe difficulties. I do not what the President or Stettinius may have to say publicly, but it may well be that one or both of them must state in unequivocal terms our determination to do all that we can to seek a free and secure world."

17 December 1944:

From a report related to the murder of 129 American prisoners of war which was perpetrated by the German Army in a field in the southwest, and west of Baignes in Belgium: "...the artillery and machine gun fire on the column of American vehicles continued for about 10 to 15 minutes, and then two German tanks and some armored cars came down the road from the direction of Weismes. Upon reaching the intersection, these vehicles turned south on the road toward St. Vith. The tanks directed machine gun fire into the ditch along the side of the road in which the American soldiers were crouching; and upon seeing this, the other American soldiers dropped their weapons and raised their hands over their heads. The surrendered American soldiers were then made to march back to the crossroad, and as they passed by some of the German vehicles on highway N-23, German soldiers on these vehicles took from the American prisoners of war such personal belongings as wrist watches, rings, and gloves. The American soldiers were then assembled on the St. Vith road in front of a house standing on the southwest corner of the crossroad. Other German soldiers, in tanks and armored cars, halted at the crossroad and also searched some of the captured Americans and took valuables from them ......

. . . an American prisoner was questioned and taken with his other comrades to the crossroads just referred to. . . . at about this same time a German light tank attempted to maneuver itself into position on the road so that its cannon would be directed at the group of American prisoners gathered in the field approximately 20 to 25 yards from the road…some of these tanks stopped when they came opposite the field in which the unarmed American prisoners were standing in a group, with their hands up or clasped behind their heads. A German soldier, either an officer or a noncommissioned officer, in one of these vehicles which had stopped, got up, drew his revolver, took deliberate aim and fired into the group of American prisoners. One of the American soldiers fell. This was repeated a second time and another American soldier in the group fell to the ground. At about the same time, from two of the vehicles on the road, fire was opened on the group of American prisoners in the field. All, or most, of the American soldiers dropped to the ground and stayed there while the firing continued, for 2 or 3 minutes. Most of the soldiers in the field were hit by this machine gun fire. The German vehicles then moved off toward the south and were followed by more vehicles which also came from the direction of Weismes. As these latter vehicles came opposite the field in which the American soldiers were lying, they also fired with small arms from the moving vehicles at the prostrate bodies in the field…some German soldiers, evidently from the group of those who were on guard at the crossroad, then walked to the group of the wounded American prisoners who were still lying on the ground in the field ... and shot with pistol or rifle, or clubbed with a rifle butt or other heavy object, any of the American soldiers who still showed any sign of life. In some instances, American prisoners were evidently shot at close range, squarely between the eyes, in the temple, or the back of the head ......"

17 December 1944:

Churchill to Hopkins: "I am distressed and puzzled by your message. I hope you will not hesitate to telegraph me on any points which you think we, or I personally, have been in error, and what you would advise, because I have great trust in your judgement and friendship, even if I may at times look at matters from a different angle. All the President’s telegrams to me have been most kind and encouraging, and also his telegram to U.J. may do a world of good. 2. Naturally I should welcome any public statements in American which set forth the aims stated in your last sentence. These are also ours. We seek nothing for ourselves from this struggle."

17 December 1944:

Churchill to FDR: "…Our immediate task is to secure control of Athens and the Piraeus. According to the latest reports, E.L.A.S. may agree to depart. This will give us a firm basis from which to negotiate the best settlement possible between the warring Greek factions. It will certainly have to provide for the disarming of the guerrilla forces. The disarmament of the Greek Mountain Brigade, who took Rimini, and the Sacred Squadron, who fought so well at the side of British and American troops, would seriously weaken our forces, and in any case we could not abandon them to massacre. They may be removed elsewhere as part of a general settlement. 5. I am sure you would not wish us to cast down our painful and thankless task at this time. We desire nothing from Greece but to do our duty by the common cause. In the midst of our task of bringing food and relief and maintaining the rudiments of order for a Government which has no armed forces we have become involved in a furious, though not as yet very bloody, struggle. I have felt it much that you were unable to give a word of explanation for our action, but I understand your difficulties…"

19 December 1944:

Churchill to Alexander (Italy)

"The Cabinet feel it better to let the military operations to clear Athens and Attica run for a while rather than embark all our fortunes on the character of the Archbishop. Have you looked up his full record? It is a hard thing to ask me to throw over a constitutional King acting on the true advise of his Ministers, apart from British pressure, in order to install a dictator who may very likely become a champion of the extreme Left. We are waiting here till the scene clears a little more, after which we shall give all necessary directions."

19 December 1944:

Churchill to Stalin

"I saw last night for the second time the film which you have given me called Kutuzov…this is one of the most masterly film productions I have ever witnessed…Never has the importance of fidelity in commanders and men been more effectively inculcated by the film pictures. Never have the Russian soldiers and the Russian Nation been presented by this medium so gloriously to the British Nation…I like to think we were together in that deadly struggle, as in this Thirty Years War. I do not suppose you showed the film to de Gaulle, any more than I shall show him Lady Hamilton when he comes over here to make a similar treaty to that which you have made with him, and we have made together. Salutations."

21 December 1944:

Alexander to Churchill

"In answer to your signal of December 19, I am most concerned that you should not know exactly what the true situation is and what we can do and cannot do. This is my duty. You would know the strength of British forces in Greece, and what additions I can send from Italian front if forced by circumstances to do so. Assuming that E.L.A.S. continue to fight, I estimate that it will be possible to clear the Athens-Piraeus are and thereafter to hold it securely, but this will not defeat E.L.A.S. and force them to surrender. We are not strong enough to go beyond this and undertake operations on the Greek mainland. During the German occupation they maintained between six and seven divisions on the mainland, in addition to the equivalent of four on the Greek islands. Even so they were unable to keep their communication open all the time, and I doubt if we will meet less strength and determination than they encountered. The German intentions on the Italian Front require careful watching. Recent events in the West and the disappearance and silence of 16th S.S. Division opposite Fifth U.S. Army indicates surprise move we must guard against. I mention these factors to make the military situation clear to you, and to emphasize that it is my opinion that the Greek problem cannot be solved by military measures. The answer must be found in the political field…as I am convinced that further military action after we have cleared the Athens-Piraeus area is beyond our present strength."

22 December 1944:

Churchill to Alexander

"There is no question of us embarking in any military operations away from the Athens-Piraeus area. We must however have a military foundation there on which a Greek Government of some kind or other can function…Thereafter we do not intend to stay in Greece except for such reasonable period as may be necessary to let the new government, whatever it is, gain for itself a National Army or Militia, in the hope that we may be able to conduct elections, plebiscites, etc. We can achieve no political solution while negotiating from a position of weakness and frustration. The political field in the present circumstances can only be entered by the gates of success…"

22 December 1944:

Churchill to Smuts

"Montgomery and also we here in England have, as you are aware, pressed for several months for the emphasis of the advance to the north of the Ruhr, and have on repeated occasions urged that our strength did not enable us to undertake two major offensives such as the one against Cologne and that across the Saar. In spite of appalling weather conditions our friends, however, pushed on confidently, and were very much spread from north to south when the enemy began his counter-stroke. I spoke to Eisenhower on the telephone during the afternoon of the 20th and suggested that he give to Montgomery the whole command north of the breakthrough, and to Omar Bradley everything south of the breakthrough, keeping control himself of the concerted operation. He replied that he had issued orders exactly on these lines in the morning. Montgomery now has under his command eighteen American divisions plus his Twenty-First Army Group comprising about sixteen divisions. He is forming substantial reserves and is assuming entire charge of the battle in the area of his command. He should be able to intervene heavily. There is nothing so far to suggest that the Germans have the power to mount a full-scale offensive against the Twenty-First Army Group’s main front. 2. Matters are not by any means so clear south of the gap. The Americans are putting up stubborn resistance but there is a good deal of disorganization. Naturally an army has been gathered from the Metz region to march north under Patton. The position of the enemy does not strike me as good. As usual I am optimistic; the tortoise has thrust his head out very far."

26 December 1944:

Churchill to FDR

"Anthony and I are going to see what we can do to square the Greek entanglement. Basis of action: the King does not go back until a plebiscite in his favor has been taken. For the rest, we cannot abandon those who have taken up arms in our cause, and must if necessary fight it out with them. It must always be understood that we seek nothing from Greece, in territory or advantages. We have given much, and will give more if it is in our power. I count on you to help us in this time of unusual difficulty. In particular I should like you to tell your Ambassador in Athens to make contact with us and to help all he can in accordance with the above principles."

27 December 1944:

FDR to Churchill

"I have asked our Ambassador to call upon you as soon as possible, and I am ready to be of all assistance I can in this difficult situation. I hope that your presence there on the spot will result in achieving an entirely satisfactory solution."

27 December 1944:

Stalin to FDR

"…radio communications with Mikolajczyk’s Government intercepted by us from terrorists arrested in Poland - underground agents of the Polish émigré Government (London Poles) - with all palpability prove that the negotiations of M. Mikolajczyk with the Polish National Committee served as a screen for those elements who conducted from behind Mikolajczyk’s back criminal terrorist work against Soviet officers and soldiers on the territory of Poland…It seems to me that now we should be interested in the support of the Polish National Committee and all those who want or are capable to work together with it, and that is especially important for the Allies and for the solution of our common task - the speeding of the defeat of Hitlerite Germany. For the Soviet Union, which is bearing the whole burden for the liberation of Poland from German occupationists, the question of relations with Poland under present conditions is the task of daily close and friendly relations with a power which has been established by the Polish people on its own soil and which has already grown strong and has its own army, which, together with the Red Army, is fighting against the Germans…Poland is a border State with the Soviet Union and the problem of Poland is inseparable from the problem of security for the Soviet Union. To this I have to add that the successes of the Red Army in Poland in the fight against the Germans are to a great degree dependant on the presence of a peaceful and trustworthy rear in Poland. And the Polish National Committee fully takes into account this circumstance, while the émigré Government and its underground agents by their terrorist actions are creating a threat of civil war in the rear of the Red Army and counteract the successes of the latter…I think that we cannot allow the Polish people to say that we are sacrificing the interests of Poland in favor of the interests of a handful of Polish emigrants in London." 28 December 1944 Churchill (Athens) to General Ismay "It is clear to me that great evils will follow here in Athens, affecting our position all over the world, if we cannot clear up situation quickly - i.e. in two or three weeks. This would entail, according to Alexander, the moving in of the two brigades of the 46th division, which are already under orders and standing by. On the other hand, the military situation in Western Apennines is such that any serious weakening of the reserves of Fifteenth Army Group might be attended with danger. 2. In these circumstances I wish you to consider and be ready to discuss with me on my return allowing the leading brigade of 5th division to proceed from Palestine to Italy on schedule arranged before 4th Division was diverted to Greece…This of course would mean that no violent action could be taken in Palestine, irritating the Jews, such as search for arms on a large scale, until the situation is easier all round."

28 December 1944:

Churchill to FDR

"Many thanks for your message, which encouraged me amidst many difficulties…I have seen the Archbishop several times, and he made a very good impression on me by the sense of power and decision which he conveyed, as well as by his shrewd political judgements…I do not consider the Archbishop is at all Left Wing in Communist sense. On the contrary, he seems to be an extremely determined man, bent on establishing a small, strong executive in Greece to prevent the continuance of civil war…Mr. President, we have lost over one thousand men, and though the greater part of Athens is now clear it is a painful sight to see this city with street-fighting raging now here, now there, and the poor people all pinched and only kept alive in many cases by rations we are carrying, often at loss of life, to them at various depots. Anything that you can say to strengthen tjis new lay-out as the time comes will be most valuable, and may bring about acceptance by E.L.A.S. of the terms of truce set forth by General Scobie. For the rest we are reinforcing as is necessary and military conflict will go on. The vast majority of the people long for a settlement that will free them from the Communist terror…"

29 December 1944

Churchill to FDR:

"Ambassador Winant has sent me a copy of your message to the Greek King. We are all very much obliged to you for acting so promptly…The War Cabinet have endorsed all our actions, and have authorized the King of Greece tonight to appoint the Archbishop as Regent…"

30 December 1944:

Smuts to Churchill and Eden

"…So that the world will see that Britain, as friend and ally, had no choice, a factual exposure should now be made of the bitter suffering inflicted on the Greek people, the dynamiting of property, the ruthless destruction and extortion, the rounding up and execution of innocent hostages, the coercion of the civilian population by terrorist methods in true Nazi style. Following immediately on your courageous mission, a full and accurate statement of facts may lead to a wholesome reversal of public opinion…"

30 December 1944:

FDR to Stalin

"I am disturbed and deeply disappointed over your message…in regard to Poland…I would have thought no serious inconvenience would have been caused your Government or your armies if you could have delayed the purely juridical act of recognition for the short period of a month remaining before we meet…I see no prospect of this Government’s following suit and transferring its recognition from the Government in London to the Lublin Committee in its present form…The fact is that neither the Government nor the people of the United States have as yet seen any evidence either arising from the manner of its creation or from subsequent developments to justify the conclusion that the Lublin Committee as at present constituted represents the people of Poland…I am more than ever convinced that when the three of us get together we can reach a solution of the Polish problem, and I therefore still hope that you can hold in abeyance until then the formal recognition of the Lublin Committee as a Government of Poland. I cannot from a military angle see any great objection to a delay of a month."

31 December 1944:

Churchill to FDR

"The Greek King behaved like a gentleman and with utmost dignity, and I am sure a private message from you would give him comfort. I shall send only a civil acknowledgment to E.L.A.S. for the published message they have sent me, and hand the matter over to the Archbishop. It is clearly his job now. The great battle in the West seems to be turning steadily in our favor, and I remain of the opinion that Rundstedt’s sortie is more likely to shorten than to lengthen the war."

31 December 1944:

Churchill to Eden

"You may feel inclined to see how the proposals which have come on the tapis meanwhile for a bilateral treaty between Britain and France shape themselves. You said to me that if de Gaulle attempted to say that there could be no Anglo-French Treaty until we had settled everything about Syria you would let him wait. It is for him to make the proposal, not us. Meantime, we are losing nothing from the point of view of security, because the French have practically no army and all the other nations concerned are prostate or still enslaved. We must be careful not to involve ourselves in liabilities which we cannot discharge and in engagements with others for which there is no corresponding return. I do not know what our financial situation will be after the war, but I am sure we shall not be able to maintain armed forced sufficient to protect all these helpless nations even if they make some show of recreating their armies. Anyhow, the first thing to do is to set up the World Organization, on which all depends."

1 January 1945:

Stalin to FDR: "I have received your message of December 30. I greatly regret that I have not been able to convince you of the correctness of the Soviet Governments attitude towards the Polish question. I nevertheless hope that events will convince you that the Polish National Committee has always rendered and will continue to render to the Allies, and in particular to the Red Army, considerable assistance in the struggle against Hitlerite Germany, whereas the émigré Government in London assists the Germans by creating disorganization in this struggle. I naturally fully comprehend your suggestion that the Soviet Governments recognition of the Provisional Government of Poland should be postponed for a month. There is however a circumstance here which makes it impossible for me to fulfil your wish. The position is that as early as December 27 the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR informed the Poles in reply to an inquiry on the subject that it proposed to recognize the Provisional Government of Poland as soon as the latter was formed. This circumstance makes it impossible for me to fulfil your wish. Permit me to send you my greetings for he New Year and to wish you health and success."

4 January 1945:

Stalin to Churchill: "…I much regret that I was unable to convince you of the correctness of the Soviet Governments attitude towards the Polish question. I nevertheless hope that future events will show you that our recognition of the Polish Government in Lublin is in the interests of the general Allied cause and will contribute to hasten the defeat of Germany…I am aware that the President has your consent to a meeting between the three of us at the end of the month or the beginning of February. I shall be glad to see you and the President…"

4 January 1945:

Churchill to Eden: "Treatment of Germany after the war. It is much too soon for us to decide these enormous questions. Obviously, when the German organized resistance has ceased the first stage will be one of severe military control. This may well last for many months, or perhaps for a year or two, if the German underground movement is active. 2. We have yet to settle the practical questions of the partition of Germany, the treatment of the Rhur and Saar industries, etc. These may be touched upon at our forthcoming meeting, but I doubt whether any final decision will be reached then. No one can foresee at the present moment what the state of Europe will be or what the relations of the Great Powers will be, or what the tempers of their peoples will be. I am sure that the hatreds which Germany has caused in so many countries will find their counterpart here. 3. I have been struck at every point where I have sounded opinion at the depth of the feeling that would be aroused by a policy of ‘putting poor Germany on her legs again.’ I am also well aware of the arguments about ‘not having a poisoned community in the heart of Europe’…I remember so well last time being shocked at the savage views of the House of Commons and of the constituencies, and being indignant with Poincare when he sent the French into the Ruhr. In a few years however the mood of Parliament and the public changed entirely. Thousands of millions of money were lent to Germany by the United States. I went along with the tolerant policy towards Germany up to the Locarno Treaty and during the rest of Mr. Baldwin’s Government on the grounds that Germany had no power to harm us. But thereafter a swift change occurred. The rise of Hitler began. And thereafter I once again found myself very much out of sympathy with the prevailing mood…"

5 January 1945:

Churchill to Stalin

"I thank for sending me your two messages to the President on the Polish question. Naturally I and my War Cabinet colleagues are distressed at the course events are taking. I am quite clear that much the best thing is for us three to meet together and talk all these matters over, not only as isolated problems but in relation to the whole world situation both of the war and the transition to peace. Meanwhile our attitude as you know it is unchanged."

6 January 1945:

Churchill to FDR

"C.I.G.S. and I have passed the last two days with Eisenhower and Montgomery, and they both feel the battle very heavy, but are confident of success. I hope you understand that, in case any trouble should arise in the Press, His Majesty’s Government have complete confidence in General Eisenhower and feel acutely any attacks made on him. 2. He and Montgomery are very closely nit, and also Bradley and Patton, and it would be disaster which broke up this combination, which has in 1944 yielded us results beyond the dreams of military avarice. Montgomery said to me today that the break-through would have been most serious to the whole front but for the solidity of the Anglo-American Army. 3. Although I regret our divisions only amount to seventeen and two-thirds, all units are absolutely up to strength, and we have seven or eight thousand reinforcements all ready in addition in France awaiting transfer to their units. The measures we have taken to bring another 250,000 into or nearer the front line enable me to say with confidence that at least our present strength will be maintained throughout the impending severe campaign…5. I most cordially congratulate you on the extraordinary gallantry which your troops have shown in all this battle, particularly at Bastogne and two other places which Montgomery mentioned to me on his own front, one at the peak of the salient, where the 1st and 9th American Divisions fought on and won with extremely heavy losses, and the other in connection with the United States Armored Division, which seems to have performed the highest acts of soldierly devotion. Also many troops of the First Army have fought to the end, holding cross-roads in the area of incursion, which averted serious perils to the whole armies of the north at heavy personal sacrifice. 6. As I see there have been criticisms in the American papers of our troops having been kept out of the battle, I take this occasion to assure you that they stand absolutely ready at all times to obey General Eisenhower’s commands. I believe that the dispositions which he and Field-Marshal Montgomery under him have made are entirely in accordance with strict military requirements, both as regards the employment of troops in counter-attacks and their lateral movement, having regard to criss-cross communications. I have found not a trace of discord at the British and American headquarters; but, Mr. President, there is this brute fact: we need more fighting troops to make things move…"

6 January 1945:

Churchill to Stalin

"The battle in the west is very heavy and at any time large decisions may be called for from the Supreme Command. You know yourself from your own experience how very anxious the position is when a very broad front has to be defended after the temporary loss of initiative. It is Eisenhower’s great desire and need to know in outline what you plan to do, as this obviously effects both his and our major decisions…I shall be grateful if you can tell me whether we can count on a major Russian offensive on the Vistula front, or elsewhere during January, with any other points you may care to mention. I shall not pass this information to anyone except Field-Marshal Brooke and General Eisenhower, and only under conditions of utmost secrecy. I regard the matter as urgent."

7 January 1945:

Stalin to Churchill

"I received your message of January 6, 1945 on the evening of January 7…It is most important that we should be able to take advantage of our supremacy over the Germans in artillery and in the air. This demands clear flying weather and an absence of low mists, which hinder aimed artillery fire. We are preparing an offensive, but the weather is at present unfavorable. Nevertheless, taking into account the position of our Allies on the Western Front, G.H.Q. of the Supreme Command has decided to accelerate the completion of our preparation, and, regardless of the weather, to commence large-scale operations against the Germans along the whole central front not later than the second part of January. You may rest assured that we shall do everything possible to render assistance to the glorious forces of our Allies."

8 January 1945:

Churchill to FDR

"I am still thinking it of high importance that our military men should get together for a few days before we arrive at Yalta…there are a tremendous lot of questions which should be looked into beforehand and our agenda ought really to be considered. What are your ideas of the length of our stay at Yalta? This may well be a fateful Conference, coming at a moment when the Great Allies are so divided and the shadow of the war lengthens out before us. At the present time I think the end of this war may prove to be more disappointing than was the last." 9 January 1945 Churchill to Stalin "I am most grateful to you for your thrilling message. I have sent it over to General Eisenhower for his eyes only. May all good fortune rest upon your noble venture. 2. The battle in the West goes not to badly. There is a good chance of the Huns being crushed out of their salient with very heavy losses. It is predominantly an American battle, and their troops have fought splendidly, with heavy losses. We are both shoving everything in we can. The news you give me will be a great encouragement for General Eisenhower, because it gives him the assurance that the German reinforcements will have to be split between our flaming fronts. The battle in the West will be continuous, according to the generals responsible for fighting it."

10 January 1945:

Churchill to FDR: "…Eden has particularly asked me to suggest that Stettinius might come on forty-eight hours earlier to Malta with the United States Chiefs of Staff, so that he (Eden) can run over the agenda with him beforehand. Even though Molotov were not invited, I am sure this would be found very useful. I do not see any other way of realizing our hopes about a World Organization in five or six days. Even the Almighty took seven. Pray forgive my pertinacity…"

19-20 February 1945:

From notes of a conferences between the Doenitz and Hitler: "...The Fuehrer is considering whether or not Germany should renounce the Geneva Convention...The Fuehrer orders the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy to consider the pros and cons of this step and to state his opinion as soon as possible. Doenitz: "On the contrary, the disadvantages outweigh the advantages. Even from a general standpoint it appears to the Commander-in-Chief that this measure would bring no advantage. It would be better to carry out the measures considered necessary without warning, and at all costs to save face with the outer world.

13 January 1945:

From a radio speech by Fritzsche: "If Jewry provided a link between such divergent elements as plutocracy and Bolshevism and if Jewry was first able to work successfully in the democratic countries in preparing this war against Germany, it has by now placed itself unreservedly on the side of Bolshevism which, with its entirely mistaken slogans of racial freedom against racial hatred, has created the very conditions the Jewish race requires in its struggle for domination over other races...Not the last result of German resistance on all the fronts, so unexpected to the enemy, is the fruition of a development which began in the prewar years, that is, the process of subordinating British policy to far-reaching Jewish points of view. This development started long before this when Jewish emigrants from Germany commenced their warmongering against us from British and American soil...This whole attempt, aiming at the establishment of Jewish world domination, was obviously made at a time when the national-racial consciousness had been too far awakened to promise such an aim success."

8 February 1945:

Churchill (Yalta) to Atlee

"Today has been much better. All the American proposals for the Dumbarton Oaks constitution were accepted by the Russians, who stated that it was largely due to our explanation that they had found themselves in a position to embrace the scheme wholeheartedly. They also cut down their demand for sixteen membership votes of the Assembly to two...Our position appears to me to be somewhat different. For us to have four or five members, six if India is included, when Russia has only one is asking a great deal of an Assembly of this kind. In view of other important concessions by them which are achieved or pending I should like to be able to make a friendly gesture to Russia in this matter. That they should have two besides their chief is not to much to ask, and we shall be in a strong position, in my judgment, because we shall not be the only multiple voter in the field…In spite of our gloomy warning and forebodings Yalta has turned out very well so far…"

25 February 1945:

From an order by Gauleiter and National Defense Commissioner of Westfalen-Sud, Albert Hoffman: "Fighter-bomber pilots who are shot down are in principle not to be protected against the fury of the people. I expect from all police officers that they will refuse to lend their protection to these gangster types. Authorities acting in contradiction to the popular sentiment will have to account to me. All police and gendarmerie officials are to be informed immediately of this, my attitude."

8 March 1945:

Churchill to General Ismay

"…Late on Monday night General Bedell Smith volunteered to me at Reims the statement that he hoped that two divisions might be available to clear Holland immediately after the passage of the Rhine. I understand he contemplated American divisions. I am of the opinion that a military plan should now be concerted to prevent the horrors which will befall the Dutch, and incidentally to extirpate the rocket-firing points in Holland at the earliest moment. I consider that if it were inevitable, which I doubt, a certain delay might be accepted in the main advance on Berlin. I am prepared to telegraph to the President on these lines, but I should like first of all to hear your views…If it is true that the German forces in Holland are now almost entirely static and that all the effective fighting units have left, there is no need to dwell upon the military task and overweight it."

9 March 1945:

Churchill to Eisenhower

"Let me offer you my warmest congratulations on the great victory won by the Allied armies under your command, by which the defeat or destruction of all the Germans west of the Rhine will be achieved. No one who studies war can fail to be impressed by the admirable speed and flexibility of the American armies and groups of armies, and the adaptiveness of commanders and their troops to the swiftly changing conditions of modern battles on the greatest scale. I am glad that the British and Canadian armies in the north have played a part in your far-reaching and triumphant combinations."

10 March 1945:

Churchill to FDR

"The Lublin Poles may well answer that their Government can alone ensure ‘the maximum amount of political tranquility inside,’ that they already represent the great mass of ‘democratic forces in Poland,’ and that they cannot join hands with émigré traitors to Poland or Fascist collaborators and landlords, and so on, according to the usual technique. Meanwhile we shall not be allowed inside the country or have any means of informing ourselves upon the position. It suits the Soviets very well to have a long period of delay, so that the process of liquidation of elements unfavorable to them or their puppets may run its full course…"

13 March 1945:

Churchill to FDR

"At Yalta also we agreed to take the Russian view of the frontier line. Poland lost her frontier. Is she now to lose her freedom? That is the question which will undoubtedly have to be fought out in Parliament and in public here. I do not wish to reveal a divergence between the British and United States Governments, but it would certainly be necessary for me to make it clear that we are in the presence of a great failure and an utter breakdown of what we settled at Yalta, but that we British have not the necessary strength to carry the matter further and that the limits of our capacity to act have been reached. The moment that Molotov sees that he has beaten us away from the whole process of consultations among Poles to form a new Government, he will know that we will put up with anything. On the other hand, I believe that combined dogged pressure and persistence along the lines on which we have been working and of my proposed draft message to Stalin would very likely succeed."

16 March 1945:

FDR to Churchill

"I cannot but be concerned at the views you expressed in your message of the 13th. I do not understand what you mean by a divergence between our Governments on the Polish negotiations. From our side there is certainly no evidence of any divergence of policy. We have merely been discussing the most effective tactics and I cannot agree that we are confronted with a breakdown of the Yalta agreement until we have made every effort to overcome the obstacles incurred in the negotiations at Moscow…"

16 March 1945:

Churchill to FDR

"I am most relieved that you do not feel that there is any fundamental divergence between us, and I agree that our differences are only about tactics. You know, I am sure, that our great desire is to keep in step with you, and we realize how hopeless the position would become for Poland if it were ever seen that we were not in full accord…At present all entry into Poland is barred to our representatives. An impenetrable veil has been drawn across the scene. This extends even to the liaison officers, British and American, who were to help in bringing out our rescued prisoners of war. According to our information, the American officers as well as the British who had reached Lublin have been requested to clear out. There is no doubt in my mind that the Soviets fear very much our seeing what is going on in Poland. It may be that, apart from the Poles, they are being very rough with the Germans. Whatever the reason, we are not allowed to see it. This is not a position that could be defended by us."

17 March 1945:

Churchill to General Ismay: "I should like the Intelligence Committee to consider the possibility that Hitler, after losing Berlin and Northern Germany, will retire to the mountainous and wooded parts of Southern Germany and endeavor to prolong the fight there. The strange resistance he made at Budapest and is now making at Lake Balaton, and the retention of Kesselring’s army in Italy so long, seem in harmony with such an intention. But of course he is so foolishly obstinate about everything that there may be no meaning behind these moves. Nevertheless the possibilities should be examined."

18 March 1945:

Churchill to FDR: "…Peace with Germany and Japan on our terms will not bring much rest to you and me (if I am still responsible). As I observed last time, when the war of the giants is over the wars of the pygmies will begin. There will be a torn, ragged, and hungry world to help to its feet; and what will Uncle Joe or his successor say to the way we should like to do it?…"

20 March 1945 Molotov to Eden: "…In Berne for two weeks, behind the backs of the Soviet Union, which is bearing the brunt of the war against Germany, negotiations have been going on between the representatives of the German military command (Note: Secret talks code-named ‘Crossword,’ between SS Commander in Italy General Karl Wolff and Allen Dulles) on the one hand and representatives of the English and American commands on the other…"

23 March 1945:

Churchill to Stalin: "I am with Field-Marshal Montgomery at his HQ. He has just ordered the launching of the main battle to force the Rhine on a broad front with Wesel at the center. The operation will be supported by two thousand guns and by the landing of an air-borne corps. It is hoped to pass the river tonight and tomorrow to establish bridgeheads. Once the river has been crossed a very large reserve of armor is ready to exploit the assault…" 24 March 1945 Churchill to Eden "For the moment negotiations (Crossword) have dropped. They may be reopened in a far more vital area than Italy. In this military and political questions will be intertwined. The Russians may have a legitimate fear of our doing a deal in the West to hold them well back in the East. On the whole it will be well to send no reply (to Molotov) till we have checked with Washington, to whom you should repeat the Russian message."

25 March 1945:

Churchill to Eden: "Further reflection convinces me we should send no answer to the insulting letter from Molotov. I presume you have already sent a copy of it to the State Department, pointing out, in no spirit of complaint, that it was they who particularly wished that the Russians should not come to Switzerland and that Alexander should deal with the matter on a purely military basis. I am sure the right thing now is to get absolutely in line with the United States, which should be easy, and meanwhile let Molotov and his master wait. I agree with you that the whole question of the San Francisco Conference hangs in the balance. The sending of Gromyko instead of Molotov is a grimace. I should suppose the President would be much offended by this. We have had a jolly day, having crossed the Rhine. Tomorrow we go to the 15th Scottish Division, on the other side. I should think it not at all unlikely that the whole German front in the West may collapse and be broken up into blobs. There is still hard fighting going on in the North, and the brunt again seems to come from the left-hand hinge, which, as usual, we form."

27 March 1945:

Churchill to FDR: "…As you know, if we fail altogether to get a satisfactory solution on Poland and are in fact defrauded by Russia both Eden and I are pledged to report the fact openly to the House of Commons. There I advised critics of the Yalta settlement to trust Stalin. If I have to make a statement of facts to the House the whole world will draw the deduction that such advise was wrong; all the more so that our failure in Poland will result in a set-up there on the new Rumanian model. I other words, Eastern Europe will be shown to be excluded from the terms of the Declaration on Liberated Europe, and you and we shall be excluded from any jot of influence in that area. Surely we must not be maneuvered into becoming parties to imposing on Poland - and on how much more of Eastern Europe - the Russian version of democracy?…There seems to be only one possible alternative to confessing our total failure. That alternative is to stand by our interpretation of the Yalta agreement….I believe therefore that if the success of San Francisco is not to be gravely imperiled we must both of us now make the strongest possible appeal top Stalin about Poland, and if necessary about a any other derogations from the harmony of the Crimea. Only so shall we have any real chance of getting the World Organization established on lines which will commend themselves to our respective public opinions…"

30 March 1945:

Churchill to Eden: "Have we not told the Russians that the only purpose of the contacts in Switzerland is to arrange a meeting at our military headquarters in Italy, where military questions will be discussed in the presence, if they wish, of a Russian representative, and that if at any moment political affairs are trenched upon the whole matter can be referred to the three Governments? It looks as if the Swiss conversations may go beyond that, if indeed they have not already gone beyond it. We have decided to ignore the insulting telegrams which Molotov has sent. This however does not relieve us of our obligation as Allies on any matter which might involve peace negotiations…"

30 March 1945:

Eisenhower to Churchill: "As soon as the US Ninth and First Armies join hands and enemy encircled in Ruhr area is incapable of further offensive action I propose driving eastward to join hands with Russians or to attain general line of Elbe. Subject to Russian intentions, the axis Kassel-Leipzig is the best for the drive, as it will ensure the overrunning of that important industrial area, into which German Ministries are believed to be moving; it will cut the German forces approximately in half, and it will not involve us in crossing of Elbe. It is designed to divide and destroy the major part of remaining enemy forces in West…"

31 March 1945:

Churchill to Ismay: "…I hope however we shall realize that we have only a quarter of the forces invading Germany, and that the situation has thus changed remarkably from the days of June 1944…It seems to me that the chief criticism of the new Eisenhower plan is that it shifts the axis of the main advance upon Berlin to the direction through Leipzig to Dresden, and thus raises the question of whether the Twenty-first Army Group will not be so stretched as to lose its offensive power, especially after it has been deprived of the Ninth United States Army. Thus we might be condemned to a static role in the north and virtually prevented from crossing the Elbe until an altogether later stage in the operations has been reached. All prospect also of the British entering Berlin with the Americans is ruled out…It also seems that General Eisenhower may be wrong in supposing Berlin to be largely devoid of military and political importance. Even though German Government departments have to a great extent moved to the south, the dominating fact on German minds of the fall of Berlin should not be overlooked. The idea of neglecting Berlin and leaving it to the Russians to take at a later stage does not appear to me to be correct. As long as Berlin holds out and withstands a siege in the ruins, as it may easily do, German resistance will be stimulated. The fall of Berlin might cause nearly all Germans to despair…"

31 March 1945:

Churchill to Eisenhower: "…I do not know why it would be an advantage not to cross the Elbe. If the enemies’ resistance should weaken, as you evidently expect and which may be fulfilled, why should we not cross the Elbe and advance as far east as possible? This has an important political bearing, as the Russian armies of the South seem certain to enter Vienna and overrun Austria. If we deliberately leave Berlin to them, even if it should be in our grasp, the double event may strengthen their conviction, already apparent, that they have done everything…."

1 April 1945:

Churchill to Stalin: "…If our efforts to reach an agreement about Poland are to be doomed to failure I shall be bound to confess the fact to Parliament when they return from Easter recess. No one has pleaded the cause of Russia with more fever or conviction than I have tried to do. I was the first to raise my voice on June 22, 1941. It is more than a year since I proclaimed to a startled world the justice of the Curzon Line for Russia’s western frontier, and this frontier has now been accepted by both the British Parliament and the President of the United States. It is as a sincere friend of Russia that I make my personal appeal to you and to your colleagues to come to a good understanding about Poland with the Western democracies, and not to smite down the hands of comradeship in the future guidance of the world which we now extend." 1 April 1945 Eisenhower to Churchill "…I had never lost sight of the great importance of the drive to the northernmost coast, although your telegram did introduce a new idea respecting the political importance of the early attainment of particular objectives. I clearly see your point in this matter. The only difference between your suggestions and my plan is timing…In order to assure the success of each of my planned efforts, I concentrate first in the Center to gain the position I need. As it looks to me now, the next move thereafter should be to have Montgomery cross the Elbe, reinforced as necessary by American troops, and reach at least a line including Lubeck on the coast. If German resistance from now on should progressively and definitely crumble you can see that there would be little if any difference in time between gaining central position and crossing the Elbe. On the other hand, if resistance tends to stiffen at all I can see that it is vitally necessary that I concentrate for each effort, and do not allow myself to be dispersed by attempting to do all these projects at once. Quite naturally, if at any moment collapse should suddenly come about everywhere along the front we would push forward, and Lubeck and Berlin would be included in our important targets."

2 April 1945:

Churchill to Eisenhower: "…I am however all the more impressed with the importance of entering Berlin, which may well be open to us, by the reply from Moscow to you, which in paragraph 3 says, ‘Berlin has lost its former strategic importance.’ This should be read in the light of what I mentioned of the political aspects. I deem it highly important that we should shake hands with the Russians as far to the east as possible…"

3 April 1945:

Stalin to FDR: "I have received your message on the question of negotiations in Berne. You are absolutely right that, in connection with the affair regarding negotiations of the Anglo-American command with the German command somewhere in Berne or some other place, there ‘has developed an atmosphere of fear and distrust deserving regrets. You insist there have been no negotiations yet. It may be assumed that you have not yet been fully informed. As regards my military colleagues, they, on the basis of data which they have on hand, do not have any doubts that the negotiations have taken place, and that they have ended with an agreement with the Germans, on the basis of which the German commander on the Western Front, Marshal Kesselring, has agreed to open the front and permit the Anglo-American troops to advance to the east, and the Anglo-Americans have promised in return to ease for the Germans the peace terms. I think that my colleagues are close to the truth. Otherwise one could not have understood the fact that the Anglo-Americans have refused to admit to Berne representatives of the Soviet command for participation in the negotiations with the Germans. I also cannot understand the silence of the British, who have allowed you to correspond with me on this unpleasant matter, and they themselves remain silent, although it is known that the initiative in this whole affair with the negotiations in Berne belongs to the British. I understand that there are certain advantages for the Anglo-American troops as a result of these separate negotiations in Berne or some other place, since the Anglo-American troops get the possibility to advance into the heart of Germany almost without resistance on the part of the Germans, but why was it necessary to conceal this from the Russians, and why were your Allies, the Russians, not notified? As a result of this at the present moment the Germans on the Western Front in fact have ceased the war against England and the United States. At the same time the Germans continue the war with Russia, the Ally of England and the United States. It is understandable that such a situation can in no way serve the cause of preservation of the strengthening of trust between our countries…I personally and my colleagues would never have made such a risky step, being aware that a momentary advantage, no matter what it would be, is fading before the principal advantage of the preservation and strengthening of the trust among the Allies."

5 April 1945:

FDR to Stalin: "I have received with astonishment your message of April 3 containing an allegation that arrangements which were made between Field-Marshal Alexander and Kesselring at Berne ‘permitted the Anglo-American troops to advance to the east, and the Anglo-Americans promised in return to ease for the Germans the peace terms.’ In my previous messages to you in regard to the attempts made in Berne to arrange a conference to discuss surrender of the German Army in Italy I have told you that (i) no negotiations were held in Berne; (ii) that the meeting had no political implications whatever; (iii) that in any surrender of the enemy Army in Italy there could be no violation of our agreed policy of unconditional surrender; (iv) that Soviet officers would be welcomed at any meeting that might be arranged to discuss surrender. For the advantage of our common war effort against Germany, which today gives the promise of an early success in a disintegration of the German armies, I must continue to assume that you have the same high confidence in my truthfulness and reliability that I have always had in yours. I have also a full appreciation of the effect your gallant Army has had in making possible a crossing of the Rhine by the forces under General Eisenhower, and the effect that your forces will have hereafter on the eventual collapse of the German resistance to our combined attacks…Our advances on the Western Front are due to military action. Their speed has been attributable mainly to the terrific impact of air-power, resulting in destruction of German communications, and to the fact that Eisenhower was able to cripple the bulk of the German forces on the Western Front while they were still west of the Rhine. I am certain that there were no negotiations in Berne at any time, and I feel that your information to that effect must have come from German sources, which have made persistent efforts to create dissention between us in order to escape in some measure responsibility for their war crimes…Frankly, I cannot avoid a feeling of bitter resentment toward your informers, whoever they are, for such vile misrepresentations of my actions or those of my trusted subordinates."

5 April 1945:

Churchill to FDR: "I an astounded that Stalin should have addressed to you a message so insulting to the honor of the United States and also of Great Britain. His Majesty’s Government cordially associate themselves with your reply…There is little doubt in my mind that the Soviet leaders, whoever they may be, are surprised and disconcerted at the rapid advance of the Allied armies in the West and the almost total defeat of the enemy on our front, especially as they say they are themselves in no position to deliver a decisive attack before the middle of May. All this makes it the more important that we should join hands with the Russian armies as far to the east as possible, and, if circumstances allow, enter Berlin…I deem it of the highest importance that a firm and blunt stand should be made at this juncture by our two countries in order that the air may be cleared and they realize that there is a point beyond which we will not tolerate insult. I believe this is the best chance of saving the future. If they are ever convinced that we are afraid of them and can be bullied into submission, then indeed I should despair of our future relations with them and much else."

6 April 1945:

Churchill to Stalin: "…There is however the possibility that the whole of this request to parley by the German General Wolff was one of those attempts which are made by the enemy with the object of sowing distrust between Allies…it has certainly for the moment been successful…In the interests of Anglo-Russian relations His Majesty’s Government decided not to make any reply to this most wounding and unfounded charge, but to ignore it. This is the reason for what you call in your message to the President ‘the silence of the British.’ We thought it better to keep silent than to respond to such a message…I associate myself and my colleagues with the last sentence of the Presidents reply."

7 April 1945:

Stalin to FDR: "…in the course of our correspondence it has become evident that our views differ on the point as to what is admissible and what is inadmissible as between one ally and another. We Russians think that in the present situation on the fronts, when the enemy is faced with inevitable surrender, if the representatives of any one ally ever meet the Germans to discuss surrender the representatives of another ally should be afforded an opportunity of participating in such a meeting…I still think the Russian point of view to be the only correct one, as it precludes all possibility of mutual suspicions and makes it impossible for the enemy to sow distrust between us. 2. It is difficult to admit that the lack of resistance by the Germans on the Western Front is due solely to the fact that they have been defeated. The Germans have 147 divisions on the Eastern Front. They could without prejudicing their own position detach fifteen or twenty divisions from the Eastern Front and transfer them to reinforce their troops on the Western Front. Yet the Germans have not done and are not doing this. They are continuing to wage a crazy struggle with the Russians for an insignificant railway station like Zemlyanitsa in Czechoslovakia, which is as much use to them as hot poultices to a corpse, and yet they yield without resistance such important towns in the center of Germany as Osnabruck, Mannheim, and Kassel. You will agree that such behavior on the part of the Germans is more than curious and unintelligible. 3. As regards my informants, I can assure you that they are extremely honest and modest people who discharge their duties conscientiously and have no intention of offending anyone…"

7 April 1945:

Stalin to Churchill: "…My messages are personal and strictly confidential. This makes it possible to speak one’s mind clearly and frankly. This is the advantage of confidential communications. If however you are going to regard every frank statement of mine as offensive it will make this kind of communication very difficult. I can assure you that I had no intention of offending anyone…You wonder why the Polish theatre of military operations must be wrapped in mystery. In fact there is no mystery here. You ignore the fact that if British observers or other foreign observers were sent into Poland the Poles would regard this as an insult to their national dignity, bearing in mind the fact moreover that the present attitude of the British Government to the Provisional Polish Government is regarded as unfriendly by the latter. So far as the Soviet Government is concerned, it cannot but take into account the negative attitude of the Provisional Government to the question of sending foreign observers into Poland. Further, you are aware that the Polish Provisional Government puts no obstacles in the way of entrance into Poland by representatives of other States which take up a different attitude towards it, and does not in any way obstruct them. This is the case, for instance, in regard to representatives of the Czechoslovak Government, the Yugoslav Government, and others. I had an agreeable conversation with Mrs. Churchill, who made a great impression on me. She gave me a present from you. Allow me to express my heartfelt thanks for this present."

10 April 1945:

Churchill to FDR

"The plight of the civil population in Occupied Holland is desperate. Between two and three million people are facing starvation. We believe that large numbers are dying daily, and the situation must deteriorate rapidly now that communications between Germany and Holland are virtually cut. I fear we may soon be in the presence of a tragedy…I therefore ask you to join me in giving notice to the German Government through the Swiss Government, as the Protecting Power, to the following effect. It is the responsibility of the German Government to sustain the civilian population in those parts of Holland which remain in German occupation. As they have failed to discharge that responsibility, we are prepared to send food and medical supplies for distribution to the civilian population through the agency of the International Red Cross…In the present circumstances I think that the German Government might well accede to this request. If however they should refuse I propose that we should at this stage warn the German commander in Holland and all the troops under his command that be resisting our attempt to bring relief to the civilian population in this area they brand themselves as murderers before the world, and we shall hold them responsible with their lives for the fate which overtakes the people of Holland. Full publicity would be given to this warning, so as to bring it home to all German troops stationed in Holland. We must avert this tragedy if we can. But, if we cannot, we must make it clear to the world on whose shoulders the responsibility lies…"

12 April 1945:

FDR to Stalin

"Thank you for your frank explanation of the Soviet point of view of the Berne incident, which now appears to have faded into the past without having accomplished any useful purpose. There must not, in any event, be mutual distrust, and minor misunderstandings of this character should not arise in the future. I feel sure that when our armies make contact in Germany and join in a fully coordinated offensive the Nazi armies will disintegrate."

12 April 1945:

FDR to Churchill

"I would minimize the general Soviet problem as much as possible, because these problems, in one form or another, seem to arise every day, and most of them straighten out, as in the case of the Berne meeting. We must be firm however, and our course thus far is correct."

13 April 1945:

Churchill to Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt

"Accept my most profound sympathy in your grievous loss, which is also the loss of the British nation and of the cause of freedom in every land. I feel so deeply for you all. As for myself, I have lost a dear and cherished friendship which was forged in the fire of war. I trust you may find consolation in the magnitude of his work and the glory of his name."

13 April 1945:

Churchill to Truman

"Pray accept from me the expression of my personal sympathy in the loss which you and the American nation have sustained in the death of our illustrious friend. I hope that I may be privileged to renew with you the intimate comradeship in the great cause we all serve that I enjoyed through these terrible years with him. I offer you my respectful good wishes as you step into the breach in the victorious lines of the United Nations."

14 April 1945:

Churchill to Stalin

"I have received your message of April 7. I thank you for its reassuring tone, and trust that the ‘Crossword’ misunderstanding may now be considered at an end. I have been greatly distressed by the death of President Roosevelt, with whom I had in the last five and a half years established close personal ties of friendship. This sad event makes it all the more valuable that you and I are linked together by many pleasant courtesies and memories, even in the midst of all the perils and difficulties that we have surmounted…In the friendship of the masses of our peoples, in the comprehension of their Governments, and in the mutual respect of their armies the future of the world resides."

14 April 1945:

Churchill to Ismay

"I should advise the following line: We consider that before the Anglo-American armies retire from any ground they have gained from the enemy, over and beyond the zones of occupation agreed upon, the political issues operative at that time should be discussed between the heads of Governments, and in particular that the situation should be viewed as a whole and in regard to the relations between the Soviet, American, and British Governments. These Governments will have to make sure that there is in fact a friendly and fair execution of the occupation zones as already agreed between Governments. For these reasons we consider the matter is above the sphere of purely military decision by a commander in the field."

15 April 1945:

Stalin to Churchill

"…In President Roosevelt the Soviet People saw a distinguished statesman and an unswerving champion of close cooperation between the three states. The friendly attitude of President Franklin Roosevelt to the USSR will always be most highly valued and remembered by the Soviet people. So far as I personally am concerned I feel exceptionally deeply the burden of loss of this great man, who was our mutual friend."

15 April 1945:

Eden (Washington) to Churchill

"The Ambassador and I had a talk with Stettinius shortly after my arrival this morning. Stettinius said that both Stalin and Molotov had shown signs of being deeply moved by the Presidents death. Stalin asked Harriman whether there was any contribution he could make at a moment like this to assist to promote the unity of the great Allies. Stettinius said that unfortunately Harriman had not at once replied ‘Poland,’ but instead had suggested that it would be a good thing if Molotov could come to San Francisco for the Conference. Stettinius had seized on this, and telegraphed urging not only that Molotov should come to San Francisco, but also he should come to Washington first for conversations. An hour ago Stettinius rang me up to say that the Russians had agreed to this course and that Molotov was coming by American aircraft which had been sent to bring him. I suppose therefore that he will be here by Tuesday, when I plan that we should embark upon the Polish issue…"

15 April 1945:

Churchill to Truman

"…I have just read the draft joint message which you propose we should send to Stalin. In principle I am in complete agreement with its terms…I strongly agree with you that our reply is of high urgency. Moreover, it is important to strike the note of our unity of outlook and of action at the earliest moment…"

16 April 1945:

Halifax (Washington) to Churchill

"Anthony and I saw Harry Hopkins this morning…He had not been greatly surprised by the Presidents death, and was thankful he had not had a stroke and lost power like Wilson. For some time he had noticed how much the President had failed. He had been able to do only very little work. He judged the President’s death to have created a completely new situation in which we should be starting from scratch. One thing we would be certain of would be that the policy would be very much more the concerted action of the Senate. How this would work it was quite impossible to predict…It may be of interest that Truman’s hobby is history of military strategy, of which he is reported to have read widely…"

16 April 1945:

Eden to Churchill

"Edward and I paid our first call on the President this morning. He made a good impression…My impression from the interview is that the new President is honest and friendly. He is conscious of but not overwhelmed by his new responsibilities. His references to you could not have been warmer. I believe we shall have in him a loyal collaborator, and I am much heartened by this first conversation."

16 April 1945:

Mikolajczryk to Churchill

"1. I consider close and lasting friendship with Russia is the keystone of future Polish policy, within the wider friendship of the United Nations. 2. To remove all doubt as to my attitude, I wish to declare that I accept the Crimea decision in regard to the future of Poland, its sovereign independent position, and the formation of a Provisional Government representative of National Unity. 3. I support the decision arrived at in the Crimea that a conference of leading personalities be called with a view to constituting a Government of National Unity, as widely and fairly representative of the Polish people as possible, and one which will command recognition by the three major Powers."

17 April 1945:

Stalin to Churchill

"Mikolajczryk’s statement represents of course a great step forward, but it is not clear whether Mikolajczryk also accepts that part of the decisions of the Crimea Conference which deals with the eastern frontiers of Poland. I should be glad, first, to receive a full text of Mikolajczryk’s statement, and, secondly, to receive from Mikolajczryk an explanation as to whether he also accepts that part of the decisions of the Crimean Conference on Poland which deals with the eastern frontiers of Poland."

18 April 1945:

Churchill to Truman

"Your armies soon, and presently ours, may come into contact with the Soviet forces…But the moment V.E. Day has occurred we should try to set up the Allied Control Commission in Berlin and should insist upon a fair distribution of the food produced in Germany between all parts of Germany. As it stands at present the Russian occupational zone has the smallest proportion of people and grows by far the largest proportion of food, the Americans have a not very satisfactory proportion of food to conquered population, and we poor British are to take over all the ruined Ruhr and large manufacturing districts, which are, like ourselves, in normal times large importers of food. I suggest that this tiresome question should be settled in Berlin by the Allied Control Commission before we move from the tactical positions we have at present achieved. The Russian idea of taking these immense food supplies out of the producing areas of Germany to feed themselves is very natural, but I contend that the feeding of the German population must be treated as a whole and that the supplies must be divided pro rata between the occupational zones. I should be most grateful if you would let me have your views on these points, which, from the information I receive from many sources, are of the highest consequence and urgency."

19 April 1945:

Churchill to Eden

"This is for your eyes only. It would seem that the Western Allies are not immediately in a position to force their way into Berlin. The Russians have two and a half million troops on the section of the front opposite that city. The Americans have only their spearheads, say twenty-five divisions, which are covering an immense front and are at many points engaged with the Germans…There is no reason why the Russians should occupy Denmark, which is a country to be liberated and to have its sovereignty restored. Our position at Lubeck, if we get it, would be decisive in this matter. Thereafter, but partly concurrent, it is thought well to push on to Linz to meet the Russians there, and also by an American encircling movement to gain the region south of Stuttgart. In this region are the main German installations connected with their atomic research, and we had better get hold of these in the interest of the special secrecy attaching to this topic."

21 April 1945:

Eden (Washington) to Churchill

"I strongly share the view that Montgomery should take Lubeck. A Russian occupation of Denmark would cause us much embarrassment. The fears of Scandinavian countries would be greatly increased, and I seem to remember that one of the causes of dissension between the Russians and the Germans in their honeymoon period in 1940 arose out of certain Russian demands for control of the Kattegat. I am sure that you still have Prague in mind. It might do the Russians much good if the Americans were to occupy the Czech capital, when no doubt they would be willing to invite the Soviet Ambassador to join the United States and ourselves, in contrast to the behavior the Russians have shown to us…"

24 April 1945:

Churchill to Truman

"I thank you for your answer to my telegram. I agree with the preamble, but later paragraphs simply allow the Russians to order us back to the occupational zones at any point they might decide, and not necessarily with regard to the position of the fronts as a whole. It is your troops who would suffer most by this, being pushed back about a hundred and twenty miles in the center and yielding up to the unchecked Russian advance an enormous territory. And this while all questions of our spheres in Vienna or arrangements for triple occupation of Berlin remain unsettled."

24 April 1945:

Churchill to Stalin

"I have seen the message about Poland which the President handed to M. Molotov for transmission to you, and I have consulted the War Cabinet on account of its special importance. It is now my duty to inform you that we are all agreed in associating ourselves with the President in the aforesaid message. I earnestly hope that means will be found to compose these serious difficulties, which if they continue will darken the hour of victory."

25 April 1945:

Churchill to Truman

"You will no doubt have received some hours ago the report from Stockholm by your Ambassador on the Bernadotte-Himmler talks. I called the War Cabinet together at once, and they approved the immediately following telegram, which we are sending to Marshal Stalin and repeating through the usual channels to you. We hope you will find it possible to telegraph to Marshal Stalin and to us in the same sense. As Himmler is evidently speaking for the German State, as much as anybody can, the reply that should be sent him through the Swedish Government is in principle a matter for the triple Powers, since no one of us can enter into separate negotiations. This fact however in no way abrogates General Eisenhower’s or Field-Marshal Alexander’s authority to accept local surrenders as they occur."

25 April 1945:

Churchill to Stalin

"The President of the United States has the news also. There can be no question, as far as His Majesty’s Government is concerned, of anything less than unconditional surrender simultaneously to the three major Powers. We consider Himmler should be told that German forces, either as individuals or in units, should everywhere surrender themselves to the Allied troops or representatives on the spot. Until this happens the attack of the Allies upon them on all sides and in all theaters where resistance continues will be prosecuted with the utmost vigor…"

25 April 1945:

Stalin to Churchill

"…I consider your proposal to present to Himmler a demand for unconditional surrender on all fronts, including the Soviet front, the only correct one. Knowing you, I had no doubt that you would act in this way. I beg you to act in the sense of your proposal, and the Red Army will maintain its pressure on Berlin in the interests of our common cause…"

26 April 1945:

Churchill to Stalin

"This is about ‘Crossword.’ The German envoys, with whom all contact was broken by us some days ago, have now arrived again on the Lake of Lucerne. They claim to have full powers to surrender the Army in Italy. Field-Marshal Alexander is therefore being told that he is free to permit these envoys to come to AFHQ in Italy. This they can easily do by going into France and being picked up by our aircraft from there. Will you please send Russian representatives forthwith to Field-Marshal Alexander’s headquarters. Field-Marshal Alexander is free to accept the unconditional surrender of the considerable enemy army on his front, but all political issues are reserved to the three Governments…"

27 April 1945:

Churchill to Stalin

"I am extremely pleased to know that you had no doubt how I would act, and always will act, towards your glorious country and yourself. British and I am sure American action on this matter will go forward on the lines you approve, and we all three will continually keep each other fully informed."

29 April 1945:

Churchill to Stalin

"I have just received a telegram from Field-Marshal Alexander that after a meeting at which your officers were present the Germans accepted the terms of unconditional surrender presented to them and are sending the material clauses of the instrument of surrender to General von Vietinghoff, with the request to name the date and hour at which conclusion of hostilities can be made effective. It looks therefore as if the entire German forces south of the Alps will almost immediately surrender."

29 April 1945:

Churchill to Stalin

"…We are all shocked that you should think we would favor a Polish Government hostile to the Soviet Union. This is the opposite of our policy. But it was on account of Poland that the British went to war with Germany in 1939. We saw in the Nazi treatment of Poland a symbol of Hitler’s vile and wicked lust of conquest and subjugation, and his invasion of Poland was the spark that fired the mine. The British people do not, as is sometimes thought, go to war for calculation, but for sentiment. They had a feeling which grew up in years that with all Hitler’s encroachments and doctrine he was a danger to our country and to the liberties which we prize in Europe, and when after Munich he broke his word so shamefully about Czechoslovakia even the extremely peace-loving Chamberlain gave our guarantee against Hitler to Poland. When that guarantee was invoked by the German invasion of Poland the whole nation went to war with Hitler, unprepared as we were. There was a flame in the hearts of men like that which swept your people in the noble defense of their country from a treacherous, brutal, and at one time it almost seemed, overwhelming German attack. This British flame burns still among all classes and parties in this Island, and in its self-governing Dominions, and they can never feel this war will have ended rightly unless Poland has a fair deal in the full sense of sovereignty, independence, and freedom, on the basis of friendship with Russia. It was on this that I thought we had agreed at Yalta…There is not much comfort in looking into a future where you and the countries you dominate, plus the Communist Parties in many other States, are all drawn up on one side, and those who rally to the English-speaking nations and their associates, or Dominions on the other. It is quite obvious that their quarrel would tear the world to pieces and that all of us leading men on either side who had anything to do with that would be shamed before history…"

30 April 1945:

An announcement by Doenitz made on the German wireless: Announcer: "It has been reported from the Fuehrer's headquarters that our Fuehrer Adolf Hitler has died this afternoon in his battle headquarters at the Reich Chancellery, fallen for Germany, fighting to the last breath against Bolshevism. On the 30th of April the Fuehrer nominated Grossadmiral Doenitz to be his successor. The Grossadmiral and Fuehrer's successor will speak to the German nation." Doenitz: "German men and women, soldiers of the German Armed Forces. Our Fuehrer Adolf Hitler is dead. The German people bow in deepest sorrow and respect. Early he had recognized the terrible danger of Bolshevism and had dedicated his life to the fight against it. His fight having ended, he died a hero's death in the capital of the German Reich, after having led an unmistakably straight and steady life."

30 April 1945:

Churchill to Truman

"There can be little doubt that the liberation of Prague and as much as possible of the territory of Western Czechoslovakia by your forces might make the whole difference to the post-war situation in Czechoslovakia, and might well influence that in near-by countries. On the other hand, if the Western Allies play no significant part in Czechoslovakian liberation that country will go the way of Yugoslavia. Of course, such a move by Eisenhower must not interfere with his main operations against the Germans, but I think the highly-important political consideration mentioned above should be brought to his attention."

1 May 1945:

Field-Marshal Alexander to Churchill

"Tito’s regular forces are now fighting in Trieste, and have already occupied most of Istria. I am quite certain that he will not withdraw his troops if ordered to do so unless the Russians tell him to. If I am ordered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to occupy the whole of Venezia Giulia by force if necessary, we shall certainly be committed to a fight with the Yugoslav Army, who will have at least the moral backing of the Russians. Before we are committed I think it as well to consider the feelings on our own troops in this matter. They have a profound admiration for Tito’s Partisan Army and a great sympathy for them in their struggle for freedom. We must be very careful therefore before we ask them to turn away from the common enemy to fight an Ally. Of course I should not presume to gauge the reaction of our people at home, whom you know so well."

2 May 1945:

Stalin to Truman

"…The Soviet Supreme Command has given instructions that whenever Soviet troops contact Allied troops the Soviet Command is immediately to get in touch with the Command of the US or British troops, so that they, by agreement between themselves, (1) establish a temporary tactical demarcation line and (2) take steps to crush within the bounds of their temporary demarcation line all resistance by German troops."

4 May 1945:

Churchill to Eden (San Francisco)

"…I fear terrible things have happened during the Russian advance through Germany to the Elbe. The proposed withdrawal of the United States Army to the occupational lines which were arranged with the Russians and Americans in Quebec, and which were marked in yellow on the maps we studied there, would mean the tide of Russian Domination sweeping forward 120 miles on a front of 300 or 400 miles. This would be an event which, if it occurred, would be one of the most melancholy in history. After it was over and the territory occupied by the Russians, Poland would be completely engulfed and buried deep in Russian occupied lands. What would in fact be the Russian frontier would run from the North Cape of Norway, along the Finnish-Swedish frontier, across the Baltic to a point east of Lubeck, along the at present agreed line of occupation and along the frontier between Bavaria to Czechoslovakia to the frontiers of Austria, which is nominally to be in quadruple occupation, and half-way across that country to the Isonzo river, behind which Tito and Russia will claim everything to the east…This constitutes an event in the history of Europe to which there has been no parallel, and which has not been face by the Allies in their long and hazardous struggle. The Russian demands on Germany for reparations alone will be such as to enable her to prolong the occupation almost indefinitely…We have several powerful bargaining counters on our side, the use of which might make for a peaceful agreement. First, the Allies ought not to retreat from their present positions to the occupational line until we are satisfied about Poland, and also about the temporary character if the Russian occupation of Germany, and the conditions to be established in the Russianized or Russian-controlled countries in the Danube valley, particularly Austria and Czechoslovakia, and the Balkans. Secondly, we may be able to please them about the exits from the Black Sea and the Baltic as part of a general settlement. All these matters can only be settled before the United States armies in Europe are weakened. If they are not settled before the United States armies withdraw from Europe and the Western World folds up its war machines there are no prospects of a satisfactory solution and very little of preventing a third World War. It is to this early and speedy showdown with Russia that we must now turn our hopes. Meanwhile I am against weakening our claim against Russia on behalf of Poland in any way. I think it should stand where it was put in the telegrams from the President and me."

5 May 1945:

Stalin to Churchill

"…we cannot be satisfied that persons should be associated with the formation of the future Polish Government who, as you express it, ‘are not fundamentally anti-Soviet,’ or that only those persons should be excluded from participation in this work who are in your opinion ‘extremely unfriendly towards Russia.’ Neither of these criteria can satisfy us. We insist, and shall insist, that there should be brought into consultation on the formation of the future Polish Government only those persons who have actively shown a friendly attitude towards the Soviet Union and who are honestly and sincerely prepared to cooperate with the Soviet State…It appears from your message that you are not prepared to regard the Polish Provisional Government as the foundation of the future Government of National Unity, and that you are not prepared to accord it its rightful position in that Government. I must say frankly that such an attitude excludes the possibility of an agreed solution of the Polish question."

5 May 1945:

Truman to Stalin

"…Since you are well acquainted with the position of the US Government from the messages you have received from President Roosevelt and myself, I need hardly tell you that I agree with the views set forth in Mr. Churchill’s message of April 28 in regard to the reorganization of the Polish Government…I must tell you that any suggestion that the representatives of the present Polish Provisional Government be invited to San Francisco, conditionally or otherwise, is wholly unacceptable to the Government of the United States. For the United States to agree to such an invitation would mean to accept the present Warsaw Provisional Government as representative of Poland. This would be the equivalent to abandoning the agreement reached in the Crimea."

5 May 1945:

Churchill to Eden (San Francisco)

"In the north Eisenhower threw in an American corps with great dexterity to help Montgomery in his advance on Lubeck. He got there with twelve hours to spare. There were reports from the British Navel Attaché at Stockholm, which we are testing, that, according to Swedish information, the Russians have dropped parachutists a few miles south of Copenhagen and that Communist activities have appeared there. It now appears there were only two parachutists. We are sending in a moderate holding force to Copenhagen by air, and the rest of Denmark is rapidly being occupied from henceforth by our fast-moving armored columns. I think therefore, having regard to the joyful feeling of the Danes and the abject submission and would-be partisanship of the surrendered Huns, we shall head our Soviet friend off at this point too. You will by now have heard the news of the tremendous surrender that has been made to Montgomery of all Northwest Germany, Holland, and Denmark, both as regards men and ships. The men alone must be more than a million. Thus in three successive days 2,5000,000 Germans have surrendered to our British commanders. This is quite a satisfactory incident in our military history. Ike has been splendid throughout. We must vie with him for sportsmanship."

6 May 1945:

Churchill to Truman

"It seems to me that matters can hardly be carried further by correspondence, and that as soon as possible there should be a meeting of the three heads of Governments. Meanwhile we should hold firmly to the existing position obtained or being obtained by our armies in Yugoslavia, in Austria, in Czechoslovakia, and on the main central United States front, and on the British front, reaching up to Lubeck, including Denmark. There will be plenty to occupy both armies in collecting the prisoners during the next few days, and we hope that the V.E. celebration will also occupy the public mind at home. Thereafter I feel that we must most earnestly consider our attitude toward the Soviets and show them how much we have to offer or withhold."

7 May 1945:

Stalin to Truman

"I am, in receipt of your message of May 7 about announcing Germany’s surrender. The Supreme Command of the Red Army is not sure that the order of the German High Command on unconditional surrender will be executed by the German armies on the Eastern Front. We fear, therefore, that if the Government of the USSR announces today the surrender of Germany we may find ourselves in an awkward position and mislead the Soviet public. It should be borne in mind that the German resistance on the Eastern Front is not slackening but, judging by intercepted radio messages, a considerable grouping of German troops have explicitly declared their intention to continue the resistance and to disobey Doenitz’s surrender order. For this reason the Command of the Soviet troops would like to wait until the German surrender takes effect and to postpone the Governments announcement of the surrender till May 9, 7 PM Moscow Time."

8 May 1945:

Truman to Stalin

"Now that the Soviet-Anglo-American forces have beaten the armies of the Fascist aggressors into unconditional surrender, I wish to express to you and through you to your heroic armies the fervent congratulations of our people and their Government. We fully appreciate the magnificent contribution made by the mighty Soviet Union to the cause of civilization and liberty. You have demonstrated the ability of a freedom-loving and supremely courageous people to crush the evil forces of barbarism, however powerful. On this occasion of our common victory, we salute the people and armies of the Soviet Union, and their superlative leadership. I will be pleased if you wish to transmit these sentiments to your appropriate commanders in the field."

9 May 1945:

Stalin to Truman

"I thank you with all my heart for your friendly congratulations on the unconditional surrender of Hitler Germany. The peoples of the Soviet Union greatly appreciate the part played by the friendly American people in this liberation war. The joint effort of the Soviet, US, and British Armed Forces against the German invaders, which has culminated in the latter’s complete rout and defeat, will go down in history as a model military alliance between our peoples. On behalf of the Soviet people and Government I beg you to convey my warmest greetings and congratulations on the occasion of this great victory to the American people and the gallant US Armed Forces."

10 May 1945:

Churchill to Field-Marshal Alexander (Italy)

"I have seen the photograph. The man who murdered Mussolini made a confession, published in the Daily Express, gloating over the treacherous and cowardly method of his action. In particular he said he shot Mussolini’s mistress. Was she on the list of war criminals? Had he had any authority from anybody to shoot this woman? It seems to me the cleansing hand of British military power should make inquiries on these points."

2 June 1945:

Allocution of His Holiness Pope Pius XII to the Sacred College

"The struggle against the Church did, in fact, become ever more bitter; there was the dissolution of Catholic organizations; the gradual suppression of the flourishing Catholic schools, both public and private; the enforced weaning of youth from family and Church; the pressure brought to bear on the conscience of citizens, and especially of civil servants; the systematic defamation, by means of a clever, closely organized propaganda, of the Church, the clergy, the faithful, the Church's institutions, teachings, and history; the closing, dissolution, confiscation of religious houses and other ecclesiastical institutions; the complete suppression of the Catholic press and publishing houses. In the meantime the Holy See itself multiplied its representations and protests to governing authorities in Germany, reminding them, in clear and energetic language, of their duty to respect and fulfill the obligations of the natural law itself that were confirmed by the Concordat. In these critical years, joining the alert vigilance of a pastor to the long suffering patience of a father, our great predecessor, Pius XI, fulfilled his mission as Supreme Pontiff with intrepid courage. But when, after he had tried all means of persuasion in vain, he saw himself clearly faced with deliberate violations of a solemn pact,with a religious persecution masked or open but always rigorously organized, he proclaimed to the world on Passion Sunday 1937 in his Encyclical, Mitbrennender Sorge, that National Socialism really was: the arrogant apostasy from Jesus Christ, the denial of His doctrine and of His work of redemption, the cult of violence, the idolatry of race and blood, the overthrow of human liberty and dignity. From the prisons, concentration camps, and fortresses are now pouring out, together with the political prisoners, also the crowds of those, whether clergy or laymen, whose only crime was their fidelity to Christ and to the faith of their fathers or the dauntless fulfillment of their duties as priests. In the forefront, for the number and harshness of the treatment meted out to them, are the Polish priests. From 1940 to 1945, 2,800 Polish ecclesiastics and religious were imprisoned in that camp; among them was the Auxiliary Bishop of Wloclawek, who died there of typhus. In April last there were left only 816, all the others being dead except for two or three transferred to another camp. In the summer of 1942, 480 German-speaking ministers of religion were known to be gathered there; of these, 45 were Protestants, all the others Catholic priests. In spite of the continuous inflow of new internees, especially from dioceses of Bavaria, Rhenania and Westphalia, their number, as a result of the high rate of mortality, at the beginning of this year did not surpass 350. Nor should we pass over in silence those belonging to occupied territories, Holland, Belgium, France (among whom the Bishop of Clermont), Luxembourg, Slovenia, Italy. Many of those priests and laymen endured indescribable sufferings for their faith and for their vocation. In one case the hatred of the impious against Christ reached the point of parodying on the person of an interned priest, with barbed wire, the scourging and the crowning with thorns of our Redeemer."

5 July 1945: Churchill to Dominion Prime Ministers

"In the most rigid secrecy Stalin informed Roosevelt and myself at the Crimea Conference of the Soviet Governments willingness to enter the war against Japan two or three months after Germany’s surrender, on the conditions stated below: (a) Preservation of the status quo in Outer Mongolia. (b) Restoration of the Russian rights lost in the year 1904, viz: (i) Recovery of Southern Sakhalin and the islands adjacent to it. (ii) Internationalization of the port of Dairen, with safeguards for the pre-eminent interests of the USSR and restoration of the lease of Port Arthur as a Soviet navel station. (iii) Joint operation of a Soviet-Chinese company of the Chinese Eastern Railway and the Southern Manchurian Railway, providing an outlet to Dairen, on the understanding that the pre-eminent interests of the USSR will be safeguarded and that China will retain full sovereignty in Manchuria. (c) Acquisition by the USSR of the Kurile Islands…"

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